

# A Note on the Triangular Trade between Macao, Manila, and Nagasaki, 1580–1640

C. R. Boxer

Macao, Manila and Nagasaki, each rose from obscurity in the mid-16th century to a position where they were thriving commercial entrepôts and Roman Catholic missionary-centres some fifty years later. Indeed, Macao and Manila each aspired to the sobriquet of “The Rome of the Orient”, although this title had already been pre-empted by “Golden Goa.”

Spanish Manila was founded in June 1571 on the site of the burnt kampong of a petty local ruler. Governor-General Legazpi inaugurated a colonial capital by appointing a town council (*cabildo*) and several municipal judges (*alcaldes*) for the embryo settlement of some fifty flimsy thatched houses.<sup>1</sup> Nagasaki (*lit.* the “long Cape”) was an unimportant fishing-village in 1571, when it became the terminal port for the annual “Great Ship from Amacon.” The origins of Macao are more obscure; but it was likewise a modest fishing-hamlet named after a Buddhist temple dedicated to the Goddess A-Ma, when the Portuguese erected their matsheds there in 1555–57, gradually replacing them with substantial houses roofed with tiles.<sup>2</sup>

Nagasaki was for some years a virtual fief of the Jesuit mission in Japan, to which had been donated by the local daimyo (Omura clan). Even after the Taiko (Regent) Toyotomi Hideyoshi had brought it under the control of the central government in 1587, the Jesuit presence was still very obvious in 1600–1613, as the pioneer Dutch and English visitors noted.<sup>3</sup>

Both Portuguese and Spaniards combined God and Mammon in their religious and economic relations with the Japanese. But whereas the Portuguese were equally concerned with commercial and evangelical activities, the Spaniards were chiefly concerned with the latter. Japanese silver was the prime objective for the Portuguese, which they obtained in exchange for Chinese silks

<sup>1</sup> Robert R. Reed, *Colonial Manila. The context of Hispanic Urbanism and Process of Morphogenesis* (University of California Press, 1978).

<sup>2</sup> Benjamin Videira Pires, S.J., “Cartas dos Fundadores” and “The Genesis of the Jesuit College at Macao,” two well-documented articles in the *Boletim Eclesiastico da Diocese de Macau*, Numero Especial (Macao, Oct.-Nov. 1964), 729–813; Padre Manuel Teixeira in *Studia*, 41/42 (Lisboa, 1979), pp. 51–111.

<sup>3</sup> C.R. Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon. Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade, 1555–1640* (Lisboa, 1959, 1963), pp. 21–103. Articles by S. Iwao, K. Takase, and E. Kato in *Acta Asiatica, Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture* No. 30, (Tokyo, 1976), pp.1–84.

and other products. The Spaniards at Manila were plentifully supplied with silver from their American empire. They obtained their Chinese silks and textiles directly from the Chinese merchants of Fukien (so-called *Sangleyes*) who were trading with the Philippines before the Spanish occupation. By and large, the Spaniards were more interested in saving Japanese souls than in securing Japanese silver.

Although Spain (strictly speaking, Castile) formed a dual monarchy with Portugal in 1580–1640, the two colonial empires were kept strictly separate in theory (if not always in practice) by the terms of the Cortes of Tomar (1581) which legalized the seizure of the Portuguese Crown by King Philip (II of Castile, I of Portugal). This prudent monarch, who pointed out to his newly acquired and mostly rather reluctant subjects, that he had more Portuguese than Spanish blood in his veins, was always very careful of Portuguese susceptibilities, as his correspondence clearly shows. He was well aware that in the words of a later Spanish chronicler, "*Quanta sea la aversion entre Portuguéses y Castellânos es cosa tan sabida que no necessita testimónios.*"<sup>4</sup>

While both Spaniards and Portuguese prided themselves on their *pundonor* and bellicosity, the latter had quickly learned from experience that this aggressive attitude was counter-productive and quite impractical in China and Japan. The Lusitanians had been warmly welcomed in the Island Empire but barely tolerated in Ming China; in both instances provided they behaved as traders and not as *conquistadores*. The Spaniards at Manila often reproached the Portuguese at Macao for being mere merchants who did not bother with extending the Faith or the Empire, but who were content to lead an easy life and to make easy profits in the Macao-Nagasaki trade. Typical of these captious critics was Hernando de los rios Coronel who in 1621 submitted to the Castilian Crown a *Memorial y Relacion* which roundly denounced Macao and its citizens. He alleged that the place was of no benefit to either of the Iberian Crowns, and that its inhabitants were completely under the thumb of the provincial Chinese officials. It would be better, he argued, if Macao was abandoned, and its Portuguese inhabitants sent to other cities in Portuguese India, "where there is a great want of them . . . for the citizens of Macao do not bother about making converts to Christianity, nor about anything else other than enjoying the good life (*darse al bene vivere*), as the land of China is very fertile and exceedingly cheap."

Moreover, the Portuguese of Macao showed inveterate hostility to any Spaniards who went there, or who tried to trade in China; using every means, including force, to maintain their monopoly of the trade with Canton and Nagasaki. Spanish and Italian critics also complained about Portuguese high living and unbridled sexual immorality at Nagasaki, where even their Negro

<sup>4</sup>Juan Francisco de San Antonio, O.F.M., *Chronicles de la Apostolica Provincia de S. Gregorio de Religiosos Descalzos de N.S.P.S. Francisco En Las Islas Philipinas, China, Japon*, Tomo II (Sampalóc, 1741)p.81.

slaves bought Japanese girls (*shimabara-onna*) as concubines,<sup>5</sup> despite the fulminations of the scandalized Jesuit missionaries.

Needless to say, the Portuguese at Macao indignantly rebutted their Castilian critics. They pointed out that they formed the furthest outpost of the Western world, precariously perched on a tiny peninsula in the South China Sea, continually exposed to the extortions of rapacious Chinese mandarins, and their trade with Japan imperilled by xenophobic officials who were deeply suspicious of Christianity. A representation to the Crown by the Municipal Council of Macao in 1623, stated that the City of the Name of God in China had grown from insignificant beginnings to a populous stronghold and a prosperous entrepôt, without involving the Crown of Portugal or the Viceroy of India in any expense whatsoever. On the contrary, Macao's trade brought substantial benefits to the royal fisc through the taxes levied on its maritime transit cargoes at Malacca and Goa. Such armadas and warships as the Viceroy sent to Macao, were all maintained there, as was the recently-formed garrison and the new gun-foundry, at the expense of the citizens. These latter also expended huge sums in bribing Chinese, Japanese and Indochinese rulers and officials, "in embassies, offerings and gifts which must unavoidably be made for our conservation among so many and such powerful enemies."

Moreover, Macao was the headquarters of the Missions in the Far East, where the Jesuit College in particular functioned as a seminary for missionaries and martyrs, as well as a school for educating the local children. *The Santa Casa da Misericórdia* (Holy House of Mercy) was generously supported by the married citizens (*casados*), who numbered some 400. They spent large sums in "relieving destitute orphans, widows and poor people, as well as maintaining two hospitals, in which there are always many patients including Portuguese and natives of the soil, apart from many honest orphan girls who the citizens bring up in their houses as if they were their own children until they marry and dower them liberally, each girl according to her station in life." Cooperation with Manila in defence matters was also close and continuous; Macao having recently ordered, received, and paid for seven heavy guns from Manila within the space of forty-seven days.<sup>6</sup>

The Macaonese representation of 1623 was quite correct in so far as it went; but as the Spanish Dominican missionary-friar, Diego Aduarte, said of Portuguese Jesuit representations on an earlier occasion, "I do not question what they say, but what they omit." There *was* cooperation with Manila, both in defence and in (contraband) trade, but there was also continual tension and mistrust. This ill-feeling was exacerbated by the affair of the Manila galleon

<sup>5</sup> Memorial y Relacion para SM, del Procurador General de las Filipinas, de los que conviene remediar, y de la Riqueza que hay en ellas, y en las Islas del Maluco, Año de 1621, en Madrid. (British Library, Pressmark:583.D.31),fl.19; Francesco Carletti's stay in Japan (1597) is described in his *Ragionamenti* (Florence, 1701). English translation in Michael Cooper, S.J., *They came to Japan. An Anthology on European Reports on Japan, 1543-1640* (London, 1965), pp. 64-65.

<sup>6</sup> Diogo Caldeira do Rego, "Breve Relação do estado da Cidade do Nome de Deos Reino da China de seu principio até o anno de 1623," published by F.P. Mendes da Luz, *O Conselho da India* (Lisboa, 1952),pp.606-616. The author was secretary of the Macao Municipal Council.

*San Felipe*, which stranded on the coast of Tosa (Shikoku) in October 1596. This incident, which in some ways marks a turning-point in the history of Japan's foreign relations, is too well-known to need retelling here. But it involved the martyrdom of several Spanish Franciscan friars and a number of Japanese Christians at Nagasaki in February of the following year. Several of the Spanish castaways from the *San Felipe* roundly asserted that the Portuguese Jesuits of the Japan mission and the traders from Macao were largely responsible for this tragedy, since they had deliberately kept the Japanese authorities ignorant of the fact that Spain and Portugal had formed a dual monarchy since 1580. Some of the Spaniards even alleged that the Portuguese Jesuits not only declined to intervene on behalf of the Spaniards when they were asked to do so, but went so far as to entertain the Japanese magistrate who had presided over the execution of the friars. The Portuguese and the Jesuits on their side alleged that the Spaniards and the Franciscans had brought this tragedy on themselves through their own rashness and their reckless boasting of Castilian military might—"Los Españoles de Urando avian dicho, que ellos eran gente de guerra, y de conquistadores, y que los Portugueses eran gente de peso y balança y mercadores." The Portuguese also complained that the Spaniards had told the Japanese authorities that "King Philip regarded them as his sons and the Portuguese as his servants."<sup>7</sup> Fr. Juan Pobre, a Spanish Franciscan lay-brother, who was an eyewitness of the martyrdom, and who was subsequently deported to Macao, relates a conversation which he had with an elderly Macao *morador* (householder) which typifies the difference between Portuguese *casados* and Spanish *conquistadores*. This old man, who claimed to be one of the earliest settlers of Macao, told the friar: "We have settled down in this place and married here; we have children and property. And it seems to me that if the Castilians come here, since they are a restless race, they will try to enter the mainland, And if their Religious come and try to convert this kingdom, the Chinese will kill them and deport us. This is why we stand on our guard, and don't allow any Spaniards to come here."<sup>8</sup>

Nor was this old man convinced by Fr. Pobre's argument that if the missionaries were killed in this way, they would be martyrs, and the blood of martyrs is the seed of the Church, "This is true," admitted the Portuguese, "but we don't want to be martyrs, nor even that there should be any in our time, for we would then lose all that we have." Fr. Pobre pointed out that the Portuguese traders of Nagasaki had lost nothing in the recent martyrdom, since the Japanese did not interfere with them, nor with their wives, their children, or their goods. He considered that the Chinese reaction would be the same, carefully distinguishing between merchants and missionaries. In any event, he con-

<sup>7</sup> Dos Informaciones Hechas en Japon: una de la Hazienda que Taycosama, señor de dicho Reyno, mandó tomar de la Nao S.Felipe . . . y otra de la muerte de seis Religiosos Descalços de S.Francisco, y tres de la Compañía de Jesus, y otros diez y siete Japones que el dicho Rey mandó crucificar en la ciudad de Nangasaqui (Madrid, 1599).

<sup>8</sup> For the above and what follows, see my article, "Friar Juan Pobre of Zamora and his lost and found *Ystoria* of 1598-1603 (Lilly MS.BM617), in *The Indiana University Bookman*, Nr.10(Nov.1969), pp.25-46.

cluded, the conversion of souls should take priority over all earthly considerations whatsoever. Missionary enterprises should never be abandoned, whatever obstacles the World, the Flesh, and the Devil might place in their way. The old Portuguese retorted that this was undoubtedly the true ideal, but that it was unfortunately an impracticable one, "since the more roots we put down upon this earth, the less chance we have of ascending to the sky."

Another reason for the tension between Portuguese and Spaniards in the Far East was the Spanish conviction that the majority of the Portuguese at Macao were "New Christians" descended from crypto-Jews. This belief, though much exaggerated, was not entirely lacking in foundation and it was certainly widely shared. Manuel Luís, an "Old Christian" native of Oporto who had settled at Macao c. 1590, said of a certain Rui Pérez that everyone in Macao was convinced that he was crypto-Jew, and one of many such—" . . . chicos y grandes lo tenían por judío y de casta de judíos y decían ¿ Quién, diablos, trajo a este judío? No basta con los que acá están?" Rui Pérez, incidentally, escaped arrest by moving between Macao, Manila, and Nagasaki, one jump ahead of the emissaries of the Inquisition, until they finally caught up with him at Manila on 5 June 1597, seizing him for deportation to Mexico and trial there.<sup>9</sup>

Nearly fifty years later, the English of Captain Weddell's "interloping" fleet, which spent several months in Macao roadstead and the Pearl River estuary in 1637, denigrated the Procurator of the Municipal Council and his colleagues as being "of the tribe of the Rua Nova," an allusion to the main shopping-street of Lisbon, where "New-Christians" predominated.<sup>10</sup> Naturally, the *moradores* of Macao always indignantly denied these aspersions. They claimed unblemished "Old-Christian" descent, which was, of course, an obligatory qualification for membership of the municipal council and of the board of guardians of the Misericórdia. However, "purity of blood" in this remote entrepôt was easily claimed, difficult to disprove, and generally accepted. The wives of the *moradores* were either Asians or Eurasians, in default of white women born in Portugal; but an East Asian ethnic origin was not regarded as a serious racial "impurity", such as a Jewish, or a Black African, was. There was also some intermarriage between Portuguese and Spaniards, and we find prominent Macao *moradores* with Spanish surnames such as Diego Marin, and Fernão Arias de Moraes. However, with few exceptions, membership of the governing board of the Misericórdia was confined for centuries to *Reinões*, Portuguese born in Portugal.

Although the Spanish Habsburg monarchy, in the period 1600–1640 periodically legislated against any commercial trade being carried on between Macao and Manila, they likewise urged that the two strongholds should cooperate against the Dutch, and they authorized mutual trade in munitions of war. Inevitably, this trade in warlike stores could not, in practice, be separated from trade in other commodities, such as silver, silks and textiles. One of the many

<sup>9</sup>Eva Alexandra Uchmany, "Criptojudíos y cristianos nuevos en las Filipinas durante el siglo XVI, "in *The Sephardi and Oriental Jewish Heritage* (publication of the First International Congress on the Sephardi and Oriental Jewry, no place or date given, but c.1980),pp. 85–103.

<sup>10</sup>R.C. Temple (ed.), *The Travels of Peter Mundy, 1608–1667* (Hakluyt Society edition), Vol III, Part I, p.168, London, 1919.

*arbitristas* (lobbyists) who pestered the Iberian Court in 1608–1616 with proposals for combined action against the Dutch in the Far East, was a “New Christian” named Pedro de Baeza (Vaeza). He had considerable personal experience of trade in East Asia and Indonesia; but his very detailed and specific memorials were rejected as impracticable by the royal councillors at Lisbon and Madrid.<sup>11</sup>

Just as Hernando de los Rios Coronel depicted Macao as a Land of Cockaigne for its Portuguese *moradores*, Pedro de Baeza drew a similar picture of Manila. He alleged that the poorest Spanish soldier in the Philippines had an “Indio” (Filipino) to serve him, and many had two or three, each of them satisfied with a little rice and fish for their daily ration. Moreover, they could and did fight alongside their Spanish masters when occasion offered. “No ay soldado español que anda por aquellas partes, que por pobre que sea que no tenga un esclavo Indio que lo sirva, y muchos dos y tres; que como la tierra es tan barata, se sustentan con un poco de arroz y pescado, y en las ocasiones pelean estos esclavos tambien como sus amos; y lo mismo hazen los marñeros . . .”

Another Portuguese “New-Christian” entrepreneur and advocate of cooperation between Macao and Manila was Durate Gomes de Solis (c.1562–c.1630). After a chequered career in Asia as a merchant and pepper-contractor in 1586–1601, he returned to the Iberian peninsula and bombarded the authorities at Lisbon and Madrid with proposals for the establishment of a Portuguese East-India Company, which eventually, if briefly, materialized in 1628–33. He severely criticized the commercial and evangelical rivalry between Portuguese and Spaniards in East Asia; but he took the Portuguese Jesuit line in advocating that Spanish missionary-friars from the Philippines should not be allowed to work in Japan, which should be the exclusive field of the Jesuits. He also argued strongly against “New-Christians” being prohibited from serving in the armed forces, and in the *Senado da Camara* and the *Misericórdia*. He indignantly rebutted the common belief that “New-Christians” were inherently cowardly; claiming that they could fight as well as anybody else if given the chance. He urged that they should be admitted to the Military Orders (Christ, Aviz, and Santiago), and be made eligible for the same official posts, honours and offices, as were “Old Christians”. Last not least, he protested strongly against the habitual Iberian denigration of sailors as the lowest form of the working-classes. He urged that they should be adequately clothed, fed, and treated. They would gain in self-respect and become the equals of the Dutch and the English. Portugal’s maritime empire would then rest on a secure instead of on a rickety foundation.

Gomes de Solis seems to have met with some encouragement from the

<sup>11</sup> Esta relacion y discurso me mandó V.Excelencia que hiziesse. . . . cerca de la grande costa que la armada avia de hazer (Madrid,5.iv.1608); *Este memorial me mandó el Conde de Lemos que hiziesse, que es la resolucion destas materias* (Madrid,3.ii.1609). For these and other memorials of Pedro de Baeza, see Perez Pastor, *Bibliografía Madrileña* (Madrid,1909), Vol,II,pp.121–22,130–33. A *consulta* of the Conselho da India in Lisbon,d 4.xi.1608, rejected these and other proposals as “nãõ inspiram confiança.” (*Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa*, Nr.44 (Lisboa,1971),pp.3–6.130.

Count-Duke of Olivares, who was much more tolerant in his racial attitudes than most Iberian grandees. But his proposals did not find favour with most of the Crown councillors; partly perhaps on account of the prolix, rambling and confused style in which his *Discursos sobre los comercios de las dos Indias* (1622), and *Alegacion en favor de la Compañía de la India Oriental* (1628) were printed and presented. These two works were not written or published for general circulation, but for private and restricted circulation among the Crown councillors at Madrid and Lisbon.<sup>12</sup>

Duarte Gomes de Solis was particularly trenchant on the counter-productive results of the bitter rivalry between Macao and Manila (. . .“en grandissimo odio y enemistad los Portugueses de Macao con los Castellanos de las Filipinas,” *Discursos*, 1622,fl.69). As a loyal Portuguese, he placed the larger share of the blame on the Spaniards. They had breached the Portuguese monopoly of the China-Japan trade, welcoming Chinese traders to Manila, and indirectly forcing the Portuguese to pay more for their Chinese silks. He claimed that Manila’s attitude had enabled the Dutch and the English to establish a profitable trade with Japan, and had encouraged the growth of a Japanese merchant-marine. He urged that the Castilian Crown should strictly forbid Manila to undermine, undercut, or divert the trade of Macao. He thus took a diametrically opposite line to that of Hernando de los Rios Coronel.

In March 1622, a group of Franciscan and Dominican missionary friars in hiding in Japan, wrote to the Crown Councillors at Madrid, deploring the deterioration of the Iberian situation in the Far East. They placed most of the blame on the Portuguese, whom they accused of being undisciplined and unwarlike, far more interested in their own private trade than in “mirar por la honra de España.” The friars urged that the Spaniards should occupy Formosa, whence they could intercept and harass the Dutch trade between Java and Japan; and King Philip should send a powerful armada to reinforce Manila.<sup>13</sup> In point of fact, the Dutch anticipated the Formosan move, by establishing their stronghold of Fort Zeelandia in S.W. Formosa in 1624, after their failure to take Macao and to settle in the Pescadores. The Spaniards belatedly and briefly held two small strongholds at Keeling and Tamsui in Northern Formosa, but were expelled from both by the Dutch in due course. Grandiose plans and concepts were adumbrated at Madrid and Lisbon for Luso-Spanish naval and military cooperation in the China Sea, and reiterated orders were sent to Goa and to Manila to implement them. These orders were usually accompanied by others prohibiting trade between Macao and Manila, which were equally ineffective in the long run.

English jealousy and mistrust of the Dutch after the “Amboyna Massacre” (a

<sup>12</sup>The best study of Duarte Gomes de Solis and his works is by Calvet de Magalhães, “Duarte Gomes de Solis,” in *Studia Revista Quadrimestal*, XIX (Lisboa,1966), pp.119–171. Unfortunately, it is unfinished, the promised continuation never having (so far as I know) appeared. The *Discursos* were reprinted (Lisboa,1943), and the *Alegacion* (Lisboa,1955), by the late Moses Bensabat Amzalak, unfortunately without any textual annotation. Cf.also Léon Bourdon, *Mémoires Inédites de Duarte Gomes Solis, Décembre 1621* (Lisboa,1955).

<sup>13</sup>Apad C.R.Boxer & J.S. Cummins, “The Dominican Mission in Japan, 1602–1622, and Lope de Vega,” pp. 78–81. (*Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, XXXIII,Rome,1963,pp.5–88.

miscarriage of justice rather than a massacre in the meaningful sense of the term), resulted in the Anglo-Portuguese truce (in effect, a peace) concluded by the Viceroy Count of Linhares with William Methwold at Goa in 1635. This enabled the Portuguese to make use of English shipping in sending, for example, some of Bocarro's famous cannon from the foundry at Macao to Goa. One of the richest *moradores* of Macao, a *Minhoto* named Francisco Carvalho Aranha, sent a shipment of expensive silk ecclesiastical vestments, especially made in Canton, to the Church of Santa Cruz in Braga, by the English ship *London*, which brought them safely from Macao to Goa, where they were transhipped to a homeward-bound Portuguese Indiaman. These vestments eventually reached Braga and are still preserved there. Aranha was not so lucky with a previous shipment sent in 1633, which was intercepted and taken by Dutch cruisers off Malacca.<sup>14</sup> The success of the 1635 voyage induced the English to repeat the experiment later, as Weddell's fleet did in 1637, bringing many Portuguese passengers and valuable cargo from Macao and Malacca to Goa. With the outbreak of the English civil war in 1642, the Dutch did not have to be so careful in respecting English neutrality. In 1643 they seized the *Bonne Esperance* when on a similar mission in the Straits of Malacca, which later involved them in an acrimonious dispute with the English Crown which lasted for decades.<sup>15</sup>

The Japanese government had formally severed relations with the Spaniards at Manila in 1624–25, but the Portuguese at Macao were still allowed to come to trade at Nagasaki, albeit under increasing difficulties and restrictions, culminating in their virtual detention on the artificial islet of Deshima in Nagasaki harbour (1635). With the abolition of the Japanese owned "Red-Sea" shipping in 1636, and the prohibition of any Japanese living abroad to return to Japan on pain of death, the Portuguese galliot-trade between Macao and Nagasaki received a new injection of capital from the Japanese merchant-capitalists, who would otherwise have remained active competitors of the Macaonese. The Portuguese were also borrowing on a lavish scale from Chinese brokers and merchants at Canton, in order to secure the silks they needed for the Japan trade. The Macao traders narrowly survived a severe credit-crisis in 1635, when their Japanese creditors threatened to call in their loans. The Macao trade was regarded with increasing suspicion by several of the Rōjū (advisory council of elders) at Yedo, on account of its connection with Christianity; but opinion was divided, and the Macaonese were not without their supporters in influential quarters at Yedo. However, the outbreak of the Shimabara rebellion in 1637–38, which the Japanese authorities wrongly suspected had been inspired, or at

<sup>14</sup> A. Ambrosio de Pina, S.J. "Macau no século XVII. Cartas de Francisco Carvalho Aranha, navegador e comerciante no Oriente," in *Portugal em Africa. Revista de Cultura Missionária*, Vol. XIV, No. 84, (Nov. Dez, 1957), pp. 343–360.

<sup>15</sup> W. Foster (ed.), *The English Factories in India, 1642–1645* Oxford, 1913), pp. xx, 129, 148. An absurdly tendentious and grotesquely exaggerated account of these and other Anglo-Dutch incidents in the East Indies was published as war-propaganda in 1665, under the title of *A True and Compendious Narration of sundry notorious insolencies which the Hollanders have exercised from time to time against the English in the East Indies*, compiled by John Darnell, a former Factor for Courteen's "interloping" East India Company at Goa.

least connived at, by the Portuguese, sounded the end of the Macao-Japan trade. Two galliots which came in 1639, were sent back to Macao without being allowed to trade, and with the threat that if any more came next year they would be burnt with all those on board. An embassy of four leading Macaonese who came to ask for a revision of this sentence in 1640, were in fact executed with most of their suite, thirteen of the humblest members being sent back to Macao with the news.<sup>16</sup>

Meanwhile, a newly appointed envoy from Goa, Diogo de Sousa de Menezes, a fidalgo who had been a *conquistador* in Monomotapa, and who had fought against the Dutch ever since their first appearance in the East-Indies, managed to reach Macao in August, after slipping in and out of Malacca in a small vessel, despite the close Dutch blockade of the fortress, which fell to the assailants on the 14th January 1641. Diogo de Sousa de Menezes had brought news of the dire situation of Malacca and help was sent from Macao, despite the critical straits of the "City of the Name of God in China" with the loss of the Japan trade. These junks were intercepted by the Dutch, but Diogo de Sousa de Menezes, apparently indestructable, reached Bantam via Marcassar in July 1641. At Bantam he lent the substantial sum of 6,000 rials to the English agent, Aaron Baker; but thereafter I can find no trace of him.<sup>17</sup>

The government at Madrid having been informed of Malacca's plight, sent orders to Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera, the capable but controversial Governor-General of the Philippines, to help the besieged fortress, if he could do so without imperilling the Spanish position in the Philippines (16 Feb.1641). By the time these orders reached Manila, Malacca had long since fallen to the Dutch; and Corcuera's own attempt to wean Macao from its allegiance to King John IV and return to that of Philip IV, likewise failed in its objective.<sup>18</sup> But that is another story and one which is well-documented elsewhere.

<sup>16</sup> C.R.Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon* (Lisboa, 1959), pp.158-171,331-333; Benjamin Videira Pires,S.J.,*Embaixada Martir* (Macao, 1965), for full documentation.

<sup>17</sup> Diogo de Sousa de Menezes stated (17.xi.1636) that he had fought the Dutch many times by land and sea during the 41 years that he had served in the State of India (Panduronga Pissurlencar, *Assentos do Conselho do Estado da India*, Vol.II 1634-1643 (Bastorá-Goa,1954),pp.141-42. For his decisive victory over the Monomotapa on the 24 June 1632, and his subsequent mistreatment by the Viceroy at Goa, see Eric Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa,1600-1700* (Johannesburg, 1960), pp.97-98. For his abortive embassy to Japan and his success in evading the tight dutch blockade of Malacca in 1640, see Manuel Teixeira, *A Diocese Portuguesa de Malaca* (Macao, 1957), pp.267-68; C.R.Boxer, "Karl Marx and the last days of Portuguese Malacca, 1640-1641," in *Indica, Organ of the Heras Institute of Indian History and Culture*, Vol.19 (Bombay, 1982), pp. 124-25, and sources there quoted. For Diogo de Sousa de Menezes and the English at Bantam in 1641, see W. Foster (ed.), *The English Factories in India, 1637-1641* (Oxford, 1912)pp.302-03, and the Dutch sources there quoted.

<sup>18</sup> On Corcuera's governorship see Horacio de la Costa, S.J. *The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581-1768* (Harvard University Press, 1961), pp.377-403. For the abortive expedition to Macao, see José de Jesus Maria, O.F.M. *Azia Sineca e Japonica* (ed.C.R.Boxer, Macao, 1958), Vol.II,pp.13-16, and the sources there quoted. For the *Real Cédula*, Madrid,16.ii.1641, ordering Corcuera to help Malacca if possible, see Pablo Pastells,S.J. *Catalogo de los documentos relativos a las Islas Filipinas*, VIII, 1636-1644 (1933),p.164.