

CHAPTER 7

RELATIONS WITH MARITIME EUROPEANS, 1514–1662

THE TRIBUTE SYSTEM MATRIX

Between 1514 and 1662, the people and government of China were involved in, and affected by, the first stages of the development of a “modern world system.” This involvement was implemented via the sea routes linking all the continents except Antarctica and Australia in exchanges of trade goods, food plants, diseases, people, and ideas. Ming official concepts and formalized institutions of foreign relations offered little guidance to Chinese officials and had little effect on Sino-European relations after the first encounters with the Portuguese, but actual official responses were alert, flexible, and reasonably effective. Chinese merchants, craftsmen, and sailors became extremely vigorous participants in building a new world of trade and settlement around the South China Sea. The rise of Nagasaki and other ports of Kyushu, the beginnings of Chinese settlement of Taiwan, the sudden emergence of Hai-ch’eng and then Amoy, the flourishing of Macao, Manila, Banten, Batavia, Ayudhya, Melaka, and many more centers of commercial and economic growth depended very heavily on the activities of these Chinese entrepreneurs. The silk-silver trades with Japan and Manila had substantial effects on the Ming economy. The Roman Catholic missionary presence and Chinese responses to it, while on a small scale, reached all levels of Chinese society. As we seek to understand the vigor of these private involvements, we need to draw on our growing knowledge of late Ming culture and society, and especially of maritime China as a regional variant in society, economy, and polity. The changes in empire-wide politics so well summarized in Volume 7 frequently help us to understand the changes in official approaches to maritime problems.

Certain long-standing characteristics of the Chinese approach to foreign relations were maintained in the Ming tributary system. These were defensiveness, a concentration on the ceremonial supremacy of the emperor, unilateral bureaucratic regulation, and the limitation of foreign contacts. The Ming tribute system brought these characteristics together in a uniquely systematized and bureaucratized form. I have argued elsewhere that it would

help to clarify our thinking if we would reserve the term “tribute system” for this Ming system and not use it loosely to refer to the less systematic and more varied diplomatic practices of other times.¹ Be that as it may, it is clear that a very important determinant of early Ming policies toward maritime foreign relations was the court’s reaction to the menace of the “Japanese pirates,” many of whom were actually Chinese. Private maritime trade by Chinese was entirely prohibited, and foreign trade in Chinese ports was limited to trade in connection with tribute embassies, the size and frequency of which also were regulated. The Cheng Ho voyages are best seen as an anomalous state-directed revival within the framework of the tribute system of Sung-Yüan positive attitudes toward maritime trade; the end of these official expeditions and the prohibition of private Chinese voyages left a sharply reduced Chinese maritime presence in Southeast Asia. In this semi-vacuum, the India-centered Muslim network of maritime trade flourished, and various Southeast Asian states, mostly Muslim, expanded their trade to China in connection with tribute embassies. The Ryukyans also profited from the prohibition of Chinese maritime trade and from the drastic limits on Japanese embassies to China, becoming important intermediaries between China and Japan, and trading as far as Melaka. The Chinese never ceased to trade and settle abroad illegally and sometimes cooperated with Southeast Asian princes, especially the Kings of Siam, in the management of their tribute embassies.²

By 1500, the expansion of Chinese illegal maritime trade had produced a flourishing outlaw entrepôt at Yüeh-kang near Chang-chou in Fukien. In the Cheng-te period, ships from Southeast Asian tributary states were allowed to come as frequently as they wished, without regard for the limitations of time and number specified in the regulations of the tribute system, and their trade was taxed. The Superintendencies of Maritime Shipping (*shih-po-ssu*) were directed by eunuchs, who were especially interested in obtaining rare imports for the Palace. The Kwangtung Superintendency had a tax-collection station at the distant coastal point of Tien-pai in Kao-chou to accommodate this trade,³ and apparently had a station later at T’un-men in the Canton Estuary, the scene of the first encounters with the Portuguese, or at Macao itself.

1 John E. Wills, Jr., “Tribute, defensiveness, and dependency: Uses and limits of some basic ideas about Mid-Ch’ing foreign relations,” *Annals of the Southeast Conference of the Association for Asian Studies*, 8 (1986), pp. 84–90; rpt. in *American Neptune*, 48, No. 4 (Fall, 1988), pp. 225–29. For a sketch of the history of the Ming tribute system see Wills, *Embassies and illusions: Dutch and Portuguese envoys to K’ang-hsi, 1666–1687* (Cambridge, MA, 1984), pp. 14–23.

2 See *MS*, 28, p. 8,400 on one Hsieh Wen-pin, who became a high official in Siam, led a Siamese tribute embassy in 1481, and was caught trading in prohibited goods.

3 Chang Wei-hua, *Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi, Lü-sung, Ho-lan, I-ta-li-ya ssu-chuan chw-shih* (Peiping, 1934), p. 52. All my citations of the four *chüan* of the *Ming-shih* on relations with Europeans will refer to this heavily annotated edition. For relations with the Portuguese see also Chou Ching-lien, *Chung-P’u chiao-t’ung shih* (Shanghai, 1936).

This Southeast Asian trade, officially approved, but in violation of the basic rules of the tribute system, provided the matrix for the flourishing trade between Siam and Melaka and South China, within which matrix the Portuguese began their relations with China.

THE PORTUGUESE ENTRY, 1514–1524

Vasco da Gama's voyage around the Cape of Good Hope, and the arrival of his ships at Calicut on the west coast of India in 1498, opened a new phase in the history of Asia and, in conjunction with the Columbus voyages to the Americas in the same decade, of the world. The effects of the European intrusion into the Indian Ocean were by no means as catastrophic as the effects of the Spanish on the Caribbean, and on Mexico and Peru; until the age of steam Asian maritime traders remained effective competitors of the Europeans on most routes, and in most goods, and European political power was confined to small islands and coastal enclaves until the Dutch advances in Java from the 1670s on, and until the rise of English power in India after 1750. Still, the Portuguese and their successors could be very disruptive. The very prosperous and sophisticated network of Muslim maritime trade linking the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf with India and Southeast Asia was not well adapted, either in ship construction or in organization, to resist or engage in the combination of piracy, superior naval gunnery, and aggressive efforts to monopolize lines of trade which the Portuguese brought with them from the Mediterranean world. The Portuguese seriously disrupted the trade of their Muslim rivals until after 1550, when they became more interested in their own inter-Asian trade and more accommodative toward their Muslim competitors. This pattern was mirrored in their relations with China, where early aggressiveness led to disaster, but where commercial accommodation after 1550 was a brilliant success.

At Calicut, on the southwest coast of India, Vasco da Gama heard stories of pale, bearded men on big ships who had sailed along that coast several generations before; the Portuguese did not realize that these were allusions to the great fleets of Cheng Ho.⁴ If the Ming state had not abandoned its great maritime venture, the Portuguese would have found it much more difficult to get a foothold on the coast of India, and probably could have accomplished nothing in Melaka, Sumatra, and Siam.

⁴ Donald Ferguson, "Letters from Portuguese Captives in Canton, written in 1534 and 1536. With an introduction on Portuguese intercourse with China in the first half of the sixteenth century," *Indian Antiquary*, 30 (1901), pp. 421–51, 467–91, at p. 421.

Melaka became the key to the Portuguese advance toward China. The first Portuguese expedition there was instructed to find out as much as possible about the “Chijns” and their trade. Chinese merchants trading at Melaka, somewhat at odds with the local rulers, befriended the Portuguese in 1509, and, in 1511, when Albuquerque conquered Melaka, the Chinese merchants loaned his invasion force a large junk which he used in a key landing that led directly to the final rout of the Melakan forces.⁵ The Chinese merchants sought to remain on good terms with the new conquerors, transporting a Portuguese ambassador to and from Siam on their junks. We have only shadowy knowledge of the first two visits to China under Portuguese auspices by Jorge Alvares in 1514, and by the Italian, Rafael Perestrello, in 1515–16. Perestrello went on the junk of a Melaka merchant, and it is likely that Alvares also took advantage of Melakan or Chinese shipping. Both traded at T’unmen in the Canton Estuary and brought back highly profitable cargoes.

The scope of the Portuguese effort altered dramatically with the arrival in the Canton Estuary in August 1517 of eight ships under Fernão Peres de Andrade, bearing Tomé Pires as ambassador from the King of Portugal to the Ming Court. Peres de Andrade had been sent from Lisbon in 1515 expressly for this mission, along with the Florentine merchant Giovanni da Empoli, who already had been in India and had written an excellent summary of the potentialities of the China trade. The choice of Pires as ambassador was a brilliant, unconventional one: in a society where noble blood was usually a prerequisite for important office, he was a bourgeois pharmacist, recently charged with investigating and collecting Asian drugs to send home to King Manuel. He was the best European collector of information on Asia in his time; his *Suma Oriental* is the most important single source, in any language, on the trade of maritime Asia at the beginning of the Portuguese intrusion. His progress toward China was delayed in the Straits of Melaka by the loss of a ship and by a discussion of an alternative venture to Bengal, but his progress was then accelerated by the glowing report on the China trade brought by Rafael Perestrello to Melaka in 1516.

Upon his arrival in the Canton Estuary in August 1517, Peres de Andrade, with Empoli serving as factor (commercial agent) and frequent intermediary with the Chinese authorities, made every effort to establish good relations with them. He was reasonably successful, but in the process provided first instances of several sources of trouble which would prove perennial in pre-modern Sino-European relations. European impatience and assumptions of reciprocity in foreign relations encountered Chinese bureaucratic delays and

⁵ Ferguson, “Letters,” p. 422.

the Chinese Government's unilateral approach to the management of foreign relations. The Europeans also evidenced an unfortunate tendency to reject Chinese explanations of their decisions and to interpret these explanations as a result of the corrupt self-interest of the officials.⁶ Dealing at first with the naval commander at Nan-t'ou near the mouth of the Pearl River, Peres de Andrade sought permission for over a month to take his ships up the river to Canton. When he threatened to go without written permission, the naval commander gave way and passed his troublesome guest on to the Canton authorities, giving him pilots to assist him. Arriving before the city without written permission, the Portuguese caused more alarm and indignation by discharging their cannon in a friendly salute. Their explanation that the Chinese merchants did the same thing when they arrived at Melaka, and their declaration that, in taking Melaka, they had avenged the local ruler's tyrannies against the Chinese, could only have added to Ming official concerns, because Chinese overseas trade had been expressly prohibited by the government, and because the deposed King of Melaka had been a loyal Ming tributary. The ships were closely watched, the Portuguese were not allowed ashore, and no one was allowed to approach them. After the high provincial officials arrived at Canton to deal with the strangers, however, the Portuguese were received ashore with considerable pomp, and lodgings were provided for Tomé Pires and the seven Portuguese (and probably some slaves) who were to accompany him on the embassy. Trade goods were brought ashore bit by bit, and the Portuguese were very favorably impressed with the orderly management of trade. One ship was detached to reconnoiter trade prospects on the Fukien coast. Prospects were excellent, but reports to the court of this voyage stirred Chinese fears of spying. Peres de Andrade missed the 1517–18 north monsoon, but left in September 1518 at the very beginning of the next north monsoon, having made a very good impression (a Portuguese chronicler tells us) by posting a notice at T'un-men that anyone who had been injured by a Portuguese or to whom a Portuguese owed money should see him for redress.

In August 1519, Simão de Andrade, brother of Fernão Peres de Andrade, arrived from Melaka with three junks, and soon destroyed the fragile accommodation Fernão had worked so hard to build. At T'un-men, the island center for the trade of all foreigners, he built a small fort, ceremoniously executed a

6 The main Portuguese sources for this account of the Tomé Pires embassy are the passages on it in João de Barros and Diogo de Couto, *Da Asia* (Lisbon, 1777–78; rpt., Lisbon, 1973–1975), III:I:I; III:II:VI, VII, VIII; III:VI:I,II; III:VIII:V. (The Roman numerals refer to *Decadas*, *Livros*, and *Capitulos*, respectively; individual notes below referring to passages not easily found in this chronological sequence also give page numbers of the above reprint.) On the attributing of all delays to private interests of the officials see III:II:VIII, p. 209.

Portuguese, and barred the other foreigners (presumably Siamese and other Southeast Asians) from trading ahead of him. He and his men knocked the hat off an official who tried to assert Ming authority on the island. They bought Chinese children, some of whom, sons and daughters of good families, were found several years later by the Portuguese authorities at Diu in western India.⁷ The buying and selling of children was scarcely unknown in Ming China, but the large new demand of the Portuguese may have stimulated kidnappings from good families, and also contributed to the stories that soon were circulating of how the Portuguese were buying the children to cook and eat. Simão and his party stayed over the winter and left in September 1520; there is no record of local action to stop or punish their abuses, but reports soon must have been on their way by various channels to Peking, where their impact would combine with other factors to doom the Pires embassy and relegate Portuguese relations with China to an outer margin of illegal private trade for over thirty years.

The embassy party left behind in Canton in 1518 proceeded north only in January 1520. By that time, Portuguese sources tell us, there had been three exchanges of communications about the embassy between Canton and Peking. In contrast to the willingness of Ch'ing rulers and ministers to accept new tributaries and to celebrate them as evidence of the far-reaching charisma of the dynasty, many Ming statesmen seem to have believed that no embassy should be accepted from a ruler who had not been enrolled among the tributary states during the first reigns of the dynasty.⁸ This viewpoint did not immediately prevail during these last years of the Cheng-te Emperor, because of the eunuchs' interest in the exploitation of commerce and the emperor's fascination with all kinds of exotic people. The embassy reached Nanking, where the emperor was residing, in May of 1520, but soon was ordered to go on to Peking and await the emperor's return there. Portuguese sources tell us that, while members of the embassy were waiting in Peking, they had to go on the first and fifteenth of every lunar month to prostrate themselves before a wall of the Forbidden City; I know of no Chinese source on such a ceremony.⁹ They heard of the emperor's arrival at T'ung-chou in January 1521 and the execution there of the captured rebel Prince of Ning. They knew that ambassadors had arrived from the exiled king of Melaka to report on the Portuguese conquest and to ask Chinese assistance in driving out the invaders and restoring the city to its rightful lord. They knew of memorials by two censorial officials, Ch'iu Tao-lung and Ho Ao, condemning the Portu-

7 Barros and Couto, *Da Asia*, III:VI:II, p. 17.

8 Chang Wei-hua, *Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi*, pp. 9, 32.

9 Ferguson, "Letters", p. 467.

guese conquest of Melaka and urging that the embassy be rejected, and a further memorial from the Canton officials reporting that the Portuguese were troublesome people and were asking to be granted a trading post. They were told that after these negative reports about the Portuguese had been received in the capital, the interpreters were summoned and questioned one by one, and at least one of them confessed that the interpreters had not actually seen the letter from the king of Portugal, since the Portuguese had expected to deliver it sealed into the Emperor's hands, but had made up an appropriate "tribute memorial" text. There is no mention of this in Chinese sources.¹⁰

Although the Portuguese no longer were summoned to the twice-monthly ceremonies outside the Palace, there was no conclusive rejection of the embassy until after the death of the emperor on 19 April, 1521. Mourning for the emperor apparently required the temporary suspension of all ceremonial and other dealings with foreigners. In the changed political atmosphere, with the temporary ascendancy of the Grand Secretary Yang T'ing-ho, and the general turn against eunuch influence, a decision to reject the embassy and forbid all relations with the Portuguese, already probable before the emperor's death, was a foregone conclusion. The embassy was hurried out of Peking by the Chinese the day after the emperor died, and arrived in Canton in September.

In April or May 1521, about five Portuguese ships and junks arrived at T'un-men and began trading. When news of the emperor's death arrived, all foreigners were ordered to leave the country at once. The Portuguese refused, since they had not finished assembling their export cargoes. The Chinese assembled a substantial squadron and attacked both the Portuguese and some junks from Siam and Patani that had Portuguese aboard. One ship was sunk, and many Portuguese and other foreigners were killed or taken prisoner. When two more Portuguese junks arrived in June, the Chinese attacked again but were beaten off. A lull then followed, but, in September, three Portuguese ships barely managed to beat off another attack and get away. Thus, by the time the Tomé Pires embassy arrived back in Canton on 22 September, 1521, these sea battles had reinforced the determination of the Ming authorities to exclude the Portuguese. The Chinese isolated the embassy party from the prisoners taken in the sea fights. The authorities made inventories, the Portuguese thought very dishonestly,¹¹ of the embassy's presents and of the trade goods taken from the captured ships.

10 There is a hint of this in the reference to close questioning of the interpreters in Peking; Barros and Couto, *Da Asia*, III.VI.I, p. 8.

11 Ferguson, "Letters," p. 469.

The final chapter of this story was the arrival at T'un-men, in August 1522, of three ships under Martim Affonso de Mello Coutinho, who had a royal commission to conclude peace with China, and enough men to garrison a fort he hoped to establish, presumably with Chinese consent. The commanders of these ships knew nothing of the breakdown of relations, and lost two of their ships in an unexpected Chinese attack. The survivors managed to get away on the third ship after only fourteen days in Chinese waters. The prisoners taken in the sea fights were treated very harshly, put in cangues, and executed after the autumn assizes of 1523. Tomé Pires was forced to write letters to the King of Portugal, Viceroy of Portuguese India, and Governor of Melaka conveying the emperor's command that Melaka be returned to its rightful sovereign. He and his party were held hostage, to be released only when the Ming authorities were informed that the Portuguese had returned Melaka to its legitimate ruler. Pires died in 1524. Two of his party were still alive in 1534–36, sending letters to Melaka and Goa full of good information and of wild plans for the conquest of Canton.¹² The Ming authorities mustered fleets every year until 1528 to guard against the return of the Portuguese. The taxed, nontribute trade that had flourished in the Cheng-te reign was prohibited in Kwangtung to all foreigners, and Southeast Asian trade shifted to illegal entrepôts in the Chang-chou area of Fukien, to the great detriment of Kwangtung's revenues and commercial economy. Even after Kwangtung's taxed nontributary trade was re-opened in 1530, the Portuguese were completely excluded.

These episodes had attracted a good deal of attention in the Canton area, and set there a tone of fear and contempt toward the Portuguese that persisted throughout the flourishing of Macao. To judge by surviving Chinese sources, the Portuguese left only fragmentary and ambiguous impressions among the court and the high bureaucratic elite. Their cannon and ships, however, were appreciated: one ship was built in Portuguese style in the Canton Estuary, and one official, Wang Hung, made a name for himself promoting the copying and use of Portuguese-style cannon as far away as the Great Wall forts. The Portuguese were known in the records of this time as Fo-lang-chi, after the Indian-Southeast Asian term "ferengi", a term which referred to any Latin Christian and which ultimately derived from the Franks of the Crusades. Because the word "Chi" also meant "device", the same characters were used to denote the cannon, and soon, some were confused as to whether the Fo-lang-chi were guns or people. In the *Ming-shih* account of the Portu-

12 Armando Cortesão, in his introduction to the *Suma Oriental* of Tomé Pires (London, 1944), pp. xlvii–xlvi, argues that these letters were written in 1524. See, however, Ferguson, "Letters", p. 478 for a clear reference in one of these letters to the maintenance of defense fleets along the coast until 1528.

guesse and in a few of its sources, one of the foreign hangers-on in the emperor's corrupt entourage, Huo-che-ya-san, appears as the Portuguese ambassador or interpreter; this probably is a confusion involving someone from Hami or Turfan, but may reflect some kind of intrigue involving a Melakan Chinese interpreter, possibly even the renegade who told all about the bogus "tribute memorial."¹³

FROM LIAMPO TO MACAO, 1530–1572

The débâcle of the 1520s thrust the Portuguese back into the margins of Southeast Asian trade with China, so that they traveled as individuals on Southeast Asian shipping and eventually sent their own ships to the ports where the Melakans, Siamese, and others traded. There are stray references in the 1530s to royal or viceregal grants of voyages to China, and the first Portuguese ship to reach Japan, in 1542, was blown there on a voyage to "Liampo", presumably the Shuang-yü trading center on Lien-kang Island in the Chou-shan Archipelago on the Chekiang coast. In the 1540s this area became a flourishing center for illegal or semi-legal trade between China and Japan, and between China and Southeast Asia. Portuguese also were involved in the illicit trade centered on Yueh-kang harbor in the Chang-chou estuary of Fukien, the "Chincheo" of the European sources, and on the nearby island of Wu-yü. This illicit trade was, in a way, a revival of the marginally legal trade carried out on the Kwangtung coastal islands during the Cheng-te period, and it similarly served to quarantine dangerous foreigners far away from the major cities. But because these trading centers had no legal sanction and no official presence, they were even more prone to violence and more vulnerable to government hostility than the earlier centers had been.

In the rise and fall of these centers the Portuguese were not so much independent actors as they were marginal participants in a Sino-Japanese process.¹⁴ Reports of illegal trade, and of the piracy that sometimes accompanied it, finally led in July 1547 to the appointment of Chu Wan as a special Grand Coordinator with wide authority to stamp out smuggling and lawlessness on the Chekiang and Fukien coasts. In November 1547, Chu already was investigating the situation in the Chang-chou area and recommending measures to improve defenses and to control the activities of the coastal Chinese.¹⁵ In April 1548, he was in Hangchow coping with the irregu-

13 Paul Pelliot, "Le Hoja et le Sayyid Husain de l'Histoire des Ming," *T'oung Pao*, 38 (1948), pp. 81–292.

14 For an excellent summary and full citations of sources, see Jurgis Elisonas, "The inseparable trinity: Japan's relations with China and Korea." In *Early Modern Japan*, Vol. 4, ed. John Whitney Hall and assistant ed. James McLain, *The Cambridge History of Japan* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 235–300.

15 DMB, pp. 373–75; *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 7, pp. 494–95.

larities of the Japanese embassy under Sakugen Shuryō and assembling forces for an all-out assault on Shuang-yü. From April to June of that year the Shuang-yü area was occupied and devastated. Chinese sources report only a few hundred casualties, and there is no reliable record of any Portuguese casualties; clearly many Chinese and foreign ships and traders had managed to get away. It was very convenient for the denizens of Shuang-yü that this attack came just at the beginning of the south monsoon, the season for departures of trading ships to Japan. Given the conspicuous preparations for an attack on their island bases, it cannot have been too difficult for the outlaw traders to assemble export cargoes and get their ships and people out of harm's way.

Chu Wan already had been in Fukien in 1547 and had ordered measures to cut off illegal trade there. He returned there in the summer of 1548, undeterred by rising opposition to his policies and a reduction of his authority in August. The Portuguese trading on the Fukien coast that summer at first found their trade almost entirely cut off, but later were able to bribe some of the coastal commanders and obtain their export cargoes. Lin Hsi-yüan, a former high official now deeply involved in maritime trade, apparently had abetted their trade by various maneuvers to delay enforcement of Chu's rigid orders and by arguing that the Portuguese had traded peacefully for the previous five years and had even helped the authorities attack a pirate.¹⁶ Early in 1549, Portuguese traders, probably coming from Japan, found it impossible to trade, and left their goods in the hands of Chinese agents. In February or March, one or two junks were lured to the shore and attacked at Tsou-ma-ch'i in Chao-an near the Fukien-Kwangtung border. Several hundred were killed on the spot or died soon afterwards; ninety-six prisoners were taken to Ch'üan-chou, where Chu Wan ordered the Chinese among them executed. Four Portuguese prisoners were labelled as kings or princes of Melaka. Chu's executions on his own authority, especially those not at the scene of the battle, were just what his enemies needed to secure his downfall; he was dismissed and imprisoned, and apparently committed suicide. The fraud of the "Melakan nobles" was uncovered, leaving the Portuguese very much impressed with the thoroughness and impartiality of Chinese justice. The Portuguese spent several years in exile in various parts of China, and some eventually joined the Portuguese who were trading on the Kwangtung coast.¹⁷

The downfall of Chu Wan was followed by years of upheaval and anti-pirate campaigns on the coasts of Chiangnan, Chekiang, and Fukien. Looking

¹⁶ Chang Wei-hua, *Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi*, pp. 43–47.

¹⁷ Charles R. Boxer, ed. and trans., *South China in the sixteenth century, being the Narratives of Galeote Pereira, Fr. Gaspar da Cruz, O.P., Fr. Martin de Rada, OESA* (London, 1953), pp. xxvi–xxxvii, 190–211.

for peaceful trade, the Portuguese turned again to the coast of Kwangtung. Everywhere along the Chinese coast, old restrictions were shattered, and military men, sometimes in alliance with elements of the local elite, were very influential. This was the changed situation in which the Portuguese partially overcame the legacy of their first rupture in the 1520s and worked out an astonishingly useful and durable accommodation of Chinese and Portuguese interests – Macao. Several early sources say that the officials allowed the Portuguese to settle at Macao in 1557.¹⁸ By the 1620s, the Portuguese of Macao had built up an elaborate story of the extermination, by the Portuguese, in 1557, of a large force of pirates that had occupied Macao, and of the consequent cession of Macao, by the Emperor, to Portuguese sovereignty, confirmed by a “golden chop” preserved in the Macao city hall. However, the Macao authorities repeatedly acknowledged that the Chinese state retained ultimate sovereignty over Macao, and we will see that some elements of this foundation myth probably are reflections of well-documented events in 1564–65. Still better documented is the first phase of the acceptance of the Portuguese, which occurred before 1557.

Portuguese private trade on islands off the Kwangtung coast probably had begun immediately after the débâcles in Chekiang and Fukien in 1548 and 1549. The first initiative toward a more formal presence was taken by the Viceroy at Goa in 1552, with the dispatch, at the suggestion of Saint Francis Xavier, of one Diogo Pereira as ambassador to China. The Portuguese governor at Melaka did not allow Pereira to proceed beyond that point, perhaps out of fear that he might intrude on the dominance of Melaka merchants in Portuguese trade with Japan and China. Xavier, who had accompanied Pereira and had hoped to gain entrance to China in connection with the embassy, went on without it and died on Shang-ch’uan island off the Kwangtung coast a few months later.

A much more successful initiative was taken by a private Portuguese merchant named Leonel de Sousa, who also arrived on the Kwangtung coast in 1552. His own letter of 1556 is our main source of information about this episode and one of the most important documents in the history of Sino-Portuguese relations.¹⁹ Sousa’s success was a result of his own recognition, consonant with his own preoccupation with trade and his distance from the absurd bellicosity of the first generations of Portuguese in Asia, that profitable

18 One of the earliest surviving references to this date is that of Mendes Pinto; Fernão Mendes Pinto, *The travels of Mendes Pinto*, ed. and trans. Rebecca D. Catz (Chicago and London, 1989), p. 508.

19 This letter first was published in 1910 by Jordão de Freitas. See Freitas, *Macao: Materiais para a Sua História no Século XVI* (originally published in *Arquivo Historico Portuguez*, Vol. VIII, Lisbon, 1910; rpt., Macau, 1988), pp. 8–14. See also the excellent general account of this period in J. M. Braga, *The Western pioneers and their discovery of Macao* (Macao, 1949).

trade with China would require accommodation with Chinese interests and authorities, especially in view of the violent reputation the Portuguese had acquired in the past. He was very lucky to find a counterpart equally distant from past Chinese preoccupations who was ready to work out a local accommodation. This person was “the haitao,” the vice-commissioner for the maritime defense circuit, Wang Po, who is identified in Chinese sources as having accepted bribes from the Portuguese, as having allowed them to land their goods “to dry them out,” and as having allowed them to pay taxes and to trade at Canton. In 1552, Sousa learned that all foreigners were being allowed by the Chinese to trade upon payment of duties “except the Farangi, who were people with filthy hearts . . . whom they took for pirates.”²⁰ He urged the other Portuguese trading in the area to keep the peace, secured their agreement to pay duties if they were allowed to trade, and arranged to “change their name” so that they would no longer be identified with the hated Farangi. He told Wang Po they would pay only 10 percent duty; Wang said that the imperial duty was 20 percent, but that he would accommodate them, for the time being, by levying that duty on only half their goods. Many Portuguese went to Canton and traded there with no difficulty, concealing so many of their goods from the tax collectors that they paid duty on only about one-third of them. Wang was received ceremoniously on the Portuguese ships, to his great satisfaction. He granted Sousa jurisdiction over the people on all sixteen ships, Portuguese and Southeast Asian, that were trading in the area. In all this, Sousa was helped by a wealthier merchant, Simão d’Almeida, who got things done much more quickly by giving gifts to Wang Po and his subordinates. It may have been at this time that it was agreed that the vice-commissioner for the maritime circuit would be paid 500 taels per year; according to Macao local tradition, this remained a private payment to “the haitao” until 1571 or 1572, when, the payment being made in the presence of other officials, a quick-witted commissioner saved himself from suspicion by identifying it as a “ground rent” payment to the imperial treasury for the settlement at Macao.²¹ When Simão d’Almeida left, Wang suggested that an embassy be sent to regularize the status of the Portuguese. Thus, when Sousa sailed for Melaka in the fall of 1554, secure foundations had been laid for the accommodation of the Portuguese on the Kwangtung coast, without any reference to the court in Peking or to any aspect of its policies other than the taxation of foreign trade.

Between 1552 and 1557 there was a gradual shift of the center of Portuguese activity from Shang-ch’uan, where Saint Francis Xavier had found Portuguese trading in 1552, to “Lampacao” (Lang-pai-ao), farther east and much

20 Freitas, *Macao*, pp. 8–9.

21 Freitas, *Macao*, pp. 20–21.

closer in shore, and on to Macao. The best description from this period is provided by the Jesuit, Belchior Nunes, who spent the winter of 1555–56 at Lampacao on his way to Japan.²² There were 300–400 Portuguese there that winter, in rude thatched dwellings, so disorderly that the Jesuits had all they could do to keep them from killing each other. Father Belchior went to Canton, probably along with Portuguese merchants trading there, in a vain attempt to procure the release from captivity of a Portuguese captured in Fukien several years earlier.

It was estimated that by 1562 there were 800–900 Portuguese at Macao. They had two modest churches and some houses more comfortable and substantial than the straw sheds of Lampacao. Saint Francis Xavier had written to the Viceroy at Goa deploring the blocking, at Melaka, of Diogo Pereira's embassy and urging that it be sent; this finally was done, and Pereira reached Macao in 1563. Initial reactions by the Canton officials suggested that Pereira's embassy might be accepted as a tribute embassy; the presents were very carefully checked, and a high official who came to Macao to check on it seemed very pleased by his splendid reception. The officials suggested that some additional present be sent from Goa, including two elephants, and the Jesuits took this suggestion seriously enough to write to Goa urging compliance. But nothing came from Goa; after "many delays," finally, the Chinese authorities asked two key questions. Had the Portuguese brought the document given to the previous embassy? (This probably referred to the order to the Portuguese to give up Melaka.) Why had they taken Melaka? Given these questions, which seem to have come some time in 1565, it was clear that the embassy was not going to be received. Macao would continue to develop completely outside the rules and precedents of the tribute system.²³

MACAO AND NAGASAKI, 1572–1640

Between 1572 and 1590 an institutional framework emerged, both in the Kwangtung bureaucracy and within the little Portuguese settlement, that made Macao controllable and tolerable in the view of the Chinese bureaucracy. These developments are very poorly documented in Chinese sources, and the Portuguese sources on them are largely second- or third-hand, but the general institutional pattern seems clear enough, and its efficacy in actual operation can be seen in many well-documented instances from later decades. We have almost no evidence on connections with Chinese political contexts,

22 *Cartas que os Padres e Irmãos da Companhia de Jesus escreverão dos Reynos de Iapão and China*, 2 vols. (Evora, 1598; rpt. Tenri, Japan, 1972), Vol. 1, fols. 32v–37.

23 Freitas, *Macao*, pp. 30–35.

but it may be useful to notice that these developments began during the years of Chang Chü-cheng's efforts at fiscal reform and revived central control, and continued at a time when there was a sharp decline in administrative energy at the center of Chinese government but still many instances of competence and reforming energy in the provinces. In sharp contrast to the Fukien bureaucracy's conflicts with Manila, the Dutch, and the Chinese merchants of Hai-ch'eng after 1600, there is no evidence that the activities of eunuch tax collectors and mining intendants caused any substantial difficulty in Macao-Kwangtung relations.

We already have noticed that what had been a customary bribe became designated a fixed ground rent payment in 1571 or 1572. The next step, and a crucial one, was taken in 1573, when a wall and gate, the "Circle Gate" (*porta do Cerco*), were erected at a narrow point on the peninsula on which Macao stands, and the Portuguese and other foreigners were forbidden to go beyond it.²⁴ Almost no agricultural land was left on the Macao side of the barrier. Macao, thus, was instantly and permanently reduced to dependence on a food supply which the Chinese officials could cut off at any time.

Further steps toward regularization of Macao's status were taken in the next decade. Although it is clear that the Portuguese had been trading at Canton long before this, it is likely that, as their trade grew, new regulations were worked out for their trade at the two annual "fairs" there.²⁵ In 1582, the Jesuit, Alonso Sanchez, came from Manila to announce the accession of Philip II of Spain to the Crown of Portugal: news that was far from welcome to the Portuguese of Macao, but which did not really have much effect on their control of the local situation. Nonetheless, Ch'en Jui, the governor-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, became suspicious, and summoned representatives of Macao to his seat of government at Chao-ch'ing. At first, say our sources, the representatives were severely reprimanded for using foreign laws to govern themselves on Chinese territory, but, later, explanations and gifts did their work.²⁶ It probably was after this confrontation that the attorney (*procurador*) at Macao was recognized by the Kwangtung authorities as "supervisor of foreigners" (*i-mu*) there.²⁷ Under these circumstances, it is understandable that the Portuguese residents felt the need to formalize, as far as possible, their right to govern themselves, dealing with the Chinese offi-

24 Yin Kuang-jen and Chang Ju-lin, *Ao-men chi-lueh* (n.p., 1751), 1, pp. 2, 23.

25 T'ien-tse Chang, *Sino-Portuguese Relations from 1514 to 1644* (Leiden, 1933, rpt. Leiden, 1969), pp. 102-03.

26 Sir Andrew Ljungstedt, *An historical sketch of the Portuguese settlements in China* (Boston, 1836), p. 79; George H. Dunne, S. J., *Generation of giants: The Story of the Jesuits in China in the last decades of the Ming dynasty* (Notre Dame, 1982), pp. 19-22.

27 T'ien-tse Chang, *Sino-Portuguese relations*, p. 101.

cials as they saw fit, and minimizing interference from their overlords in Goa or in distant and alien Madrid. In 1583, an assembly of residents presided over by the Bishop agreed to petition the authorities in Goa and Madrid for the grant of a formal charter of municipal government.²⁸ A charter granting Macao all the privileges of the City of Evora in Portugal was granted by the Viceroy in Goa in 1586 and confirmed by the King in 1595.²⁹

The municipal government thus established had elaborate customary procedures for the indirect election of three aldermen, two magistrates, and the attorney, who formed the famous Loyal Senate (*Leal Senado*). Every three years, three pairs of electors were chosen by a presiding magistrate or judge after consultation with all citizens. Each pair of electors then compiled a list of three names for each office to be filled. These lists were sorted by the presiding officer into three lists for the three years, each of which was sealed in a ball of wax, and the balls of wax placed in a bag in a locked chest. On New Year's Eve or New Year's Day, one of those lists was drawn at random by a small boy, and the individuals listed in it were to hold office for the next year; vacancies owing to death or absence were filled by election at that time. Former magistrates and other worthy people would be summoned to a general assembly, especially in crises in municipal finance or relations with the Chinese.³⁰

Thus, decision-making power was almost entirely in the hands of a resident merchant oligarchy with a vested interest in the long-run survival and prosperity of Macao, who knew how to deal with the Chinese authorities and knew, despite the indignant trumpeting of captains-major and captains-general about Portuguese honor and craven submission to the mandarins, that Macao was completely at the mercy of the Chinese state. Any time they forgot, the Chinese officials would bring them to their senses by leaving the gate closed for a few weeks. The merchant oligarchy also administered the Holy House of Mercy (*Santa Casa de Misericórdia*), a powerful lay brotherhood for charity that cared for many of the poor and the sick and invested its capital, derived from bequests, in Macao's maritime trade. The city expressed its Catholic piety in large and fervent processions and in the support of its many churches, monasteries, and convents and many missionaries. The most powerful religious establishment, that of the Jesuits, was a great asset in diplomacy with the Chinese, and controlled so much wealth that it became a major investor in foreign trade.

28 C. A. Montalto de Jesus, *Historic Macao* (Hong Kong, 1902), pp. 36–37.

29 The most reliable source for this is *Instrução para o Bispo de Pequim, e Outros Documentos para a História de Macau* (Lisbon, 1943), p. 142.

30 Charles R. Boxer, *Portuguese society in the tropics: the Municipal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia, and Luanda, 1510–1800* (Madison and Milwaukee, 1965), pp. 6–7, 42–71, 167–76.

Between 1590 and 1610, Macao was at the heyday of its prosperity, serving as a key linking point between the growing worldwide network of European sea routes and the overheated energies of the economy and society of late Ming China, and playing an especially crucial role in the export of raw silk and silk fabrics to Japan in return for large quantities of silver.³¹ Despite the benefits of this trade, there was much about Macao that made the people of Kwangtung very uneasy. Any Chinese who went there found the streets full of strange-looking people of all types and colors: European Portuguese and slaves and mestizos from all around the Indian Ocean. The alien architecture, the religious processions, the ringing of the church bells, all told him he was not in China. The streets were unsafe at night, and sometimes even in broad daylight. Elsewhere in Kwangtung, the presence of Catholic converts in many localities probably aroused antagonism, which, in turn, affected attitudes toward Macao. Episodes of African slaves escaping from their Portuguese masters into Kwangtung were another source of aversion. Already, around 1580, Matteo Ricci had discovered that he had to carefully disassociate himself from Macao if he wanted to be welcomed by the Kwangtung elite. Around 1600, an anonymous member of the Kwangtung elite³² was quoted as saying that Macao no longer was part of Kwangtung.³³

In the 1590s, Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea distracted court attention from the south coast, but reinforced perceptions of the Japanese as dangerous enemies. Thereafter, Japanese expansion of trade with Southeast Asia, probes toward Taiwan, and the Satsuma conquest of the Ryukyus in 1609, shifted attention back toward possible Japanese threats on the south coast. At the same time, around 1600, court-centered factional strife was echoed very strongly in local struggles between eunuch mine and tax commissioners, and out-of-power officials involved in the politics of their home areas and frequently allied with merchant interests. The revived perception of a Japanese threat enhanced Macao's attractiveness as a neutral channel for obtaining Japanese silver without allowing Japanese on the Chinese coast or worrying about Chinese traders to Japan colluding with the Japanese. This attractiveness, however, could be very easily offset by any hint that the Portuguese were tolerating a Japanese presence in Macao.

For policy toward Macao in those years, a key figure was Tai Yao, governor-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi from 1597 to 1610. The *Ming-shih* blames him and the lesser officials for "valuing the precious goods [of the Portuguese], pretending to forbid but secretly permitting . . . allowing the

31 See William Atwell's chapter in this volume for full analysis.

32 Jonathan D. Spence, *The memory palace of Matteo Ricci* (New York: Viking, 1984), pp. 192–93.

33 Shen Yu-jung, et al., *Min-hai tseng-yen*, No. 56 of *T'ai-wan wen-hsien ts'ung-k'an* (Taipei, 1959), p. 34.

evil to continue to grow.”³⁴ Tai was a native of Ch’ang-t’ai county in Chang-chou, Fukien, and it is likely that connections with the Fukien traders who had been in the Macao area longer than the Portuguese influenced his attitudes. Tai was praised for reducing taxes and labor services; there even was a reduction in the tax quota on Macao’s trade in 1606.³⁵ It also is important to notice that in 1600 Chang Ta-yu, the magistrate of Hsiang-shan county, in which Macao was located, managed to prevent an attempt by the eunuch tax commissioner, Li Feng, to settle in Hsiang-shan, arguing that “the nature of the foreigners is unfathomable; if by any chance they should attack the bearer of imperial orders, what could be done [to avoid an insult to] the awesome virtue of the Court?”³⁶

In Tai Yao’s years in power, events and rumors repeatedly reinforced Chinese negative attitudes toward Macao, but no changes in policy resulted. In 1598 the Spanish of Manila attempted to establish their own trading post in the Canton Estuary. They were well received in Canton, spent about 7,000 reals on presents, and were told they could establish themselves at a place they called El Piñal, “Pine Grove,” the location of which is unknown. The Portuguese, having failed to persuade the Canton authorities that they should exclude the Spanish, took direct action, launching an unsuccessful fireship attack, but desisted after the Chinese reduced Macao’s food supply. Later, they attacked a storm-damaged Spanish ship elsewhere in the estuary. When a larger ship came from Manila to El Piñal in 1599, the Macanese reportedly traded with it. Nevertheless, the Spanish did not leave anyone behind at El Piñal at the end of that trading season, and did not repeat the experiment.³⁷

In 1601, when the first Dutch ship to appear in Chinese waters anchored near Macao, the Portuguese captured a party sent to sound the coastal waters and executed seventeen of the twenty Dutch captives. The Ming authorities might have learned from both this and the El Piñal episode that the Portuguese presence at Macao was likely to conflict with the presence of other foreigners to their coasts. They inferred otherwise. The Chinese considered Macao to be controllable when necessary, and perhaps, even of some use in controlling other foreigners. The Dutch probe is noted in Ming records, but there is no trace in them of the El Piñal events.

Signs of Japanese infiltration at Macao and the effects of the tricky relations among Japanese, Jesuits, and Portuguese in this period were much more wor-

34 Chang Wei-hua, *Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi*, pp. 62.

35 Chang Wei-hua, *Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi*, pp. 52–53, 62–63.

36 Chou Ching-lien, *Chung-P’u chiao-i’ung shih*, p. 93.

37 Charles R. Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade* (Lisbon, 1959; rpt., Macao, 1988), pp. 61–2; Barros and Couto, *Da Asia*, XII.II.XI; Antonio de Morga, ed. and trans. J.S. Cummins, *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* (London, 1971), pp. 136–38, 148–49.

risome to the Chinese. New fortifications of Macao, stimulated especially by the likelihood that the Dutch would return, alarmed the Chinese; the Portuguese might be less controllable if they were better able to defend themselves. The great Jesuit church of São Paulo, which was built in these years and on which much of the work was done by Japanese Christian artisans, looked to the Chinese very much like a fortification. Even more alarming was the rise of a thick-walled Jesuit church on Ilha Verde (Ch'ing-chou), a small island at the inner end of Macao's Inner Harbor. The Portuguese were ordered to destroy their buildings on Ilha Verde, and some walls may have been pulled down. Then, in 1606, the people of nearby regions of Kwangtung were alarmed by rumors that the Portuguese planned to invade China, relying on Japanese and Malay auxiliaries and on the many Chinese who would join them. It was said that the invaders planned to set up the Jesuit, Father Lazaro Cattaneo, as emperor. There was rioting in Macao, and a Chinese Christian was tortured to death as a spy in Canton. In 1607, Dutch ships, attempting to trade not far from Macao, were treated very warily by the Chinese because of rumors that they had two hundred Japanese warriors aboard. At that time, the Portuguese chased them away. Then, in 1608, it seemed that the worst fears of the Chinese had come true. Japanese sailors and warriors returning from a trading voyage to Vietnam walked through the streets of Macao heavily armed, and finally, serious fighting broke out in which many of the Japanese were killed.³⁸

The Portuguese had had to tread warily in dealing with the Japanese intruders because they were closely connected with the powerful Nagasaki officials on whom Portuguese trade in Japan depended. The 1608 incident led directly to a series of conflicts at Nagasaki in 1609–10 that ended in the blowing up of the great ship *Madre de Deus*, but at Macao the violence did not continue. In 1606, a Cantonese scholar in Peking for the metropolitan examination had proposed that the “various foreigners” be moved from Macao to Lampacao, but his proposal had been rejected.³⁹ Debate revived after Chang Ming-kang replaced Tai Yao as governor-general in 1610. Some advocated driving the Portuguese away entirely. We have a full text of the memorial of one Kuo Shang-pin, advocating the expulsion of all Japanese and blacks and ordering the Portuguese to leave Macao and “trade at Lampacao as before,” which probably implies no permanent settlement. With its references to Portuguese evasions of customs duties and harboring of Japanese, blacks, and Chinese desperadoes, Kuo's memorial is the fullest reflection we have of

38 Charles R. Boxer, *The Christian century in Japan: 1540–1650* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1951), pp. 269–71, 287–88; and his *Fidalgos*, pp. 53–54; see below on the Dutch voyages.

39 Chang Wei-hua, *Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi*, p. 61; Chou Ching-lien, *Chung-P'u wai-chiao shih*, p. 95.

Ming negative attitudes toward Macao. In 1613, according to a Portuguese translation of a lost Chinese text, Macao was forced to expel ninety-eight Japanese and was forbidden to allow any more to come.⁴⁰ Beyond that, Governor-General Chang did not accept Kuo's drastic proposals, arguing that it was easier to control the Portuguese where they were, because there were Ming troops close by on several sides and because the Chinese exercised easy control over the city's food supply. Late in 1614, Chang sent officials to proclaim a full set of regulations which the Portuguese were to obey to the letter in the future. They were engraved on a stone tablet which was set up in front of the hall of the Loyal Senate, probably in 1617: the date given in an accurate Portuguese summary. Their five points were: 1) Macao must not harbor Japanese. 2) The buying of Chinese people is forbidden. 3) All ships, including warships, must pay duties and must come into Macao's Inner Harbor. Anchoring and trading in the outer islands is strictly forbidden. 4) Trade must be conducted at Canton, not at Macao, and duties on goods must be paid there. 5) New construction in Macao is strictly forbidden; old structures may be repaired or rebuilt to match their previous condition. These regulations, and their revisions and expansions in the 1740s, were fundamental to Chinese policy toward Macao down to the nineteenth century; they were Macao's charter for survival through submission.⁴¹

For the next few years tension focused on Portuguese building in Macao, especially of anything that could be viewed as a fortification. In 1621, the Jesuits were forced to demolish their church on Ilha Verde, and the Ming garrison at the Circle Gate was strengthened somewhat and placed under a higher-ranking officer.⁴² In 1622, the Dutch attempted to conquer Macao and were driven off by a lucky shot into a Dutch powder barrel and a wild charge of Portuguese and slaves onto the beach where the Dutch had landed.⁴³ We have *nothing* in Chinese on this episode, but we do have a Jesuit report on a defense of Macao that they insisted had been offered in the capital by the distinguished convert Ignatius Sun Yüan-hua. Sun argued, according to the Jesuits, that the City of Macao had maintained peace with the Chinese for many years and had offered its cannoneers for service against the Manchus (see below). Now, however, the seas were full of European pirates (referring to the Dutch). That Macao had been built was the fault of those who had been enticed by petty profits and had permitted it, "but, at present, there

40 *Instrução para o Bispo de Pequim*, pp. 115–16, mis-dated 1579 but with the correct date of Wan-li 41 in the text.

41 Chang Wei-hua, *Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi*, pp. 64–67; Yin and Chang, *Ao-men chi-lüeh*, 1:25a–b; *Instrução para o Bispo de Pequim*, pp. 116–18.

42 Chang Wei-hua, *Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi*, p. 68; Yin and Chang, *Ao-men chi-lüeh*, 1:11a–b.

43 Boxer, *Fidalgos*, ch. 5.

was no other way to defend the empire on that side against the Dutch pirates."⁴⁴ Another clue to the reactions of provincial officials is to be found in a Portuguese document of 1623, which tells us that in the course of efforts to persuade the Ming authorities to allow the Macanese to keep some new fortifications, "more bribes were given and some mandarins came to see the great ships of the enemy and the dead who lay on the field of battle, from which they took some heads back to Canton to prove that the walls we wanted to build were only to defend the city which was the territory of the King of China."⁴⁵ A Chinese text states, however, that the Chinese did force the destruction of some walls in these years.⁴⁶

Macao may have won some toleration for itself by obediently expelling the Japanese and by fending off the Dutch, but when the Portuguese sought to solidify their position by sending troops to aid the Ming against the rising Manchu power, they encountered much more intricate political difficulties. In 1623, the distinguished Catholic converts, Hsü Kuang-ch'i and Li Chih-tso, proposed that the Portuguese should train Ming soldiers in the use of cannon. A small group of Portuguese artillery men was brought to Peking, but at one of their demonstrations a cannon exploded, killing a Portuguese and three Chinese. Shen Ch'üeh and other opponents of the Jesuits and their converts took this opportunity to denounce this effort, and soon the gunners were sent back to Macao. In 1630, a small group of gunners again was sent, and apparently participated effectively in the defense of Cho-chou against a Manchu attack. Now, the project expanded to include the enlistment of several hundred Macao soldiers to serve the Ming. They got as far as Nanch'ang in Kiangsi, then were turned back; they may have been stopped by the efforts of the Kwangtung trading interest and its bureaucratic allies, who did not want the Portuguese to have any channels of trade and communication in China which they did not control. A few of these soldiers went on to join the garrison of Teng-chou, Shantung, where most of them were killed in the revolt of K'ung Yu-te in 1632.⁴⁷

Macao's ambivalent relations with the people and officials of Kwangtung rarely imperilled its survival or even its prosperity. The main determinant of the latter was the attitude of the Japanese toward Catholicism and, by exten-

44 Anonymous, attributed to V.P. Kirwitzer, S.J., *Histoire de ce qui s'est Passé au Royaume de la Chine en l'Année 1624* (Paris, 1629), pp. 22–24.

45 "Relação sobre a fundação e fortificação de Macau," 27 November, 1623, published in Francisco Paulo Mendes da Luz, *O Conselho da Índia: Contributo ao Estudo da História da Administração e do Comércio do Ultramar Português nos Princípios do Século XVII* (Lisbon, 1952), pp. 606–16, at pp. 614–15.

46 Chou Ching-lien, *Chung-P'u wai-chiao shih*, p. 89; Yin and Chang, *Ao-men chi-lüeh*, 2:22b–23.

47 Charles R. Boxer, "Portuguese military expeditions in aid of the Mings against the Manchus, 1621–1647," *T'ien-hsia Monthly*, 7:1 (August 1938), pp. 24–30; DMB, pp. 414, 1147; Dunne, *Generation of giants*, pp. 215–18.

sion, toward the Portuguese who always had been so closely associated with it. The spectacular rise of Macao had depended on the great desire of various territorial lords to attract the “black ships” to their realms, as well as on the expanding silver production that made their purchases of Chinese goods possible. This unambiguously hospitable phase had an early peak, in the granting of Nagasaki to the Society of Jesus in 1580. Signs of an anti-Christian reaction began with Hideyoshi’s edicts against Christians of 1587, and became really serious with the measures taken in 1612–14.⁴⁸ However, the Chinese, the Dutch, and the English still offered no adequate alternative channel of supply of Chinese goods to the burgeoning Japanese market. As late as the early 1630s, as the Japanese took increasingly severe measures to forbid their own maritime trade and to repress Catholicism, turmoil on the China coast and Dutch bungling of their relations with the Japanese inhibited the emergence of alternate sources of supply. About 1637, both the Dutch and their Chinese competitors and trading partners were settling down to peaceful trade. In a rapidly changing situation, the Portuguese were borrowing both in Japan and in China to maintain their competitive position, and their experience and established connections made them formidable rivals. It was not commercial change but the Shimabara rebellion of 1637 that doomed Portuguese trade in Japan and thereby doomed Macao to irremediable decline and poverty. The Portuguese were expelled from Japan in 1639 and forbidden to return, and when Macao sent an embassy in 1640 to plead for reconsideration, the entire party of officers, merchants, and seamen was executed.

Macao never recovered from the loss of this leading line of trade. Dutch attacks on Portuguese shipping in the Straits of Melaka were followed in 1641 by the Dutch conquest of Melaka, depriving Macao of a key link for its trade to India. Macao sent a party of soldiers to aid the Ming Loyalist Yung-li Emperor, and suffered severely from all the wars and dislocations of trade of the Ming-Ch’ing transition, but the blow from which it could not recover, and never did, was the loss of the Japanese trade.⁴⁹

MANILA

Chinese merchants had made trading voyages to the archipelago that became the Philippines long before the Spanish arrived. However, the Spanish-Chinese connection, and the expansion of Chinese settlement and enterprise

48 Boxer, *The great ship from Amacon*; also his *The Christian century in Japan, 1549–1650* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1951); Jurgis Elisonas, “Christianity and the daimyo.” In *Early Modern Japan*, Vol. 4, ed. John Whitney Hall and assistant ed. James McClain, *The Cambridge History of Japan* (Cambridge 1991), pp. 301–72.

49 On Macao from the late 1640s to the late 1660s see Wills, *Embassies and illusions*, pp. 83–101.

on Luzon owed little to those antecedents, and almost everything to the exchange, across the Pacific, of Chinese silks and other consumer goods for Spanish American silver. References to Chinese trade with Luzon can be found in the records of the first Spanish voyages to reach the archipelago: those of Magellan in 1521 and of Loaysa in 1527. It was a combination of a magnificent harbor, a rich agricultural hinterland, and an already established trade with China that brought the Spanish under the leadership of Miguel López de Legazpi to conquer Manila in 1570–71, to immediately establish there the full institutional framework of a Spanish city, and to move the Spanish headquarters in Asian waters to the new city. The local people had just begun to develop, under Muslim influence, large-scale monarchical institutions, and offered no sustained resistance to Spanish domination once the Spanish had burned the king's town and begun building a Spanish walled town in its place.⁵⁰

Already, there were Chinese settled in an area that had been granted them by the Muslim king, across the Pasig River from Manila, roughly in the Binondo area that was a frequent center of Chinese settlement from that time to our own day.⁵¹ Chinese awareness of the new opportunities at Manila and of the likelihood of a friendly reception was increased when Legazpi's ship rescued the crew of a disabled Chinese junk off Mindoro in 1571. Some of the rescued people came to Manila with a big cargo in 1572, and, in 1573, the first cargo of Chinese goods was sent off across the Pacific to Acapulco. Six junks came in 1574, twelve or more in 1575. It was precisely in these years that the exploitation of the great silver lode at Potosí in what is now Bolivia was getting well under way and a market for Chinese silks and other fine craft products was emerging in the settled and luxurious cities of Spanish America. The trade became Manila's overwhelming *raison d'être*; there was not even much done to explore the gold resources of Luzon or to develop the magnificent agricultural potential of the area around Manila. At Manila, the Chinese brought almost all the goods that would be shipped to the New World and did almost all the mercantile and skilled craft work of the city.

Before this process was well under way, the Spanish presence was nearly extinguished by a Chinese attack. This was followed by an abortive opening of direct relations with the Ming which seemed, for a short while, to present

50 Robert R. Reed, *Colonial Manila: The context of Hispanic urbanism and process of morphogenesis* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London), 1978.

51 On the Chinese at Manila good summaries and guides to the sources are William L. Schurz, *The Manila galleon* (New York, 1939, rpt. New York, 1959), ch. 1, and the various essays in Vol. 1 of Alfonso Felix, Jr., ed, *The Chinese in the Philippines, 1570–1770* (Manila, 1966). On the Chinese presence before the Spanish arrival see especially Alberto Santamaria, O.P., "The Chinese Parian (El Parian de los Sangleyes)." In *The Chinese in the Philippines*, Vol. 1, ed. A. Felix, pp. 67–118, at p. 106, citing testimony in 1640 of an aged son of the former King of Manila.

the possibility that Sino-Spanish trade might be centered not at Manila, but at a Spanish Macao on the coast of Fukien. The pirate, Lin Feng, had been driven off the Fukien coast in 1574 and had taken refuge in the P'eng-hu (Pescadores) Islands. His fleet entered Manila Bay on 29 November of that year, and a first landing was driven back on the next day. On 2 December, Lin himself, with about 1,000 men, led a larger attack, but it too was driven back and about 200 of his men were killed. He then withdrew from the Manila area and fortified himself at Pangasinan farther north on the coast of Luzon. In March 1575, a force of Spanish soldiers and Filipino auxiliaries pursued him there, burned his ships, almost took his stockade, and settled down to wait for his surrender. But Lin's men were able to get food and firewood from nearby settlements, and eventually assembled enough timber to clandestinely build thirty-seven small junks and escape out to sea.⁵²

Not long after the Spanish force arrived at Pangasinan it had been joined by a Ming officer, Wang Wang-kao, who had been sent to track down Lin Feng. The Spanish seemed to have the situation well in hand, so Wang was sent on to Manila, where he was very cordially received and soon set out for Fukien, taking with him two lay Spanish envoys, Miguel de Loarca and Pedro de Sarmiento, and two priests, Martin de Rada and Jerónimo Marin, who would seek to make a trade agreement with the Fukien authorities and to obtain permission to preach the Gospel in China. They were very cordially received in T'ung-an, in Ch'üan-chou, and finally by the governor of Fukien in Foochow. They were told that no answer could be given to their requests until the emperor's response to them had been received. As they sailed for Manila in September 1575, their Chinese hosts pointed out to them the little island of Wu-yü on the south side of the Chang-chou Estuary as one place where they might be given a trading post. In Chinese records their mission is recorded as a would-be tribute embassy, and it is said that they were given gifts and their presents were forwarded for them, but it is implied that they were not allowed to establish any more permanent relation because they "were not a tributary country," that is, they were not to be found in the early Ming lists of tributaries.⁵³ Returning to Manila with the envoys, Wang Wang-kao was dismayed to learn that Lin Feng had escaped. He was treated rudely by a new governor at Manila. The two priests still pressed him to take them back to Fukien, and they finally embarked on his ship, but were put ashore on northern Luzon.⁵⁴ As late as 1589 the Governor told Bishop Salazar he was trying to get an agreement with the Chang-chou officials for

⁵² DMB, pp. 917-19; Boxer, *South China in the sixteenth century*, pp. xlv-xlvii.

⁵³ Chang Wei-hua, *Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi*, pp. 75-77.

⁵⁴ DMB, pp. 1131-36.

a trading post on an offshore island.⁵⁵ The 1593 prohibition of Spanish trade with China mentioned below should have put an end to these projects; the El Piñal episode, described previously in the Macao section, would seem to represent a final effort to dodge this restriction, and the unexplained end of the El Piñal foray expressive of the definitive enforcement of the prohibition. Thereafter, the Spanish settled down to mutually profitable, but uneasy and occasionally violent relations with the Chinese who came to Manila. The great massacres of 1603, 1639, and 1662 are relatively well-known and well-documented, but they must be set against a background of the organization and taxation of the Chinese community that still is not well known.

The history of the Chinese at Manila and of the very occasional attention paid them by the Ming authorities must be pulled together from very scattered sources. Only occasionally do the Seville archives yield detailed information on the types and quantities of goods imported from China. The figures on taxation of Chinese trade and on the head taxes paid by Chinese residents assembled by Pierre Chaunu are immensely valuable, but clearly tainted by changing collection practices and levels of corruption.⁵⁶ Raw silk and silk goods always were the mainstays of Chinese-Spanish trade. By 1586, concerns over the drain of specie into China, the tough and intelligent bargaining of individual Chinese traders, and the presence of large numbers of Chinese at Manila throughout the trading season, some of whom even stayed over to the next year, led the City of Manila to petition the King for the institution of the *pancada*, a procedure in which uniform prices for all Chinese imports were negotiated in advance of the beginning of the trading season; it received royal approval in 1589. Although it seems to have been a Spanish initiative, the *pancada* (the word is a Manila neologism of unknown origin) also met Chinese needs to dispose of all goods in time for the return voyage to Fukien and to keep the trade moving as smoothly as possible. It is likely that the leaders of the resident Chinese community were important middlemen in this negotiation, but no firm evidence has yet emerged on this point. In 1593, this restrictive policy was extended to limit the volume of trans-Pacific trade, to close Peru to Chinese imports, and to prohibit Spanish voyages to China and the importation of Chinese goods consigned to specific Spaniards. It seems likely that the *pancada* was never free of leaks. Soon it was confined to finer goods, and, by the late 1600s it had completely broken down and was replaced by a free-market *feria* (fair) after the Chinese ships arrived.

55 Bishop Domingo de Salazar, O.P., letter of 24 June, 1590, as reprinted in Felix, *The Chinese in the Philippines*, Vol. 1, p. 121.

56 Pierre Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques (XVIe, XVIIe, XVIIIe siècles); Introduction méthodologique et indices d'activité* (Paris, 1960).

The large number of Chinese who settled in the Manila area was a more persistent concern. Already in 1586, it was estimated that there were 10,000 Chinese, compared to a Spanish population of less than 2,000. General prohibitions of Chinese retail trade and permanent residence were little enforced. It is not clear when the practice of selling residence permits to the Chinese began. Around 1600, the rule was that only 4,000 would be sold, for 2 reals each, but, by that time, the issue of the certificates had become a venal source of income, granted by the responsible officer to his cronies, who profited not only from the sale of certificates up to the quota and beyond, but from extra extortions: Chinese who were found without a permit after the annual trading ships departed had to buy one for six reals.⁵⁷ The result of this procedure was that the limit on the numbers of Chinese residents was only very erratically enforced, and this enforcement fell more on recent arrivals than on established Chinese merchants.

The first location of the Parian, as the Chinatown came to be called, was within the walls of the City. In 1583, the Chinese were moved to a swampy area northeast of the city walls. They rapidly turned this area into a thriving town of orderly streets with a large pond at its center. The pond was accessible to substantial ships and had an island in its center where punishments were administered to Chinese criminals. The Chinese were briefly moved from this location during various periods, and separate Christian Chinese settlements soon grew up in Tondo and Binondo north of the Pasig River, but the area described generally remained the prime center of Chinese settlement down to the nineteenth century. Traces of the location still are to be found in the name of the Parian Gate of Intramuros, the old walled city, and in Arroceros Street, the location of the street of the rice merchants in the Parian.⁵⁸ By 1590 the domination of local trade and artisanal production by the Chinese was striking, and included everything from bread-baking to book-binding, tavern-keeping, and stone-masonry. The Dominicans built their church in the vicinity of the Parian soon after their arrival in 1587 and soon were deeply involved in learning the Chinese language and seeking converts among this population, making intelligent use of pageantry, charity, and learning.⁵⁹ Earlier Chinese converts had been expected to adopt Spanish clothing and to cut their long hair. It is not clear how far the Dominicans modified these policies, but two of their letters from 1589 and 1590 show considerable interest

57 H. de la Costa, S.J., *The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581–1768* (Cambridge, MA, 1961), pp. 205–06.

58 Santamaria, "The Chinese Parian." In *The Chinese in the Philippines*, Vol. 1, ed. A. Felix, pp. 67–118.

59 John E. Wills, Jr., "From Manila to Fuan: Asian contexts of Dominican Mission policy." In *The Chinese Rites Controversy: Its History and Meaning*, ed. D. E. Mungello (Nettetal, 1994), pp. 111–27.

in the Chinese and willingness to consider the need to adapt to their culture.⁶⁰ The 1590 letter also gives us our first reference to a Christian Chinese “Don Juan Zanco, Governor of the Christian Chinese.”⁶¹ It is not clear if he was given any authority over his non-Christian countrymen, but it is likely that he was an important intermediary in their relations with the Spanish. In 1603, there was a royal confirmation of what seems to have been well-established practice by that time, namely, that a Christian Chinese was appointed mayor (*alcalde*, also referred to as *Capitan*) over all the Chinese, that the other regional mayors (*alcaldes*) had no jurisdiction over them, and that, in legal cases and other important matters, the mayor of the Chinese was required to seek the advice of the Crown Attorney (*fiscal*) of the Audiencia.⁶²

In 1593, the Chinese rowers of the galley of Governor Gomez Perez Dasmariñas mutinied and killed him. The mutineers headed west, most of them remaining on the Vietnam coast. Thirty-two of them reached China, however, where their deed was reported to the court and their leader was punished. At Manila, further attacks were feared and the local Chinese were forced to move their Parian to the north side of the Pasig. The appearance, in 1594, of seven Chinese warships, ostensibly searching for Chinese outlaws, heightened tension. Soon, the Chinese were allowed to move back across the river. In 1596, 12,000 were sent back to their homeland, but as many more remained.

In 1603, this stew of fear, mutual dependence, flourishing trade, and unstoppable immigration exploded in a massacre in which over 20,000 Chinese were killed. The catalyst was the arrival of an official mission sent by the Fukien provincial authorities. Two Fukien adventurers, Yen Ying-lung and Chang I, had told Kao Ts'ai, the notorious eunuch tax and mines commissioner in Fukien, that there was a mountain of gold on Cavite Peninsula in Manila Bay. It seems that plans were made for a mission, with Ming naval backing, to attack Manila or otherwise seek the mountain of gold. After a number of censors protested to no avail, the provincial authorities decided they had to send an expedition of some kind, but clearly planned it to show up Chang I's hoax. An assistant county magistrate, Wang Shih-ho, and a company commander, Yü I-ch'eng, were sent, bringing Chang I in chains, to check on the truth of his story.

The delegation arrived in March of 1603 and was promptly received by Governor Pedro Bravo de Acuña, their procession with its music, heralds, and standard bearers making a great impression. They were given comfort-

60 Reports by Bishop Salazar and Juan Cobo O.P. In *The Chinese in the Philippines*, Vol. 1, ed. A. Felix, pp. 119–142.

61 Salazar. In *The Chinese in the Philippines*, Vol. 1, ed. A. Felix, p. 129.

62 Milagros Guerrero, “The Chinese in the Philippines, 1570–1770.” In *The Chinese in the Philippines*, Vol. 1, ed. A. Felix, pp. 15–39, at pp. 30–31.

able accommodations. When they began to administer justice in the Chinese community they were immediately ordered to desist. At a second meeting with the Governor in May they made it clear that they were skeptical about Chang I's report but had to obey the commands of their emperor. The Governor then arranged that they should go to Cavite and see for themselves that there was no gold there. They did so, and soon left for China, taking with them a basket of earth from Cavite and the unfortunate Chang I, still in chains.⁶³

Unaware of the political tensions behind this expedition, the Spanish could not believe that the search for the mountain of gold had been its real purpose. Soon, rumors were spreading that it had been sent to spy out Manila for a major Chinese invasion, in which the local Chinese would cooperate. Defensive measures were taken, and many Spaniards, Filipinos, and resident Japanese began to threaten the Chinese. The established merchants of the Parian remained quiet and conciliatory, but new arrivals, especially settlers in the semi-rural areas north of the Pasig, were less well controlled, had less to lose, and probably were suffering more from the abuses of the license fee collection previously described. North of the river, a large group of Chinese began to plan a first strike, and some Parian residents began to join them. The mayor of the Parian, Juan Bautista de la Vera, whose Chinese name was transcribed as Eng Kang, tried to dissuade them, but found his adopted son in command of the rebels. They tried to persuade him to become their leader, but he escaped back to the Parian, promptly reporting the danger to the Spanish. When gunpowder was found in his house, possibly intended for fireworks, he was arrested and eventually executed.

On the night of 3 October the Spanish shut the gates of the walled city and prepared for an attack. North of the Pasig one Spanish family was killed and many houses were burned. A Chinese attack on the church in Tondo was beaten off by Spanish soldiers, who then foolishly pursued the Chinese into a swampy area and were surrounded and cut down. The rebels now rested, arguing among themselves and casting lots (probably the divining blocks still so ubiquitous in southern Fukien culture) to determine their next move. On 6 October, they crossed the Pasig, occupied the Parian, and prepared for an attack on the walled city, building ladders and rolling siege towers. They had taken some firearms from the Spaniards cut down in the swamp, but still were no match for the musket and cannon fire that now was trained on them from the walls of the city. Their disorderly assaults on

63 This account of the events of 1603 relies on De la Costa, *The Jesuits in the Philippines*, pp. 203–15; Morga, *Sucesos*, pp. 206–25; Francisco Colin, S.J., *Labor Evangélica de la Compañía de Jesús en Filipinas*, ed. Pablo Pastells, S.J. (Barcelona, 1904), Vol. 2, pp. 428–32; and Chang Wei-hua, *Ming-shih Folang-chi*, pp. 90–101.

the wall were broken up, their ladders and towers demolished by cannon balls. In a day or two, disciplined Spanish and Japanese soldiers began to mount sorties from the city, and as Filipino auxiliaries arrived from outlying areas, the Chinese broke and fled in any direction they could. They were pursued in the countryside during the following weeks, and whenever Spaniards or Filipinos caught up with them, no prisoners were taken. Estimates of the total number of Chinese slaughtered range from 15,000 to 25,000.

The Spanish now very quickly realized that, however much they feared and despised the Chinese, they could not survive without their trade and industry. Surviving Parian merchants were assured that the trade would continue as usual. The Manila authorities wrote to the rulers of Kwangtung and Fukien to explain what had happened. The Fukien officials were inclined to fix much of the blame on Chang I. They replied, according to the *Ming-shih*, that the Spanish should not have killed Chinese criminals on their own initiative and that they should send the widows and orphans back to China, but no chastising expedition was sent. Because so much of the Parian had been burned, Chinese merchants coming to trade in 1604 were lodged in fine houses in the walled city. The revival of the trade was so rapid that Chaunu's figures on taxes on Chinese trade suggest that the average value of the trade for 1606–10 were over 3 million pesos per year, the highest five-year average in the history of the trade.⁶⁴

Spanish jurisdiction over the Chinese community remained tangled and venal, with the governor supposedly having final jurisdiction and the Crown Attorney (*fiscal*) of the Audiencia serving as “protector” of the Chinese and adviser of their mayor on all legal matters. The Chinese were exempted from labor service and petty personal dues required of the Filipinos, but paid a very stiff license fee of 8 pesos per year, with added extortions and harassments by the sellers. Chinese resentment of Spanish extortion and misrule was manifested in a series of petitions to the king of Spain to allow them to be governed solely by their own people, which were rejected in 1630.⁶⁵ The sale of the licenses remaining a venal privilege of Spanish appointees, new efforts to limit the Chinese population to 6000 had no chance of success; estimates in the 1620s and 1630s ranged from 15,000 to 21,000, at the time of the 1639 revolt 33,000–45,000, the majority of them rural. The license fees became a greater source of government income than the tax on the trade of the Chinese.⁶⁶ A larger proportion of this population by now was

64 Based on Chaunu, *Les Philippines*, pp. 34, 92, dividing the average collection of 46,390 pesos by the 3 percent rate and doubling to allow for untaxed and undertaxed trade.

65 Charles H. Cunningham, *The Audiencia in the Spanish colonies, as illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila (1583–1800)* (Berkeley, 1919), p. 253.

66 Chaunu, *Les Philippines*, p. 92.

engaged in farming in outlying areas, on their own, on estates of the religious orders, and, in at least one case, in a forced settlement project. It was these rural Chinese who rose against the Spanish and brought another massacre down on their heads in 1639.

The 1639 rebellion of the Chinese of Luzon was largely a rural affair, which only briefly occupied the Manila Parian and threatened the Spanish walled city. It was ill-armed, but well-organized; Spanish soldiers searching camps from which they had expelled the Chinese found large stocks of rice, written notice boards, and evidence of thorough organization into squads of ten, kept track of by cash-like counters collected at the end of each fighting day. The uprising must have been in preparation for some time in its rural centers. There were rumors, not very detailed or convincing, that the leaders were in touch with Cheng Chih-lung and that a coordinated rising had been planned for 24 December, but was botched by the earlier rural rising. This took place on 20 November at Calamba, on the south shore of Laguna de Bay east of Manila, where a large number of Chinese, probably several thousand, were engaged in developing paddy rice agriculture. Many of them had been compelled to settle there, and all paid a substantial rent to the Spanish Crown. The site was very unhealthy: about 300 of them had died. The rebels advanced rapidly toward Manila, and, on 22 November, took the church at San Pedro Makati on the eastern outskirts. They broke and fled when substantial Spanish and Filipino forces arrived. Risings now were reported in other areas, and, from 26 November to 2 December, the rebels controlled the north bank of the Pasig River.⁶⁷

On 2 December, some elements in the Parian revolted and started fires, and the Spanish began firing on it from the walls of the city. Estimating that there were 300 Spaniards capable of bearing arms against 26,000 Chinese, the Spanish took drastic action to make sure that the Chinese would never be able to assemble their forces. On 5 December, the Governor sent out orders to all outlying Spanish settlements to kill all the Chinese they could find, offering a reward for every Chinese head. Spaniards and Filipinos needed little urging. In some places, the Chinese were rounded up and decapitated ten at a time; in others, parties fanned out in the countryside to hunt them down. The total slaughter has been estimated at 17,000 to 22,000. Some fortified themselves in the mountains, but eventually were dislodged. A final army of 6,000–7,000 held out on the eastern shore of Laguna de Bay until

67 This account is based on De la Costa, *The Jesuits in the Philippines*, pp. 389–92; Santamaria in Felix, *The Chinese in the Philippines*, pp. 103–05; *The Philippine Islands*, 55 vols., eds. Emma H. Blair and James A. Robertson (Cleveland, 1903–1909), Vol. 29, pp. 201–58.

they surrendered on 15 March 1640, were marched back to Manila, and lodged in a stockade north of the Pasig.

Chaunu's figures on taxes on the trade of the Chinese and on the Chinese license fees both show striking declines after 1650. Factors at work here included declining silver production in the New World and the disruption of trade by the wars of the Ming-Ch'ing transition. In this pinched setting there was a final upheaval, which might be seen as a distant echo and continuation of the farce-tragedies of the Southern Ming, such as the factional strife at Nanking and the Lung-wu Emperor's conflict with Cheng Chih-lung. On 24 April 1662, less than three months after the capitulation of the Dutch at Casteel Zeelandia on Taiwan, Cheng Ch'eng-kung sent Victorio Riccio OP, who had had a mission at Amoy in the 1650s, to bear a letter to Manila summoning the Spanish to acknowledge his suzerainty and pay him tribute, and threatening to lead his fleet to conquer them as he had the Dutch. If he had a purpose to serve beyond his megalomania, it may have been that he had his eye on the rice production of Luzon, the surplus of which would have helped to feed his hungry soldiers on the still little-cultivated plains of Taiwan. Riccio arrived on 5 May. Cheng's threat was taken very seriously. The garrisons in the Moluccas and on Mindanao were withdrawn to reinforce Manila; the loss of a Spanish presence in the Moluccas was permanent, and the Mindanao posts were not reoccupied for many years. Harsh levies of building supplies, food, and Chinese and Filipino labor were ordered, and a great deal of new work was done on the walls of the Spanish city.⁶⁸ Many argued for killing or sending away all the non-Christian Chinese. The Chinese of the Parian were more inclined to flee than to revolt, but the Spanish Governor still was trying to reassure them and keep them quiet. On 25 May, however, a confused mêlée near the Parian Gate ended with casualties on both sides and a Spanish cannonade of the Parian. More and more fled north of the Pasig. The Governor now negotiated an understanding with the Chinese that those who submitted peacefully would not be harmed, and that the non-Christians among them would leave Manila on the trading ships then present. We are not told how many left, but it is mentioned that 1,300 crammed themselves on one ship. None of this satisfied the widespread desire for slaughter. The Governor now gave way to it, ordering that any Chinese who had not come down to the assembly areas by 4 June be killed. Some were killed; others fled to the mountains, where they died of hunger or were killed by the Negritos. Father Riccio had been sent away with a defiant reply, but, by the time he returned on 8 April, 1663 with a conciliatory mes-

68 Domingo Abella, "Koxinga nearly ended Spanish rule in the Philippines in 1662," *Philippine Historical Review*, 2, No. 1 (1969), pp. 195-347, at pp. 301-2 and pp. 321-2.

sage from Cheng Ching, the Spanish were ready to once again recognize their need for good relations with the Chinese.⁶⁹

MISSIONARIES AND THE MING STATE

The Roman Catholic missionary enterprise in Ming China led to some fascinating interactions in religion, scholarship, science, literature, and art. It was intricately intertwined with the policies and institutions of the Church and of the Catholic monarchies and especially of their outposts at Manila and Macao, and on the other hand with the shifts of Ming politics and the political fortunes of its patrons and protectors in the bureaucracy. Here we are concerned only with its Chinese and foreign political connections; the cultural interactions are discussed by Willard Peterson elsewhere in this volume.⁷⁰

We have noted the effort of Dominican and Augustinian missionaries to gain entry to China in connection with the Spanish embassy of 1574–75. There were a number of later Dominican and Franciscan attempts to enter the empire from Manila, but until the 1630s, all led to immediate expulsion. During its first half-century, the effective missionary enterprise was entirely the work of members of the Society of Jesus coming to the Far East under Portuguese patronage and entering China via Macao. From Saint Francis Xavier on, Jesuits were constantly involved with Portuguese efforts to trade and settle in the Kwangtung islands. An important step forward was taken by Michele Ruggieri, SJ in his visits to Canton with the Portuguese merchants in 1580 and 1581. He studied and practised Chinese etiquette with great care, and was asked to be present at all meetings between the foreign merchants and the officials. Ruggieri also was experimenting with having expositions of Christian doctrine translated into Chinese.⁷¹ Matteo Ricci, in a number of ways, walked through doors Ruggieri had opened.

Ruggieri accompanied the Macao mission to negotiate with the governor-general at Chao-ch'ing in 1582, made an excellent impression on that high official, and was invited to stay there. In 1583 he went to Macao and brought Matteo Ricci, SJ, back with him. As hostility surfaced there, Ruggieri moved on to Shao-chou in 1589. The complex story of Ricci's gradual discovery of the possibilities of dialogue with the Chinese elite has been told many times. Ricci learned that the key to being able to move around the Empire was the

69 De la Costa, *The Jesuits in the Philippines*, pp. 450, 483–84; Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, Vol. 36, pp. 213–66; John E. Wills, Jr., "The Hazardous Missions of a Dominican: Victorio Riccio, O.P. in Amoy, Taiwan and Manila. Les missions aventureuses d'un Dominicain, Victorio Riccio." In *Actes du IIe Colloque International de Sinologie, Chantilly, 1977* (Paris, 1980), pp. 231–57.

70 See pp. 789–840.

71 Joseph Sebes, S. J., "The Precursors of Ricci." In *East meets West: The Jesuits in China, 1582–1773*, eds. Charles E. Ronan, S. J. Bonnie and B. C. Oh (Chicago, 1988), pp. 19–61.

protection of high officials in whose large entourage a single foreign priest could travel without getting into difficulties with local crowds or officials. In 1598, Ricci was able to travel to Nanking with Shih Hsing, President of the Board of War. He immediately sensed its great potential as a center for his efforts, but also great difficulties, especially when the Hideyoshi invasion of Korea had increased suspicion of all foreigners. He settled at Nanchang, where he was exposed for the first time to the sophisticated moral and philosophical debates of the late Ming academies and study societies.⁷²

In 1598, Ricci paid a brief visit to Peking in the retinue of another high official. He did not stay there, but settled in Nanking. His world map was spreading his reputation in scholarly circles. In the rich intellectual life of the city he found many to learn from and argue with: Yeh Hsiang-kao, Li Chih, Ch'en Ti, Chiao Hung. Above all, it was in these Nanking years that he met Hsü Kuang-ch'i, the most influential convert and supporter of the Jesuits in the late Ming.

In 1600, Ricci set out for Peking again, this time in the retinue of a eunuch of the Imperial Silk Manufactories. At Lin-ch'ing he came under the control of the court eunuch Ma T'ang. In Peking, he was treated as a tribute envoy and the gifts he had brought for the court as tribute presents. Since the emperor gave no audiences, it is not clear what kind of ceremony was conducted. Ricci noted the farcical condition of the "tribute system," exploited by scores of Central Asian merchants as a means of gaining access to the markets of the capital. He managed to stay on in Peking, although the Board of Ceremonies pointed out that tribute envoys were supposed to depart soon after their audiences.⁷³ He was helped by the impression his clock, spinet, and other gifts had made in the Palace, as part of the vast network of pleasures and distractions the eunuchs wove around the emperor. Chinese friends, old and new, were assisting him in putting his writings into good Chinese, writing prefaces for his works, and reprinting them in the provinces. Sometimes searching for new spiritual insight, sometimes simply curious, visitors to the capital for examinations or other official business came to see him in a steady stream. The imperial gift of a burial ground after Ricci's death in 1610 was a further indication of the solid and respected position he had established at the court.

Unlike the Catholic missions under the Ch'ing, which experienced repeated reversals of fortune as a result of changes in court power and policies, the missionaries under the Ming were little affected by central government policy, but gradually expanded their enterprise on the basis of a very Chinese network

72 The exposition in this section is based primarily on Dunne, *Generation of giants*.

73 Chang Wei-hua, *Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi*, pp. 171–80.

of publishing, friendship, and patronage. By the end of the T'ien-ch'i reign, despite two episodes of anti-missionary policy, they had, in addition to the places listed above, mission outposts at Shanghai, Chia-ting, and Ch'ang-shu in Kiangsu, at Hangchow, and in Fukien, Shensi, and Shansi. Most had begun very quietly with a father living in the household of a sympathetic great man whom he had met in Nanking, Peking, or another mission.

Political opposition to the missionaries was instigated largely by Shen Ch'üeh, who became Vice-President of the Nanking Board of Ceremonies in 1615, a post that combined a minimum of actual responsibilities with a maximum of implied obligation to protect orthodoxy. In his memorial and those of his supporters, we already find allegations that the missionaries were forming a secret society like the White Lotus, were serving as spies and developing a fifth column of Chinese adherents for the aggressive purposes of the Europeans, and were enticing people with monetary rewards. Acting more in accord with his duty to defend the traditional ceremonial order, Shen condemned the use of the term *Ta-hsi-yang* (Great Western Ocean, Great Occident), which seemed to belittle China, the different calendar they used, their apparent encouragement of unfilial feeling and behavior, and their buying of property near the great Hsiao-ling tomb of T'ai-tsu.⁷⁴ In response, in 1617, an imperial edict ordered that all the missionaries should be sent back to their own countries. Shen had a good deal of power and support in Nanking, and there the missionaries were imprisoned and sent to Macao, while their converts suffered much imprisonment and mistreatment. There were signs of elite and popular anti-Christian feeling in a number of other places, but the elite protectors managed to keep the missionaries safe in their households. In Hangchow, Yang T'ing-yün even took in and sheltered a number of missionaries who had been forced to leave their posts in Peking and elsewhere.

In 1622 there was a brief revival of Shen Ch'üeh's career and his policies, which was abetted by the fiasco of the Macao cannoneers mentioned above and by the fears aroused by the large White Lotus rebellion in Shantung, but Shen soon fell from power and the missionaries once again were allowed to live in Peking. A major breakthrough came in 1629 with the appointment of Hsü Kuang-ch'i as vice-president of the Board of Ceremonies and his promotion to president of that Board in 1630. In 1629 he arranged a competitive comparison of predictions of a solar eclipse by the traditional Chinese, Muslim, and newly introduced European methods. The European method proved to be the only accurate one. Imperial approval was obtained for

74 *DMB*, pp. 1177–78; John D. Young, *Confucianism and Christianity: The first encounter* (Hong Kong, 1983), pp. 60–61.

reform of the calendar according to the European methods of calculation, and a team of Jesuits and Chinese scholars set to work under Hsü's direction on a large program of manufacture of instruments and translation of scientific books. The best Jesuit scientist, Johann Terrenz, died in 1630, and Johann Adam Schall von Bell and Giacomo Rho continued the work. The first calendar calculated according to the new methods was promulgated in 1634. The astronomical and calendrical work of the Jesuits turned out to be their most secure justification for keeping a presence in Peking and a connection with the court that allowed them to maintain the visibility in the capital of which Ricci already had made good use, to use their connections on behalf of other missionaries and of Macao, and even to make a few converts among the eunuchs and women of the Palace.

Under the umbrella of the Jesuits' good standing in the capital, their efforts prospered in Shansi and Shensi and extended into Hukuang, Szechwan, and Shantung. Spanish Dominicans and Franciscans entered China via the Spanish outposts at Keelung and Tamsui on the north end of Taiwan. Although they frequently were vehemently at odds with the Jesuits on mission policy, they too profited from the acceptance of the Jesuits in the capital and particularly from the reputation and political skills of Schall, and they established long-lasting mission centers in Shantung and in Fu-an, Fukien. Missionaries were more or less involved witnesses of several of the dramas of the Ming-Ch'ing transition. Two Jesuits had a harrowing ordeal as captives of the rebel Chang Hsien-chung in Szechwan. Another was summoned by the Ming Loyalist Lung-wu Emperor and sent off to Macao⁷⁵ in search of military aid. The Loyalist Yung-li Court, where the Empress and the eunuch, P'ang T'ien-shou, were converts, sent Michal Boym, SJ, to Rome as its envoy.⁷⁶ Jesuits reported on rural turmoil near Shanghai⁷⁷ and on the Ch'ing conquest of Canton.⁷⁸ Victorio Riccio, OP, left a long and fascinating record of his experiences at Amoy under Cheng Ch'eng-kung.

THE DUTCH ONSLAUGHT

The Dutch East India Company brought to Asian waters a level of centralized political and commercial decision-making and a bureaucratization of violence that went far beyond that of the Portuguese Estado da India. The Company's

75 *DMB*, p. 1151.

76 *DMB*, pp. 20–22.

77 Archivum Romanum Societatis Jesu, Archives of the Japan-China Province, Vol. 122, fols. 204–42, Antonio Gouvea, S. J. to Father General Vitelleschi, 16 August, 1645, at fols. 212–13.

78 Antonio Francisco Cardim, S. J., *Batalhas da Companhia de Jesus na sua Gloriosa Provincia do Japão*, ed. Luciano Cordeiro (Lisbon, 1894), pp. 37–40.

impact on some areas of Indonesia and on their Portuguese adversaries was devastating. In their relations with China, their centralized decision-making, dominated by lessons learned in Southeast Asia, made it harder for them to learn how to get along with the Chinese. That, and the way in which they brought their war with the Spanish-Portuguese monarchy to Far Eastern waters, produced a string of pointlessly violent onslaughts that left the “Red Hairs” (*hung-mao*) with a bad reputation to match that of the Fo-lang-chi. Later, they settled down to an uneasy symbiosis with the maritime Chinese in the opening up of Chinese settlement on Taiwan, a process of immense importance to the history of maritime China, but hardly noticed by most of the elite or by the Ming rulers, preoccupied with the terrible dramas of the collapse of the dynasty.

In 1601, a ship, sent by one of the precursor companies to the founding of the United Dutch East India Company, was blown past Patani on the Malay Peninsula and eventually anchored near Macao. Two parties sent ashore were taken captive by the Portuguese. Unable to send further messages ashore, the Dutch finally left the captives behind. One of the captives, according to the *Ming-shih*, was questioned by the eunuch tax commissioner Li Tao. Seventeen of the twenty were executed by the Portuguese. That such a small disturbance should be noted in the *Ming-shih* should remind us that the relatively rich Chinese documentation of European relations in the decade 1600–10 was a by-product of the elite’s preoccupation with its struggles against the eunuch mine and tax commissioners.⁷⁹

In 1604, the Company commander, Wijbrand van Waerwijck, met some Fukien merchants in Patani who told him they could arrange for the Dutch to be allowed to trade if they would give rich presents to the officials. Apparently, the merchants had the eunuch Kao Ts’ai particularly in mind. The Dutch squadron anchored in the Penghu Islands in August and messengers went back and forth. Kao Ts’ai sent word that permission to trade could be obtained for 40,000 to 50,000 reals. In October, however, the naval officer Shen Yu-jung arrived at the head of a fleet of fifty war-junks, and told the Dutch they would have to withdraw from Penghu, which was Ming territory, but that some kind of trading arrangement could be worked out if they would anchor on the coast of Taiwan.⁸⁰ The Dutch could find no suitable harbor there, and finally gave up and returned to Patani, leaving several of their

79 This section is based on W.P. Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China, Eerste Deel: De Eerste Bemoeiingen om den Handel in China en de Vestiging in de Pescadores, 1601–1624* (The Hague, 1898), and Chang Wei-hua, *Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi*, pp. 113–47.

80 This is obliquely confirmed by a Chinese text, Chang Wei-hua, *Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi*, p. 120, which quotes Shen saying to the Dutch, “The four seas are very wide, and there is no place where you cannot live.”

Fukienese middlemen in Chinese prisons; at least one was executed. To the scholars and civil officials, this had been just another case of collusion between eunuchs and sea-going Chinese desperadoes, that so closely paralleled the 1603 events at Manila, that the two occurrences were discussed in the same memorial.

When the Dutch tried to trade near Macao in 1607, they aroused Chinese fears that they might be in collusion with the Japanese, and they were finally driven off by the Portuguese. Thereafter, the Dutch preoccupied themselves with consolidating their positions in the Spice Islands and on Java, and had to get along with the supplies of Chinese goods which Chinese ships brought to Southeast Asian ports. Their attacks on Chinese shipping to Manila that occurred from 1619 to 1621, which attacks were part of their world war on the Iberian monarchy, must have left a few more “Red Hair” horror stories circulating in Fukien ports, but left no trace in surviving Chinese sources.

The Dutch returned to the offensive on the China coast in 1622 with the unsuccessful attack on Macao previously described. Their fleet then went on to occupy the Penghu Islands in July. There they began to build a fort. They also sent a messenger to Amoy with their amazing demands: Chinese merchants must be allowed to come to Penghu or Taiwan to trade. Chinese merchants also would be given Dutch passes for voyages to Batavia and perhaps also to Siam and Cambodia, but not to Manila. Any Chinese vessel sailing to Manila would be subject to capture and confiscation by the Dutch. Any delay in agreeing to these proposals would lead to attacks on Chinese shipping and coastal towns. The Dutch officers on the immediate scene soon came to understand that they could not bully the Ming Empire as they had often bullied some small Southeast Asian port kingdom, but the Dutch authorities in Batavia learned slowly, or not at all, and over and over again, their orders licensed episodes of irrational violence against those with whom they would have to cooperate to obtain trade.⁸¹

On 29 September 1622, the Dutch on Penghu received a letter from Shang Chou-tso, governor of Fukien. It said nothing, as far as the Dutch could tell, about permission to trade. When the Dutch began to talk about attacking the coast, the bearers of Shang’s letter suggested that something could be worked out if the Dutch would withdraw to some port on the coast of Taiwan. The Dutch rejected this, the solution already offered them in 1604 which they eventually would be forced to accept, and, in October and November, they plundered towns and burned junks in the area around Amoy. Chinese captives were put to work on the fort in Penghu, and some

81 On the Penghu episode see also Leonard Blussé, “The Dutch occupation of the Pescadores (1622–1624)”, *Transactions of the International Conference of Orientalists in Japan*, 18 (1973), pp. 28–44.

of the survivors later were shipped off to Batavia. Even so, Shang wrote to renew the suggestion that his envoys had made informally: something could be worked out, but not as long as the Dutch were occupying Penghu. Early in 1623, the Dutch commander Cornelis Reijersen visited Shang in Foochow, and they quickly came to an understanding. In the presence of a representative of the Fukien authorities, the Dutch would make a token beginning in the demolition of their fort on Penghu, which then would be reported to Peking with a recommendation that Chinese merchants be given passes to trade with the Dutch at a port on Taiwan. The Dutch might stay in Penghu until they found a suitable port on Taiwan, but no longer. Chinese envoys would be sent to Batavia to secure confirmation of this agreement.

In June 1623, however, Reijersen and Shang learned that their superiors in Batavia and Peking had both rejected the proposed agreement. Shang was dismissed from his office. The Dutch sent ships to cruise off Kwangtung and Fukien to capture Chinese shipping bound for Manila. Later instructions from Batavia, received in August, were somewhat more conciliatory, and Reijersen made further probes for renewed negotiations in August and in October, but on the latter occasion, some of the Dutch envoys were imprisoned and their ships were attacked by fire-ships. In January 1624, Dutch ships again raided along the coast south of Amoy. Beginning in February, 1624, a force of forty to fifty war junks carrying over 5,000 men gradually assembled in the northern part of the Penghu Islands. On 30 July, this force advanced to occupy all of the main island except the point where the Dutch fort stood. The Dutch, now cut off from their drinking water, had to negotiate in earnest. Li Tan, headman of the Chinese community in Hirado, Japan, and his young agent, Cheng Chih-lung, were very actively involved as intermediaries.⁸² By the end of 1624, the Dutch had completed their withdrawal from Penghu and were beginning to establish themselves in the area of modern Tainan. After much loss of life and property on both sides, they had accepted the solution that first had been offered them in 1604.

THE DUTCH AND THE SPANISH ON TAIWAN

In 1620, Taiwan was inhabited almost entirely by the various Malayo-Polynesian peoples whom we call the “aborigines”: some of them quite closely related to some of the peoples of Luzon a hundred miles to the south. They lived comfortably off the abundant fish and game and the modest harvests of their shifting cultivation. Chinese pirates occasionally based themselves

82 Iwao Seiichi, “Li Tan, Chief of the Chinese residents at Hirado, Japan in the last days of the Ming dynasty,” *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, Vol. 17 (1958), pp. 27–83.

on the coast, and Chinese and Japanese traders met regularly in some of the harbors. The Dutch were intruders and competitors, but might turn out to be tolerable, or even welcome neighbors, if they provided new and stable trade links among China, Japan, Southeast Asia, and even the distant markets of Europe. But, should they be so unperceptive as to try to have everything their own way with no consideration for the interests of their Chinese and Japanese trading partners, they would make themselves most unwelcome. Unfortunately, they were that obtuse. In 1627 and 1628, their efforts to collect tolls from the Japanese who had been trading at Taiwan before the Dutch arrived led to a dangerous quarrel and the Japanese authorities retaliated by prohibiting Dutch trade with Japan until 1632.⁸³

The Dutch difficulties with their Chinese trading partners down to 1636 resulted from their repeated overreactions to any Chinese trading practice that they suspected interfered with their “free trade” with all Chinese merchants and from the existence of a great deal of conflict among the would-be Chinese sea-lords. In particular, the Dutch repeatedly made plans to assist the Ming authorities against one “pirate” or another, their help to be rewarded by “free trade.” This led to much Dutch naval activity on the coast, which usually was, on balance, unwelcome to the authorities and to coastal residents, especially after the brutal Dutch raids of 1622–23. The only stable solution was for the Dutch to stay away from the coast, stay out of coastal politics, and make the best they could of whatever trade came to them. Those had been, after all, the terms of the original understanding of 1624.

Between 1628 and 1636 Cheng Chih-lung maneuvered and fought his way among old enemies and among past and present allies to a dominant position on the Fukien coast. The Dutch usually supported him against his enemies, but always were disappointed by the trade they got in return. Cheng simply was not yet in complete enough control of the situation to give them what they wanted. In 1633, a bellicose Dutch commander delivered an ultimatum to Cheng demanding relaxation of restrictions on trade, sailed off to Batavia without waiting for his reply, which was conciliatory, and returned in July to attack the fleet of the astonished Cheng. After two months of small actions and Dutch marauding along the coast, Cheng finally assembled his fleet for

83 For the first part of the Dutch period on Taiwan the most important source and guide to the literature is *De Dagregisters van het Kasteel Zeelandia, Taiwan, 1629–1662. Deel I: 1629–1641* eds. J. L. Blussé et al. (The Hague, 1986). Useful studies include Ts’ao Yung-ho, *Taiwan tsao-ch’i li-shih yen-chiu* (Taipei, 1979); John R. Shepherd, *Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, 1600–1800* (Stanford, 1993), chs. 2, 3; and Wen-hsiung Hsu, “From aboriginal island to Chinese frontier: The development of Taiwan before 1683.” In *China’s island frontier studies in the historical geography of Taiwan*, ed. Ronald G. Knapp (Honolulu, 1980), pp. 3–29. Specific citations for some assertions can be found in John E. Wills, Jr., “The Dutch Period in Taiwan History: A preliminary survey,” unpublished.

a full-scale attack on a Dutch squadron off Quemoy on 21 October. One Dutch ship was blown up and the rest retreated to Taiwan. The Dutch had been trying to cooperate with Cheng's rivals, especially one Liu Hsiang, but now rejected new overtures from him. He, then, attacked the Dutch fort on Taiwan in April 1634, but was beaten off.⁸⁴

A less dangerous challenge to the Dutch position on Taiwan came from the Spanish settlements on the north end of the island. The outpost at Keelung had been established in 1626 as a strategic move against Dutch power and as an effort to provide a center where Chinese merchants might come to trade with the Spanish without Dutch interference.

Another post was founded at Tamsui in 1629. The Spanish built a very solid stone fortress at Keelung and fairly substantial fortifications at Tamsui, and, in 1628, were reported to have 200 Spanish and 400 Filipino soldiers at Keelung, probably more than the Dutch could have mustered in the south. The Chinese did come to Keelung to trade, but, in 1630, they found that the Spanish had very little cash on hand with which to buy their silk. In 1633 the Spanish were able to buy as much silk as the Dutch had in some of their first years in Taiwan, but they were finding Keelung so unhealthy that about 100 Spanish and twenty Portuguese left for Manila later that year. Tamsui faced a good deal of aborigine hostility, and was abandoned in 1638. In August 1642, a force of 591 Dutchmen took the Keelung fortress, encountering little resistance from a decrepit garrison of 115 Spaniards and 155 Filipinos.

By 1636 Cheng Chih-lung had no really dangerous rival for naval supremacy on the Fukien coast, the Japanese conflict was settled, and the Company had sent over 400 fresh soldiers to Taiwan who, in a series of marches to the north and south in 1635–36, established firm Dutch domination over many more aborigine villages and vastly increased the zone that was safe for Chinese agriculture and commerce. A formidable stone fortress, Casteel Zeelandia, near modern Tainan, was completed and dedicated in 1639. Welcome reductions in competition for China–Japan trade resulted from the Japanese exclusion of the Portuguese and prohibition of all Japanese ocean voyages. Trade expanded very rapidly: in nineteen months, from late 1637 to early 1639, the Dutch received Chinese goods worth well over 1,000,000 taels.⁸⁵ A large part of these goods were paid for in Japanese silver. The volume of trade remained in this range until production and trade in China were disrupted by the Ming–Ch'ing wars.

84 Leonard Blussé, "The VOC as sorcerer's apprentice: Stereotypes and social engineering on the China coast." In *Leiden Studies in Sinology*, ed. W. L. Idema (Leiden, 1981), pp. 87–105.

85 Blussé, et al., *Dagregisters*, p. 451.

The growth of Chinese settlement and agriculture on Taiwan was a slower process. Chinese traders had been in the coastal aborigine villages when the Dutch arrived. Particularly welcome to the Dutch was the growing supply of deer hides, hunted or trapped by frontier Chinese or bought from the aborigines, which the Company bought for the Japanese market.⁸⁶ A very different mode of Chinese settlement emerged as rice and sugar cultivation expanded in the plains near the Dutch forts. Several big Chinese merchants did a great deal of investing and organizing. The most interesting figure among them was Su Ming-kang, the first chief of the Chinese community at Batavia, who resigned that position and moved to Taiwan in 1635. After 1644 a wave of refugees from the Ming-Ch'ing wars came across the Taiwan Strait. Some of them returned to the mainland as the fighting in the southeast began to die down, but there was another surge in the 1650s as Cheng Ch'eng-kung consolidated his power base on the Fukien coast and the Ch'ing increased their efforts to drive him out. The Chinese population was less than 4,000 in 1640, and over 14,000 in 1648.

In striking parallel to the Spanish at Manila, the Dutch levied a head tax on every Chinese. Beginning in 1645, monopolies of trade with various aborigine villages were distributed to local Chinese under a competitive bidding system that produced considerable revenue for the Company and much trouble for everyone in the 1650s. Around 1650, the Company's income from Taiwan came about one half from profits of trade and one half from tolls, head taxes, and so on. As the payments for the various monopolies rose as a result of competitive bidding, the tax collectors were more often in arrears or in debt. The violent practices of head-tax collectors, and especially their intrusions into households where the women were kept secluded, were bitterly resented.

In September 1652, all these tensions exploded in a large but poorly armed rebellion led by Kuo Huai-i. The Dutch, warned by seven of the headmen of the Chinese community, had only one night to muster their forces. The next morning Kuo's forces, over 4,000 strong, plundered the Dutch settlement at Saccam (Ch'ih-k'an), across the harbor from Casteel Zeelandia, and killed and mutilated eight Dutchmen and some slaves. But then, they broke and fled before the discipline and firepower of only 150 Dutch musketeers and never again offered coherent resistance. The Dutch and aborigines hunted out the fugitives, including one large group that was camped in the mountains, and "killed between 3,000 and 4,000 rebel Chinese in revenge for the

86 Thomas O. Höllman, "Formosa and the trade in venison and deer skins." In *Emporia, commodities, and entrepreneurs in Asian maritime trade, c. 1400-1750*, Beiträge zur Südasiensforschung, Südasiens-Institut, Universität Heidelberg, No. 141, eds. Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund (Stuttgart, 1991) pp. 263-90.

spilled Dutch Christian blood.” There are striking parallels here with the rebellions at Manila: the split between the rural population and the leaders who informed the Dutch, the resentment of tax collection practices, and the enthusiastic participation of indigenous troops in the slaughter.⁸⁷

In the 1650s, the profits of the Dutch Company from Taiwan became smaller and less consistent, largely as a result of Cheng Ch’eng-kung’s efforts to establish tight control over trade and shipping in the Taiwan Strait. Overproduction in the growing sugar industry was aggravated by a decline in European demand for Taiwan sugar as production revived in Brazil. The Company authorities in Batavia were more and more inclined to view Taiwan as a dubious asset, and thus less inclined to take serious measures to deal with the possibility of an invasion by Cheng Ch’eng-kung. Nothing they could have done, however, would have enabled them to withstand the large and well-disciplined army with which Cheng finally landed on Taiwan on 30 April 1661.

When Cheng’s troops landed, Dutch rule in most of Taiwan ended in a few days. In view of the many conflicts and irritations previously described, it is not surprising that most of the Taiwan Chinese seem to have welcomed Cheng as a liberator. The defenders of Casteel Zeelandia could do nothing but fend off Cheng’s attacks, receive some reinforcements from Batavia, and wait as Cheng Ch’eng-kung consolidated his control of the island, put many of his soldiers to work farming, and even collected from the Taiwan Chinese the debts they owed the Dutch. On 1 February 1662, the Dutch capitulated and were allowed to march out in good order and depart, leaving to Cheng the Company’s stores of money, arms, and trade goods. The Dutch presence on Taiwan had stimulated and accelerated the process of Chinese settlement there, but the Dutch had long ago outstayed their welcome. Taiwan had a Chinese ruler for the first time.

THE WORLD OF THE MARITIME CHINESE

The structure of this chapter seems to require dealing with its subject matter via a set of topics about relations between the various European nations or peoples and such vast and undifferentiated entities as the Chinese state or the Chinese people. Most of these relations took place, however, in a very special set of environments dominated by a very distinctive variant of Chinese cul-

87 Johannes Huber, “Chinese settlers against the Netherlands East India Company: The rebellion led by Kuo Huai-i on Taiwan in 1652.” In *Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the 17th and 18th centuries*, Sinica Leidensia, Vol. 22, ed. E. B. Vermeer (Leiden, 1990), pp. 265–96.

ture, economy, and politics: that of the maritime Chinese.⁸⁸ We have seen more of the maritime Chinese in their settlement centers away from China, such as Manila and Taiwan, than on the China coast itself. In addition to the famous Cheng family, we have encountered some named individuals, like Su Ming-kang and Kuo Huai-i on Taiwan, and the hapless Juan Bautista de la Vera in Manila. The fate of the latter is an excellent example of the hazards of the mediation across cultural and linguistic barriers that was a maritime Chinese specialty. We have also seen that many maritime Chinese took on sometimes more, sometimes less, of the clothing, customs, and religion of the Europeans under whom they settled.

The first Portuguese ventures east of India, we have seen, owed something to the Chinese who already were trading at Melaka when they arrived and who aided their efforts to go on to Siam and the China coast. In the 1540s and 1550s, the Portuguese shared a maritime world in crisis with a host of Chinese leaders who raided, traded, and negotiated with the government as opportunities shifted; our sources hardly ever allow us to identify a specific interaction. In 1600–05, offshore intriguers and entrepreneurs brought the Dutch to the Fukien coast for the first time and brought agents of the Ming state to Manila. And of course the Cheng family dominated Dutch relations with China as it dominated much of maritime China after 1625.

The achievements of the maritime Chinese away from the south China coast can be traced, frequently through the records of the Dutch or other Europeans, in many other ports of East and Southeast Asia: Nagasaki, Batavia, Banten, Ayudhya, Melaka, Makasar, and so on. Of these the most important for our story, the best studied, and perhaps the best documented, is Batavia. There had been a small Chinese settlement at Jakarta before the Dutch conquered it in 1619. Immediately after the Dutch victory, the formidable Governor-General, Jan Pietersz Coen, appointed Su Ming-kang, “Captain Bencon” to the Dutch, as headman of the Chinese community. Su and another highly capable leader whom the Dutch called Jan Con and whose Chinese name we do not know almost immediately began contracting with the Dutch to collect taxes on various forms of trading and activity, of which the tax on Chinese gambling was one of the earliest and most lucrative. Jan Con also began supplying lumber and stone for the new buildings and fortifications, hard work made more dangerous by attacks by the Banten-based enemies of the Dutch, and contracting with the Dutch to supply Chinese labor for the buildings, walls, and canals. There thus was a remarkable congruence

88 John E. Wills, Jr., “Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang: Themes in Peripheral History.” In *From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, region, and continuity in seventeenth-century China*, eds. Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr. (New Haven, 1979), pp. 204–38.

of interest among the leaders of the Chinese community, profiting from labor contracting, supply of building materials, and tax farming, and the substantial numbers of poor Chinese who were getting steady work on the building projects. In 1625, at Jan Con's suggestion, the Dutch began to levy a special tax of 3 reals on each Chinese, the proceeds of which were earmarked for construction projects and thus came back to the Chinese as wages, labor contracting profits, and payments for supplies of building materials. In addition the Chinese paid a capitation tax to obtain exemption from service in the local militia, which was farmed by the Chinese headmen. These two taxes came to provide over half the revenue from tolls and taxes at Batavia. By 1644, the Chinese headmen farmed nineteen of the twenty-four tolls, levies, and monopolies instituted by the Dutch at Batavia.

By the deaths of Jan Con in 1639 and Su Ming-kang in 1644, the Chinese community at Batavia was so prosperous that it no longer provided much of the heavy labor at Batavia. They maintained a complex network of trade with many ports, including quite a few where the Dutch were not allowed or could not afford to maintain a presence. They were making first efforts in salt production and sugar cultivation around Batavia which would lead to large-scale production later in the century. In the tense and intricate diplomacy of the Dutch with their Javanese enemies of Banten and Mataram, Chinese advisors on both sides frequently served as intermediaries. Batavia, like Manila and Casteel Zeelandia on Taiwan, was in many ways very much a "Chinese colonial town."⁸⁹

The energetic meetings of two worlds described in this chapter, the evolution of such complex Sino-European accommodations as Macao, Manila, and the early network of missionaries and converts, owed a great deal to maritime Chinese both on the China coast and in foreign ports, to astute and realistic officials, and to statesmen and intellectuals who were much more open to novelty and to interaction with foreigners than some clichés about Chinese culture would have us believe. In our increasingly interactive and transnational world, the study of the achievements and frustrations of these Chinese and of the amazing variety of brutal, devoted, astute, obtuse, brave Europeans with whom they interacted can provide rich food for thought.

89 Blussé, *Strange Company*, chs. 4, 5, 6.