

SILK AND SILVER: MACAU, MANILA AND TRADE IN THE CHINA SEAS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

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In the second half of the 16th century there developed a pattern of trade in the China Seas and the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos of which the two chief entrepôts were Portuguese Macau and Spanish Manila. Other centres were also involved, notably Japan in the north, Malacca, Timor and the Moluccas in the south and Mexico on the other side of the Pacific Ocean. All these places played a role in the development of a vast and complex trading network that depended primarily on supplying Macau and Manila with two commodities — silk and silver — which neither produced.

There was of course a highly developed trading system in the China Seas long before the Europeans arrived, but it so happened that they came on the scene just at a time when Chinese naval and commercial power was waning and Japan was in the midst of a period of feudal anarchy. It was therefore relatively easy for them to penetrate this system, and even at some points and for a limited period to dominate it. By the mid 15th century Chinese seapower had greatly declined and the famous mission of the eunuch-admiral Cheng Ho had no successors. The reasons for this decline are complex and need not detain us here. Suffice it to say that in 1420 the Ming navy consisted of some 3800 vessels. By the end of the century it had almost disappeared. By 1500, death was, at least in theory, the penalty for building a three-masted sea-going junk and in 1551 it was decreed that all communications with foreigners overseas would be treated as espionage.

Private trading by the eunuchs and others continued during this period, but in the face of increasing official hostility, and Chinese merchants trading in South East Asian ports had to conduct their

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affairs clandestinely. This greatly encouraged them to develop autonomous merchant communities with what amounted to extra-territorial rights. The most important of these Chinese merchant communities at the end of the 15th century was in Malacca.

Ships went to and from Malacca as far as India and China, trading in a wide variety of Indian and Chinese goods which were exchanged for the products of the Indonesian islands. Malacca, the "city made for merchandise", was essentially an entrepot the very existence of which depended upon its carrying trade. It had an excellent and easily defensible harbour, protected on either side by the narrow straits between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula and strategically placed, as Pires put it, at the end of one monsoon and the beginning of others.¹ When Afonso de Albuquerque captured Goa in 1510 he was quick to see that Malacca's unrivalled position as an emporium and as a centre for the dissemination of Islam in South East Asia made it essential that he gain control of it also. He could thus fulfil Portuguese obligations to the Holy See and acquire a base for their commercial activities in the archipelago, in particular the carrying trade in spices and other precious goods from Indonesia to Goa and Lisbon in which the Portuguese sought to gain a share, if not a monopoly.

At the other end of the maritime area with which we are here concerned was another important trading centre. This was the Ryukyu Islands. The inhabitants of these islands, known to the Europeans as Lequeos or Loochoos, were actively engaged in the carrying trade between the northern and southern parts of the area from the 13th to the mid 16th century. The islanders carried to the south Chinese porcelain, silks and other textiles, metal goods and drugs, Japanese weapons and armour, lacquer and gold, all of which they exchanged for spices, aromatic woods, dyewoods and exotic beasts and birds from the Indonesian archipelago — goods that they could sell in China for several hundred times the buying price.²

Technically this trade with China remained an imperial monopoly and was carried out under the pretence of tribute. As Ming seapower dwindled and piracy in the China Seas accordingly grew, and as the Portuguese extended their trading activities in the years following their conquest of Malacca in 1511 into the Indonesian archipelago and beyond — to the spice islands, to Timor and the Solor Islands, to Makassar and eventually to Macau — so the Ryukyu trade became increasingly circumscribed until it was con-

fined to the limited, though evidently still profitable, carrying trade between China and Japan.³

Conditions in Japan were no more conducive to an organised system of state trade than they were in China. The period from 1467 to 1568 was the age of the warring states, in which both the Emperor and his shoguns were powerless against the might of the regional war lords, the *daimyō*. Even amid the anarchy to which this state of affairs gave rise, merchant communities nevertheless flourished and cities such as Hakata, Hirado and Sakai prospered. Japanese exports to China included copper, sulphur and weapons, and their imports from China were chiefly raw silk and porcelain, both of which they considered superior to their own products, cash, drugs and books. Again, from the Chinese point of view this trade was technically tribute and the ships were officially dispatched by the Emperor, the Shogun, by great *daimyō* or monasteries, while the fitting out of the ships and the business arrangements were in the hands of the merchants of Sakai and Hakata, and chiefly to their profit.

As both Chinese policy became more restrictive and isolationist and the power of the shoguns grew weaker, so this Sino-Japanese trade collapsed and by the 1540s had been replaced by extensive piracy and smuggling. Pirates ranged up and down the coasts of China and the many offshore islands more or less unchecked. In Japan the *daimyō* and in China the mandarins connived at this illegal activity because it brought them considerable profits.⁴

Thus, when the Portuguese first arrived on the scene, they found great opportunities for acting as trading agents in goods which for various reasons could no longer be traded directly between the countries that produced them. They soon found that "there is as great a profit in taking spices to China as in taking them to Portugal". But they had to fit into existing trade patterns both in the inter-island trade of the Indonesian archipelago centred on Malacca and in the trade of the China Seas. Even in theory they were never able to attain a complete monopoly but had to trade in competition — and often in conflict — with the Asian traders already active in those waters. Within a few years of their conquest of Malacca the Portuguese had opened up direct trade relations with the spice islands and sent expeditions to the Lesser Sunda Islands in search of sandalwood. They also endeavoured to open relations with China. Their first attempt was a disaster and led to

the imprisonment of Tomé Pires, whom they had sent as ambassador to the Emperor, and to the closure of Canton until 1530 to all foreign commerce. Henceforth the Portuguese had to trade clandestinely around the Bay of Amoy and at Ningpo in Fukien in the various goods, notably pepper and sandalwood, for which no amount of imperial prohibitions could lessen the demand in China.⁵

The commercial losses suffered by the Chinese as a result of their isolationism and the prohibition of their own navigation were gains for the Portuguese. As the American scholar George D. Winius has aptly put it, "in the Atlantic the Portuguese were explorers; in the Indian Ocean they were conquerors and in the Far East they were businessmen".⁶ Before long their trading activities in the China Sea had developed sufficiently to make inadequate the temporary shacks and tents in which they stored and displayed their wares in such places as Shang-ch'uan (Portuguese Sanchao or São João, where St. Francis Xavier died of fever in 1552), and they began to press the Chinese authorities for a trading centre of their own. In 1555 the Jesuit Father Belchior Nunes Barreto described Shang-ch'uan as a centre for trade with the Chinese where "silk, porcelain, camphor, copper, alum and China-wood are bartered for many kinds of merchandise from this land" (i.e. Japan).⁷ In the previous year Leonel de Sousa had secured permission for regular trade with China on payment of customs dues and in 1557 the Portuguese were allowed to establish themselves at Ao-men (Gate of the Bay), otherwise known as Amacon, Macau or the City of the Name of God in China.⁸

There was no written agreement with the Chinese for the establishment of Macau as a Portuguese enclave in China and, though the Portuguese continued to pay rent to the Chinese government till 1849, their sovereign rights in Macau were not fully conceded till 1887. But from the outset, Macau's extra-territoriality was admitted in practice because it suited both parties to the agreement — the Portuguese because it gave them a secure place in a highly profitable commercial network and the Chinese because, as later with Hong Kong, they could now enjoy most of the benefit of foreign trade without having to abandon their restrictions on foreigners entering or Chinese leaving China.

A gate was erected across the isthmus joining Macau with the mainland — the *Porta do Cêrco* — upon which the Portuguese placed a grandiloquent inscription: "Dread our greatness and res-

pect our virtue".⁹ Through this gate the Chinese passed the food and other supplies needed by the inhabitants, but at other times they sealed the gate with strips of paper, allowing into China only those few Portuguese officials with authorisation and sending to Macau only customs officers.

The Portuguese in Macau were first given some official recognition by the Chinese government in 1582 when the new Viceroy of Canton and Kwangsi summoned Macau's chief officials to his court. They came with 4,000 cruzados worth of presents—velvets, crystals, mirrors and so on—and were informed that foreigners could continue to inhabit Macau provided they remained subject to the laws of the Empire.¹⁰

By 1585 the settlement had acquired full city status with its own municipal council (*Senado da Câmara*). The Senado was dominated by the *casados*, Portuguese who had retired from the service of the crown, married and settled permanently in Macau. These acted not only as agents for the Chinese traders but traded on their own account in pepper, cloves, sandalwood and other goods from the Indonesian islands and financed voyages to Manila and to Japan in the so called Great Ship from Amacon. Macau was not under royal control and was not ruled by *fidalgos* sent out from Portugal or Goa, so that the interests of the Portuguese government were seldom, if ever, allowed to prevail. The Crown had to be content with a share in the profits from the annual voyages that it financed and the revenues from customs, duties and license fees levied on the merchants.¹¹

The overall command of the government of Macau was in the hands of the Captain-major of the Japan voyage, who would spend some months in Macau each year en route to Japan from Goa via Malacca—from one end of the Estado da India to the other. As the Portuguese Crown seldom got more than the commissions and port duties paid in Goa and Malacca, the Captain-major was able to amass a large fortune for himself. He was, however, only permitted to operate a single ship during his term of office so he would ensure that it was the largest ship available. This ship he would load at Goa with Gujerati cottons, chintzes and other Indian textiles, woollen and scarlet cloths, wine, glassware, crystal and Flemish clocks. He would sail with the monsoon in April or May to Malacca, where much of his cargo would be traded for Indonesian spices, camphor and sandalwood and hides from Siam. Thence he

would go to Macau, where this cargo would be trade for Chinese silk, porcelain, gold, musk, rouge and rhubarb. The ship would stay in Macau for almost a year if it missed the southwest monsoon or the silk fairs in Canton, held in June and January, where the finer silks from central China were sold. On the next monsoon, between June and August, the Captain-major would set out for Japan. In Japan, successively at Bungo, Hizen and Omura and after 1571 at Nagasaki, the Chinese goods would be sold for Japanese silver, gold, copper (which was chiefly used for casting cannon in the famous foundry of Manuel Tavares Bocarro in Macau), lacquer, painted screens, swords and other weapons, and slaves, including Korean prisoners of war. In November, the ship would catch the northeast monsoon back to Macau, where the silver acquired in Japan would be exchanged for gold, copper, ivory, pearls and more Chinese silk. From Macau the captain-major would return to Goa. The bulk of the cargo from Macau to Japan was at first raw silk, but woven silks and damasks were increasingly exported during the 17th century. There was generally sufficient silk left over after trading in Japan to supply India, Europe (via Goa) and Spanish America (via Manila).¹²

The Chinese demand for silver was, as we have seen, insatiable. A factor of the English East India Company wrote in 1636 that the Chinese, "will as soon part with their blood" as silver once they had possession of it.¹³ Japan possessed rich silver mines in Honshu and the ratio of the value of silver to gold in Japan was about 12 : 1, approximately the same as in Europe. China, however, possessed very little silver and was willing to acquire it in exchange for gold at about 5½ : 1.¹⁴ Thus, the Portuguese could trade spices for Chinese silks and porcelains, sell these to the Japanese, who prized them above their own products, together with some European goods such as firearms, in exchange for silver and, finally, exchange the silver in China for gold at a very favourable rate. The total ban imposed by China in 1557 on all direct trade with Japan, and the continuing raids by Japanese pirates on the China coast, enabled the Portuguese to gain a virtual monopoly of this Sino-Japanese trade and the annual silver exports from Japan in the Great Ship from Amacon reached a value of about 1 million cruzados by the end of the 16th century. The restoration of strong central government in Japan under Oda Nobunaga, who occupied Kyoto in 1568, brought about a decrease in piracy and a consequent increase in the volume of

legitimate trade that could be allowed to the Portuguese. Portuguese ships were indeed used both by the Chinese and Japanese for suppressing local pirates.

There was keen competition among the *daimyō* of Kyushu to attract the Great Ship from Macau to their fiefs. In 1562 Omura Sumitada gave what amounted to extra-territorial rights to the Portuguese at Yokoseura and soon after was baptised with the name of Dom Bartholomeu. Yokoseura was however destroyed in 1564 by some anti-Christian merchants from Bungo and the Great Ship was diverted to Hirado. In 1568 Jesuit missionaries first visited Nagasaki, then a small fishing village in a wood belonging to a Christian vassal of Omura Sumitada. It provided excellent anchorage and in 1571 the Great Ship called there for the first time. From then on it was the chief port in Japan for the Macau trade and by 1580 had become a large settlement with an entirely Christian population. In that year Omura offered possession of Nagasaki to the Jesuits, reserving only the shipping dues for himself.

From about 1578 the Macaonese began to make use of the Jesuit missionaries, then gaining rapidly in influence in Japan, to market their goods. As the Italian Fr. Valignano wrote to his superiors in 1580: "After the grace and favour of Goa, the greatest help we have had hitherto in securing Christians is that of the Great Ship For as the Lords of Japan, even though they have much land, are very poor in revenue and ready money and the benefits they derive when the ships come to their ports are very great.they try hard to entice them to their fiefs".¹⁵ The Jesuits indeed depended for most of their revenue on this investment in the Macau-Japan trade. By an agreement of 1578 with the Macau merchants they were allotted a share of 50 piculs in the annual cargo of 1600 piculs of raw silk.¹⁶ These 50 piculs brought a profit of about 1600 cruzados. There was much opposition to this arrangement — from the Mendicant Orders, particularly the Spanish Friars in the Philippines, from the Jesuit General in Rome and even from some of the more scrupulous merchant *casados* in Macau, but it survived at least until 1614, when the first decree of the Tokugawa Ieyasu banishing all foreign and Japanese missionaries from Japan was issued, and it gave the Portuguese an edge over their English, Dutch and Spanish rivals.¹⁷

Meanwhile, the Philippines were being brought under Spanish rule by force and the missionary work of the religious orders. The

Philippines was a colony within a colony, being financed and administered not from Madrid but by the government of Nueva España in Mexico. The islands produced little except small quantities of wax, ginger, cinnamon and gold, and the entire Spanish military and administrative establishment had therefore to be subsidised from Mexico. Apart from the missionaries, who were scattered fairly widely over the archipelago and later became the principal landowners in the Philippines, there were no Spanish settlements of any consequence outside Manila and the colony's sole economic—as opposed to spiritual—justification was the existence of Manila, which therefore grew rapidly and soon became the metropolis of the whole archipelago. Its excellent harbour facilities and its proximity to the rich rice-producing hinterland of central Luzon had made it a natural centre for government and commerce in the first place. By 1650 the population of the Spanish walled city of Intramuros and the suburbs where the Chinese and Filipinos lived was about 42,000.

For about 200 years the Manila galleon sailing between Manila and Acapulco in Mexico was the economic mainstay of the Spanish colony in the Philippines. The galleon trade was based on the exchange of Chinese silks, for which there was an almost limitless demand in Mexico, and Mexican silver, for which, as we have seen, there was an equally insatiable demand in China.

To the galleon trade the substantial Chinese immigration into the Philippines, which has significantly altered the ethnic composition of the Filipinos, must also be attributed. Already by the 1580s the Sangleyes, as the Chinese settlers were called, had been assigned a separate quarter of the city—the Parian or market place—which soon became the commercial centre of Manila. The Chinese rapidly gained a virtual monopoly of retail business in the city and dominated the craft trades. The galleons also brought to the Philippines the clergy needed for the propagation of Christianity in the islands and many new crops and animals from the New World, including maize, cattle, goats and horses.¹⁸

The voyage across the Pacific was made almost annually from the foundation of Manila and in 1593 was regulated at two ships a year from Acapulco to Manila. This pattern was maintained more or less continuously right up till the end of Spanish rule in Mexico. Very large ships were used for the voyage; vessels of up to 1000 tons are recorded from 1614.¹⁹

Originally the Spanish had hoped to gain a share of the Moluccan spice trade from Manila, but the Portuguese and later the Dutch were too strongly entrenched and the trade with China soon became virtually the Philippines' only economic resource. Silk and other Chinese goods were brought to Manila at first by Chinese junks and after about 1604 also by Portuguese ships from Macau. In the 1630s the annual value of imports from Macau to Manila averaged about 1.5 million silver pesos. At the end of the 16th century between 40 and 50 large seagoing junks were still coming yearly to Manila from Fukien bringing Chinese goods, which they sold for Mexican and Peruvian silver pesos and rials-of-eight.²⁰ In 1573, for example, the two galleons bound for Acapulco carried 712 bolts of Chinese silk and 22,300 pieces of fine china gilt and other porcelain wares.²¹

Although the Manila merchants gained enormous profits from this trade, the government of the colony had an annual deficit of between 85 to 350 thousand pesos. The Mexico treasury made up this deficit with silver bullion, much of which found its way into the coffers of the Chinese merchants. This tremendous drain on Spanish resources led to various proposals being put forward to abandon the Philippines altogether. The merchants of Seville, who enjoyed a monopoly of the trans-Atlantic carrying trade with Nueva España, and the Andalusian textile manufacturers, who feared that Mexico and Peru would be flooded with cheap Chinese silks, were especially hostile to the Philippine colony. In the end, they succeeded only in having the trade restricted to the Manila-Acapulco route, the trade between Mexico and Peru abolished, and the value of the goods to be shipped annually from Manila to Acapulco restricted to 250,000 pesos, which was deemed a large enough quota to maintain the Philippine colony and small enough to be easily absorbed in Mexico. In practice, however, the value of the goods shipped from Manila was closer to 2 million pesos a year, the quantity of merchandise loaded being determined not by royal decree but by the amount of cargo space available on the galleons. The Chinese packers were extremely skilled at cramming goods into the galleons, with resulting overlading, which caused many shipwrecks. Individual seamen were also each allowed to carry one chest, which, as one contemporary wryly observed, had a most expansive capacity.²² Space on the galleons was bought by a few wealthy entrepreneurs and by groups such as the cathedral chapter and charitable foundations such as orphanages and hospitals, which often amassed enough

wealth thereby to act as bankers to the shippers. Profits were seldom less than 100 and often as much as 300 per cent. In return the galleons from Acapulco brought about 2 million silver pesos to the Philippines in an averagely good year.²³

In 1580, with the death of the Cardinal King Henry of Portugal, the crowns of Spain and Portugal were united in the person of Philip II. In the Indies as well as in Europe, the Cortes of Tomar of 1581 guaranteed completely separate Portuguese and Spanish administrations and made direct trade between the Spanish and Portuguese possessions overseas illegal. Both in Manila and Mexico there were many who wished to engage in direct trade with China, but the Portuguese argued that this would ruin their commerce in the Far East and that Spain would also suffer, as all the silver from Nueva España would go to China and not to Spain or the Philippines.²⁴ They also claimed it would mean the ruin of the Portuguese Jesuit missions in Japan, since, as a bishop in the Philippines remarked, "all these affairs are moved by but one wheel, namely Macau".²⁵

Direct voyages were even made occasionally from Macau to Acapulco, though these caused great scandal in official circles. In 1589, D. João da Gama made the first crossing of the Pacific from Macau but on arrival in Acapulco was imprisoned and his goods impounded.

Requests made by the leading citizens of Manila to make voyages to "Japan, Macau and all other kingdoms and posts, whether Portuguese or pagan" were not granted.²⁶ The government in Madrid accepted that Japan lay within the Portuguese sphere of influence and that Macau had a monopoly of the Japan trade, while at the same time the Macaonese consistently thwarted all Manila's attempts to gain a trading base on the China coast which would have competed with theirs. The Cantonese officials did finally allow the Spanish to settle at a place they called El Pinal on the coast between Canton and Macau; its exact whereabouts are unknown. The Portuguese informed the Chinese that the Spaniards were "robbers and insurrectionaries who raise revolts in the kingdoms they enter" and then attempted to drive them out of El Pinal. Though this attack was staved off, El Pinal was nevertheless abandoned shortly afterwards.²⁷

By about 1610 some direct, though intermittent, trade had developed between Nagasaki and Manila. Most of it was conducted in

Japanese junks owned or commanded by Portuguese interlopers. Much of their cargo consisted of supplies such as wheat-flour, salted meat and fish, but also woven silk, screens, cutlery, arms and armour, and lacquer ware. Some of the supplies were used to furnish the ships sailing to Mexico. Payment was made by the Spaniards in silver rials and the Japanese traders took back raw Chinese silk, gold, deerskins, brazil-wood, palmwine, Spanish wine, glass and other European curiosities as well as old Chinese pottery and porcelain found in graves in the Philippines and used by connoisseurs of the tea ceremony.²⁸

The Macaonese felt themselves threatened by this trade between Manila, China and Japan — particularly the re-export of Chinese silk from Manila — but they were of course keen to continue trading with Manila themselves. Portuguese ships, sometimes sailing from India via Macau, would come every year to Manila with African slaves, Indian cottons, spices, amber, ivory, precious stones, toys and curiosities from India, Persian and Turkish carpets, gilded furniture made in Macau and “other commodities of great curiosity and perfection”.²⁹

In 1624 the Viceroy rejected the petition of the Senado of Macau that the Manila voyages be officially sanctioned but the Macau-Manila trade in silk was sufficiently profitable to both sides for it to survive all bans. It remained in Portuguese hands and there were in consequence some who advocated Macau transferring its allegiance from Portugal to Spain.³⁰ In 1625 the Spanish founded a settlement which they called La Santissima Trindad at Keelung on the northern tip of Taiwan, partly as a counterweight to the Dutch settlement of Fort Zeelandia established in Taiwan the previous year and partly as an entrepot for the Chinese silk trade which they hoped might eventually supersede Macau. The Governor of the Philippines, D. Fernando de Silva, stated in 1626 that the Dutch had already diverted much of the carrying trade in silk to Fort Zeelandia. “This damage is clearly seen”, he wrote, “from the fact that the fifty Chinese ships which have come to these islands have brought less than forty piculs of silk, whereas the enemy have 900 excluding the textiles and, if it were not for what has been brought from Macau the ships from Nueva España would have nothing to carry”.³¹ The shortlived Spanish attempt to lessen Manila’s dependence on Macau ended with the fall of La Santissima Trindad to the Dutch in 1642.

In 1629 the Viceroy Conde de Linhares ordered that both the Macau-Nagasaki and Macau-Manila voyages should henceforth be made under the supervision and control of the Crown and the profits from them used for the upkeep of the royal dockyard at Goa and the maintenance of the Portuguese fleet in Asian waters, but it was not until 1635 that an administrator for the voyages was sent from Goa to Macau to enforce the new system.³² In the same year the Viceroy finally agreed to allow one pinnace to make the Macau-Manila voyage each year, laden with munitions for the Manila garrison and enough silk for local consumption in the Philippines without any any surplus for export to Mexico, where it would compete with silks from Seville.

By the end of the 16th century Macau's trade was already being threatened from several quarters. On the one hand, the development of the Manila-Japan trade, the increasing power and cohesion of the Japanese state under the Tokugawa and the encouragement of a Japanese merchant navy by Tokugawa Ieyasu — the famous *Angust Red Seal ships*³³ — and, above all, the growing hostility of the shoguns towards Christianity and the missionary activities of Portuguese Jesuits and Spanish friars undermined Macau's trade with Japan. On the other hand, competition from the Dutch, whose control of the Straits of Malacca made trade and communications between Macau and Goa difficult and dangerous and whose establishment in Taiwan after 1624 extended this danger into the China Seas, had a deleterious effect on Macau's trade with Indonesia. The extortions of the Chinese merchants, who also of course carried on direct trade in competition with the Portuguese, licitly or illicitly, both with Japan and Manila, weakened Macau's position still further. Between 1613 and 1640, an average of 60 to 80 Chinese junks visited Japan yearly, though from 1634 they were, like the Portuguese, confined to Nagasaki. These difficulties culminated in the summary expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1639 by the Shogun Iematsu and in the fall of Malacca to the Dutch in 1641. The embassy sent from Macau in 1640 in a last attempt to get Iematsu to revoke his edict of expulsion met a terrible fate. 61 of the 74 members of the delegation were beheaded by 61 executioners sent specially from Yedo to Nagasaki for the purpose. A contemporary Portuguese account of how the citizens of Macau reacted to the news of the calamity sums up well the peculiar quality of the whole Portuguese adventure in the East, its mixture of missionary zeal and

commercial acumen, of piety and profit. It demonstrates how in Macau as elsewhere in their far flung empire, the Portuguese desire to win both converts to Christianity and fortunes by trade went hand in hand.

The Macaonese received the news with "tears of joy in their eyes, congratulating each other on such a piece of good fortune, especially the families and relatives of the martyrs, all of whom dressed not in mourning but in gala clothes. They did not shut the windows of their houses from grief, but opened them wide, placing many lights in them, and sounding shawms and other musical instruments for many days, singing many tuneful songs as a sign of their joy. It is a most noteworthy thing that, as the welfare, maintenance and almost the very existence of this city depends chiefly on the Japan trade, if the news that the embassy had failed in its purpose had come without that of this glorious triumph, the citizens of Macau would have been aghast and their spirit would have sunk to their shoes. With this glorious news, however, everyone rejoiced exceedingly and nobody spoke sadly or showed any sorrow because the trade was not reopened. On the contrary, they all rejoiced in the comforting thought that they had their ambassadors in Heaven, hoping with good reason that through their intercession, God would cast his eyes on that commonweal to save and sustain it, either by restoring the Japan trade or by opening some other way for its preservation".³⁴

FOOTNOTES

¹ Tomé Pires *Suma Oriental*. Trans. and ed. Armando Cortesão. 2 vols. Hakluyt Society 2nd series. LXXXIX, 1944. I, p. 286.

² Pires, *op. cit.* I pp. 128-134. João de Barros. *Da Asia, dos feitos que os Portuguezes fizeram no descubrimento das terras e mares do Oriente*. Ed. N. Pagliarini 3 vols. Lisbon, 1777-1778. III. 2. ch. 8.

³ O. H. K. Spate. *The Spanish Lake*. London, 1979, pp. 147-148.

⁴ On Sino-Japanese relations and European dealings with the Japanese in the 16th century see C. R. Boxer, *The Christian Century in Japan*. University of California Press and Cambridge University Press, 1951, G. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan*, London 1950, Idem, *A History of Japan 1334-1615*, London, 1961, J. Murdoch, *A History of Japan II, 1542-1651*, London 1949, M. Cooper S.J. (ed.), *The Southern Barbarians*. Tokyo, 1971, especially D. Pacheco S.J. 'The Europeans in Japan, 1543-1640', Knauth, *Confrontación Transpacífica. el Japon y el Nuevo Mundo Hispanico*. Mexico, 1972, and Kuchi Matsuda, *The relations between Portugal and Japan*. Lisbon, 1965.

⁵ See Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 151, Tien-tse Chang, *Sino-Portuguese trade from 1514-1644*. Leyden, 1934, pp. 35-38 and 54-56 and Boxer, *South China in the sixteenth century. Being the narratives of Galeote Pereira, Fr. Gaspar da Cruz, O.P., Fr. Martin de Rada, O.E.S.A. 1550-1575*. Hakluyt Society. 2nd series. CVI, pp. xiv-xx.

⁶ Bailey W. Duffie and George D. Winius. *Foundations of the Portuguese empire 1415-1580*. University of Minnesota Press and Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 380.

⁷ *Cartas que os Padres e Irmaos da Companhia de Jesus escreverao dos Reynos de Japao e China desde anno de 1549 até o de 1580*. Evora, 1598. Quoted in Boxer. *The Great Ship from Amacon. Annals of Macao and the old Japan trade 1555-1640*. Lisbon, 1963, p. 22.

⁸ For accounts of the foundation and early history of Portuguese Macau see Duffie and Winius *op. cit.*, pp. 381-392, Jose Maria Braga. *The western pioneers and their discovery of Macao*. Macao, 1949, pp. 102-139, A. Ljungstadt. *An historical sketch of the Portuguese settlements in China*. Boston, 1836, pp. 30-46, Boxer. *Fidalgos in the Far East 1550-1770*. Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 12-29.

⁹ Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

¹⁰ Ljungstadt, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

¹¹ See Boxer. *Portuguese society in the Tropics. The Municipal councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia and Luanda 1510-1800*. University of Wisconsin Press, 1965, pp. 42-71. See also Montalto de Jesus. *Historic Macao*. Hong Kong, 1902, pp. 37-40.

¹² On the Captains-major see Boxer *Great Ship*, pp. 8-11 and 179-241, and Idem. *Christian century*, p. 106.

¹³ H. Boinford writing from Surat to the East India Company of London. 29 April 1636. Quoted in Boxer. *Great Ship*, p. 1.

¹⁴ Boxer, *Christian century*, pp. 426-427 and 464-465.

¹⁵ Quoted in Boxer. *Christian century*, p. 93. Padre Lourenço Mexia in his report for 1580 makes an almost identical comment. See Boxer, *Great Ship*, p. 40.

¹⁶ *Viceregal provisao* of 18 April 1584.

¹⁷ Boxer, *Great Ship*, p. 39.

¹⁸ See John Leddy Phelan. *The Hispanization of the Philippines. Spanish aims and Filipino responses*. University of Wisconsin Press, 1959, pp. 11-12, 42, 101-102 and P. Chaunu. *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques*. Paris, 1960, pp. 43-46.

¹⁹ Spate, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-164.

²⁰ For a detailed list of Chinese goods brought to Manila see Dr. Antonio de Morga. *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*. Mexico, 1609. Trans. and ed. Hon. H. E. J. Stanley. Hakluyt Society. First series. XXXIX, 1868, pp. 337-339.

²¹ W. L. Schurz. *The Manila galleon*. New York, 1939, p. 27.

²² Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

²³ Boxer, *Great Ship*, p. 170.

²⁴ Investigations at Manila concerning trade with Macau. In E. H. Blair and J. A. Robertson (eds.), *The Philippine Islands 1493-1803*. 55 vols. Cleveland, Ohio, 1905. VIII. pp. 174-196.

²⁵ Miguel de Benevides, Bishop of Nueva Segovia to the King. Tulac, 17 May 1599. In Blair and Robertson, *op cit.* X. p. 193.

²⁶ Memorial to the Council. 26 July 1586. In Blair and Robertson, *op cit.* VI. p. 169.

²⁷ See Morga, *op cit.*, pp. 136-149, Boxer, *Fidalgos*, pp. 46-47, Idem, *Great Ship*, pp. 61-62, Spate, *op cit.*, pp. 163-164.

²⁸ Morga, *op cit.*, p. 341 and Boxer, *Great Ship*, p. 73.

²⁹ Morga, *op cit.*, pp. 341-342.

³⁰ Boxer, *Great Ship*, p. 111.

³¹ D. Fernando de Silva to the King. 30 July 1626. In *Boletín de la Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid*. XII. pp. 142 sqq. Quoted in Boxer, *Great Ship*, p. 144. For an account of Fort Zeelandia see F. R. J. Verhoeven, *Bijdragen tot de oudere koloniale geschiedenis van het eiland Formosa*. The Hague, 1930.

³² Boxer, *Great Ship*, p. 117.

³³ On the Red Seal ships see Boxer. *Christian century*, pp. 261-267 and N. Peri. *Essai sur les relations du Japon et de l'Indochine aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*. Hanoi, 1923.

³⁴ Antonio Francisco Cardim S.J. *Relação der gloriosa morte de quatro embaixadores portuguezes da cidade de Macao com sincoenta e sete Christãos de sua Companhia... a tres de Agosto de 1640*. Lisbon, 1643. Quoted in Boxer, *Great Ship*, pp. 165-166.