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Macao: The Shadow Land

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RECONSIDERATIONS

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Macao The Shadow Land *Kenneth Maxwell*

Fifty miles across the Pearl River estuary from Hong Kong lies the ancient city of Macao. First settled by the Portuguese in the 1550s, it will be handed back to China on December 20, 1999. This small European enclave on the South China Sea played a small and long forgotten role in U.S. history; on July 3, 1844, the first Chinese-American treaty, known as the Treaty of Wang Xia, was negotiated and signed here. Two and a half years ago, the Chinese made much of the fact that their recuperation of sovereignty over Hong Kong marked the final abrogation of the 1842 Chinese-British Treaty of Nanjing, whereby China had ceded Hong Kong to Queen Victoria "in perpetuity" and was forced to pay \$12 million for having "obliged" the British to wage war on them, as well as compensation to the tune of an additional \$6 million for the cost of the opium seized from British merchants and destroyed by the Chinese authorities—the original *casus belli* of the "Opium War."

In contrast, the Treaty of Wang Xia was not punitive; and the United States—with its own anticolonial past strongly in mind—acquired the same "most favored nation" status in China that the British enjoyed, not by force of arms but by convincing the Chinese that it sought no unfair advantage and, above all, did not seek territory.

In July 1844, Caleb Cushing, a congressman from Massachusetts and a forceful advocate for the China trade merchants of his state, and the Imperial commissioner Qiying met at the old Temple of Kun Iam, which today faces onto a busy avenue toward the center of the small peninsula on

which Macao stands. At that time, the temple lay within the Chinese village of Wang Xia, just outside the seventeenth-century walls of Macao city but well inside the territory controlled by the Portuguese. Kun Iam, as she is known in Macao, is the Buddhist Kwan Yin, Goddess of Mercy and Queen of Heaven. The image of the goddess, dressed in the robes of a Chinese bride, is set above the altar table in the smoky inner third chamber of the temple, where, on a side wall, a long glass case contains the gold lacquer figures of 18 Chinese wise men, including Marco Polo—whose statuette has bulging round eyes, a largish nose, and a small curly beard intended to denote his European origin. Beyond the temple's maze of shrines, lies a garden with a round stone table, four simple granite stools, and a plaque written in Chinese that mark the spot where the treaty of "peace, amity, and commerce" was signed by Caleb Cushing and Qiying.

The Treaty of Wang Xia gave American cargo ships access to the five Chinese treaty ports, only recently forced open to foreigners as a result of the Opium War, and it also gave Americans the right to construct hospitals, churches, and cemeteries in China, a privilege the missionaries who served as Caleb Cushing's translators in Macao were especially anxious to obtain. The Imperial commissioner Qiying had been China's representative at the acrimonious Nanjing negotiations, and his large entourage of soldiers, servants, officials, and advisors was lodged at the Temple of Kun Iam during the negotiations with Cushing.

The Treaty of Wang Xia, which governed the American relationship with China until 1905, committed the United States and China "to a perfect reciprocity" and was concluded with the utmost cordiality in less than two weeks. As Qiying wrote to Cushing when inviting him to take "fruit and tea" at the temple of Kun Iam: "This conduct is vastly different from that of the English taking and keeping possession of Hong Kong...."

The British officials based in Hong Kong had implied that the Chinese could not be trusted to police their own agreement since it was insinuated in London that they had signed one document with the British, but then published a different version for the use of their own customs officials. Cushing thought it "a harsh construction to suspect the Chinese of such an act." The problem, he thought, had more to do with the "want of care on the part of the English translators." Daniel Webster, the U.S. secretary of state, had given Cushing careful instructions: "You are a messenger of peace, sent by the greatest power of America to the greatest empire in Asia to offer respect and good will and to establish the means of friendly intercourse." It is a pity that no senior U.S. public official in recent decades has taken the short helicopter flight to Macao across the Pearl River estuary from Hong Kong and stopped by at the Kun Iam Temple. It would do no harm at all to think back to the Treaty of Wang Xia once in a while, or to the good will the United States could once count on, in its less bellicose days.

The Midas Tale

The territory of Macao today consists of a tiny, densely populated peninsula of just over two square miles and two islands: Taipa, of 2.2 square miles, and Coloane, of three square miles. Its population is about 430,000, of which 97 percent are Chinese. Lisbon had wanted the transfer of Macao to China to take place in 2007 and mark the

four hundred and fiftieth anniversary of their settlement on the south China coast, but the Chinese wished to have the matter settled before the end of the millennium.² The British mandarins of Whitehall, who could not come to terms with the fact that the Portuguese flag will fly over Macao longer than the Union Jack flew over Hong Kong, and smarting from accusations that they blundered in their reading of Chinese intentions and "lost" Hong Kong prematurely, were quick to claim that the Portuguese had sold out to the Chinese long ago.³ Sir Percy Craddock, former British ambassador to Beijing and advisor to Margaret Thatcher on China policy while she was prime minister, called Portuguese authority in Macao "a ghostly sham." The Portuguese in Macao, however, have been long used to such snootiness from the British who often forget that they arrived in China as drug dealers, not democrats. The British inhabitants of Hong Kong in the 1850s called Macao "an unrecognized and unpermitted, but unchallenged squatting, on an undefined portion of Chinese territory."

In many ways, of course, they were right. Lisbon was always very far away and the Chinese very close at hand. Yet Macao had been most convenient to the British for the century before their own forceful annexation of Hong Kong. Prior to that date, the Chinese denied foreign merchants the right to remain year round at the great trading city of Guangzhou (Canton), and Macao was absolutely essential to British merchants, or to any other European or American merchants for that matter, if they wanted an entrepôt from which to sell Indian opium and purchase Chinese tea. The ambiguity of Macao's status suited all parties.

The Portuguese arrived in the Pearl River estuary as early as 1513, although Macao itself was not settled by them until 1557. The initiative for its founding came from the merchants of Malacca, seized by Afonso de Albuquerque in 1511, giving the Portuguese a stronghold on the critical sea pas-

sage between the South China Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Initially, Macao's prosperity rested on its strategic location on the trade route from Goa through Malacca to Japan. No less important was access to Guangzhou, the great outlet for South China silk, porcelain, and lacquer ware, a three-to-five-day voyage some 80 miles up the Pearl River from Macao.

Climatic conditions were also important for Macao. As the Northern Hemisphere tilts on its axis toward the sun in the early spring, the Asia landmass warms and the rising heated air creates a low-pressure zone, drawing the cooler, denser air from the ocean, creating the southern monsoon, which blows up the Indian Ocean and eastward and northward along the China coast. In the autumn the process is reversed. For centuries, seaborne traders took advantage of the monsoons, moving north and east to arrive off the southern coast of China in the spring and summer, and departing for South and Southeast Asia in the winter. The Canton fairs of January and June were held to coincide with the monsoons.

The Portuguese, who saw Macao always from the seaward end of the peninsula, named it after the seaward-facing temple of A Ma. The Chinese, looking out to the peninsula from the mainland, named the narrow sand spit and the hills of the peninsula beyond after the stem and bud of a lotus flower. The Chinese found the Portuguese both peculiar and fearsome. "They are white and black," one Chinese observer noted. "The faces are pink, and their hair is all white. Even the young appear as white as snow." The Chinese were impressed by the European's "beaklike noses, deep-set green eyes, piercing and unblinking like a cat's." The African slaves the Portuguese brought with them the Chinese claimed were "generally similar to humans." The Chinese believed that the Portuguese were cannibals, kidnapped children, and were quickly roused to anger and violence, at which time they ceased to be human and became wild ani-

mals.⁴ The Chinese also had a healthy respect for Portuguese firepower and fighting ability, and wanted to confine them to a remote place where they could be observed, monitored, and, if need be, learned from. The technological wonders and curiosities to be observed in Macao especially intrigued the Chinese. One Chinese observer found a "particularly obscene device," the inflatable naked woman made of leather and silk some Portuguese travelers carried with them in a case to be taken to bed when needed.

Chinese dislike and suspicion of Westerners remained strong throughout the Ming period and beyond. The Italian-born Jesuit Matteo Ricci, who had entered China in 1582, writing to the general of the Jesuit order Claudio Acquaviva, noted that those wishing to speak ill of their adversaries say, "He's a man who makes a habit of going to Macao."⁵ To keep out such influences, in 1573 the Chinese district magistrate ordered the construction of a barrier gate surmounted by a small gatehouse at the midpoint of the sand spit between the Macao peninsula and the mainland. Here Chinese troops were stationed to control the flow of people and goods through the border.⁶

When, in 1684, after a period of prohibition, China resumed foreign trade contacts, Macao was incorporated in China's system of port control, and in 1688, the Chinese established a customs office (*hoppo*) in Macao. Chinese bureaucratic oversight was increased in the eighteenth century, when the Portuguese-Macanese fleet was strictly limited to 25 vessels. In 1736, a local mandarin was established, and at mid-century the district magistrate moved his residence to the Chinese village of Wang Xia within the Macao peninsula itself.⁷ In effect, Macao lived under an overlapping mixed Portuguese-Chinese jurisdiction, and the Portuguese paid tribute to the Chinese emperor for the right to reside there.

The link with Lisbon was always tenuous. The distance between Portugal and Macao by sea was immense, a voyage of some

10,000 to 15,000 miles that began south and west across the Atlantic to Brazil, then east to the Cape of Good Hope and north to Madagascar, across the Indian Ocean to the Malabar Coast, on from Goa, Cochin, and Calicut and around India to the Coromandel Coast and Malacca, and from there past Java and the Malay Peninsula to Macao. Macao lived by commerce, and it was pivotal to the trade network between Japan, South China, and Southeast Asia and India. From the 1550s until the 1640s, it became prosperous on the silks exported from China to Japan and the silver brought back from Japan in payment. Silver was also used to purchase exports in Macao and Canton for reexport to Southeast Asia, India, and Europe.

Macao's prosperity depended in the early years on an inter-Asian commerce where the Portuguese had established themselves as intermediaries, partly because of their superior gunpower but also because of the political decision of the Chinese not to take part in overseas commerce and maritime exploration, despite the success of their voyages into the Indian Ocean in the preceding century.⁸ Goa, the administrative heart of all the Portuguese settlements from East Africa to Japan, was at the western end of this interoceanic commercial system. Every two or three years, the "Japan ship" set out from Goa carrying cotton cloth from India, glassware, silver, ivory, Spanish velvet and scarlet cloth, olives, olive oil, and wine. At Malacca, pepper, cloves, and aromatic woods were taken on for sale in Japan and China.

At Macao, the carrack remained sometimes for up to a year before making for Nagasaki with white silk, red silk, porcelain, musk, white and black sugar, and other precious commodities. The Japanese called these vessels *Kuro-fune*, or "black ships," a name revived for Commodore Perry's vessels three centuries later. Beginning in 1571, a prosperous if unauthorized trade between Manila and Macao was financed by the silver flowing across the Pacific from the mines of Peru and Mexico.

The Portuguese administration of Macao reflected this seasonal, oceanic, and inter-Asian trade. Executive authority was held not by a Portuguese resident official but by the captain-major who commanded the Japan-bound carrack, and he was only in Macao while en route to India or awaiting the monsoon for the onward voyage to Japan. The "Great Ship of the Amacon," as the English called it, was an enormous vessel of 1,600 tons or more, the largest in the world at the time; only the Manila galleon that plied the Pacific between the Philippines and Acapulco was comparable.⁹ The illustrious figure of the captain major is depicted in the Japanese *Namban-byobu* screens of the period, where he is often shown sitting on a folding chair on the ship's deck, surrounded by cases of trade goods, or he is seen arriving on land in Japan with his retinue, accompanied by black slaves and acrobats, Arabian steeds, cages of hawks, peacocks and tigers, to be greeted by black-garbed Jesuits.¹⁰

Governing Macao

To govern in the absence of the captain major, the citizens of Macao formed an elected body, the Senado de Camara, in 1586. This included a chief judge, a secretary, and a procurador, whose job was to represent the city government with the Chinese authorities, which recognized his right to do so. The Macao Senate thus became the first representative institution established in Asia, occasionally removing Portuguese officials it disapproved of, and by running the day-to-day operations of the city.¹¹

The impressive building of the Loyal Senate still dominates the colonnaded central square of Macao. The walls of its council chamber are hung with the portraits of the senators who have held office since the sixteenth century; they have recently been joined by a portrait of Ho Yin, the rich Chinese senator who ran the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Macao and was the unofficial link between the Chinese in Macao and Beijing in the 1960s and 1970s. His son Ed-

mund Ho Hau Wah will be the first chief executive of Macao when the enclave returns to China.

The threats to Macao for most of its history came less from the Chinese, in fact, than from other Europeans, especially the Dutch. The Jesuits built the first fortification on the Monte, the central strong point of the peninsula; and the Jesuits as well as the fortress helped defend Macao from a naval assault by the Dutch in 1622, when they laid siege to the city with 13 men-of-war carrying a force of 1,300 men. A large cannon mounted on the São Paulo Church and manned by Father Jeronimo Rho, a Jesuit of Italian origin and a mathematician, fired a shot that landed directly on the Dutch magazine. It was John the Baptist Day, and he was promptly dubbed patron saint of the city. It was claimed that the African slaves in Macao took the reference to John the Baptist too literally and to celebrate the feast beheaded the unfortunate Dutch captives.¹²

In 1641, however, a key link in the trade chain that underpinned the city's prosperity was broken when Malacca fell to the Dutch. Even more catastrophic for Macao was the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1639, and the end of the profitable Japan commerce. The Senate of Macao sent a delegation to plead with the Japanese to reverse their prohibition. As a final warning that they meant what they said, the Japanese executed 61 of the delegates; only the servants were spared to relay the message back to Macao.

Portugal's assertion of its own sovereignty in the revolution against Spanish rule in 1640 also meant that Macao's lucrative trade with Manila collapsed. In China, the Manchus had overthrown the Ming Dynasty and were consolidating their power. With Manila and Japan gone, the Macao merchants no longer had the silver with which to finance their trade. "We are living proof of the fable of Midas who died of very hunger at a table of golden dishes," wrote one Macao merchant, João Marques Moreira, in

1644. "Such is happening to us now, for having seen our tables replete with gold, silver, diamonds, rubies, pearls and seed pearls, we are dying by inches."¹³ The Jesuit priest Gabriel de Magalhães drew an equally discouraging lesson. "Can God forget the piety of such a city," he wrote to the Macao Senate from Peking in 1656. "Where is the refuge and sanctuary of religion but in this city, which is gloriously called after the name of God. Can God forget his promises? He hath promised tribulations and a hundredfold for the suffering of his saints; and a hundredfold will He pay."¹⁴

After 1640, Macao turned to Indochina, Macassar, and Timor, and many of its merchants became commission agents for Cantonese businessmen who continued to trade with the Japanese in Chinese junks. In fact, Macanese merchants were often front men or *compradores* for wealthy Chinese merchants and slipped easily into the role of intermediaries selling their names to both Chinese and Europeans to allow them to do business through Macao.

Macanese Identity

It was during this period of economic decline and isolation, however, that the "Macanese" acquired a distinct identity. This identity was reflected, in part, in their ethnic makeup through racial intermarriage or concubinage between European men and Malay, Indian, Japanese, and Chinese women. A creole Macao patois developed, a mixture of Portuguese and Chinese with Malay words and phrases, which facilitated communication between Europeans and Chinese merchants and shopkeepers as the Macanese became important intermediaries to both Chinese and Europeans. Macao's domestic architecture and decoration reflected this eclectic mix, with large roomy houses built around Chinese-styled central courts, shuttered European windows on upper stories, with doors opening onto an interior space graced with carved, painted columns, ornate railings, interior lanterns, and shrines.

Macao's houses were painted yellow, green, and pink, soon faded by the sun and stained with mildew from the subtropical rain.¹⁵

In the eighteenth century, English, and other European merchants who were engaged in the Canton trade, prohibited from living permanently in Canton by the Chinese, established yearlong residences and trading companies along the beautiful semi-circular bay of Macao's Praia Grande. Among the most important of their establishments was the headquarters of the English East India Company, whose directors occupied a house close to the Camões Grotto, which is now the offices of the Orient Foundation. Through an archway still boasting the East India Company name stands Macao's Protestant Church and a leafy Protestant cemetery, where the gifted painter of the South China coast, George Chinnery (1774–1852), is buried, as well as many young New England seamen, their names recorded on simple headstones "raised by their messmates."¹⁶

Opium was first imported to China from India for medical uses, principally to relieve pain and dysentery. But the traffic in opium escalated exponentially after the English East India Company's tea monopoly was abolished in the 1830s, and the tea market in Britain expanded by 40 percent. The Chinese tried unsuccessfully to prevent the imports of opium, provoking the aggressive intervention of British gunboats to protect opium traders. Prosperity returned to Macao's waterfront, crowded now with opium-laden vessels, its warehouses full of disguised crates awaiting transshipment up river to Canton.

Less Savory Enterprises

The founding of Hong Kong, however, struck at Macao's prosperity no less than had the loss of Malacca and the destruction of the Portuguese presence in Japan two centuries before. Macao was no longer needed to house merchants engaged in the commerce of Canton. Macao's shallow, easily silted harbor was no competition for Hong

Kong's deep-water anchorage on the other side of the Pearl estuary. Macao's merchants thus turned to less savory enterprises, creating an underworld specializing in drugs, slavery, and prostitution. From the 1850s to the 1870s, the notorious "coolie trade" to Peru and Cuba flourished in Macao; the conditions under which the rural Chinese were transported as indentured workers to the New World were as bad as those of the recently suppressed African slave trade. Poverty and instability at home, and economic opportunities overseas, led to increasing mainland emigration to the Philippines, Cochin China, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, as well as to Hawaii, the United States, Canada, and South Africa. Most of the emigrants came from the coastal districts of the Canton delta, which made Macao, more porous than Hong Kong, an important conduit for remittances of the overseas Chinese to their families at home.

The political consequences followed quickly as well. The establishment of Hong Kong inspired the Portuguese to seek a similar status for Macao. Until the 1840s, the dual sovereignty exercised over Macao was of mutual convenience to China and Portugal. But this balance of power was to change dramatically. Encouraged by the example of the British, an aggressive Portuguese governor, João Ferreira do Amaral, was determined to imitate them. He imposed taxes on the Chinese fishermen, expelled the Chinese customs agents, suspended the annual tribute payments to the Chinese emperor, and took control of the barrier gate that had always been under Chinese control.

The Chinese reacted with fury. Governor Amaral, while inspecting the new construction of the gate, was pulled from his horse and assassinated, his head and left hand chopped off and taken back to China. When the Chinese sent additional forces to garrison their fort outside Macao, a young Macanese lieutenant, Mesquita by name, set out with 36 Macanese soldiers and routed them. He became an instant hero to Macao's

residents, and his statue was raised in the square outside the Loyal Senate, where it stood until it was destroyed by Maoist student rioters in 1966. But the avenue that today cuts through what was once the old Chinese village of Wang Xia still bears his name, and Governor Amaral is commemorated by the road leading up to the old barrier gate, and will be so at least until December 20, 1999.

The Chinese returned Governor Amaral's head and hand in 1850, and his remains were later shipped to Lisbon to be buried in the curiously named *Cemitério dos Prazeres* (cemetery of the pleasures) in that city. But symbols remain potent in this world of shadow play. Governor Amaral's statue in Macao was removed in 1991 and sent back to Lisbon at the insistence of the director of Beijing's Office of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs.

"City of God in China"

In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese named Macao the "City of God in China." Later on, they added the phrase, "There Is No Other More Loyal," in recognition, it is said, of Macao's support of Portuguese independence from Spain in 1640 despite the fact it was threatened by Spanish troops from Manila, a city with which it enjoyed a profitable commerce. In fact, the title was given in the early nineteenth century, when Macao resisted British attempts to "protect" it from the French by sending in an occupation force during the Napoleonic Wars. The Portuguese were wont to name their overseas settlements in such a grandiloquent manner, but such names rarely stuck in popular usage. "Macao" is a bastardization of a Chinese name, and referred to the bay of the goddess A Ma (A-Ma-Gao). Her temple, the oldest in Macao, faces out at the seaward end of the peninsula. It is set tight against the rocks of the steep hillside, as a Chinese temple usually is to placate the dragon who lived in such places. A Ma is holy to fishermen and is daily thronged with worshipers,

unlike Macao's largely empty Catholic churches.

I was in Macao at the time of the A Ma festival, and all day long the temple was filled with the endless staccato concussion of firecrackers, to which the sampans and high-decked pearl river fishing junks responded as they rounded the headland on their way to and from Macao's inner harbor, turning their prows toward the temple and paying a noisy obsequiousness to the goddess. A modern maritime museum, built on landfill in front of the temple gate, and where both Chinese and Portuguese navigational exploits are celebrated, was closed for the day in homage to a more ancient presence, entirely hidden behind the intricate bamboo latticework and colorful banners of a traveling Chinese opera.

At times, Macao certainly was the "City of God in China," home to many zealous Jesuits and saints-to-be. The Spanish-born Francisco Xavier died on the nearby island of Shangchuan, awaiting the call to Peking that never came, and the chapel named after him on Coloane Island contains part of the left arm of the saint as well as the venerated bones of Vietnamese and Japanese Christian martyrs. By the seventeenth century, it was claimed that Macao had more convents and monasteries than the Vatican City. Speculative landfills and high-rise buildings have today almost obliterated the old Macao of fortresses and churches, a skyline recorded by George Chinnery in the nineteenth century, and which had remained largely unchanged from the mid-seventeenth century until the late 1980s.

In the eighteenth century, this remarkable cityscape often reminded sailors arriving from the seaward side of the Macao peninsula of the bay of Naples. Some part of this atmosphere still remains toward the end of the Praia Grande, where the grand old Bela Vista Hotel, scene of much intrigue over the decades, still sits high on the hillside. The Bela Vista, much to the dismay of many, is to become the Portuguese

consulate after Macao returns to the China. This area of Macao, with its curving seaside boulevard and old shade trees and the remaining musty nineteenth-century palaces of the great Macao merchants of that time, recalls the Urca district under the Sugar Loaf Mountain in Rio de Janeiro, or the port of Cannes in the 1950s. Here motorized rickshaws ply their trade, neatly uniformed Chinese children play happily in the gardens outside the Matteo Ricci School, and Macao's old folks quietly exercise each morning before the sticky subtropical heat rises with the sun.

The Praia Grande was traditionally the "European" or "Christian" quarter of Macao. The Chinese quarter lay over the hill, around the inner harbor, and beyond the old city wall. To reach the inner harbor from the Praia Grande is a brief walk past Government House, up past the empty Saint Joseph's Seminary, which holds in its cluttered rooms the paintings of the Christian martyrs crucified by the Japanese in 1596, past a remarkable square onto which faces the colonnaded facade of the oldest European Theater in China, and beyond a quiet stucco building that houses a magnificent Chinese library, bequeathed to Macao by a Hong Kong Chinese tycoon in gratitude for Macao's role in harboring his family and many other Hong Kong residents during the Japanese occupation of the British colony.

The inner harbor lies below, a bustling commercial and industrial waterfront with old warehouses, a gaudy floating casino, long sidewalks under arches onto which face a jumble of narrow open entrance ways housing the occasional dark interior of a Buddhist temple, metal workshop, food store, and fish shop, peopled by straggling bleary-eyed gamblers and worn out prostitutes on their way home, and busy shoppers and old men chatting. The inner harbor itself is crowded with craft of all sizes and shapes, and at a very short distance beyond is China proper.

The cornerstone of Macao's most famous Jesuit Church of São Paulo was laid in 1601.

Only its facade now stands at the top of its wide staircase beside the great seventeenth century fortress of the Monte, also built by the Jesuits and a critical bastion for the defense of Macao. The first Jesuits settled permanently in Macao in 1563. By the end of the 1570s, a spacious residence had been constructed between the Monte and the hilly garden within which lies the grotto named after the Portuguese epic poet Luis de Camões, who may or may not have lived in Macao (the two leading historians of Macao, Father Teixeira and Charles R. Boxer, both now very old and ill, vigorously disagree on the subject). The garden is still a beautiful place, and a bust of Camões, under which are carved the first three verses of the first canto of *Lusiadas*, now sits within the grotto. Here, under the shade trees, old Chinese men bring their caged birds each morning to chirp and warble. It is fortunate that less than 2 percent of Macao's population can read Portuguese, hence few can understand Camões's somewhat disparaging reference in his second verse about the "*terras viciosas de Africa e Asia*." The oratory for St. Martin, built in 1580 by Michele Ruggieri as a center for Chinese and Japanese converts, also housed the school where he, and then Matteo Ricci, could learn Chinese. The Jesuit college founded in 1594 subsequently developed Chinese studies, Latin, mathematics, and music, and eventually, with its printing press and extensive library, became one of the great centers of Chinese studies in Asia.

The famous church of São Paulo itself was financed by the city of Macao, from which the Jesuits had obtained a fixed share of profits from the Japan trades. A Chinese narrative of the seventeenth century described the "Mother of Heaven" on the altar as a goddess who "wears curious cloths and a veil made of glass beads; her hair appears lifelike." I was struck by the relative simplicity of the Catholic churches in Macao, almost Calvinist in their lack of ornamentation and strikingly plain in comparison to

the Baroque effervescence of churches in Brazil or Spanish America of the same period. But having visited the incense-laden interior of the temple of Kun Iam, this made more sense, as did the seventeenth-century Chinese references to the virgin set above the altar of São Paulo.

The great facade of São Paulo, still one of Macao's most prominent landmarks, reflects the vision of its Chinese and Japanese craftsmen. A broad flight of steps leads up to the front of the church where the facade rises in four tiers; the second containing the four Jesuit saints, with Loyola and Francis Xavier at the center; a dragon and a Portuguese great ship in full sail are on the third tier, to the left and right of which are admonitions in Chinese; on the fourth is Jesus and the instruments of the crucifixion, and at the top a bronze dove between the sun and the moon. The steps of São Paulo are usually thronged with Japanese tourists amazed at the work of their seventeenth-century ancestors. To the extreme left of the facade are two stone slabs that once held the flags indicating that the Jesuits were granted the rank of mandarin by the Chinese emperor.

Opening the Rock

Francis Xavier had failed in his attempt to enter China. But Alessandro Valignano, Father Visitor of the order in the East Indies, while spending ten months in Macao on his return from Japan, developed a new and far more effective strategy to "open the rock," as he put it.¹⁷ He found the Chinese, with "their love of learning, their neat dress, their delicate eating habits, their banning of weapons in public places, the shyness of their women, their good government," in every way superior to the Japanese. Valignano decided, in effect, that to convince the Chinese of Christianity's validity, it was necessary to impress the educated elite, to dazzle them with the Jesuits' own education and skills. In order to do so, the Jesuits must learn the language and traditions of China.

Michelle Ruggieri was the first new recruit under this dispensation to arrive in Macao, via Goa in 1578, but he encountered enormous difficulty himself in mastering Chinese and requested that Matteo Ricci be sent from Goa to join him in Macao. Ricci was to be much more successful and went on to establish, in 1601, the Jesuit mission in Peking. Here his skill and what Ricci called his *cosette*, bits and pieces, metallic spheres, sundials, prisms, and, above all, clocks, were much appreciated. Ricci and his followers attempted to show that the moral doctrine of Confucius in no way conflicted with Christian morality, and that the ritual observances were purely secular. The remarkable Cologne-born Johann Adam Schall von Bell, who arrived in Macao in 1619 in response to Ricci's call for true scientists to meet the Chinese demand for competent mathematicians and astronomers, succeeded brilliantly in fulfilling Valignano's surmise that scholars more than mendicants would win the way to Peking. He studied Chinese in Macao and helped defend the city from the Dutch in 1622; a year later he was in Peking and accurately predicted the lunar eclipse with great impact on the court, beginning an extraordinary career. He eventually became the first director of the Imperial Astronomical Bureau under the Manchus, from 1644 to 1655, and was permitted to build a mission compound and church close to the imperial palace, a place, to the surprise of the Chinese hosts, the Portuguese president Jorge Sampaio sought out during a visit to Beijing in 1998. The Peking Jesuits dressed and behaved like Confucian literati, but they also brought ingenious gadgets and clever maps, which allowed them to survive the transition from Ming to Qing Dynasties, providing protection for the Christian mission in China and obstructing other Europeans in their attempts to reach the Chinese court.

The Jesuits, despite their dominant role, were not the first Catholic order in China, nor were they the only order in Macao. The

Augustinians, Dominicans, and Franciscans had little love for the Jesuits, or for each other. In 1613, Jesuits and Dominicans and their respective partisans fought pitched battles in the streets with guns and swords, much to the consternation of the Chinese authorities, who put the Canton armed forces on alert and banned food sales to the Portuguese.¹⁸ It was not the Chinese who in the end undermined the Jesuits' position in China and made impossible the continuation of their experiment in cultural adaptation pioneered by Valignano; it was contention within the Catholic Church over the question of how far the church should go in accommodating Chinese traditions. The bitter controversy over Chinese rites was eventually resolved against the Jesuits by papal decree in 1742. The Jesuit Order was itself expelled by the Portuguese from its overseas possessions in 1759 (1762 in Macao) and suppressed by the papacy in the 1770s.¹⁹ The vast riches the Jesuits were supposed to have hoarded in secret tunnels between their church and the Monte were never found; but old myths die hard, and the archeologists accompanying the building of a new historical museum to present Macao's history beyond 1999 told me they are again searching for these hidden chambers.

Portugal suppressed the monastic orders in the 1830s, converting the monasteries and convents to other uses. When in 1835 fire destroyed the old Jesuit college, which once housed one of the great Western centers of Chinese scholarship, it was no longer a place of worship but the kitchen for the local garrison. In the narrow street that leads from the base of the steps at São Paulo toward the grotto garden I noticed a shop window overflowing with porcelain statuary. Here many small fat Chinese buddhas were lined up beside several "mothers of heaven" or "Our Lady of Fatimas," fairly interchangeable in these parts apparently depending on the season, as well as miniature Red Guards raising a flag much in the style of the U.S. marines at Iwo Jima, and Mao holding up

his little book, even Joseph Stalin looking much as I remember seeing him in Moscow some weeks before he was removed from the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square. In the end, it seems most things can be commercialized.

By the early nineteenth century, Macao had become a home base for earnest Protestant missionaries, many of them Americans, doing good works and building hospitals and anxious to proselytize the Chinese masses. They were of course deeply suspicious of their Catholic hosts—a suspicion returned in good measure by Macao's numerous Catholic priests. The bishop of Macao's enormous palace, now empty, sits atop the hill on the landward side of the Penha peninsula, of which the A Ma Temple marks the seaward end, just where the Chinese dragon might have been supposed to live.

The current bishop of Macao, Dom Domingos Lam, the first Chinese to head the diocese since its founding in 1576, is turning the palace into a university business and management school, and prefers to live elsewhere. Bishop Lam is a small, chain-smoking, energetic cleric. His door "is open to all comers," he told me when I called on him at his office next to the cathedral in downtown Macao. He is a great enthusiast for the World Wide Web and its potential for his work in Macao, as well as for communication beyond it.

There are fewer than 20,000 Catholics in Macao today, but the church's role is much more important than these numbers suggest. Over 40,000 children, for example, are enrolled in Catholic private schools. He "never talks politics," the bishop told me. "We do what we have to do regardless, and I don't much worry if people like it or not; they can draw their own conclusions." His position is a sensitive one given what he calls "the bad relationship between the Chinese government and the Vatican." In an elliptical way, the bishop was saying something very important about Macao: look at actions and not words.

The Catholic schools and religious expression are both explicitly protected in Macao's Basic Law (Article 34), to which China formally committed itself in 1993. The Basic Law will form the constitution of Macao after December 1999, when the enclave will become a "special administrative region" (SAR) of China like Hong Kong, under the formula invented by the late Deng Xiaoping of "one country, two systems." It is an arrangement intended, as with Hong Kong, to leave the territory to run its own internal affairs while preserving its special Sino-European character and capitalist system.²⁰

Yet even before the ink was dry on the Basic Law, doubts emerged as to how much autonomy this particular special administrative region will have. Bishop Lam's commitment to establishing a new interuniversity institute with a school of business and management in collaboration with Portugal's Catholic University quickly became subject to intense pressure from Beijing, which made it clear that China will not accept an institution subject to the control of a "foreign state," by which China means the Vatican.

Bishop Lam made no direct reference to this dispute in his conversation with me, but he did make a point of handing me the brochure for the university institute and its planned curriculum, as well as calling up on his computer and printing out for me a listing of the Christian missions supported by his bishopric, including the construction in 1992 of a church at Ta-huang, the largest church built in the Pearl River delta region in the past 50 years. Given the historical role of Macao in Christian missionary endeavors in the Far East and China, how the Beijing Communists deal with this part of Macao's heritage will be a vital indication of their willingness to abide by other protections embedded in Macao's Basic Law.

The bishop's resistance to attempts to manipulate him provoked some criticism on the Portuguese side too. A number of Portuguese officials find him "very Chi-

nese," tending to place "community values over individual values." My own sense of the bishop is that he is a man of great personal strength and conviction, and that he will be a key player at one of the most sensitive points of potential confrontation in the coming years. Bishop Lam walked me past the faded portraits of his predecessors as I left his residence. They stretch back four centuries. But as the great Jesuit polymath António Vieira noted in the 1640s: "The preachers took the Gospel and the merchants took the preachers." Macao's *raison d'être* after all was commerce, and it remains so: only the commodities have changed over the centuries.

City of Sin

Macao, despite its godly aspirations, was no less often a city of sin, a nether zone of concubines and prostitutes, an opaque shadow world of shady deals and opium dens, well known for its corruption. One shocked visitor in the 1930s saw Macao as the playground of the "riffraff of the world, the drunken shipmasters; the flotsam of the sea; the derelicts, and more shameless, beautiful, savage women than any part of the world." W. H. Auden in a memorable phrase called it "a weed from Catholic Europe."

This is the Macao thousands of eager Hong Kong residents hope for as they crowd aboard the jet hydrofoils that rush back and forth across the Pearl River estuary between the two cities. Owned by Macao's casino king, Stanley Ho, these speedy vessels bring gamblers to the Hotel Lisboa and the casino "VIP rooms," where they rub shoulders with Communist cadres from the mainland, dropping their ill-gotten gains at the card tables. Six million visitors cross to Macao each year; 80 percent of them are Hong Kong Chinese, most of whom head straight for the gambling. The rich pickings of Macao's casinos are swiftly reinvested in China, Europe, and New York, in Hong Kong enterprises, and Lisbon real estate, as well as in payoffs to Chinese party officials, local administrators,

and Portuguese bureaucrats, and in campaign contributions to Portuguese politicians—and in 1996, it seems, to U.S. politicians as well—who can provide favors. The casinos provide over 60 percent of Macao government revenues.

Stanley Ho has held the gaming monopoly since 1962 through his Macao Tourism and Entertainment Corporation (STDM) in which he holds a 25 percent personal stake. His gambling monopoly will continue until 2001. Ho's net value was placed in 1992 at well over a billion dollars and his gambling interests now extend to Europe through the Portuguese-based Sol Estoril group. He is the head of the Shun Tak shipping company, which dominates the transportation routes between Hong Kong and Macao. There are very few enterprises or developments in Macao in which Stanley Ho is not a major participant.

Ho, now in his late seventies, was born in Hong Kong to a well-to-do Eurasian family and educated at the University of Hong Kong. He made his fortune during the Japanese occupation. Macao, as a Portuguese territory, retained its neutrality during the Second World War and became a refuge for many from Hong Kong. Ho developed a profitable trade between Japan, Macao and occupied Hong Kong. After the Communist takeover of China and during the Korean War, he supplied the Chinese with gold and airplanes and other embargoed materials.

It is sometimes said of Macao and Stanley Ho that it is the only place in the world where a "casino king" owns his own colony. As one might expect, the Macao casino king is not himself a gambler; he does "not have the patience for it," he says. Stanley Ho and the Portuguese governor open the gambling season on the eve of the Chinese New Year. Ho arrives in his green Rolls Royce and the governor in a black Mercedes Benz to place the first stakes at the roulette table at Ho's flagship, the "Casino Lisboa."

The final years of Portuguese administration has seen increasing gang violence

around the edges of Ho's empire. He stepped up security and hired Gurkhas demobilized by the British in Hong Kong to provide protection. The triads, Chinese secret societies and criminal brotherhoods, have played a key role in the Chinese underworld for centuries and are at war again in Macao, with two Hong Kong-based gangs, the 14K and the Wo On Lok (the latter through its Macao affiliate, the Shui Fong) pitted against each other. These triad organizations are believed to number about 400,000 members worldwide, from corporate executives to street corner thugs.²¹

The upsurge of gang-related shootings, knifings, arson, and bombings in Macao is also partly attributed to the drying up of illegal shakedowns from the construction business in the territory. The speculative property boom in Macao, fueled by hot money flowing in from China in the early 1990s, burst five years ago after China clamped down in an attempt to cool off its economy. Property values in Macao collapsed, leaving more than 30,000 apartments, or a quarter of the total housing stock, empty and unsold. Clampdowns on the triads in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong forced them to shift their operations to Macao.

The triads are not subtle when they go to war. One of the first victims, general manager of the Macao Holiday Inn, Gerhard Kropp, tried to keep prostitutes and their pimps out of his lobby. He was ambushed at his home by three assailants who hacked at him with knives and choppers. He nearly lost three fingers and left for a new posting. "Choppings," an assault with a cleaver, are the triads' favorite means to settle scores. The triads then took their war to the elegant Praia Grande Avenue. Most blatant was a pointblank and deadly fusillade unleashed by two motorcyclists brandishing 7.62 mm Chinese military issue semiautomatic pistols, who ambushed a car carrying a former officer of the Hong Kong police and a bodyguard of the 14K's leader.

The killings were believed to be in retaliation for the murder on Macao's Taipa island of a rich businessman and Kong Lik triad member from Hong Kong who was a shareholder in one of the enclave's franchised VIP gambling rooms and a gambling-tour operator for wealthy clients from Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Thailand.²² Breaking a long unwritten convention against attacking senior government officials and expatriate Portuguese, the gangs then attempted to murder the chief of Macao's gambling secretariat, who was shot twice in the head and, despite a remarkable recovery, was called back to Lisbon for his own safety.

Macao's lone pro-democrat legislator, Antonio Ng Kouk-cheung, says police corruption and triad membership by officers has caused the crisis. He blames the casino regulations that allow individuals to operate VIP rooms for high rollers.²³ After several police raids on suspected triad safehouses failed, the director of the judiciary police, Antonio Marques Baptista, confiscated his officers' mobile phones and pagers and immediately met with a striking success. He now never leaves his office without a bodyguard, and his car is flanked by armed motorcycle outriders. A very nervous Macao public was not reassured by Baptista's statement that for law abiding men, women, and children "the streets were safe because these attacks were carried out by professional killers who never miss their targets."²⁴

Out of Control

The question of what constitutes a threat to "public order" has serious political implications. Recurrent claims in the press that the "situation is out of control" can provide an excuse for more Chinese intervention. Article 18 of the Basic Law provides that: "In the event that the standing committee of the national People's Congress decides to declare a state of war or, by reason of turmoil within the Macao Special Administrative Region, which endangers national unity and is beyond the control of the government of

the region, decides that the region is in a state of emergency, the central people's government may issue an order applying relevant national laws in the region."²⁵

As the owner of a furniture store near the landmark facade of the old São Paulo Church told Peter Stein of the *Wall Street Journal*: "If Macao's police can't solve the problem, China will."²⁶ The Xinhua News Agency, China's official mouthpiece, has urged tougher measures and that the Guangdong authorities will help if need be.²⁷

Given the multiple layers of motivation on all sides in Macao it is worth noting that the professional hit men brought in from China by the triads—and who slip back across the border in ten minutes on foot or by boat across the narrow inner harbor—are believed to be members of the Chinese security forces. All the recent hits have been carried out with People's Army—issue firearms. The struggle over ownership of the new Grandview Hotel on Taipa Island involved the Anran Company owned by the Chinese Ministry of State Security, which is also believed to be trying to obtain a slice of the casino monopoly.²⁸

Indeed, almost on cue, before the Portuguese could bring in sophisticated eavesdropping devices, the bigwigs of the local Chinese community, together with Stanley Ho and the representative of the Chinese central government in Macao, the head of the Xinhua News Agency, acted with the authorities across the border in the Guangdong province to cut triad money laundering sources and bring the warring factions to an agreement. The Beijing government has used the argument of public order to justify the stationing of army troops in Macao after its retrocession to China on December 20.

The Portuguese governor of Macao, Gen. Vasco Rocha Vieira, whom I met at the pink and white colonial-style Government House (which houses both his office and the Macao legislature), told me that he believes the English press in Hong Kong

has greatly exaggerated the problem of gang violence in Macao and that the streets of Macao are among the safest in the world. Statistically, he may be right. I was certainly able to walk anywhere in Macao. But gang-related mayhem has a life of its own. Gory pictures of murdered hoodlums have already badly dented Macao's vital tourist business. The number of gamblers visiting Macao from Hong Kong, who are big spenders and are vital to Macao's prosperity, has fallen precipitously since gang violence first broke out. And Macao's competitors for Hong Kong dollars in the gambling business have been quick to take note of its troubles. Hong Kong's shrewd business leaders have not only recently signed a deal with Disney for a vast new theme park, but they have also been visiting Las Vegas and dropping hints that Hong Kong might establish its own casino. Like the loss of the Japan trade in the seventeenth century, or the establishment of Hong Kong in the nineteenth century, such a move would be a disaster for Macao, and Stanley Ho has been quick to condemn the idea.

A General without Troops

Gen. Rocha Vieira is a quiet but determined individual. He believes, as Portuguese generally do, that it is essential to work with the Chinese and not against them, and holds that this is the best way "of making possible a continuing and effective presence of European culture in this important Chinese region." He is a general without troops. The last Portuguese military units withdrew from Macao at the end of 1975. After the fall of the dictatorship in Lisbon in 1974, the Macao governorship became a revolving door for Portuguese politicians, and the instability of the governments in Lisbon in the early years of the new democracy did not help Portuguese credibility or enable Portugal to become a serious player in the real power games in Macao.

The dominant role played in Lisbon by the pro-Moscow Portuguese Communist

Party between 1974 and 1976 was also viewed with great suspicion by Beijing. Gen. Rocha Vieira, however, came with impeccable credentials in that respect. Not only had he served in Macao in the 1970s, but he played a critical role in Lisbon during the anticommunist coup of November 1975, which in effect sent the Portuguese Communists packing.

His head of security in Macao, Brigadier Manuel Monge, an early member of the armed forces movement that overthrew the right-wing regime in Portugal in 1974, like Gen. Rocha Vieira, had also fallen afoul of the Portuguese Communists. While the democratic credentials of both these military officers are impeccable, more important from Beijing's perspective is the fact that both had opposed the Moscow-inspired power grab in Lisbon.²⁹

In Macao, General Rocha Vieira, who has held office since 1991, has brought both stability and integrity to a Government House that had been severely tainted previously by accusations of corruption. Universally and unsolicitedly, people I spoke with in Macao testified to his honesty. But one also senses in General Rocha Vieira a sense of determination that the Portuguese in Macao avoid at all costs the disasters that followed their withdrawals in Africa and East Timor; and that if the Portuguese politicians and functionaries have notoriously sticky fingers, then the Portuguese military at least will withdraw with honor.

Macao's formal institutional structure, where the Portuguese presence in Macao is most pronounced, has many of the trappings of a Western society: law courts, an elected legislature, formal protection of free speech and assembly. Most of these rights in Macao preceded the liberalization in Hong Kong and were a direct consequence of the Portuguese Revolution of 1974, which provided the constitutional means on the Portuguese side for reexamining sovereignty and reforming Macao's institutions. In 1976, wide autonomy was granted to Macao by the new

democratic Portugal under an "organic statute" that established a wide range of civil rights and set up the Macao Legislative Assembly. Election to the legislature was by means of a restricted franchise with only one-third of the seats open to direct election. (The remaining representatives were either indirectly elected by professional and neighborhood organizations or appointed by the Portuguese governor). Nevertheless, the Portuguese residents and a minority of the Chinese population have participated in direct elections in Macao since 1976.

The Macao legislature was no rubber stamp. In the early years, the Macanese legislators, who had centuries of experience bucking the authority of Portuguese governors through their domination of the Loyal Senate, became so outspoken in their opposition to the executive that a governor dissolved the legislative assembly and called new elections in 1984. The system of proportional representation used in Macao as in Portugal also helped to assure a voice for the small liberal minority in Macao, which has consistently obtained at least one of the directly elected seats since the assembly was first instituted. In the hotly contested 1996 election, for example, one seat went to a pro-democracy candidate. The eight indirectly elected members of the assembly come from the traditional pro-business, pro-China sector.

Beijing did not object to direct elections in Macao as it had in Hong Kong, and the present legislature will continue in office through the transfer of sovereignty in 1999 until the year 2001, unlike that of Hong Kong, which was dissolved at the time of the handover. Since 1992, Macao has had its own court of final appeal.

The Basic Law also includes some significant concessions on China's part; there is no restriction on foreign passport holders taking important posts in the administration after 1999, except those of chief executive and chief justice, a reassurance to the large number of Macao Chinese who qualify for Portu-

guese passports. The 10,000 Macanese Eurasians retain access to the civil service, where they have traditionally sought official careers, and over a quarter of Chinese residents of Macao hold Portuguese, hence EU passports. Both China and Portugal are aware that if they mishandle the transfer, Macao could easily lose much of its Eurasian and Macao-born Chinese and end up as an empty shell and suburb of the Chinese border city of Zhuhai.

The "Macao Formula"

Portuguese authority in Macao, however, was essentially broken in 1966, when the balance of power in Macao between the Portuguese and Chinese shifted dramatically during the turmoil unleashed by the Cultural Revolution. Maoist militants rioted in Macao's streets, and the Portuguese governor, after some initial armed clashes, capitulated to their demands, which included the closing of the offices of the Nationalist Kuomintang in Macao, and the ending of Macao's use as an exit point for dissidents fleeing China. The Portuguese governor was obliged to sign the agreement in the office of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce under a huge portrait of Mao Zedong, with Ho Yin presiding. But Beijing did not want the Portuguese facade destroyed. It was useful to the Chinese Communists to preserve a place where the appearance of separation from the regime could provide a gray area for deals and contacts; a place with enough ambiguity to permit a degree of separation and plausible deniability.

To the surprise of the Salazar regime, China did not seek to expel the Portuguese administration from Macao in 1966; and when in the mid-1970s the Portuguese twice tried to give Macao back to China, the offer was politely refused, with Ho Yin telling the Portuguese that the time was not ripe.³⁰

But this in many ways was the traditional use the Chinese had made of the Portuguese enclave. Prof. Fok Kai Cheong, an

American-trained historian at the University of Macao, calls this arrangement the "Macao Formula," a type of implicit acquiescence in each other's claims to overlapping areas of sovereignty.³¹ Premier António de Oliveira Salazar's wily foreign minister, Franco Nogueira, said that after 1967 the Portuguese in Macao remained as "a caretaker of a condominium under foreign supervision."³²

In effect, the *modus vivendi* after the Maoist riots reestablished the old *de facto* system of overlapping authority, with the head of the Xinhua News Agency representing the interests of the central government, much as the local mandarins had done prior to the 1840s, which the historian Charles R. Boxer called a matter of "give and take." And while it has been true from the sixteenth century onward that China could disrupt Macao's food supply at any moment and impose its will by force, China never sought to do so.

Unlike the other ancient Portuguese enclaves in Asia, Goa, invaded by India in 1961, and East Timor, bloodily annexed by Indonesia in 1975, in the case of Macao the Chinese chose stealth. As the director of the Xinhua News Agency's Hong Kong branch said, quoting Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, "defeating the enemy without going to war is the utmost success."³³ The Chinese waited for the moment that suited them.

The Mediating Chinese

The largely European superstructure of Macao is embedded in a politics and society rooted in a complex network of powerful interconnecting Chinese clans whose collaboration is essential if anything is to be done at all in Macao. These Chinese networks of individuals and business interests are closely tied to the mainland and to Beijing. The Nam Kwong trading company was China's official political and economic representative in Macao for 35 years until 1984, when these functions were split into political and trading arms, with the Xinhua News Agency

and its Macao head becoming China's spokesman and unofficial representative in the territory. Today, China is the leading investor in Macao, with 200 companies in the territory controlling 50 percent of finance and insurance and 70 percent of the tourism business.³⁴

Overlapping memberships in Chinese and Portuguese institutions is typical of Macao, as is the continuity within the leadership of the Macao Chinese community. The venerable Chinese Chamber of Commerce, founded in 1913, became the central mediator between Portugal and China between 1949 and 1979. From 1950 until his death, its chairman and the undisputed leader of the Macao Chinese was the aforementioned Ho Yin, a very rich businessman with interests in hotels, restaurants, banks, buses, and utility companies. Two-thirds of the Chinese members of the legislative assembly are also members of the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce. The current chairman is also a member of the standing committee of the National People's Congress in Beijing.

Ho Yin's son, Edmund Ho Hau Wah, 44, executive director and general manager of the Tai Fung Bank, half of which is owned by the Bank of China, is to be Chief Executive of the Macao SAR after the Chinese takeover in December 1999. The Tai Fung Bank is the second largest bank in the territory and Edmund Ho is chairman of the Banking Association and was a member of the Basic Law drafting committee and of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Liaison Group. He is also vice chairman of the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce.

I met with Ho—who is Canadian educated—in his wood-paneled third-floor office at the Tai Fung Bank, which sits off Macao's busy Central Avenue. His major concern, he said, is how Macao positions itself for the challenges of the new century by diversifying its economic base to enable it to sustain a real autonomy, especially from the neighboring Chinese mainland development

areas. He sees a need for urgently enhancing technical and scientific education and believes the city is too small to be viable.

Macao's per capita income, at \$15,010 in 1995, is the fifth highest in Asia, after Japan, Brunei, Hong Kong and Singapore, and higher than Taiwan and South Korea. But like Hong Kong, its manufacturing industry is crossing the border to find cheaper labor. When I met with Edmund Ho, he had just returned from Brazil, where he had accompanied Governor Rocha Vieira on a mission to promote Macao as a bridge to China for Brazilian businesses.

The Chinese print media in Macao tends to follow the Beijing line, under the ever-watchful eye of the Xinhua News Agency. The lively Portuguese language press has a small circulation and is focused on the internecine intrigues of Portuguese politics, something the Chinese find entirely impenetrable and confusing, as if the Portuguese are endlessly and needlessly complicating their own lives. Several Macao Chinese leaders told me they find Portuguese politics as obscure as those of the old men of the Central Committee in Beijing. The local television station, TDM, is 50.5 percent owned by the government and by Stanley Ho's STD, the Nam Kwong Group, and Edmund Ho. The electronic media in Macao take a more independent line than the Chinese print media, but the Portuguese-language STD tends to broadcast the metropolitan news program of no special interest to most of the residents of Macao, who cannot understand the language, let alone the content. Much of the population watches the Hong Kong English-language and Cantonese-language stations, and many have access to international cable and satellite television services.

Who Runs Macao?

The Chinese population of Macao is of quite diverse origins. Tanka boat people comprise the oldest elements of the population, though most today have left their boats and live in city apartments. In the

past there was a strong Fukanese component, but now 50 percent of the Chinese in Macao are of rural Guandongese origin. These longtime residents have not lived under the communist regime and retain many of the practices of an Old China, long destroyed on the mainland by war and revolution. Many hold Portuguese passports.

About 40 percent of the Chinese population of Macao are more recent immigrants, many having come clandestinely from the mainland since the 1980s. There is a smaller but important group that came from the Chinese diaspora, returning to Macao from Southeast Asia in the 1960s. These tend to be middle-class people with a high level of education. The leadership of the Chinese community rests principally in the first group, families with more than two generations of residence in Macao, influential in the world of business and the secret societies. Extremely conservative socially and pro-Beijing politically, their children, often educated overseas, tend to be English-speaking, and are strongly influenced by developments in Hong Kong and more liberal than their parents.

Several significant figures in Macao arrived from China after 1979, including intellectuals as well as underworld figures and a contingent of Chinese from Southeast Asia who had played key roles in Beijing in the past and now hold important positions in Macao's financial and intellectual circles and take a more independent line. One of the most prominent of these is the multilingual Gary Ngai, from a Chinese family that spent five generations in the former Dutch East Indies and, later, Indonesia. Formerly a close confidant of Deng and his personal translator, he was until recently vice president of Macao's Cultural Institute and is now executive director of the Sino-Latin Foundation.

The Eurasian population of the city, known as the "Macanese," is a tightly knit group numbering until recently between 10,000 and 15,000; but extensive out-

migration means that today the Macanese dispersed throughout the world probably equal or surpass the number of Macanese at home. The Macanese community integrates genetic elements from across Asia, its ancestors including principally Malays, Japanese, Indians, Timorese, Chinese, and Koreans as well as Portuguese. In the local Cantonese argot they are referred to as "sons and daughters of the soil," that is, people "born in the land" and not "foreigners" to the Chinese, as the Portuguese were and remain. Macanese culture was a rich creole mix, and they spoke and wrote in a local patois. The Loyal Senate, Macao's de facto government during much of its first three centuries, was dominated by elected Macanese representatives. The Macanese also dominated the middle levels of the colonial administration and were important in the merchant and legal communities.

The Maoist riots of 1966 were a profound shock to this group. The Macanese had always identified themselves with the ruling Portuguese, and their sense of betrayal at Portugal's capitulation to Chinese demands was profound. The Macanese had formerly distanced themselves from Chinese elites in Macao in everything except business; after 1966 this changed, especially with respect to marriage patterns, religion, and politics.³⁵ The estrangement of the Macanese from the Portuguese was also aggravated by the fact that Macao's bureaucracy became more, not less, "colonial" in the 1980s, its higher ranks filled with short-term Portuguese expatriate appointees whom the Macanese deeply resent. Unlike Hong Kong where expatriate British officials made up a very small percentage of the civil service prior to the handover, in Macao the Portuguese participation increased as the end neared and with an inevitable consequence: the Portuguese administration became more isolated from Macao's daily realities and more dependent on the collaboration of the long-entrenched leadership of the Chinese community.³⁶ Gary Ngai calls

these officials the "full stops," individuals who have no real interest in the future of Macao but a great deal of interest in enriching themselves at Macao's expense.

An Ambiguous Place

But in an economy fueled by vast flows of cash, by casinos and sex; with institutions isolated by language and procedure from the vast majority of the population; where for centuries intermediaries provided the contacts, bribes, and special knowledge that produced results; an ambiguous place where the wheels could be greased by kickbacks or favors, where money could be laundered and commodities as well as people slipped in and out without great supervision; where entrepreneurs lived by providing what was prohibited elsewhere in their neighborhood—it is hardly surprising that Macao, like other free cities with multiple and overlapping sovereignties, should be a place readymade for espionage and fund transfers for the broader but clandestine political purposes of the great powers that chose to keep Macao the way it is in the first place.

So when Ron Brown, the late U.S. secretary of commerce, held a private dinner party at the Hong Kong Island Shangri-La Hotel in October 1995, to which "a Macao property businessman and his wife, a Macao banker and legislative councilor, a Macao entertainment magnate and members of several illustrious Hong Kong families" were invited, they were met by Yah Lin Trie, a Chinese American, co-owner of a Chinese restaurant a few blocks from the Arkansas State Capitol and a favorite watering hole of Bill Clinton while governor, and Trie's partner Antonio Pan, a former executive of the Lippo Group, and Ernest Green, a Clinton crony and Arkansas fundraiser for the Democratic Party. The guests quickly got the message. After all, they were well used to similar requests from Portuguese presidential candidates.³⁷ Brown himself, of course, had been the party's chief fundraiser before his appointment as secretary of commerce.

In early 1996, despite State Department objections, new rules permitting the export of high-speed computers to Chinese companies went into effect. According to a comprehensive investigative report by Jeff Gerth and Eric Schmitt in the *New York Times* in 1998, "the Central Intelligence Agency and other Federal agencies concluded that at least some of those computers {were} being used by the Chinese military...."³⁸

"Charlie" Trie was to become a central if illusive figure in the inconclusive Senate investigation of campaign abuses, the House Select Committee's report on Chinese "theft of nuclear secrets," as well as a federal prosecution and conviction, all related to laundered Chinese contributions to the 1996 presidential campaign. And most of these contributions were laundered through Macao. Charlie Trie visited the White House 23 times, at least, between 1993 and 1996, taking with him several casino barons from Macao—more times to be sure than Congressman Caleb Cushing did in the late 1840s, when Macao was last on the White House's agenda at the time of the Treaty of Wang Xia.³⁹

Macao was also the front for the purchase for \$20 million by a local company (Chong Lot, incorporated in Macao for a mere \$125,000 at a nonexistent address on the Praia Grande) of a partially built Ukrainian 67,000-ton aircraft carrier. Vasyl Hureyev, Ukraine's industry minister, said it was to be used as "a discotheque." Other reports said it would be used as a floating casino. The problem no one noticed was that Macao cannot harbor deep-water ships. One of the central reasons Hong Kong boomed after it was founded in the 1840s, and Macao did not, is that Macao is situated on the side of the Pearl River estuary that silts up. In a very peculiar comment, Portuguese prime minister António Guterres, who visited Macao in April 1998, said that Macao's crime rate "compared favorably to the Ukraine's," a remark even the Chinese government found complacent in the extreme, and

told him so privately in Beijing a few days later.⁴⁰

Rui Afonso, a Macao lawyer and former member of the legislature, took a much more sober view, saying that the security situation in Macao was desperate, that a culture of private justice by execution had emerged, and that the Portuguese had lost the stamina to rule.

But the gangs went too far when they embarrassed both the Portuguese and the Chinese in the runup to the December hand-over, which each side wanted to look as smooth as possible. The sensational and much delayed trial of Wan Kuok-koi, alias "Broken Tooth," alleged head of the 14K triad in Macao, ended (to the surprise of many in Macao) in his conviction on November 23, barely a month before the hand-over ceremonies were scheduled to occur. The Macao court found Wan guilty of being a member of a triad group, loan sharking, illegal gambling, and interfering with a local telecommunications network, and sentenced him to 15 years. Two days later, a former police officer and gang member was also sentenced and jailed. Wan's mistake was to have emerged too blatantly from the shadows, boasting about his gangland prowess in newspaper interviews. He was arrested while attending a gangster movie called *Casino*, purportedly based on his life history, which he had financed. And in a risky challenge to the soon-to-be sovereign power, a well-known pro-China Macao legislator had been attacked and wounded leaving the offices of the Xinhua News Agency no less.

But these last-minute tidy ups cannot disguise the fragility of the legal system and the administration, where language and procedure are incomprehensible to 90 percent of the population, where laws have only recently been hastily and often badly translated into Chinese, and where a supreme court only created in 1993 has judges with less than a year's experience in charge. The University of Macao only graduated its first class of lawyers in the mid-1990s, and

locally trained magistrates have little practical court experience. Despite the hoopla, the sprucing up and repainting of public buildings, and the construction of new museums, the fact remains that after almost four and a half centuries in Macao, the Portuguese had spent only the past half decade preparing Chinese officials to assume the critical bureaucratic roles that would assure not only the continuation of Portuguese institutions in Macao but also, and more important, help guarantee that the statutory rights that legally protect Macao's special status within China after the hand-over are respected and upheld.

I asked a Hong Kong Chinese tycoon I had breakfast with recently what he thought about all this. He replied elliptically. In Shanghai, he said, where he was born, the police were also totally, irretrievably corrupt, so the army had invited them to a banquet. Then, while they were eating and drinking, the army set up sand bags and machine guns, and when the police were allowed out, mowed them all down. It was not an encouraging answer.

A City of Culture?

Macao, in addition to the rich veneer of an old Europe, also retains much of traditional China, isolated as it has been from the turmoil that devastated China over the past century. Many ancient religious practices survive in Macao, where hardly a street or corner or niche does not house a small shrine, candle, incense stick, or offering to a rich diversity of deities. A wide range of religious and civil groupings have long lived there in mutual tolerance. Partly as a consequence, the population of Macao is not as apolitical as it appears. After the Tiananmen Square bloodbath in 1989, over 150,000 people—a very significant proportion of Macao's population of half a million—protested, in an unprecedented rebuke to Beijing.

The 1996 legislative elections saw workers in the tourist and gambling sectors organize politically and join forces with the

pro-democracy representative, Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong, in complaining of vote buying by the big business interests. Workers in manufacturing jobs also complained that the powerful pro-Beijing union confederation was more interested in politics than in workers rights and wages.⁴¹ Macao human rights activists complain that procedural changes may vitiate any guarantees of judicial independence after 1999 as guaranteed by the Basic Law, because of new rules limiting tenure of judges to three years (they had lifetime tenure under the Portuguese system), and the dominant role of the government in the selection of magistrates and judges.⁴²

Legislation to create a press council galvanized the usually self-censoring press into vociferous protest. The president of the Macao Journalists Club complained that the government proposal was "very dangerous" and that any press watchdog body should be "a genuinely independent body which protects press freedom. Macao is a very small community, interpersonal relations are very close and it is very difficult to find someone who is totally independent, free of influence and unaffected by the people around him."⁴³

Macao's Chinese and Macanese intellectuals are also beginning to realize that Macao's special blend of Asia and Europe risks being engulfed by the burgeoning economic growth of the Pearl River delta and the self-interested philistinism of the odd coalition of capitalist magnates, Communist Party commissars, and short-term Portuguese bureaucrats who together have set the agenda in construction and real estate in recent years. An important motivation behind the cultivation of the Chinese central authorities in Beijing by Macao's Chinese leaders and their belated embrace of Macao's rich Sino-Portuguese cultural history is their growing anxiety about the activities of the neighboring special economic zone of Zhuhai. This relationship has turned extremely competitive—"malignant and vicious" is how Gary Ngai describes it—and has led to a failure

to collaborate on waste disposal, delays in a proposed Macao-Canton rail and highway connection, the construction of duplicative international airports, and even to Zhuhai's preemption of Macao's famous grand prix auto race with a grand prix of its own held a week earlier. There are now two grandiose schemes afoot to construct duplicative bridges across the Pearl River estuary. And Macao has also become aware that its income from gambling would be greatly diminished if China or Hong Kong were to permit casinos. Should this occur, Macao could face a fatal blow to its prosperity.

As Gary Ngai told me, turning Macao from "a city of gambling to a city of culture is the best way for Macao to survive in the future, turning it from a shadow of Hong Kong in tourism to a dragon head of cultural tourism in the Pearl River delta." Macao's business leaders have come to realize that it is in their own interest to persuade Beijing that Macao has a special role to play precisely because of its unique European-Chinese mix, and they have started to aggressively develop links to the European Community as well as the Portuguese-speaking world.⁴⁴ Preserving the "City of God in China" has thus by a strange historical reversal now fallen to the Chinese of Macao, rather than to the Portuguese, who will soon be gone. The local Chinese elite's own power and influence rests to a considerable degree in persuading Beijing that cultural preservation in this case is an asset to China and in convincing the local "nationalists" that this heritage is not "colonial trash" to be thrown overboard after 1999.

Gary Ngai, along with Professor Fok and other scholars from Macao and Portugal, have formed a new Sino-Latin Foundation. "It is precisely Macao's history and cultural identity which distinguished it from Hong Kong and other Chinese coastal cities, a Sino-Latin identity; formed over four centuries of its existence," is the way Ngai puts it. Funds have been provided by Stanley Ho and local entrepreneurs who

launched the foundation with the blessing of the Portuguese governor and the head of the Xinhua News Agency. For a first project, they plan a symposium on Matteo Ricci, to remind China and the West of a time when Western and Chinese culture shaped mutual understanding and mutual respect. It is not an ignoble effort among the triad wars and the real estate deals and the shadowy world of espionage and money laundering.

One can only wish them luck, recalling of course the admonition of Bishop Lam that nothing in Macao is ever what it appears to be, and the shrewd observation of that wise old historian Charles Boxer that it is essential to remember, for better or worse, that "in Macao, if anywhere, East and West did meet."⁴⁵ So it is not inappropriate that at this tiny, ambiguous, and opaque spot, the great adventure that took Europe 500 years ago to Asia in search of the riches of Cathay will end, just before the end of the millennium as the Chinese had wanted, and very much on their terms. ●

Notes

1. The Sino-American Treaty and documents can be found in Hunter Miller, ed., *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, vol. 4 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1934), pp. 647-62.

2. See Geoffrey C. Gunn, *Encountering Macau: A Portuguese City-state on the Periphery of China, 1557-1999* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1996).

3. "Did Britain's Diplomats Blunder?" *Economist*, May 17, 1997, pp. 47-48.

4. There was truth to the charges of kidnapping. See C. R. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East, 1550-1770* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1948), p. 223.

5. Jonathan D. Spence, *The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1984), p. 193.

6. The district or county office was the lowest level in the Chinese imperial bureaucracy. The major responsibility of this low-level bureaucrat in Macao was to make sure that the Portuguese paid their

annual rent and customs duties to the Chinese imperial authorities. See Jonathan Porter, *Macau: The Imaginary City* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1996). Porter's is by far the best recent book on Macao in English.

7. Angela Guimarães, *Uma Relação Especial: Macau e as relações luso-chinesas, 1780–1844* (Lisbon: Edição Centro de Investigações e Estudos de Sociologia, 1996.)

8. For a discussion of the seven great Chinese voyages of the Grand Eunuch Zheng He between 1405 and 1433, see K. N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), esp. pp. 34–62.

9. C. R. Boxer's *The Great Ship of the Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade, 1555–1640* (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1963) is one of the great works on the Portuguese in Asia and is still unsurpassed for its pithy detail and original research. More recently, the Indian historian Sanjay Subrahmanyam has written an excellent overview, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700: A Political and Economic History* (London and New York: Longman, 1993).

10. Yoshitomo Okamoto, *The Namban Art of Japan* (New York and Tokyo: Weatherhill and Heibonsha, 1972). See also, Luiz Carlos Lisboa and Mara Rúbia Arakaki, *Namban* (São Paulo: Aliança Cultural Brasil-Japão, 1993).

11. C. R. Boxer, *Portuguese Society in the Tropics: The Municipal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia, and Luanda 1510–1600* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965).

12. For these events, see Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, pp. 72–92; and Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606–1661* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 119–20.

13. Boxer, *Great Ship of the Amacon*, p. 19.

14. Ibid.

15. The most accessible Chinese text on this period is the report by two officials, Tcheong-u-Lam and Ian-kuong-Iam, *Ou Mun Kei-Leok: Monografia de Macau*, trans. Luis Gonçalves (Macao: Imprensa Nacional, 1950). Boxer reproduced the remarkable illustrations of Chinese and Portuguese inhabitants of Macao contained in the original manuscript in his *Fidalgos in the Far East*.

16. This period has been skillfully evoked in the romanticized histories of Austin Coates's *City of Broken Promises* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1967), and *A Macao Narrative* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1975). For the opium trade, see Martin Booth, *Opium: A History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 103–37.

17. On Valignano, see Spence, *Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci*, pp. 40–41. For the Jesuits in Macao and China, see also Porter, *Macau*, pp. 104–16.

18. The Macao Senate had to calm the Chinese with a lengthy memorial explaining that no anti-Chinese plot was involved in the fracas.

19. On the expulsion of the Jesuits from Portugal and its empire, see Kenneth Maxwell, *Pombal, Paradox of the Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 71–86; on the Jesuits within the Portuguese Empire, see Dauril Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise: The Society of Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire and Beyond* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

20. The Basic Law is printed in full in Steve Shipp, *Macau, China: A Political History of the Portuguese Colony's Transition to Chinese Rule* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1997), pp. 143–71. There is also a good description of the negotiations and legal background in R. D. Cremer, ed., *Macau: City of Commerce and Culture*, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: API Press, 1991), esp. pp. 261–353.

21. *South China Morning Post*, May 12, 1997.

22. Ibid., April 19, 1997.

23. Reuters World Service, May 12, 1997.

23. *South China Morning Post*, April 19, 1997; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Chi-92–082, April 27, 1997.

25. Shipp, *Macau, China*, p. 146.

26. *Wall Street Journal*, May 6, 1997.

27. FBIS, Chi-93–139, May 19, 1997, p. A6.

28. FBIS, Chi-92–127, daily report, May 7, 1997; FBIS, Chi-97–128, May 8, 1997; and *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 26, 1996, p. 30.

29. For this period in Portugal, see Kenneth Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

30. China thus demanded that the United Nations exclude Macao from the list of territories "under colonial rule." As far as the China was concerned, Macao was "part of China" and a domestic

question. The Portuguese acquiesced in this definition and described Macao thereafter as "a Chinese territory under Portuguese administration."

31. Fok Kai Cheong, *Estudos sobre a Instalação dos Portugueses em Macau* (Lisbon and Macao: Gradiva, 1996).

32. Franco Nogueira, *Salazar: Estudo Biográfico*, 6 vols. (Coimbra: Atlântida Editora, 1977), vol. 3, p. 393.

33. FBIS, Chi-97-086, daily report, May 2, 1997, p. A11. C.R. Boxer, "Dares-e-tomares nas relações luso-chinesas durante os séculos XVII e XVIII através de Macau," *Boletim do Arquivo Histórico de Macau*, vol. 1 (January 1981), pp. 3-13.

34. *Economist Intelligence Unit*, Country Report: Macau, May 13, 1997.

35. There is an excellent account of the Macanese in "The Macanese: Anthropology, History, Ethnology," *Review of Culture*, (Instituto Cultural de Macau), no. 20, 1994.

36. For a forceful analysis of the problem of corruption in Macao, see Lo Shiu-hing, "Bureaucratic Corruption and Its Control in Macao," *Asian Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 15 (June 1993), pp. 32-58.

37. Hong Kong Sing Tao Jim Pao (in Chinese), FBIS, Chi-96-236, daily report, December 5, 1996, p. A16 (translated text). The veil that closely covers the role of Macao and its money in domestic Portuguese politics was partially lifted by the "tell all," or at least part of the "all" in a remarkable book by Rui Mateus, the former confidant, translator, and political bagman for Mario Soares. Mateus was caught up in allegations of corruption in the contracting of Macao's new international airport, and former president Soares quickly dumped him; as a result, Mateus's book reveals a good deal of the seamy side of Portuguese politics, including the extraordinary tale of the murky proposed deals over the use of Macao as a base for a television franchise aimed at the Hong Kong market and southern China, involving Soares, and at various stages, the late Robert Maxwell, Rupert Murdoch, and Stanley Ho. See Rui Mateus, *Contos Proibidos: Memórias de um PS desconhecido* (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1996). Soares, when asked about the Mateus book, said that he "had not read it.... He did not wish to disturb himself or waste time uselessly." See Maria

João Avillez, Soares, *Democracia* (Lisbon: Público, 1996), p. 272.

38. *New York Times*, October 19, 1998.

39. Final Report of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U. S. Senate, Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns, together with additional and minority views, March 10, 1998. 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998), pp. 2497-2904, 5270-5413; and Report of the Select Committee United States House of Representatives, U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1999). The most comprehensive discussion on Yah Lin "Charlie" Trie's role as a direct source or solicitor of the second largest volume of contributions returned by the Democratic National Committee is to be found in the testimony of Jerry Campana, special agent, Senate Governmental Affairs Campaign Finance Investigation, on July 29, 1998. This testimony was not in the six-volume Senate committee report, but is available through the Federal Document Clearing House. Charlie Trie was charged by the Justice Department's Campaign Finance Task Force. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 18 months of home detention, three years probation, and a \$5,000 fine (*Wall Street Journal*, November 10, 1999).

40. *Economist Intelligence Unit* Country Report, April 27, 1998.

41. Lo Shiu-hing, "Comparative Political Systems: The Cases of Hong Kong and Macau," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol. 25, no. 2 (1995), pp. 254-71, and his "Aspects of Political Development in Macao," *China Quarterly*, no. 120 (December 1989), pp. 837-51.

42. These questions are discussed in detail in U.S. Department of State, *Macao Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996*, released January 30, 1997.

43. *Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly*, September 23, 1996.

44. For the current economic situation, see International Monetary Fund, Public Information Notice No. 99140, May 7, 1999. Article IV Consultation held in 1998 with Portugal-Macao.

45. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 288.