

XI. TURBULENT TIMOR

Of all the obscure corners of the world which the Pacific War of 1941-5 dragged temporarily into the limelight, Portuguese Timor was probably even more unfamiliar to the majority of newspaper readers than the Kuriles or the Solomons. Joseph Conrad's admirers may have remembered his description of Timor-Dilli; but even the best informed persons might be excused ignorance of the fact that the Portuguese had been precariously established in the Lesser Sunda islands for some three hundred years. Their history in this remote portion of the Malay Archipelago is little known and not particularly edifying, but it has its romantic side and redeeming features. The close connection of the colony with Macao, and their mutual influence on each other's economy and social life, is the justification for this chapter. Timor's strategic importance is likely to grow in the years to come, and a consideration of how the Portuguese managed to retain a foothold there for so long may not be entirely devoid of interest.

For many years before Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope, Timor was known to the Chinese as a source of supply of the fragrant sandalwood, which in both the white and yellow variety, was in such demand for burning as incense in temples and joss-houses. Chinese junks from Fukien and Kwangtung visited the island periodically, whilst the Portuguese found their way there soon after Albuquerque's conquest of Malacca in 1511. It was not until fifty years later that they made their first proper settlement in the Lesser Sunda islands, and then and for the ensuing century the centre of their activities was not Timor, but the neighbouring smaller island of Solor. The foundation of this settlement was due to the Dominicans, who encouraged by the success of some preliminary conversions, built a stone

fort on Solor in 1566, with the object of affording protection to the local Christian *kampongs*, against Mohamedan raiders from Celebes and Java. Round this stone fort there grew up a settlement populated by native converts, and the offspring of the Portuguese soldiery and sandalwood traders from Malacca and Macao who intermarried with native women. This mixed race was known as 'Topasses', a term popularly derived from the Hindustani *Topi*, a hat, which headgear formed the distinguishing (and in some cases the only) evidence of their Christianity, although a more probable etymology is the Dravidian *Tuppasi* (Interpreter).

Timor was still the main source of supply of sandalwood for the China and Coromandel markets, but the island was only visited periodically for the purpose of collecting the wood, both trade and conversion being centered on Solor. For the first quarter of a century of its existence, the captain of the fort was chosen by the Dominican Prior at Malacca, subject to the confirmation of his choice by the Captain of Malacca. So much may be gathered from an *Alvara* to this effect, signed by the Governor of Portuguese India, Antonio Moniz Barreto in 1576, which is in the present writer's collection. Some twenty years later the appointment was transferred to the Viceroy of India, the earliest recorded incumbent under the new regime being Antonio Vilhegas. This Captain's instructions dated September 1595, empowered him *inter alia* to levy fines and confiscate the property of offenders up to a certain value, but he could not carry out death sentences without confirmation from the Supreme Court at Goa. He was also entitled to remove suspected criminals who had taken sanctuary in the church to the local jail, pending reference to the legislature at Malacca. This and other privileges led the Dominicans to complain bitterly of the change of system, whereby the captain was no longer under their control, and they tried in vain to have the old arrangement restored.

About the turn of the century, the White Friars as they were called in East Asia (conversely to Black Friars in mediaeval England) had a total of twenty-seven *Kampongs* in Solor, Flores and the neighbouring islands under their control, with converts numbering 12,250 according to the Dutch,

or 100,000 if the Dominican claims are to be believed. The lower estimate is the most likely to be the true one. Their most important post after Solor was on the islet of Pulo Ende, on the south coast of Flores, where they had another stone fort, from which they were driven by native rebellions in 1605 and again in 1630. Even after their final expulsion in this year, they seem to have kept up some sort of contact with the partially-converted inhabitants, for a Dominican narrative of 1665, records the dispatch of an expedition from Larantuka to the relief of the Christian *kampongs* on Pulo Ende five years previously. The only trace left of their occupation at the present day, is a hazy legend of a red-bearded Portuguese captain's beautiful daughter, whose lover was slain by a licentious Dominican monk, with the result that the lady died of grief. This picturesque if improbable story, and a few ruined walls of the original fort, partly built of coral stone, attest the passage of the Portuguese through this Eden-like isle.

The main Dominican stronghold on Solor had an even more chequered career. Surprised, plundered and partly burnt in an abortive native rebellion in 1598, it was soon rebuilt and restored, only to fall to a Dutch attack led by a Captain rejoicing in the curious name of Appollonius Scottie in April 1613. The fort was stoutly built and strongly situated, its fall being principally due to the absence of the greater part of the garrison on a sandalwood-felling expedition to Timor. Over a thousand persons left the place on its capitulation, but of these only thirty were Portuguese or Eurasians, and seven Dominican monks. These refugees found shelter at Larantuka, on the eastern tip of the island of Flores a few miles away, where they founded a settlement which in course of time became a thorn in the side of the Hollanders in these parts, and prevented the consolidation of their hold on the Lesser Sunda islands for two centuries. The first Dutch occupation of Solor did not last long. Scottie was drowned whilst bathing (untimely deaths were a feature of captains' careers in these parts as we shall see) and the Hollanders abandoned the island in 1615. The Dominicans made a tentative reappearance two years later, but the Dutch were back again in 1618. Their commander was

Crijn van Raemburch, who beat off a half-hearted Portuguese attack on the fort, but was himself soundly thrashed when he tried to take Larantuka in May, 1620. He was succeeded as *Opperhoofd* (Chief) of Solor by Jan Thomaszoon Dayman, who set a precedent in 1625, by deserting to the Portuguese at Larantuka where he became a Roman Catholic and settled down with a native woman. He died soon after (poisoned by the Portuguese if contemporary Dutch accounts are to be trusted) but his nefarious example was followed by his successor, Jan de Hornay, who after making a year's truce with the Larantuka Dominicans on his own responsibility, likewise deserted to the Portuguese in February 1629. This naturally infuriated the Governor-General J. P. Coen, uncompromising Calvinist as he was, and equally naturally rejoiced the hearts of the Portuguese, — although Hornay gave them some trouble through being an incurable drunkard.

The centre of Portuguese influence in the Lesser Sunda islands was now Larantuka, which contemporary Portuguese writers confusingly refer to as "Solor". Both Portuguese and Dutch visited Timor periodically to obtain sandalwood and slaves, but neither of them had any settlement on this island. Despite the loss of Solor and Ende, Portuguese trade in this region was surprisingly resilient, and much more flourishing than is usually realised. An English merchant from Macassar who called at Batavia in 1625, reported that between ten and 22 Portuguese galliots called at Macassar yearly from Macao, Malacca and ports on the Coromandel coast, there being sometimes as many as five hundred Portuguese ashore, where the Moslem Sultan allowed them the free exercise of their religion. They arrived in November-December and left again in May, using Macassar as an entrepot for the sale of Chinese silks and Indian cotton textiles, which they exchanged for sandalwood from Timor, cloves from the Moluccas and diamonds from Borneo. The Englishman declared that their trade was worth over half a million pieces-of-eight annually, the Macao galliots alone taking some 60,000 worth. Small wonder that he added that the Portuguese looked upon Macassar as a second and better Malacca, and "held themselves as safe as if they had no

enemies in India, since they had never once been attacked there". Macassar continued to afford a profitable commercial base to the Portuguese, and particularly to the Macaonese, down to the Dutch expedition of 1660, which was indeed largely motivated by their increasing prosperity.

Jan de Hornay's desertion and the subsequent abandonment of Solor by the Dutch, induced the Dominicans to reoccupy it in April 1630, with the help of men and materials made available by Nuno Alvarez Botelho's great victory at Malacca, and by the generosity of the inhabitants of Macao. The latter's contribution included some cannon cast by Manoel Tavares Bocarro, and a number of Chinese masons and a gunsmith. The moving spirit in the reoccupation was Frei Miguel Rangel O.P., later Bishop of Cochín, who wrote a glowing account of Solor, its climate, products and attractions, which he represented as an earthly Eden where only man was vile. The island was famed for its upland rice, which did not need the laborious cultivation of the paddy variety; its prolific sheep, goats and buffaloes; its tasty fruits and vegetables, excellent drinking water and healthy air. When due allowance is made for exaggeration, it must be admitted that the Friar had some reason for his claims. One of his prize exhibits was the local Captain-Major of the native militia, a hale and hearty veteran of over 80 years service, who, if another Dominican account of 1665 is to be believed, begat a child (and killed a fierce water buffalo out hunting) at the ripe age of 130 years. The contemporary chronicler Antonio Bocarro, writing in 1635, also alludes to the prosperity of the Solor settlement, and to its flourishing sandalwood trade from Timor with Macao. This commerce was carried on *via* Macassar in galliots manned with native Christians whose fighting quality was proved on several occasions, notably in the capture of the Dutch ship *Jaeger* with all her crew in 1630. This Macao-Solor-Timor trade was not placed on a monopoly basis like the Japan Voyage, but (after a futile attempt to place it on this footing) left free for all and sundry to participate in, — which was probably one of the causes of its success.

The Dominicans were not left undisturbed in their stronghold. A Dutch expedition of 6 sail carrying 200 men under

being the best harbour and the strategic key to the island. His military efforts aroused unfriendly criticism amongst the Portuguese traders, with the result that he was recalled to Goa in 1649, leaving the continuation of the work in the hands of the Captain-Major Francisco Carneiro de Siqueira, who, having quarrelled with the Friars at Larantuka, had established himself in another hampong nearby. News of this fort reached the Hollanders at Solor in a greatly exaggerated form; but when their commander, Major William Verbeeck, visited the site in 1648, he reported that he found the alleged fort to be only a house with three or four people therein. In February of this year a violent earthquake gravely damaged Fort Henricus, which never really recovered from this blow. Verbeeck annoyed his superiors at Batavia by marrying a Solor Princess. He was replaced by an officer who was killed during a skirmish on Timor in a homeric duel with the Portuguese Captain-Major, Mattheus da Costa, circa 1652. Three years later his successor, Major Jacob Verheijden, met a similar fate at the hands of the Eurasian Antonio de Hornay, son of the renegade Hollander Jan de Hornay and his native wife.

In 1653 the Hollanders seized the embryo Portuguese fort at Kupang, and converted it into a stronghold of their own, which under the name of Fort Concordia, henceforth became their headquarters on Timor. Fort Henricus was apparently abandoned after Arnold de Vlamingh van Oudshoorn's unsuccessful expedition to Timor against da Costa and de Hornay in 1656; when far from avenging the previous Dutch defeats, he was forced to withdraw in confusion with the loss of 170 European soldiers. A final effort to turn the Portuguese out of Larantuka was made on the conquest of Macassar in 1660, but when this proved abortive, the Portuguese were left in relative tranquility, until the Luso-Dutch Peace of 1662 put an official end to the fifty years hostilities in the Sunda Islands.

At this time the Portuguese still had no fixed settlement on Timor, but their favourite port of call was Lifao (the modern Ocussi or Okocessi) on the N.W. coast, where the native ruler was one of Friar Jacinto's most enthusiastic converts circa 1640. Larantuka on Flores was their head-

Commander Tombergen appeared off the fort on the 8th June 1636 and summoned the occupants to surrender. The senior Dominican Friar answered that Bishop Rangel had left, but that he was determined to hold out as long as possible, "the more so, since he owed God only one death", — a diction surprisingly reminiscent of Shakespeare's Francis Feeble in *King Henry IV*, Pt. II, Act III Scene II. The Friar was as good as his word and beat off a half-hearted Dutch attack without much trouble. Despite this success, the Dominicans voluntarily abandoned the fort a few weeks later, which then remained untenanted for the next ten years, until the third occupation by the Hollanders in February, 1646. The Hollanders gave this stronghold the name of Fort Henricus.

The loss of Malacca by the Portuguese in 1641, far from giving the death-blow to their influence in the Sunda islands, indirectly served to strengthen it. Many of the Catholic Eurasian inhabitants of that city sought new homes in Macassar, whence some of them settled in Timor. A certain Portuguese named Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, who traded from Macassar to Macao, Timor, Flores and the Coromandel Coast, became a great favourite of the Sultan Hassan Udin, and of his Minister Patengaloan who spoke and wrote fluent Portuguese and was an enthusiastic collector of European books and sea-charts. It is not an exaggeration to describe Vieira de Figueiredo as the most influential figure in the Eastern part of the Archipelago, and he naturally used his great influence to encourage the Sultan of Macassar to take a firm line with the Dutch. So strong were the Portuguese in Timor and Flores, where Larantuka was still their only settlement, that an uneasy Luso-Dutch truce prevailed for some years, during which both parties cut sandalwood on Timor, and the Dominicans had a signed contract for supplying it to the Hollanders.

During the Viceroyalty of the Count of Aveiras (1640-1645) the Dominican Friar, Antonio de São Jacinto, who was the first missionary to obtain lasting results on Timor, where he converted some of the petty pagan chiefs, started the construction of a fort at Kupang (also spelt Cuplo, Cupam, Koepang), which he rightly selected as

quarters, but it is not easy to ascertain who was in even the nominal control of affairs. The aged native Captain-Major of militia, Francisco Fernandes, had died about 1653, at the age of over 130 years if the Dominicans are to be believed, and his titular Portuguese superior, Francisco Carneiro de Siqueira, co-founder of Kupang, died soon after. Subsequent candidates for the Captaincy were almost as many as there were individuals at Larantuka, but the principal contestants were the two Eurasian swashbucklers, Antonio de Hornay and Mattheus da Costa. Their rivalry for the leadership of the motley throng of Portuguese soldiers, Macaonese traders, Dutch deserters and Chinese smugglers who made up the male part of Larantuka's lay community, lasted all their lives, and was continued by their successors for generations. This was the origin of the rise to power of the *Larantukeiros*, *Toepasen* or *Suarte Portugesezen* (Black Portuguese) as the Dutch termed them, who whilst always acknowledging the nominal suzerainty of the Portuguese Crown, fiercely resented any attempts by the authorities at Goa and Macao to enforce their paper control of the colony.

Another contestant in 1661-3 was Simão Luis, who had the advantage of the support of Vieira de Figueiredo, uncrowned King of Macassar, who removed to Larantuka in 1664, after four years of Dutch pressure. Simão Luis was a monster of cruelty. In order to discourage desertions to the Dutch at Koepang, he once hung a native chief in the presence of several others, whom he then compelled to drink the blood and eat the flesh of the alleged culprit. On his death in 1664, Vieira forced the election of his own candidate, Antonio de Hornay, to the great disgust of his rival Mattheus da Costa, who attacked him next year. In the bitter civil war which ensued, fortune alternated her favours with monotonous regularity, until the death of Mattheus da Costa in 1673 decided the question in favour of Antonio de Hornay. For the next twenty years the latter acted as the uncrowned King of Timor, paying lip service to the Portuguese Crown (to whom he also sent occasional financial presents) but stubbornly refusing to admit successive Governors nominated by the Viceroy of Goa. Only his death at the ripe old age of eighty, enabled the Government

nominee, a Macaonese fidalgo named Antonio de Mesquita Pimentel, to seize the reins of government from his brother and successor Francisco de Hornay amidst scenes of great rejoicing at Larantuka and Lifao in 1695.

This popular rejoicing proved short-lived, for Pimentel proceeded to murder two of Antonio de Hornay's bastard children, and subsequently fleeced the population unmercifully. The result was that "the same people who had received him with applause, expelled him with scorn" to Goa; where however he cleared himself of the charges of maladministration, and ended his career as Captain-General of Bardez. Pimentel's forceful if temporary suppression of the Hornay family, opened the way for a return to power of the da Costas, whose representative, Domingos (a bastard son of Matheus da Costa) extended his control over the whole area, save for Koepang and its immediate vicinity, by the end of 1700.

The authorities at Goa had hitherto been little more than spectators of this long drawn-out civil strife. Early in the Hornay regime, they had dispatched an emissary with sealed Patents of Governorship addressed to the leaders of both contending factions, and with orders to present only that addressed to whoever was in power at the time, concealing the other from both parties. This turned out to be Antonio de Hornay, who accordingly was recognised as Captain-General, although Matheus de Costa had an earlier patent which he regarded as valid since it had not been expressly revoked. A few years later, the Viceroy sent letters-patent to selected Portuguese residents at Larantuka, empowering them to take charge of the government. These individuals, fearful of incurring the wrath of the all-powerful de Hornay, merely handed their letters-patent over to him. De Hornay was henceforth left alone till his death, and seems to have ruled fairly well on the whole. In correspondence with the Dutch Government at Batavia, he maintained the rights of his nominal suzerain, the King of Portugal, over Solor and Timor, and cracked down on the export of sandalwood to the Dutch when it suited him. He amassed great wealth through his virtual monopoly of the sandalwood trade, and often boasted that he would leave it to the King of Portugal

if practicable. The rebellion (of the Costas) against the Crown will be suppressed . . . if circumstances permit it. The rebellious colonists will be treated . . . cautiously and deceitfully. If the Dutch have occupied any Portuguese territory, "you will conduct yourself in such a way as to give them no pretext for breaking the peace". And so forth and so on.

Admittedly the situation of Portuguese Asia at this period did not allow the Viceroy to collect a sufficient force to carry out an aggressive policy. The loss of Mombassa to the Arabs of Oman after a two-year siege in 1699, had greatly enfeebled the military and maritime strength of the State, due to the failure of the repeated attempts made to relieve it. The mortality in the India-bound fleets was unusually heavy, three-quarters of the men sent out dying during the voyage. Of ten frigates which formed the Portuguese Armada in the Indian Ocean in 1701, only one was seaworthy. In these circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that the harassed Viceroy could only supply one frigate and fifty soldiers to take the Governor to Macao, whence the frigate was to return to Goa, leaving him to go on in a local vessel. Even so, it is obvious that the vacillating orders given to Antonio Coelho Guerreiro, did nothing to alleviate the precarious situation in the island.

At the time of his appointment Guerreiro had submitted a draft of what men and supplies he required. These included a force of 27 officers, and 650 men, but he could only secure a miserable company of fifty at Goa. Not all of these subsequently could be induced to leave Macao, where his exertions could only enlist another 32 men, so that he had to sail for Timor in January 1702 with less than a hundred soldiers to enforce his precarious authority. During his six months stay in Macao, he had taken the opportunity of getting a good supply of military and technical equipment such as "muskets, ladders, axes, nails, carpenters' tools", cheaply made by skilled Chinese workmen, which he realised would come in handy for the building of the projected new settlement. Nor did he neglect to take 200 piculs of rice along with him, "in order to avoid asking for sustenance on his arrival in the islands at a time when there was such a dearth of this food stuff."

on his death. That his loyalty was not mere sentiment, was proved by his regal donations to the Treasury at Goa, one of which included a quantity of gold dust to the value of 23,000 xerafines. The temporary eclipse of this powerful family in 1700, afforded the Viceroy of Goa the opportunity of appointing a Governor to whom he could confide the enforcement of the Royal authority.

The newly-appointed Governor and Captain-General of the islands of Timor and Solor and other regions of the South as his title read, was an interesting person in his way. Born in the picturesque Alentejan town of Santiago-do-Cacem, he enlisted in the army in 1668 and served for thirteen years in Brazil and West Africa, rising from the ranks to captain, and specializing in military engineering. In 1688 he was nominated Colonial Secretary of Angola, in which capacity he lived for some time at Loanda, before being promoted to Secretary of State in Portuguese India ten years later. His appointment as Governor of Timor in 1701, may therefore be regarded as a reward for colonial services rendered; since despite the remoteness and instability of the post its possibilities were believed to be enormous. Thus a contemporary Dominican friar wrote with as much enthusiasm as exaggeration, — "It is the general opinion in India that the effective conquest of the Zambesi River valley together with the occupation of Timor island would yield sufficient wealth to make His Majesty the most powerful monarch in all Europe, without possession of any other realm or dominion whatsoever".

His official instructions are too detailed for reproduction here, but an accurate idea of their tenor may be gained from the comments of Captain Faria de Moraes who printed them for the first time in 1934. He points out that the keynote was weakness predominating over caution and political sagacity. None of the twenty-two paragraphs of the instructions contain a trace of administrative firmness or a categorical order whose enforcement is clearly stated. The difficulties of various kinds which confront the new governor, are considered insuperable from the beginning. Thus the landing place will be chosen . . . where it is possible to land. The sandalwood trade driven by the Dutch will be hindered . . .

From some stray documents relating to Antonio Coelho's governorship of Timor which Senhor Frazão de Vasconcelos disinterred from the Archives in 1937, it seems that the new Captain-General ran foul of Domingos da Costa from the start. Despite the at first covert and later open hostility of the latter however, the Governor succeeded in establishing a fortified beachhead at Lifao (also written Lifau, Liphao, Leiffauw &c) on the N.W. coast of Timor. This seems to have consisted of a small earth fort, mounting eight guns, which commanded a large space of several acres enclosed by a stockaded trench and a few loose stone bulwarks, affording scant protection to the matshed houses of the embryo settlement.

The place never seems to have progressed very far beyond its pioneer beginnings; but such as it was, it constituted the centre of Portuguese power in the island for over half a century, and its establishment marked the transference of authority from Flores to Timor. It was not long before Guerreiro found himself more or less closely blockaded at Lifao by Domingos da Costa, but the latter was never able to capture the place by assault nor to starve it out by blockade or siege. His failure was not due to want of trying, since the garrison were forced to eat "horses, dogs, hides, toasted bones, worms, and other filthy fauna, from doing which many of them sickened and died," as a contemporary chronicler informs us.

Malnutrition and pestilence combined could not break the Governor's spirit apparently, for he not only defied Domingos da Costa in his two-year blockade, but disobeyed the letter and spirit of the viceregal instructions by openly challenging the Dutch to fight him.

The Larantauqueiros as the Portuguese called da Costa's adherents, or the 'Black Portuguese' as the Hollanders less politely termed his motley followers, were supported by Chinese sandal wood smugglers egged on by Jan van Alphen the Dutch Resident of Koepang, — or so Guerreiro professed to believe. Ignoring his orders to avoid an open breach with the Hollanders, the Governor not only sent truculent notes to the Dutch authorities at Koepang and Batavia, but forcibly seized the sloop *Doradus* (belonging to some Batavian

Chinese) and carried her into Lifao where she was declared good prize. He then added insult to injury by sending an insulting missive recording this seizure addressed to "Jan Van Alphen and the other rats of his nest" in May 1704. Possibly some of his allegations were not without foundation, as Governor-General Johan Van Hoorn warned the Dutch Resident at Koepang against intervening in the Portuguese quarrels on Timor that year.

During his contests with Domingos da Costa and the Dutch, the Governor attempted to get the native chiefs on his side by granting the rank of Colonel to twenty leading Datus (Tribal heads), and lower commissioned ranks to various petty chiefs and lesser lights. This measure apparently had some effect, as he could occasionally muster sufficient outside support to make extensive raids into hostile territory in the interior. The custom was continued by his successors and has lasted down to the present day. Soon after his arrival, the Governor sent to Goa for help and reinforcements, but although his request was sympathetically considered at a Council meeting on Christmas Eve 1702, it turned out to be a case of "help from Spain comes late or never". Some assistance was forthcoming from Macao, and this enabled him to hold out until the end of 1704, when he appears to have abandoned the struggle and left Lifao in disgust and in disguise. This last assumption is based on the supposition that Antonio Coelho Guerreiro is the source of the curious description of Timor which is hereby reproduced from Captain Alexander Hamilton's entertaining *A New Account of the East Indies* (Edinburgh 1727).

"... The natives acknowledge the King of Portugal their Sovereign, and have embraced the Romish Religion. They permitted the Portuguese colony of Macao in China, to build a Fort on it, which they called Leifew, and the Dutch a Factory called Coupang, but would never suffer either to interfere with the Government of their country. The Portuguese of Macao drove a very advantageous trade to Timor for many years, and finding the natives to be passive Catholics, tried by fair means to get the whole government of the country into the Churches' hands, but could not beguile them that way, therefore

they tried force, and commenced a war, but to their Cost they found that the Timoreans would not lose their liberty for fear of the loss of Blood. They chose one Gossales Gomez their general. [This must be a mistake for Costa or Hornay]. He was a native of Timor and had travelled to Maccao and Goa. He allowed the King of Portugal to be the Sovereign and Protector of their Country, and they would be his loyal subjects, providing their Laws and Liberties might be secured to them.

That war with the City of Maccao lasted about fifteen years. It began about the year 1688, and was not quite finished in the year 1703, and Maccao in the end was ruined by it, for it exhausted both their stock of men and money to such a degree that of 1,000 citizens the town had before the war, there was hardly fifty left at the end of it, and of forty sail of trading ships, not above five left....

The Product of the island is Sandal-wood, the best and largest in the World, which is a great commodity in China, also Gold and Bees-Wax. The Gold is plentiful, but of a low touch, not amounting to 20 Caracts fine. And all manner of Provisions are plentiful and cheap, but no anchoring about the island, except at Liefau and Coupang. And the coast is subject to frequent tornadoes, or squalls of wind and rain, introduced with much thunder and lightning.

The natives report, that at a certain season of the year, after the South-west Monsoons are set in, they can discern a high mountainous land to the Southward of them, and continues in sight from December to the latter end of February, or the beginning of March, and then disappears. If the Report be true, it must be some floating island, that comes from and goes to New Holland, which is the next tract of land to the South of Timor. These accounts I had from a Portuguese gentleman, called Alexander Pinto, who was a Captain at Liefau four years, and was bound from Batavia to Goa, in Anno 1704. He went Passenger with me, and seemed to be a Man of Probity."

In all Coelho's voluminous correspondence about Timor in 1701-4, I can find no mention of a Captain Alexander Pinto, nor have I been able to trace this name in the contemporary lists of fidalgos and captains in Portuguese India. It is curious that this Captain Pinto who impressed Alex-

ander Hamilton (a man far from easy to please) so favourably, was in Lifao just during these years; and the suspicion that this pseudo-Pinto was none other than Antonio Coelho Guerreiro in disguise is strengthened by some otherwise cryptic entries in the inventory of documents in the Archives at Batavia printed under the title of *Realis* in 1886.

An entry under the 20th February 1705, deals with the Government's decision to send an official protest to "the Portuguese Governor of Lifao over the hostilities he has practised for three years". Another entry under the 26 June notes the "clandestine arrival of the late Governor of Lifao", and records the determination not to raise with him the question of his hostile acts, nor to send the protest mentioned in the previous February. A third entry dated 21 August records the decision to send the written protest against his actions direct to the Viceroy at Goa. It is true that Hamilton says, somewhat vaguely, that he took his Portuguese passenger from Batavia anno 1704, but writing over twenty years later he could easily have made a mistake of one year. It is easy to understand why Guerreiro should have gone disguised to the headquarters of a Company whose servants he had officially stigmatised as "rats," but it is not so easy to understand why the Hollanders treated him so leniently when they obviously knew who he was, allowing him to land unmolested in July 1705.

The Dutch protests were presumably disregarded by the Viceroy. At any rate Guerreiro was offered the post of Captain-General of Zambesia (E. Africa) in 1706; but he rejected the offer, although this post was normally one of the most lucrative in the Portuguese colonial service. Possibly piqued by this refusal, the authorities showed no haste to pay him his arrears of salary as Governor of Timor which were still owing to him in 1712. He is mentioned three years later, and he probably died soon afterwards at Goa, without ever receiving any pecuniary reward for what Gregorio Pereira Fidalgo described as "deeds worthy of record by the pen of whoever wishes to continue the History of India, forgotten and neglected these many years". Nobody did come forward to continue the work of Barros, Couto and Bocarro, so this modest tribute to a man who served his country well

from Pernambuco to the 'Pearl of the Orient' (as he magniloquently termed Timor) may not be out of place here.

As regards the economic situation in the islands, this seems to have been better than one might reasonably expect from a perusal of its bloody annals. The fact that the fragrant sandalwood could always be profitably disposed of in China was doubtless the main reason. Slaves for the Batavia and Macao markets were the next most profitable commodity and a constant supply of these unfortunates was guaranteed by the internecine wars of the Hornays and Costas. Gold and copper, although rumoured to abound in great quantities, never materialised to any great extent, but horses and honey were numbered amongst the other minor exports. Proposals for the establishment of sugar, cotton, and indigo plantations never came to anything, and the excellent coffee which the island now produces is of recent origin. During the last quarter of the 17th century, trade was in a relatively flourishing condition, judging by the fact that vessels sailing between Macao and Timor frequently called at the Javanese ports of Japara and Bantam, as can be seen from a perusal of the monthly shipping lists printed in the *Dagh-Register Gehouden int Casteel Batavia* for the years 1663-1682. The Eurasian population was also increased by the arrival of a number of refugees from Macassar after the Dutch conquest of 1660, who settled in Larantuka and near Lifao.

There seems to have been something about the atmosphere of Timor which was conducive to violence however, for sudden death was the order of the day amongst its unruly inhabitants. Apart from the numerous instances already given, we may mention the great slave-raid of the 'Black Portuguese' on the little island of Pulo Kisser, which was accompanied by every circumstance of atrocity. Fighting between Dutch and Portuguese native adherents was more or less endemic, the skirmishes which took place in 1680 being particularly severe. Two Portuguese captains killed each other in a bloody duel at Japara in 1674, whilst their respective seconds were severely wounded. Dutch soldiers and sailors (mostly French and German born) continued to desert periodically to the Portuguese of Lifao, which

assumed the status of a kind of Alsatia, largely populated by cutthroats. Not that the Dutch garrison of Koepang were a much more edifying lot, if we are to judge from a visiting official's description of them in 1665, "leading from the highest to the lowest, a very vile and irregular life, both in drunkenness and in whoring, wherein their commander, Cullenberg, sets them an example like a true captain". These man-made calamities were aggravated by periodic natural disasters, such as the typhoon which devastated part of the island in 1674, and the small-pox plague which ravaged the hapless population next year.

If it is asked how the sons of Saint Dominic fared in this scene of strife and debauchery, truth compels us to answer but ill. With certain notable and honourable exceptions (of whom Frey Jacinto de Santo Antonio O.P., the Apostle of Timor was one) it can be fairly said that the general standard of Dominican missionaries throughout the Portuguese Asiatic Empire in the 17th and 18th centuries was deplorably low. They afforded a sorry contrast to the Jesuits, whose common failing of pride at least saved them from many of the meaner sins. The tired reader of the Dominican mission histories in Asia finds that their credulousness, carelessness and at times downright shameless mendacity, compares very unfavourably with the better balanced and more intelligent accounts of the Jesuits. There is nothing in Dominican mission literature faintly comparable with the informative Jesuit Letters from Japan and China (1550-1750) which opened up a new world to European readers, if we except a few works like the racy *Tratados* of Fernandez Navarrete (Madrid 1676) and the earlier *Ethiopia Oriental* published by his more modest confrere, the Portuguese João dos Santos, in 1609. The official correspondence of the Viceroy at Goa abounds in complaints against the moral laxity, religious indifference and pecuniary greed of the bulk of the Dominican Friars in the Asiatic missions. That the Order had a bad name, and that it thoroughly deserved it, is the inescapable conclusion forced on anyone who takes the trouble to plough through the documents of that time.

One of the most curious Jekyll and Hyde characters amongst the Dominican missionaries in 18th century Timor

was the Goanese Friar, Manoel de Santo Antonio, who was titular Bishop of Malacca from 1701 until his death thirty three years later. Early records attest his exemplary zeal as a model missionary. Governor Guerreiro, who expressed a very low opinion of the majority of Dominicans in the island, particularly exempted Friar Manoel from his strictures, terming him a "human angel" who was responsible for the conversion of over 10,000 natives in the space of five years. The value of these conversions may be doubted when we read that the Bishop himself claimed that Saint Francis Xavier had performed over 800 miracles in his diocese alone, thus revealing a singularly credulous mind. But up till 1705, all the authorities concerned were unanimous in their praise of his unwearied and truly Apostolic zeal. From then on the tune changes, and a sour note is sounded in all the relevant official correspondence.

According to the Viceroy, Fernandes Cesar de Menezes, the main cause of the continual civil strife in Timor was the behaviour of the Bishop of Malacca, "who forgetful of his duties as a prelate, was only interested in those of a general or a politician, — a temptation to which many of the clergy succumb," he added slyly. Friar Manoel could however plead consistency in his defence, for his troubles originated with his formal excommunication of the rebellious Domingos da Costa, who after Guerreiro's departure in 1705, made his peace with the other representatives of the Crown, becoming an excellent example of the poacher turned game-keeper. The Bishop still persisted in refusing the ex-rebel the Sacraments, and was accused by successive Governors of fomenting fresh rebellion in the island.

Matters came to a head in 1722, when the Governor of the island, a one-armed fidalgo of Brazilian origin named Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho whom we shall meet again in this work, clashed openly with the Bishop. The first disputes came over petty questions of seating and protocol during divine service in the local church, which however ridiculous they may seem to us, were of prime importance in the hidebound etiquette of those days. These quarrels were merely the prelude to an open clash over the Prelate's alleged support of the rebel Black Portuguese, which led

Albuquerque to deport him forcibly to Macao. Even here his troubles were not at end, as he fell foul of the Governor Dom Christovão Manoel, who had him arrested in his house and shipped off to Goa. He must have been a difficult person to get on with, for after his arrival at Goa he spent most of his time quarrelling with the Archbishop-Primate, Dom Ignacio de Santa Tereza, or writing indignant protests to the authorities of the Propaganda Fide at Rome, on his claims to spiritual jurisdiction in Siam and Sumatra.

Albuquerque's drastic action, remarkable in a man of his priest-ridden time and nation, did not in point of fact improve matters much. Whether instigated by the Bishop or not a general revolt was brewing throughout the island. The leaders cemented their compact to exterminate the Portuguese, by the ceremonial sacrifice of a black and white dog, and the drinking of its blood mixed with their own. Francisco de Hornay became the leader of the revolt — perhaps because his rival Domingos da Costa had turned loyalist — which started with the massacre of some Dominicans in the interior and the destruction of several churches. This was no difficult matter, as there were no stone buildings in the island outside of Fort Concordia at Koepang. Albuquerque did not quail before the storm, and though he did not succeed in suppressing the revolt, he maintained his position at Lifao until the arrival of his successor. He accused the Dutch of supporting the rebels, but his protests to the Governor-General at Batavia remained unanswered. His successor roundly insinuated that the drastic punitive methods which Albuquerque adopted, had made the situation worse rather than better. He himself speedily came to terms with the rebels, thus leaving the real power to de Hornay.

Conciliation and forgiveness proved as ineffective in the long run, as had the strong-arm methods of Guerreiro and Albuquerque. Revolt was endemic amongst the turbulent chieftains of Timor, by virtue of the anarchical and tribal state of society. At this epoch, the island was nominally divided into two uneven halves, of which the eastern portion known as Bellos contained some 46 petty tribes, whilst Servião, as the western half was termed, contained sixteen. The tribes of Bellos could muster about 40,000 warriors, of whom

only 3,000 were musketeers, the remainder being armed with swords, spears, bows and arrows. The warriors of Servião numbered about 25,000 of whom a couple of thousand were equipped with firearms. These sixty-two chiefs were virtually independent of each other, although those of Bellos owed a shadowy allegiance to the Portuguese Crown; whilst those of Servião also paid a still more tenuous homage to one of their number who was grandiloquently entitled the "Emperor" of Timor, but who in fact possessed no power whatsoever. The most influential chiefs in the island were the Black Portuguese families of de Hornay and da Costa, whose influence was however more pronounced in the western than in the eastern part. The Dutch at Koepang originally controlled little more territory than that within range of the cannon of Fort Concordia, but they gradually extended their influence over the neighbouring chiefs, at the expense of the claims of White and Black Portuguese alike. Tetum was the most common language amongst the Malayo-Polynesian population, in whom a marked Papuan strain is obvious. By the middle of the 18th century, the Hornays and Costas had reached an arrangement whereby the headship of the Black Portuguese community (and thus control over the greater part of the interior of the island) devolved upon a representative of each of the two families in rotation.

Most of the Governors expressed very unflattering opinions about their subjects, characterising them as lazy good for nothing savages, whose menfolk left all the heavy agricultural and household work to their women. They were paradoxically described as being warlike but timid, their indifference to death being ascribed to a lack of moral value (*sic*). It was admitted however that they were docile and easily led if their tribal customs were respected. Their hardihood was notorious, for they could go for two weeks without food, although they atoned for this by feasting and drinking for the same space of time when opportunity offered. One of the most intelligent Portuguese Viceroy's sarcastically qualified the Timorese as being model subjects and Christians, — "model subjects because they recognise the sovereignty of their legitimate monarch, when they are governed by men who oppress them in every possible way

although without means to enforce their authority; model Christians because they still acknowledge evangelical truths, without having pastors who guide them". There was more than a little truth in this sarcastic judgement of the Count of Sarzedas.

The abortive general rebellion in Governor Albuquerque's time flared up again in a fiercer form soon after the arrival of Colonel Pedro de Mello as Captain-General in 1729. The Black Portuguese joined with the purely native tribes in this effort to expel the white Portuguese from the island, each of the allies intending to turn on the other when their common suzerain had been destroyed. The majority of those native auxiliaries who remained ostensibly loyal had a secret understanding with the rebel chiefs, and gave only outward help to the government. Despite the fact that he had less than fifty white soldiers with him, Pedro de Mello made a manful effort to crush the revolt with the help of some Macaonese volunteers. The faithlessness of his nominal allies forced him to abandon his efforts to take the rebel stronghold of Dilli, and he was eventually closely besieged in the little port of Manatuto on the 18th October 1730. The siege lasted for eighty-five days, during which the besieged were reduced to the greatest straits, being latterly forced to subsist on "the leaves of trees, powdered horse-bones and vermin", so that Manatuto was (somewhat inaptly) compared to "a living representation of ruined Troy."

All his provisions having gone, Pedro de Mello with the courage of despair sallied out at the head of his scanty garrison on the 13th January 1731. The rebels' trenches and earthworks were carried after some confused fighting, which resulted in the enemy retreating with considerable loss. Some of the petty chiefs submitted forthwith, whilst the remainder did so shortly after the arrival of the new Governor, Pedro de Rego.

The most dangerous threat to Portuguese suzerainty in Timor thus collapsed as quickly as it had arisen. There is nothing particularly surprising in this, as these rebellions nearly always petered out on the appearance of a new Governor, only to start again towards the end of his term, and

die down once more with the next change of regime. Supplies of all kinds being so short, neither side could keep the field for long; nor did the fighting normally amount to much more than petty raiding and skirmishing. The eighty-five day siege of Manatuto was a more stiffly contested affair than usual, and it was Colonel Pedro de Mello's outstanding leadership which was responsible for thwarting the carefully-laid plot of the Black Portuguese. A blot on the name of this valiant officer is his treatment of six rebel chiefs whom he captured and imprisoned on short rations, which led to the death of two of them. Pedro de Mello subsequently distinguished himself in the heroic defence of Bassein against the Maratha army of Chimaji Appa, until he was killed by a cannon ball whilst directing an attack on the fortress of Reis Magos on the 8th December 1738. Both Pedro de Mello and his successor accused the Dutch at Koepang of aiding and abetting the revolt of the Black Portuguese, but there seems to have been no justification for this suspicion. Right or wrong it afforded de Mello a pretext for giving refuge to some Dutch mutineers who carried their sloop into Lifao; whilst Pedro de Rego not only declined to surrender these deserters, but rejected the Resident of Koepang's protests with the observation that he considered Dutch jurisdiction limited to the range of the guns of Fort Concordia.

During these perennial troubles on Timor, help never came from Goa, but only from Macao which seldom failed in the hour of need. The Macao-Timor trade was first organised via Solor, later via Larantuka, then by Japara and Batavia, and finally with Lifao direct. It had originally been free to all who could afford to pay the freight charges, but sporadic attempts to take it over were made by the Crown officials. The earliest of these was made in 1631, when the Viceroy farmed out the voyage to Agostinho Lobo, on the same lines as the contemporary triennial monopoly of the Nagasaki and Manila voyages to Lopo Sarmiento de Carvalho. But in this instance, popular opposition in Macao was so strong that the would-be monopolist was forced to abandon his efforts, and the Timor trade like that of Macassar was left open to the participation of all and sundry.

Another attempt to monopolise the voyage was made about the year 1674, but this too broke down, and the lasting freedom of the voyage was affirmed by a Viceregal *Alvará* promulgated in 1689.

This edict, which was renewed in 1709, revoked the former arrangement whereby the monopolist provided a frigate in which he had one-third and the citizens of Macao two-thirds of the cargo space. Instead, all ship-owners in Macao were registered on sealed lists which were opened annually to decide whose turn it was to make the voyage, so that everyone would get a turn in due course. The pay of the garrison came out of the proceeds of these voyages, which otherwise seem to have been free of Crown as distinct from municipal duties and taxes. The *Alvará* further stressed that the cargo-space was not to be monopolised by the Senators or the wealthy merchants, but that the poor, widows, and orphans were likewise to be allowed their share, if they could scrape together the wherewithal for a venture. With this reservation, the Senate was entrusted with the allotment of cargo-space on the annual ship or ships (there were seldom if ever more than two). If when the sealed *Pausa* or List was opened, the designated ship was absent and the owner had no other vessel available, the next List was opened and the ship specified therein made that year's voyage, the former taking the latter's place next year. On the whole this system seems to have worked fairly well; although one Viceroy criticised it on the grounds that the development of Timor suffered through being cut off from direct communication with Goa.

Against this it could be argued that even when the government of Goa had been ostensibly responsible for keeping up contact with the colony, by sending an annual frigate with supplies to Larantuka or Lifao prior to 1725, this had turned out in practice to be a purely paper arrangement, as there was so seldom sufficient shipping available at Goa for this voyage. There are in fact only two or three recorded instances during the 17th and 18th centuries of government vessels sailing direct from Goa to Timor. With these paltry exceptions, supplies and men, like the Governors and Captain-Generals, had to tranship at

Macao. Profits on this voyage were very high in early days. Bishop Rangel O.P. estimated them at averaging between 150 and 200% circa 1630. This was the golden age of the Macao-Timor sandalwood trade; but even 150 years later the Macaonese merchants bought sandalwood in Timor for approximately one third of the price which it fetched in China.

If the Portuguese position in Timor was precarious at the beginning of the eighteenth century, it was in an even more parlous plight fifty years later. The Viceroy of Goa stated that there were then only seven or eight Portuguese in the island, apart from a few Dominican Friars whose "fruit was not so much that which they gathered in the vineyard of the Lord, as that which they begat in the freedom and licence in which they lived". This somewhat oblique reference is clarified by a Pastoral of the then Bishop of Malacca, in which he admonishes the clergy *inter alia* not to maintain women of dubious character under the common pretence that they were housekeepers. This complaint was one of long standing, and when the Dominican Vicar-General at Goa was taxed with this accusation some 40 years earlier, he could only reply that "the native women were exceedingly lascivious and they all came to the vicars' houses, principally the young ones, both by night and day, leaving the clergy with no other remedy but flight from their own homes". The Episcopal Pastoral of 1752 likewise informs us that the practice of human sacrifice was still prevalent among the so-called Christianised tribes on such occasions as the death of a chief or *Datu*!

Another contemporary authority tells us that only two churches in all the island had doors to them, and none were properly furnished. The civil and military conditions were on a par with the ecclesiastical. Lifao and Larantuka were only defended with half-rotten stockades and a few obsolete cannon, most of them lying dismounted on the ground. Their nominal garrisons consisted of some ill-armed and unpaid native auxiliaries, supplied in rotation by the chiefs of such neighbouring tribes as were not then in a state of rebellion. Dutch and Chinese smugglers were engrossing the larger share of the sandalwood traffic, and altogether it

seemed that Portuguese power and prestige could sink no further without disappearing altogether. It could and did however; and not the least remarkable thing about the history of Timor is the basic loyalty of the native tribes. Although nearly always in a state of revolt against the local representatives of the Crown, they never wholly threw off their allegiance as they easily could have done, and always returned to the fold. An influence which aroused such loyalty could not have been wholly bad.

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