

V. Midsummer Day in Macao, Anno 1622

[72] The idea of a Dutch attack to Macao was no novelty in 1622. Apart from the raids made in 1601, 1603 and 1607, which were not intended to occupy the colony, the project of capturing it for use as a commercial base in China dates from the establishment of the Hollanders at Hirado in 1609.

The Dutch trading in this little fishing-town – where the English were also established from 1613 to 1623 – found it impossible to compete on equal terms with their Portuguese competitors at Nagasaki. Thanks to their possession of Macao, and consequent easy access to the Canton market, the Lusitanians were in a most favourable position for obtaining large quantities of raw silk and silk fabrics for sale in Japan. The Hollanders having no foot in China, nor access to any of the ports, depended on what small quantities they could pick up at patani and (after 1619) Batavia, or from the capture of Portuguese and Chinese shipping in the China Sea. The Japanese authorities looked on these buccaneering activities with an unfriendly eye, and more than once accused the Hollanders of being pirates rather than traders.

The project of establishing a Dutch base on or near the China coast was one of the favourite schemes of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, and one which he urged on his superiors in and out of season. In January 1614, he wrote a report to the Directors of the East-India Company advocating an attack on Manila and Macao, alleging that it would be easy to obtain a large number of Japanese mercenary soldiers for service in this expedition. The occupation of Macao, he pointed out on this and on many other occasions, would not only enable the Dutch to supplant the Portuguese as purveyors of Chinese silk for the Japan market, but would also knock away [73] the chief prop of the Lusitanian Asian empire. It would likewise deprive the Spaniards in the Philippines of their means of support, and would render much easier the subsequent occupation of Malacca and Manila, which in its turn would split the Iberian colonial empire in two. Last, but by no means least, possession of Macao would give the Hollanders a stranglehold on the Chinese overseas trade, and, more important still, give them direct access to the “wealth and products of China for which the whole world is covetous”.

Thus the sanguine Coen; and if his day-dream of Dutch hegemony in the maritime trade of Asia seems unduly ambitious today, it was not then beyond the realm of possibility. Provided that the Chinese accepted the Hollanders in place of the Portuguese at Macao, and given the absence of effective Iberian, English or Japanese competition, the Dutch with their enterprise, resources and tenacity might well have built up a monopoly of the seaborne trade between the Cape of Good Hope and Japan, which would have been even more complete than that of their Portuguese predecessors in the 16th century. The possible results of such a monopoly on the overseas expansion of China and Japan is a fascinating subject for speculation; but as things were ordained otherwise, we must return to a consideration of how Coen's plans went astray.

The Hollanders at Batavia did not think that they would find any very formidable resistance if they attacked Macao, which they knew was an open town, nor were they alone in this opinion. Richard Cocks writing to his superiors at London in September 1621, warmly advocated the project of a combined Anglo-Dutch expedition, for the reasons he described as follows,

“It is very certain that with little danger our fleet of defence may take and sack Amacon in China, which is inhabited by Portugales. For the towne is not fortified with walls; neither will the King of China suffer them to doe it, nor to make any fortifications, nor mount noe ordinance upon any platforme; and. ½ partes of the inhabitantes are Chinas. And we are credibly informed that, these last two years, when they did see but two or three of our shipp

within sight of the place, they were all ready to run out of the town, as I have advised the Precedent and Council of Defence at Jacatra; and, had but 2 small ships, as the *Bull* and *Pepercorne*, entred this yeare, they might easily have burnt and taken 17 sale of galliots which were at anchor, amongst which were the 6 galliots which came into Japan, being then full laden; and, had they taken this fleet, the Portingales trade in these parts of the world is quite spoiled, both for Manillas, Malacca, Goa, and else where. And the King of China would gladly be ridd of their neighbourhood; as our frendes which procure our entry for trade into China tell me, and doe say that he wished that we could drive them from thence".

The last allegation in this letter must be taken with a large pinch of salt. It emanated from Fukienese trader Li Han Kok *alias* Andrea Dittis, *alias* 'Captain-China', who led the credulous Cocks a will o' the wisp journey in pursuit of the China trade, costing his employers the tidy sum of 6,636 taels before the baseless fabric of this vision was dissolved by the closing of the Hirado factory in 1623. It is also highly improbable that the Ming Emperor hoped that the Dutch and English would drive the Portuguese from Macao; as far as the Cantonese officials were concerned, it was undoubtedly a case of better the foreign devil they knew than the one they did not.

As regards the state of the fortification of Macao, Cocks' information was much nearer the truth, and was confirmed and amplified by that secured by the Hollanders from a case of letters found on board a Portuguese prize taken by the *Gallias* off Malaya at the end of 1621. Judging from these intercepted letters and from the information available in Japan, Coen and his Council considered that Macao was not in a position effectively to resist a serious attack. Thus in the preamble of the instructions for the Dutch admiral commanding the expedition, it was stated that "... Macao was always an open place without a garrison, which, despite of its being provided with a few munitions and some shallow entrenchments, could easily be taken by a force of a thousand or fifteen hundred men and converted into a stronghold which we could defend against the entire world." Elsewhere

There was then a battery on the point at the entrance to the inner harbour where the fort of Santiago da Barra (Saint James of the Bar) was built in 1629, part of which exists today. There was another battery at São Francisco and a third at Bompato, at either end of the crescent-shaped bay fronting the outer harbour. These were apparently defended by earthworks or by low stone walls; whilst the stone citadel of Saint Paul begun by the Jesuits in 1616, was still only half completed. This seems to have been the extent of the fortifications, whilst the number of able-bodied men available for the defence was depleted by the absence of many of the citizens at Canton, where they were buying goods for the Japan trade at the annual market. The oldest Portuguese version claims that there were only about 50 musketeers and a hundred residents capable of bearing arms; and this is to a large extent confirmed by the Dutch statement that their subsequent defeat was mainly due to the fighting ability of the slaves, "for our people saw very few Portuguese". On the other hand, candour compels us to admit that although the Portuguese inhabitants were few, they included some "valiant knights and captains of renown in the King's service", as a contemporary chronicler observed.

The fleet organised at Batavia for this expedition was composed of a nucleus of eight ships, with orders to incorporate any other Dutch vessels encountered on the voyage to China. This initial squadron consisted of the following,-

Ship	Tonnage	Complement	Captain
Zierichzee (Flagship)	800	221	Cornelis Reijersen
Groeningen	700	192	William Bontekoe
Oudt Delft	700	196	Andriessen
Enhuizen	500	165	D. Pietersen
de Gallias	220	91	D. Floris
de Engelsche Beer	—	96	L. Nanning
St. Nicholas	—	40	J. Constant
Pallacatta	—	23	J. Jacobsen

Precise information about the armament of the squadron is lacking, but it seems probable that the larger ships mounted between 20 and 40 guns, and the smaller 10 to 15. There

in the same document this allegation is supported on the following grounds.

"Ever since we and the English have traded with Japan with many ships, the population has been greatly alarmed. The place was therefore strengthened with some bulwarks, and they brought twelve cannon from Manila, whence another five guns are expected. They would gladly fortify the city but the Chinese will not allow it, saying that there will be time enough to do so when the enemy actually appear in sight. They compelled the Portuguese to rase and abandon a few small brick buildings which the Jesuits had built in a certain island (the Ilha Verde) about 18 years ago; at the present time there are some some 700 or 800 Portuguese and Eurasians in Macao besides about ten thousand Chinese. The form of government is so irregular that a certain Jesuit said that unless the King sent a Captain to take the responsibility for it, the city would be abandoned or would fall into the hands of the Chinese or the Dutch. In October 1621, the inhabitants of Macao were told to furnish a contingent of 100 men and some cannon to go and fight against the Tartars, by an order of the King of China transmitted through the Mandarins of Peking. The Jesuits who had previously been expelled from Peking by these mandarins, have now been readmitted with the object of teaching the Chinese the use of these cannon. Each man of the Macao contingent is to receive 150 taels besides his monthly pay. The Portuguese are very pleased with this news, since they hope through this means to get a free port and good trade in China besides converting it to Christianity".

The last paragraph is an allusion to the efforts of the Christian Mandarin Paul Hsu Kwang-ch'i who memorialised the throne, recommending the employment of Macaoese cannon and gunners against the invading Manchus in 1620. Four bronze cannon were sent to begin with, followed by a contingent of about thirty men in November 1621. These reached Peking in the following May, but though well received by the Emperor, they were sent home a few months later, after losing one of their number when a gun burst during firing practice. The information was otherwise perfectly accurate, and this brings us to a consideration of Macao's means of defense in 1622.

were some lascars and Malays amongst the crews, but a smaller proportion than normally; whilst the soldiers carried for the landing had been selected with greater care than usual. Coen at any rate was pretty well satisfied with the composition of this force, and wrote to the Directors at the Hague that he was sorry not to have been able to lead "so magnificent an expedition" in person. The Directors must have received this letter (written in September 1622) with mixed feelings, as on April 14th they had written their over-zealous servant "... You are now urging an attack on Macao before the Portuguese have had time to fortify it. This project we believe to be clean contrary to our previous determination. We have already more than enough costly wars on our hands in India; We therefore want you to do nothing in this matter until you receive further advice from us, after we have got more information about it". But this warning came too late. Reijersen had left Batavia Roads four days before the ink was dry on this document.

His orders were to secure a base on the China coast by hook or by crook. Irrespective of whether Macao was attacked or not — and the final decision was left to the commander and his council — he was instructed to form a fortified settlement in the Pescadores, which Coen considered to be even better situated from a strategical viewpoint. If the Chinese showed themselves unwilling to trade with the Hollanders in their newly-acquired base, then Reijersen was to attack all Chinese shipping he met with and blockade the coast as closely as possible. The captured crews were to be sent to Batavia for use as labourers in Java and Banda. Coen was confident that this policy of unrestricted frightfulness would soon bring the Chinese to terms; and he would have cordially endorsed Lord Elgin's dictum that "The Chinese yield nothing to reason and everything to force". Subsequent events proved that he was as mistaken in this belief as were the Japanese war-lords when they launched their policy of aggression over three centuries later on the same mistaken premise.

Cornelis Reijersen left Batavia on the 10th April 1622, setting his course for the coast of Annam. Coen had already sent orders to William Janszoon, admiral of the Anglo

Dutch Fleet of Defence blockading Manila, directing him to detach some of his ships to join Reijersen's squadron. Janszoon was also told that he could accept any offer of help from English ships as regards purely maritime operations; but that he was on no account to allow the English to join in the attack on Macao or to have any share in the garrisoning of the captured stronghold. These orders reached Janszoon too late for him to act on them; but he had already detached two Dutch and two English ships to blockade Macao, and Reijersen duly found these vessels cruising off the port.

On the 8th June the Dutch Commander put into Camranh Bay on the coast of Annam for firewood and water. It was from this Bay, one of the finest natural harbours in the Far East, that the Russian Baltic Fleet sailed to meet its doom at Tsushima in May 1905, and it was from here that the major portion of the Japanese convoy left to land its troops in Malaya in December 1941. Off the coast of Indo-China, Reijersen fell in with four Dutch ships which he incorporated in his squadron, detaching one of his smaller ships with dispatches for Admiral Janszoon, so that his force now amounted to eleven sail. He continued his voyage on the 10th, encountering a Siamese war junk with a complement of 28 Siamese and 20 Japanese after he had been a few days at sea. The Japanese asked for permission to enlist in the Dutch expedition and their request was granted.

The preparations for the attack on Macao began soon after leaving Camranh Bay. The 201 soldiers on board were formed into three companies and drilled daily under the command of two captains and an ensign. The sailors were divided into six companies of fifty men each, or a total of three hundred. There were thus nine companies of European soldiers and sailors and these were organised in three detachments — advance-guard, main-guard and rear-guard — each composed of one company of soldiers and two of sailors. Every detachment was provided with 600 lbs of small shot, 6 barrels of gunpowder and a surgeon. They were distinguished by a red, a green, and a blue flag respectively. There were also 60 scaling-ladders, 1,000 sand-bags and 3 cannon. In addition to the 500 Europeans there

was the Japanese contingent and some Bandanese and Malays, the whole landing force amounting to about six hundred men. A commission of two infantry and one naval captain was appointed to visit the ships in rotation for the purpose of supervising the preparations.

The fleet arrived in sight of Macao on the 21 June where it was joined by the four ships (two Dutch and two English) of Janszoon's blockading squadron. These ships had arrived on the 29th May, but they had not succeeded in taking any Portuguese prizes, since the Captain-Major, Lopo Sarmiento de Carvalho, "hurriedly fitted out seven well-found chos (from the Cantonese *Ts'o* a sea-going junk) to escort the vessels expected from India; and to such good purpose that they convoyed safely into harbour from between the islands, not only the ships from India but those from Solor, Borneo and Macassar". Another account however gives the chief credit for this successful convoy to the commander of the armed junks, Francisco Tavares.

Reijersen now found himself at the head of a force of thirteen Dutch ships (*Zierickzee*, *Groeningen*, *Delft*, *Gallias*, *Engelsche Beer*, *Enchuyzen*, *Palliacatta*, *Haan*, *Tiger*, *Victoria*, *Santa Cruz*, *Trouw* and *Hoop*) carrying a force of 1,300 men, so that he was able to reinforce the landing detachment by another hundred Europeans. The two English ships — the *Palsgrave* and *Bull* — did not participate in the enterprise, since Reijersen in accordance with Coen's instructions refused to allow their crews any share in the expected booty, with the result that their Captain declined to join in the attack.

On the 22nd June, the Dutch Commander sent ashore three men with a Chinese guide, to reconnoitre the Chinese suburb and to find out whether its inhabitants would stay neutral. They could not find anyone and returned aboard without any information. The Portuguese accounts make no mention of this scouting party, so they must have disembarked by night. On the 23rd, Vigil of Saint John the Baptist, Reijersen accompanied by his senior officers, reconnoitred the place from a launch, and it was decided to disembark the landing party on Cacilhas beach the next day. Meanwhile, to distract attention from the intended landing-

place, three of the ships — *Groeningen*, *Gallias* and *Engelsche Beer*, anchored off the São Francisco battery which they heavily bombarded during the afternoon. They received however more hurt than they inflicted, for although their shot caused some damage to houses and much consternation to the inmates, none of these were actually killed if the Portuguese accounts are to be trusted. During this artillery duel, the Dutch crews shouted to the battery's defenders that next day they would be masters of Macao and would rape the women after killing all the men over twenty years old. The ships drew off at sunset, but celebrated the expected victory by blowing trumpets and beating drums all night. Not to be outdone by this bravado, Lopo Sarmiento de Carvalho ordered similar martial rejoicings to be made on the city's bulwarks "so that the enemy should understand that we had greater reason to rejoice, by the manifold mercies which our Lord God had shown us". Since it was obvious that the enemy would land next day, Lopo Sarmiento spent the night in visiting all the fortified posts and exhorting the soldiers and citizens to fight to the last. He pointed out that they could expect no mercy from their heretic foes, nor seek refuge with the Chinese, the majority of whom had abandoned the town.

At daybreak on the Feast-day of Saint John the Baptist (24 June) the Dutch ships *Groeningen* and *Gallias* resumed and intensified their bombardment of the Sao Francisco bulwark. The Portuguese gunners replied with equal determination and better success, as the *Gallias* was so badly crippled that she had to be abandoned and scuttled a few weeks later. Meantime, about two hours after sunrise, the landing force of 800 men, embarked in 32 launches (equipped with a swivel-gun in the prow) and 5 barges, steered for Cacilhas beach to the north-east of the town, protected by fire from the guns of two of the ships. Further protection was afforded by the drifting smoke from a barrel of damp gunpowder which had been fired to windward, — perhaps one of the earliest instances of the tactical use of a smoke-screen. About 150 Portuguese and Eurasian musketeers under the command of Antonio Rodriguez Cavalhino opposed the landing from a shallow trench dug on the beach.

A lucky musket-shot fired at random into the smoke-screen struck the Dutch Admiral in the belly, so that he had to be taken back to his flagship at the beginning of the action. The Hollanders were nothing dismayed at his loss, and the senior military officer, Captain Hans Ruffijn, speedily formed up his men on the shore and drove the Macaonese from their entrenchment, after losing about 40 men in the landing. Antonio Rodrigues and his party did not await the onset of the Hollanders, but withdrew towards the town, fighting a rear-guard skirmish as they went.

The Dutch now disembarked their three field-pieces and the rest of their men without further opposition. Ruffijn then organized two rear-guard companies to stay on Cacilhas beach, with a view to covering the withdrawal of the main body if the attack on the town should prove unsuccessful. This done, he resumed the advance with 600 men, "boldly marching in orderly array and with even steps along the field which borders the foot of the hill of Nossa Senhora da Guia, firing their muskets with such precision and dexterity that they aroused great admiration amongst our people in this respect", as a Jesuit eye-witness reported.

In this way the Hollanders continued their advance skirmishing with Cavalhino's musketeers, until they reached a small spring called *Fontinha* where the local women were accustomed to wash their laundry. This place was within artillery range of the city, and they now came under fire from a large bombard which the Jesuits had planted on a bulwark of the half-finished citadel of São Paulo. A lucky cannon-ball from this gun, which was served by the Italian Jesuit and mathematician Padre Jeronimo Rho, struck a barrel of gunpowder which exploded in the midst of the Dutch formation with devastating results. Disheartened by this unexpected disaster, or else suspicious of an ambush awaiting them in a neighbouring bamboo grove, the Dutch halted their advance on the city, and after some consultation amongst their senior officers, wheeled towards the Guia hill, on whose commanding height a small hermitage was situated. Their advance up this hill was checked by a party of thirty Macaonese and negro skirmishers, to whose harassing fire from behind the large rocks strewn on its rugged

slope, the serried ranks of the Hollanders could make no effective reply.

With all or most of their powder supply lost in the explosion resulting from Father Rho's lucky shot, harassed by the fire of the Macaonese from the Guia hill on the one side and from Cavalinho's party on the other, and hot and tired from the three hour's marching and skirmishing in the heat of a summer day, the Hollanders now halted a second time, whilst their captains deliberated on the next move. After a brief discussion, they decided to occupy a favourable tactical position on rising ground near the Guia Hill which likewise covered the Cacilhas beachhead. In view of the unexpected strength of the defence and the unforeseen loss of their ammunition, they had evidently decided to break off the attack and withdraw to their ships while there was yet time.

Whilst this battle or rather skirmish was in progress, the defenders of the town had not been idle. The commander of the garrison of São Thiago at the entrance to the inner harbour, realising that the main attack was coming from the landward and that the naval bombardment of São Francisco was a feint, detached a party of 50 men under Captain João Soares Vivas, to reinforce the main body of the defenders who were being concentrated for a decisive counter-attack by the Captain-Major Lopo Sarmiento de Carvalho. Vivas arrived with his welcome reinforcement just at the critical moment when the Hollanders had begun their retreat. The Portuguese Captains, seeing what was happening, hurriedly occupied the rising ground towards which the Dutch were moving, before the latter could reach their objective.

Seizing his opportunity Lopo Sarmiento gave the signal for the attack by shouting the Iberian battle-cry of *Santiago* — "Saint James and at them!" His eager followers needed no second bidding and the whole motley throng of Portuguese soldiers, Macaonese citizens and negro slaves — to say nothing of armed Friars and Jesuits to boot — took up the cry and hurled themselves at the Hollanders. A few scattered musket shots had no effect on their ardour, and the death of Captain Hans Ruffijn, who was encouraging his men to stand fast at this critical moment, settled the issue

Prisoners were few and far between. A Portuguese account alleges that the negroes refused to give quarter and busied themselves in beheading the wounded heretics by way of celebrating the feast of John the Baptist! Given the standards of the time, and the number of armed priests and friars who participated in the action "with Apostolic blows and knocks" this allegation sounds very likely. At least one member of the Church Militant was more merciful however, for the solitary Dutch Captain taken prisoner was captured personally by the Jesuit Father Johann Adam Schall Von Bell. His biographer claims that this famous Jesuit missionary — later Astronomer-Royal at Peking — was also the man who fired the fatal shot which blew up the Dutch gunpowder reserves and thus turned the tide of battle in favour of the Portuguese. This seems a trifle far-fetched as he could not have been in two places at once; and the version which credits the lucky shot to his confrere Father Rho seems more likely. It is also alleged, on the authority of another Jesuit eye-witness, Father Bruno, that Schall's prisoner was so important that the Dutch offered three hundred Portuguese captives in exchange for his release. There is nothing to confirm this story in the Dutch (or other Lusitanian) sources, which merely indicate that Reijersen sent a flag of truce ashore next day to offer to ransom the prisoners, — an offer which was brusquely rejected.

The losses of the victors were insignificant in comparison with those of the vanquished. Six Europeans (four Portuguese and two Spaniards) killed and about twenty wounded, together with a few slaves, comprised the casualty list. Coen indeed asserts that the Hollanders inflicted heavier losses than they suffered, but this assertion will not bear a moment's investigation, and was evidently made by the survivors as a salve to their *amour-propre*. Few of those who have studied this affair will be disposed to quarrel with the Jesuit Father Fernão Queiroz's claim that "those Portuguese, some Spaniards, our Priests and their companions in arms did marvels on that day, above all in the charge which broke their formation and which cost us a few lives; for even though the enemy did not resist as he might have, one cannot but admire the spirit of so few against so many".

of the day. Discouraged by the fall of their leader and demoralised by the furious onset of the drunken negro slaves, the Hollanders turned and fled after a trifling resistance. To make matters worse, the two rearguard companies at Cacilhas, on seeing the approach of these disordered fugitives, were seized with panic and fled precipitately to the boats without firing a shot. The finishing touch to this demoralisation was supplied by the sailors manning the boats, who, fearful of having their vessels overturned by a mass of fugitives, pushed off into deeper water, so that many of those who escaped the cold steel of the Portuguese were drowned or shot down in the sea. So complete was the panic, that the entire force would probably have been exterminated, save for the fact that many of the negro slaves abandoned the pursuit of the flying foe in order to strip and plunder the bodies of the dead.

Even so, the defeat was the most decisive ever sustained by the Hollanders at the hands of the Portuguese in the East. The lowest Lusitanian claim states that over three hundred of their heretic enemies were slaughtered on this occasion, and most of their accounts give six or eight hundred as the total killed. This is of course absurd, but the official Dutch version admits to a loss of 136 Europeans killed in addition to 126 wounded. These figures do not apparently include the Bandanese and Japanese contingents, the latter of which lost heavily, and the total casualty list may well have been about three hundred. The loss of officers was particularly serious, including seven captains, four lieutenants and seven ensigns. The Dutch also lost all their cannon, flags and equipment, the victors collecting over a thousand weapons on the battlefield. In view of this terrible drubbing, it is not surprising that Reijersen noted in his Journal that evening "and so our men returned on board greatly crestfallen," — a fact which the watching English crews of the *Palsgrave* and *Bull* also noted with a certain malicious satisfaction, for relations between the two Protestant allies were still anything but cordial. Jan Pieterszoon Coen summed up the general opinion when he wrote "in this shameful manner we lost most of our best men in this fleet together with most of the weapons."

Immediately after the victory, and on the very field of battle, many of the European victors there and then liberated their negro slaves, as well they might in view of the signal courage that these had shown. Coen indeed was firmly of the opinion that the victory was due to them and to them alone, as the following extracts from his official correspondence show. "Many Portuguese slaves, Kaffirs and the like, having been made drunk, charged so fearlessly against our muskets, that it was a wondrous thing to see". The enemy, it was reported, "had lost many more men than we, albeit mostly slaves. Our people saw very few Portuguese". A year later he was still harping on the same theme. "The slaves of the Portuguese at Macao served them so well and faithfully, that it was they who defeated and drove away our people there last year". And he wrote again in 1623 advocating the employment of slaves in preference to Dutch soldiers, — "The Portuguese beat us off from Macao with their slaves; it was not done with any soldiers, for there are none in Macao and . . . only about 3 companies of 180 men in Malacca. See how the enemy thus holds his possessions so cheaply whilst we squander ourselves".

It is hardly to be expected that the Portuguese writers should take this point of view. Father Queiroz states categorically that "the *canaille* pursued the fleeing Hollanders in the wake of the Portuguese", but in this respect he does the *povo miúdo* less than justice. Even he however makes special mention of the negress who wielded a halberd with such deadly effect that she was admirably compared to a mediaeval Portuguese heroine, the legendary baker's wench of Aljubarrota who slew seven Spaniards with a shovel. The most striking testimony to the services rendered by the negro slaves on this occasion was given by the *Haitao* of Canton, who on being informed of the courage and loyalty they had shown, sent a gift of 200 piculs of rice for distribution amongst them. With this substantial *douceur* and the freedom given them by their grateful masters, the slaves of Macao must have passed a few days of joy such as rarely fell to the lot of their unhappy class.

If any further testimony to the fighting value of the Bantu

slaves were needed to confirm Coen's emphatic praise, it is afforded by two other instances of the courageous behaviour of African negroes during this period. One was in the siege of Ormuz by an Anglo-Persian force which occurred in the spring of this year. On this occasion the English factor Edward Monnox, who was an eye-witness of the scene he describes, narrating the repulse of a Persian assault on the Castle, wrote in his *Journal* "... the most that was done was done by the Negroes, whom the Portugals did beat forwards to throw powder-pots, with which many of the Persians were pitifully scalded and burnt." The second occasion was the disastrous Dutch attack on the Portuguese stronghold of São Jorge da Mina (Elmina) on the Guinea coast in October 1625. The failure of this expedition was entirely due to a surprise attack by 200 local negroes led by a few Portuguese, which resulted in 440 headless Dutch corpses lying on the sands, a high proportion of fatal casualties in a force totalling 1200 men. Finally we may cite the part played by the negro Henrique Dias and his regiment of blacks in the expulsion of the Hollanders from Brazil in 1650-54. The foregoing surely suffices to show that the victors in the only battle fought between Europeans on Chinese soil owed much of their success to persons of a very different colour.

The Dutch chronicler Caspar Barlaeus, narrating the rout of his countrymen at Elmina in 1625, wrote "this disaster is to be ascribed to the negligence of the commanders;" adding with bitter but justifiable irony, "and in true military fashion each one threw the blame on the other". He might have added that the converse is also true, — credit for a victory being as acrimoniously disputed amongst commanders as is blame for a defeat. So and no otherwise was it at Macao. Scarcely had the jubilant strains of the *Te Deum Laudamus* died away in the Jesuit Collegiate church on the evening of the battle, when an unseemly strife arose as to whom (under God) the victory was really due. The rival claimants for the post of Saviour of the colony early found their vociferous partisans, and, as often was the case, the Jesuits and the Friars were ranged in opposing camps. A modern writer indeed, and one who deserves a respectful hearing for his scholarly opinions, dismisses the claims of the

contending captains, and awards the palm to the populace as a whole in the following terms.

"The magnificent victory of 1622 does not represent an isolated event, which must needs be attributed to the exceptional qualities of one or another of the leaders . . . uncommonly forceful, noble fighters, as was usually the case in the East. The secret of that and of the later victories, and above all, of the fear inspired in the Dutch, lies in the origins and in the social and political organisation of the City, — a purely democratic foundation and one which likens Macao to the great medieval burghs in this respect". (Dr. Jaime Cortesão in *Historia de Portugal*, Barcelos, 1933).

There is some truth in this contention but it is not wholly correct. Apart from the fact that it was the "drunken debauched niggers" and not the pseudo-medieval municipality which inspired the Hollanders with such a wholesome respect for Macao, it is obvious that the Portuguese must have had some leader, who at the critical moment when the Hollanders halted irresolutely at the foot of the Guia hill, saw and seized the fleeting opportunity to launch a decisive counter-attack. So much is clear from the narrative of events, but the question is who was the man?

The principal claimants to the honour were the Captain-Major Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho, and his jealous rival Captain João Soares Vivas. The latter's claim for a long time held the field, since he became friendly with the historian Faria y Sousa at Madrid, who consequently gave him the credit for the victory in his classic *Asia Portuguesa* (Lisbon 1675), concluding his narrative of Vivas' exploits by adding somewhat ingenuously "esta informacion es suya". Subsequent historians mostly accepted Faria y Sousa's version on trust, and ignore the existence of Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho. In this as in other respects, Padre Fernão Queiroz S.J. shows himself an exceptionally patient and unprejudiced investigator, and his account, compiled as he states from official records and surviving eye-witnesses, whilst doing full justice to João Soares Vivas, gives the chief credit to the Captain-Major.

The chief supporter of this latter was the Dominican Friar Antonio do Rosario, then acting governor of the

bishoprick at Macao, and a fervent supporter of Sarmento de Carvalho. In his lengthy account of the Dutch attack (which remained unpublished until printed by the present writer in 1938) he eulogises Carvalho's leadership throughout the crisis, stating that like another Gideon "with an unconquerable soul and a cheerful countenance, he encouraged and inspired the weak," being the first to set an example in digging trenches, visiting rounds at night, and sleeping on the stones of the São Francisco battery with a sandbag for a pillow, as long as the Dutch ships were in the offing. He also credits him with suffering fools gladly and ill-wishers patiently; and with animating, directing and leading the decisive sortie at noon on Saint John the Baptist's Day. On the other hand, the City Fathers in their report to the Viceroy, allege that Lopo Sarmento conspicuously failed to do his duty; they state that his claims were based on unreliable evidence given by his relatives and other interested persons.

When we turn to the narrative of the Jesuit eyewitnesses (as distinct from Padre Queiroz who compiled his work later from hearsay) we find a curious and disconcerting reticence on the subject. The oldest printed narrative, the *Relacion de la Vitoria*, printed at Lisbon in 1623, although published anonymously, can be said with confidence to be the work of the Jesuit Father Jeronimo Rodriguez, Visitor of the Far Eastern Missions with headquarters at Macao in 1621-30. This pamphlet does not mention the name of a single person on either side with the exception of the Dutch Admiral; but it insinuates pretty clearly that it was the Jesuits who were chiefly responsible for the happy issue of the day, as it was they who egged on the Macaonese to make the final charge. Oddly enough, neither Rho the gunner, nor Johann Adam Schall Von Bell, the captor of the Dutch captain, are mentioned by name. We cannot definitely say to what this unwillingness to award credit where credit is due is to be ascribed; but the fact that Friar Antonio do Rosario O. P. was so outspoken a panegyrist of Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho may have had something to do with the Jesuit omission of his name, as the Company of Jesus and the Order of Saint Dominick were on the worst of terms in Macao at this time.

Be this as it may, King Philip of Spain and Portugal, who was besieged with claims for services rendered after this victory, evidently decided that the Captain-Major was really as well as nominally responsible for the brilliant success — doubly welcome after the loss of Ormuz to an Anglo-Persian force in the previous May. So much at least may be deduced from the fact that after lengthy official enquiries into the affair, the King (or his Council in his name) finally awarded Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho a knighthood in the coveted Order of Christ in March 1629, mainly as a reward for the service he had rendered as Captain-Major in beating off the Dutch attack seven years before.

The herculean João Soares Vivas (Faria y Sousa comments admiringly on his physical proportions) could ill brook this royal recognition of his rival. After a long and adventurous career in the Far East, the disgruntled Captain returned to Portugal in 1640. Testifying before the Tribunal of the Holy Office in Lisbon that year, he made serious allegations against the family of Lopo Sarmento, whose Macaonese wife, so he said, was born of a mother "of whom it was said publicly in the city of Macao, amongst great and small, rich and poor alike, that she was a Moor, daughter of a blackamoor and of a crypto-Jew, and as such she was considered, held, and commonly regarded." True or not, the modest ancestry of Dona Maria Sequeira, (the lady's maiden name) did not prevent her from giving birth to three strapping sons, two of whom gave their lives for their country in the war against the Dutch in Ceylon, whilst the eldest, Inacio Sarmento de Carvalho, lives in history as the heroic defender of Cochin in 1659-1663. Vivas' tattle-bearing did not prevent the grant of a knighthood in the Order of Christ to Inacio Sarmento; and his bitterness against this successful family may have been one of the reasons which impelled him to desert to the Spaniards in 1641, ending his chequered career as an exile in Madrid.

At the risk of flogging a dead horse, we may adduce one more reason for ascribing the main share of the leadership on that memorable midsummer's day to Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho, who by virtue of his post of Captain-Major certainly held the most responsible position. A familiar anecdote

dote relates that Marshal Joffre, when pestered by a lady friend to tell her who was really responsible for the victory of the Marne, replied to the effect that he could not say for certain, but that he could tell her who would have been held responsible if the battle had been lost, — himself. So too might Lopo Sarmiento, as the senior commanding officer, have replied to his critics.

The rest of the tale is soon told. Discouraged by their defeat, and after vainly attempting to ransom their seven prisoners, the Dutch fleet steered for the Pescadores in accordance with Coen's orders to Reijersen which directed him to form a stronghold there, irrespective of the result of the attack on Macao. Also in accordance with Coen's instructions, Reijersen — who never recovered from the effects of his belly wound — began a policy of frightfulness with the object of forcing the Chinese to come and trade with the Dutch at their new headquarters. This barren island group, it was hoped, would in due course supplant both Macao and Manila as a silk entrepot for the Japan market. It is surprising that Coen, who was an exceptionally intelligent man, should not have realised that the Chinese were not to be browbeaten, especially since he had been repeatedly told so by those in a position to know.

Thus in November 1623, Cornelis van Nieuwenroode, then chief of the Dutch Factory at Hirado, stated in the course of a letter to Reijersen at the Pescadores, "It is an amazing thing, when one hears here of the enormous armies which the Japanese used in Korea against the Chinese, and which the latter withstood, although the Japanese took many of their forts and strongholds far into the interior, yet even so they were compelled eventually to withdraw. Some of those here who fought in that campaign, state on one occasion there were so many Chinese killed that the dead lay so high on top of each other as to overtop and fall inside a besieged castle's walls, thereby finally causing so great a stench that the Japanese were forced to abandon the place. Hereby one can easily understand how far we shall succeed in war, when we have barely sufficient force to set ashore, unless under the protection of the ships' cannon. So that according to my judgment, though subject to correction, I

think it will prove extremely difficult for us to reduce the Chinese to compliance by force of arms".

After a year of desultory warfare on Chinese shipping, Reijersen himself was of the same opinion. His successor, Martinus Sonck, expressed this view point still more cogently in a report written on the eve of abandoning the Pescadores. "Our previous actions on the China coast have so embittered the whole country against us, that we are universally regarded as nothing but murderers, freebooters and pirates Our proceedings against the Chinese have indeed been very cruel and brutal, and in my opinion such that we would never have obtained trade with China by this means. It is to be wished that we had never visited the China coast, and that Your Excellency had been truly informed of the Chinese strength and normal dispositions, and particularly of the nature of this place, before the departure of Commander Reijersen from Batavia; in which event perhaps neither the whole Chinese Empire nor the Emperor himself would have come to look upon us with such loathing and hatred. Now we must needs first atone for all these and many other wrongs, consigning them to oblivion as best we may, before ever the Company will be able to enjoy the long coveted fruits of the magnificent China trade".

Two years of fruitless Sino-Dutch hostilities having led to no result other than the sacrifice of thousands of innocent lives, the Hollanders finally complied with the Chinese demands and abandoned the Pescadores to settle in Formosa. The Portuguese naturally reaped the benefit of Coen's mistaken 'big-stick' policy, which also afforded excellent material to the Jesuits at Peking in their endeavours to persuade the Ming Court of the undesirability of any commercial or political connexion with the Red-haired Barbarians.

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