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Index

BOOK REVIEWS

Editor's Introduction

This is the inaugural issue of EWIAS Viewpoints, the biannual multi-disciplinary journal of the East-West Institute for Advanced Studies. The Institute was recently launched in Macau to do work with universities and others in the region to expand research activities related to Macau and its place in the world.

This first issue critically reflects on the confluence of East and West - a recurring theme in the cultural identity of Macau - as a research contribution for the celebrations surrounding the 500th anniversary of China-Portugal encounters since the 1513 arrival of Jorge Àlvares at Lin-Tin Island aboard a Chinese junk filled with pepper. Despite the dangerous generalizations behind classifications like "East and West" that tend to be subsumed in fragile essentialisms, or simply tourist marketing strategies, EWIAS was established as an independent research institute specifically for fostering multi-disciplinary studies, advanced formation and scientific activities grounded on the platform role of Macau as an historical locus of East-West encounters. Through new investigations, new ideas and new perspectives, East-West encounters and clashes must be submitted to new cognitive and reflexive approaches to deepen our understanding and dispel ignorance. This is a role that Macau has played for centuries, not only as an inter-continental trade platform, but also as a place for the dissemination and mixing of Eastern and Western ideas, from philosophy to science, from astronomy to art, and simply food, resources and especially people. Over the years, Macau has been a safe haven for countless exiles from Europe, South-East Asia, Latin America, Africa and elsewhere.

EWIAS Viewpoints is a scientific journal gathering at disseminating research founded on multi-disciplinary perspectives, associating philosophy, history, social, political, economic and other social sciences. Nowadays, as we witness the astonishing economic and social development of China and the emergence of new economies in the Asia-Pacific, a kind of Braudelian new Mediterranean, along with the persistence of the European debt crisis, the challenges of new East-West encounters in this era of unprecedented globalization will become a key research subject. If this journal can contribute to avoiding essentialisms, prejudices, ideological misunderstandings or simply ignorance to highlight new paths for comparative, connective and contrastive studies of East and West, this first issue can be justified with the hope of a prolific and creative continuation.

Richard Whitfield,
Editor.

PEDRO CARLOS BACELAR DE VASCONCELOS

Asian Values Universality?

The east-west debate about the universality of human rights emerged after the end of the cold war and its denial was "officially" held in 1993, at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, in the name of "Asian values" thesis that fulfil different roles and took on different meanings in multiple contexts in which it was used. The pretension of East Asian countries to include, in the final declaration of the Vienna Conference, the mention of the alleged "regional particularism" was designed to address the newly forged "duty of protection on humanitarian grounds." It will seem excessive to claim the universality of "Asian values", parodying the old controversy about the universality of human rights. But the provocation is justified because rule of law, democracy and human rights are not absolute, universal and definitive goods. On the contrary, there are many risks, today, that threaten these precarious historical acquisitions that, nevertheless, present inalienable values of humanity and can only subsist while different people of the world remain engaged in appropriating and adjust them to the size of their own history, of their ambition and generosity.

INTRODUCTION

The east-west debate about the universality of human rights emerged after the end of the cold war, as a vindication of the relativity of the Western values centred in democracy and individual freedom as opposed to the alleged relevance of the community ties strongly protected by East and Southeast Asian culture. High rates of economic growth allowed that rulers of Singapore, Malaysia, China or Vietnam wished to legitimize, internationally, their authoritarian regimes by invoking the same values that would explain their extraordinary success. However, the thesis of "Asian values", closely linked to the performance of the economy, has fulfilled different roles and assumed different meanings in multiple contexts in which it was used. So, the 1997 economic crisis should seriously affect the importance accorded to the "Asian values" and the former conflict with universal human rights is now replaced by the global doctrine of "good governance", promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund[1]. In Indonesia, the dictatorship of Suharto's would fall under strong contestation of popular movements and, in independent East Timor, would flourish the first democracy of the XXI century. Twenty years later, on the 18th November 2012, in Phnom Penh, the Heads of State and Chiefs of Government of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN – approved a "Human Rights Declaration" where they explicitly proclaim that "All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated"[2] and "All persons are born free and equal in dignity and rights".[3] And further "affirm all the civil and political rights" and "all the economic, social and cultural rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights".[4] Apparently, this should put an end to the old quarrel but it did not.

As an immediate reaction to the announcement of the Human Rights Declaration by the 21st ASEAN Summit in Phnon Penh, more than sixty civil society groups, national and international - including "Human Rights Watch" and "Amnesty International" - called up on Member States to postpone the

(1) Thompson, Mark R. (2004). "Pacific Asia after 'Asian values': authoritarianism, democracy, and 'good governance", in: *Third World Quarterly*, London: Routledge, Vol. 25, No. 6, 1079-1081,

(2) ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), article 7.

(3) AHRD, article 1

(4) AHRD, articles 10 and 26.

adoption of the Declaration and expressed serious concerns over the substance and lack of transparency of the whole drafting process: "as it stands now unquestionably fails to meet existing international human rights standards"[5]. On the other hand, how could we avoid questioning to what extent would be the Asian values less "relative" than the western ones, namely, when the human rights doctrine historically appeared in Europe, three centuries ago, with the Enlightenment philosophers?

Will there be a more drastic example of "cultural relativism" than the one that consented, for over half a century, the persistence of slavery and racial segregation in the United States, despite the "Declaration of Independence" in 1776, solemnly proclaim: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness"? The truth is that the same God who suspended Abraham's arm and prevented him from sacrificing his own son's life, did not prevent the release of "crusades" against the "infidels", the religious wars in Europe, torture and death of "heretics" ordered by the "Tribunal of the Holy Office" judges, the Holocaust, the current hell of "refugee camps" in Palestine or the continued glorification of martyrdom and revenge that fuels a certain theological inspiration terrorism.

While in China, the limits to freedom of expression are highlighted as a major concern, in India, gender equality has recently been projected into the foreground by the indignation triggered, around the world, by the news of a young girl collective rape in a public transport that, eventually, led to her death. Portugal, inspired by the humanitarian feelings of the nineteenth century, was the first European country to abolish the death penalty. However, the murder of an adulterous woman by her husband would continue, for a long time, to be agreed by the laws and criminal courts. Similarly, although the feminist movements in the West have managed to impose the right of women to vote, the majority of religious denominations that claim the god of Abraham - Jews, Christians and Muslims - continues to seal them access to leadership roles. The same model repeats itself, moreover, on top of large international financial organizations, illustrated by the incredible episode that precipitated

(5) The Jakarta Post, 16th November 2012.

the resignation of the predecessor of the current director of the International Monetary Fund. And the discrepancy of women's participation in top positions of their political representation led to the need for constitutional democracies to adopt measures of "positive discrimination" to counter deeply ingrained cultural prejudices that still resists today to inclusion of women in public space.

If even the direction and amplitude of long ago law written subjective freedoms was subjected to an extensive and contradictory variation over time and place, what to say of the social systems that inscribed them as legally binding and the political institutions that adopted and assimilated them, as "principles", to their particular design and configuration? The principle of democratic representation was originally fused in the "parliamentary supremacy" emerged from the British "Glorious Revolution", in 1688. The powers division formula established by the U.S. Constitution, was inspired by the model described by Charles de Montesquieu in "Esprit des Lois", 1748, which distinguishes, in the manner of Aristotle, the legislative, executive and judiciary powers. The equality and fraternity, in their various modulations, and even the dilemmatic signalling, left / right, owe their political semantics to the French Revolution and the composition of the "General States", convoked in 1789. The genesis of human rights and the rule of law is inseparable from the contingencies of European history. However, as noted by Jack Donnelly, "No society, civilization, or culture prior to the seventeenth century, however, had a widely endorsed practice, or even vision, of equal and inalienable individual human rights". [6]

The interpretation of the laws, whether ethical or legal, doctrinal constructions and value systems are interwoven with the history and geography. Does this means that, in the era of globalization one discovers, finally, an undefeatable inability to communicate? Noise levels and the probability of error widened, undoubtedly, well as expanded, communication opportunities. However, without common values, how could we differentiate peculiar values? Conversely, we would say that "Asia" may be a too broad designation to encompass a single order of values. Even the so-called "western civilization"

(6) Donnelly, Jack (2007). 'The Relative Universality of Human Rights', in: *Human Rights Quarterly,* Denver, 5.

- the writing, the compass, algebra, philosophy - was built from east to west: from Asia to Europe and, later, from Portugal to India and China, by the coast of Africa and beyond the Americas, in search of the starting point.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CONTROVERSY

The denial of the universality of human rights was held in 1993, at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, by representatives from various countries with special emphasis on the delegations of Singapore and China. In an exercise of deliberate reversal of the contested "Eurocentric" vision of the world, it was intended that the "Asian values", unlike the "Western values", cherish respect for authority, the priority of the family and the state over the individual interest, the prevalence of order and discipline over freedom._The sovereignty of states, territorial integrity, non-interference - classic principles of international law - would provide the appropriate legal framework for the protection of the values of harmony and solidarity they intended as East Asian societies specific.

The promoters of "Asian values" sought, thus, to consolidate in the cultural diversity, the claim to include in the final declaration of the Vienna Conference, the mention of the alleged "regional particularism", which hoped to provide a serious objection, in the euphoric atmosphere that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, to the risk of being threatened by invoking the newly forged "duty of protection on humanitarian grounds." The new instrument of human rights protection, which soon became the object of a large contestation, intended to legitimize the international community's interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, if necessary by military means and without authorization from national authorities, in order to respond to grave and massive violations that can not be avoided by other means. The "duty to protect" would be used later by George W. Bush and Tony Blair in a failed attempt to get a resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations in favour of the invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and recently, the authorization for the NATO intervention in Gaddafi's Libya.

The values relativism is a subject that has, as we know, remote background in philosophy and re-emerged, more recently, with vigour within the social

sciences, promoted by multiculturalism schools of thought. Of course, its current relevance is not confined to "Asian values" or to the antagonism of those who wish to instrumentalize them. Esteemed philosophers have devoted serious attention to the controversial issue. Amartya Sen confesses his scepticism concerning the widespread myth that a millenary tradition of individual freedom was rooted in European culture. However, except for sporadic outcrops - in Greece or Rome - Amartya Sen says that for the comparison be consistent, is only by analogous outcrops that you have to wonder in Asia: "The question that does not get adequately answered - it is scarcely even asked - is whether similar elements are absent in other cultures."[7] Still in Europe, an exemplary case of peaceful and respectful interfaith coexistence excels, in the transition to the second millennium, in the Al-Andaluz[8]- Iberia - under Muslim domain.

Fareed Zakaria held a very interesting conversation, in 1994, with the former Singaporean Prime-Minister, Lee Kuan Yew[9], one of the most prominent "champions" of the cause of the "Asian Values", who argues: - "The expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly society. (…) freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy. Further answering Fareed Zakaria who questions his skepticism regarding the ability of governments to solve deeper social issues, he says that "we were fortunate we had this cultural backdrop, the belief in thrift, hard work, filial piety and loyalty in the extended family, and, most of all, the respect for scholarship and learning."

Jack Donnelly after analyzing the different possible meanings, refuses any pretended philosophical, ontological or political ground for the "universality" of human rights except the empirical one, he refers as a "overlapping consensus universality": "The transnational consensus on the Universal Declaration is largely voluntary. It arises above all from the decisions of people, states, and

(7) Sen, Amartya (1997). "Human rights and Asian values", in: *Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs*, New York.

(8) Howe, Marvine (2012). *Al-Andalus Rediscovered: Iberia's New Muslims.* New York: Columbia University Press.

(9) Zakaria, Fareed (1994). "Culture Is Destiny; A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew", in: *Foreign Affairs,* March/April, New York: Council of Foreign Relations.

other political actors that human rights are essential to protecting their visions of a life of dignity"[10].

THE ETERNAL RETURN

As we referred in the Introduction, the controversy triggered by the Human Rights Declaration adopted at the Phnom Penh Summit in late 2012, by the 10 ASEAN countries, revealed, unexpectedly, that the old quarrel about the universality of human rights is not over. Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, several international organizations and even the U.S. State Department, in addition to numerous intellectuals, civic groups and human rights activists from the countries of the region, came to express their disagreement and point out the flaws of the document that is a mere "declaration" without binding legal force, like the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" of the United Nations. Nothing more illuminating, however, than a brief assessment of the content of the challenged precepts and the reasons invoked by the critics.

Firstly, the procedure adopted was strongly condemned for it's drafting, entrusted to an intergovernmental commission - the "Asean Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights" (AICHR) – that would have despised the hearing and participation of civil society, in contrast to other experiences - namely, the "Convention on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union" - which included the presence of parliamentarians, judges and academics, that adopt more open working methods and receptive to all contributions. In fact, this was the issue that deserved more severe considerations on the part of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Secondly, it was especially criticized the wording of article 7 that just wanted to bury the stiffer competition - Heritage of the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, which we referred above - around the expression "regional particularities"[11]. Delete the reference to political, economic and

(10) Donnelly, 2007, 13.

(11) Villanueva, Kevin (2013). "La 'Carta Magna' de la ASEAN universaliza los derechos humanos", in: *El País,* 10th January. Kevin Villanueva was a member of the Philippine delegation to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights.

social particularisms that the Declaration contemplates, does not extinguish the inevitable conditionality that different historical and geographical contexts always end up imposing to the implementation of human rights. What seems more important is the recognition of the universality of human rights, explicit in the first part of the provision,[12] and the exclusion of limiting interpretations of the meaning and scope given in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," of the United Nations.

Finally, the allusion to the need to harmonize the rights with the fulfilment of their respective duties was also deplored because it would admit the suppression of rights under the pretext of the violation of the respective obligations, a concern, anyway, which is not supported in any other passage of the document that, emphatically, considers the Member States responsible for the promotion and protection of "all fundamental rights and freedoms"[13].

Which, ironically, does not go unnoticed in the argument of some critics is the bias of Anglo-Saxon cultural matrix, well sensitive in the region, which reveals striking, for example, in the condemnation of a clause that prohibits all forms of intolerance, discrimination and incitement to hatred, imposing it as a limit to the right of freedom of thought, conscience and religion[14]. It is a common formulation in continental European legal tradition but which continues to raise reserve and distrust among the descendants of the "pilgrims" who 300 years ago took refuge in North America to escape bloody religious persecution in that European nations plunged into. Also very curious is the statement in the press release that the US Department of State issued on November 29, which states that "In several instances the ASEAN Declaration outlines rights, only to suggest that the universal human rights memorialized apply only to the extent

(12) Article 7. "All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. All human rights and fundamental freedoms in this Declaration must be treated in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. At the same time, the realisation of human rights must be considered in the regional and national context bearing in mind different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical an religious backgrounds."

(13) Article 6. "The enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be balanced with the performance of corresponding duties as every person has responsibilities to all other individuals, the community and the society where one lives. It is ultimately the primary responsibility of all ASEAN Member States to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms."

(14) Article 22. "Every person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. All forms of intolerance, discrimination and incitement of hatred based on religion and beliefs shall be eliminated."

afforded by local law".[15] Such a suggestion, that however is not perceptible in the text of the Asean Declaration of Human Rights, does not refer, instead, to the "flat world" of a certain "cosmopolitan" fundamentalism unable to recognize other differences beyond the insularity of "bare life"[16], to use an expression of Giorgio Agamben?

However, the content of the "press release" goes further, stating "(Human) rights are not subject to regional and national limitation. These rights do not bear in mind political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical, or religious backgrounds." And to conclude, clearly and unequivocally, a paradoxical synthesis: "When these rights mean different things to different people, to different societies, those freedoms are abridged." If so, what would then mean "the Guantanamo military base"– if by a chance someone will be able to find some meaning - and where - if by a chance such a place existed?

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW

The audacious exercise of formulating a scheme of "rule of law" adaptable to the current conditions of the People's Republic of China, undertaken by Pan Wei, deserves here a careful reference, though stripped of any critical or even analytical pretension. Although the Marxist-Leninist ideology embraces the distinction between "State" and "Party", the methods of internal co-optation practiced do not associate and even intend to avoid the association of substantial expectations of change to the procedures of choosing new leaders of the Party and State. Anyway, challenges waiting Xi Jinping, that in March will be appointed President, are well known. The beginning of the 3rd millennium has not promised the continuity of the extraordinary economic growth rhythm that marked the thirty preceding years. On the economy and society level, it is inevitable the modernization of the industrial sector which in part has become obsolete, the resolution of serious environmental problems, the reorientation of the exports productive sector to the domestic market, the qualification of human resources and the satisfaction of the demands of a more urban and

(15) Baer, Daniel (2012). *Keynote Address to the U.S.-ASEAN Symposium on the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration,* 29th November.

(16) Agamben, Giorgio (1998). *O Poder Soberano e a Vida Nua - Homo Sacer.* Lisboa: Editorial Presença.

educated population. On the political level, the expansion of social fractures, the spread of corruption and the respect for civil liberties are under particular scrutiny, both within and outside its large borders. Pan Wei identifies a "crisis of values in China." [17] The reform efforts are recognized: introduction of direct elections in rural communities, the legal regulation of administrative decision-making procedures, professionalization of leaders, political decentralization, responsibility and accountability, greater openness in the co-optation of elites.[18] Gains of legitimacy, which the regime may have achieved through political reforms promoted since the late eighties, are debatable, but as said before, that's not what we are discussing. The exclusion of political-party pluralism and the constitutional consecration, in 1982, of the aim of building a "socialist democracy", constrain any comparative approach between constitutional democracies, being, therefore, surprising this effort of developing the theory of a "Advisory Rule of Law Regime " that exempts democracy and for which the neo-conservatism of Pan Wei searched inspiration on Singapore and Hong Kong political institutions. As refers Gunter Schubert, the leaders of these countries are aware that "the public acquiescence with the lack of democracy not only depends on the requirement that civil servants perform well but also that Hong Kong and Singapore manage to maintain their prosperity in an ever more volatile international economy."[19] However, it cannot be excluded, at start, from the outset, the potential of this concept of "government under the law" - that informs the control instruments of contemporary constitutional democracies, between the unique party and the people – might be able to reveal unprecedented potentialities. We must not forget that, historically, democracy arrived in continental Europe one century after the rule of law.

(17) Wei, Pan (2012). "A New approach to stability preservation", in: Leonard, M. (ed.). *China 3.0,* London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 89.

(18) Schubert, Gunter (2005). "Reforming Authoritarianism in Contemporary China. Reflections on Pan Wei's Consultative Rule of Law Regime", in: *ASIEN The German Journal on Contemporary China,* 94, 8-10.

(19) Schubert, 2005, 22-23.

CONCLUSION

The main threat that hangs over the currently emerging global society does not come from the multiplicity of cultures - where, after all, lies their main wealth - neither from its potential conflict. The greatest danger comes from unprecedented proportions that a diffuse and impersonal financial power has achieved, benefiting from the states crisis and from the structural vulnerability of democracies, and which seeks to rule the world through an anonymous bureaucracy and diligent care of their interests located in formal and informal decision centres, free of "checks and balances", exempt of democratic legitimacy and duty of accountability. It will seem excessive to claim the universality of "Asian values", even in a parody approach, by analogy with the theory of the "relative universality of human rights" held by Jack Donnelly. But the provocation is justified because the rule of law, democracy and human rights are not absolute, universal and definitive goods. On the contrary, there are many risks, today, that threaten these precarious historical acquisitions that, nevertheless, present inalienable values of humanity and can only subsist while different people of the world remain engaged in appropriating and adjust them to the size of their own history, of their ambition and generosity.

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JOSÉ LUIS DE SALES MARQUES

The Rise of China and the European Crisis: Their Effect on the Future of China-Europe Relations

With China's rise the China-EU relations that was once clearly between a developing economy and a developed one, with its inherent asymmetries, is no longer as easy to characterize. At the same time, East Asia security and stability is facing one of the biggest challenges of the last 50 years, as China, Japan and other regional actors are raising the tone of their dispute on sovereignty claims over some islands in the East and South China seas. This paper will look at China-EU from the perspective of their economic interdependence, political engagement and the security dimension, and the people-to-people dialogue. It concludes with a discussion of a new parading for the future of China-EU relations.

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INTRODUCTION

In November 2012, Xi Jin Ping was elected by the XVIII party Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to be its secretary-general for at least the coming five years, and, most probably, until 2022. In the same token, it is expected he will become the President of the People's Republic of China during the coming National People's Congress (NPC), convey for March 2013. As he is also the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), he will be the most powerful person in China, its undisputed leader and one of the most important political figures in the world. Among his responsibilities, he will chair the Party's Leading Small Group (LSG) on Foreign Policy, the political unit that will define China's foreign policy for the decade to come. It is known that the retiring Hu Jin Tao/Wen Jiabao leadership had great expectations on EU-China relations, giving it more attention than any other leadership before. "Europe has been Chinese premier Wen Jiabao's key foreign policy priority during his two terms and ten years in office" (Chen, 2012, 1). This priority started to be implemented in a very promising fashion in 2003, with China's first ever published foreign policy paper to be dedicated to the EU, stating their mutual relations were "now…better than any time in history" (MFA, 2003). The principle guidelines to those relations, which are still featured in official declarations in the matter[1], are, namely, a) there is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU and neither poses a threat to the other; b) given their differences in historical background, cultural heritage, political system and economic development, it is natural that the two sides have different views or even disagree on some issues (MFA, 2003). Learning how to agree to disagree is a major sign of maturity in any relation. However, ten years after this landmark declaration and, as the team of Hu and Wen are about to retire, questions remain on how much both China and EU have, at times, acknowledged their differences as such and learnt to respect each other's opinions even in contemptuous issues, managing tensions without being captivated by them. In the meantime, both China and the EU are going through significant internal changes and the international system is also adapting to new realities and facing new challenges.

(1) See, Song Tao (2012).

Two recent developments are calling for special attention and analysis: the European financial and economic crisis induced political implications for the EU, with the political elite in several member states, UK aside, calling for deeper integration and economic, financial and fiscal coordination, which ultimately will lead to the increase in sovereignty sharing by EU members; on the other hand, in East Asia, Chinese and other Asian economies' resilience to the current crisis increased their positions of creditors of European and American sovereign debt, while strengthening their economic and political power. With China rising, the China-EU relations, that were once clearly between a developing economy and a developed one, with its inherent asymmetries, is no longer as easy to characterize, tilting the balance to a more symmetric relation. At the same time, East Asia security and stability is facing one of the biggest challenges of the last 50 years. China, Japan and other regional actors are raising the tone of their dispute on sovereignty claims over some islands in the East and South China seas. In the meantime time the US is re-centering their attention back to Asia. As the tension unfolds, North Korea just took the opportunity to successfully complete a nuclear underground testing, in clear violation of the United Nations (UN) rulings on the matter, and ignoring calls for abstaining to do so by US and China. It is unclear how this new North Korean drama will unfold, and how the international community will turn their condemnation into sanctions. In an unprecedented move, China summoned the North Korean ambassadors in Beijing to handle a protest and joined the UN Security Council for a unanimous condemnation (Aljazeera, 2013). What kinds of action will the international community decide to take and what will be China's position on the sanction to be imposed on its neighbor? Whatever the outcome, regional security in East Asia is degrading fast, calling for responsible powers to get their act together.

The EU has restrained itself in getting directly involved in East Asia security matters, but recently, Catherine Ashton, the vice-president for External Relations, EU's top diplomat and her American counterpart Hilary Clinton, made a joint declarations calling for closer cooperation and coordination between US and the EU its Asia policies (SD, 2012). What is the real meaning of this first ever joint declaration on Asia and how those tensions and challenges

will influence China-EU relations for the years to come; these are questions that this paper will try to address.

CHINA-EU ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

A major advantage in the overall relationship between China and the European Union, as well as with its member states, is that it is not dominated by mutual threat and traditional security concerns. It is, apparently, in some respects, a liberal dream, built around mutual advantageous economic and trade relations, which had, over time, turned into one of the pillars of world trade, with annual trade volume of around 450 billion Euros, in 2011 (DGT, 2012). They are two of the biggest traders in the world.

China and the European Economic Community (EEC) established diplomatic relations in 1975. European desire to trade with China and favorable geopolitical developments, namely the Sino-American rapprochement since Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1969 and the PRC's admission to the United Nations in 1971, dictated the set of favorable conditions that turned the visit of EEC Vice-President for foreign affairs, Sir Christopher Soames to Beijing, in May 1975 (Kapur, 1986), into the stepping stone of what would become a partnership of foremost importance for China as well as for the European Union. For a comprehensive understanding of the current developments of those relations, it is important to recall they happened,

> in the context of bipolarity [US;USSR] and with mix concerns and expectations. Europe was worried about Japan making inroads towards the Chinese market, the home of more than a billion potential consumers. On the other hand, China...wanted European technology to develop its four-modernization program. It also wished for a stronger Europe, more independent from US and resistant to the USSR, as part of the "second world" [in accordance with Mao's "three world theory"[2]] (Marques, 2007,147).

(2) The differentiation of the three worlds was, according to Mao "I hold that the U.S. and the Soviet Union belong to the First World. The middle elements, such as Japan, Europe, Australia and Canada belong to the Second World. We are the Third World" (Mao, 1998, 454).

Therefore, it is crucial to retain two basic assumptions underlining the early days of dialogue between the Chinese leaders and European politicians, representing the EC, which are still relevant today. The first one, is that both parties looked at the other primarily as a source of economic benefits, in the form of trade, technological advancement and cooperation, market access or investment; the other, Europe as a bloc and a unity in process, has been perceived by the Chinese as a strategic counterpoint to superpowers hegemony, in the old Mao's formula of the three world, (Yahuda, 1994); or, as a potential balancer to US's unilateralism in today's Chinese view of a multipolar world.

TRADE

The bilateral trade agreement signed in 1978 was very general in nature (Snyder, 2009,57), aiming at promoting and facilitating two-way trade. It created a mechanism for monitoring progress of its implementation, the Joint Committee for Trade, meeting once a year, alternatively in Beijing and Brussels. However, a mere trade agreement could not play the role of a framework agreement between the EEC and China. Therefore, a new deal was struck in 1985 leading to the establishment of a trade and economic cooperation agreement, still in force after almost 40 years, and the cornerstone of the ever more complex and multidimensional China-EU relations.

China's rapid economic rise and technological advances turned what used to be mainly an exporter of cheap manufactured goods into a leading producer of electronic and machinery goods, 50% of which is provided by companies owned by its neighbors Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong[3] and South Korea (EC, 2012a). China is the second most important source of goods in the EU and the EU is China's main supplier of those goods. In 2011, EU's exports to China increased by 20.3% reaching 136.2 billion Euros, and imported goods and services from China totaled 292.1 billion Euros, a modest increase of 3.4%, notwithstanding recession in the Euro area. 17.3% of total imports of the Union come from China and 8.9% of its exports ended up in the Chinese market

(3) Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, but a separate customs territory and World Trade Organization's founding member. Taiwan is recognized by the EU and being part of China and has also a separate membership of the WTO.

(DGT, 2012). EU's trade deficit with China surmounted to 155.9 billion Euros, a staggering average of 428.2 million Euros per day. Sino-EU deficit in trade of goods year-to-year average increase in the last five years was 4.7%.

On the other hand, trade in services, where EU benefited from a trade surplus of 6 billion Euros in 2010, is relatively modest compared to the former; same year two-way trade volume was 38.6 billion Euros, a figure representing around 14% of China's trade in services during that year. Although China's service economy is growing every year, it does not provide the EU with sufficient market opportunities to offset its deficit in their bilateral trade (EC, 2012a).

Trade deficit is the main irritant in the bilateral trade and economic relation. The perception amongst the general public in Europe is not different from official arguments by the EU Commission, trade unions and business associations: the imbalance is caused by unfair competition of Chinese products benefiting from the state's protectionist industrial policies, entrepreneur's malpractices and the suppression of labor rights forcing low salaries on the Chinese workforce. Some scandals in product safety, such as the use of toxic paint in toys made in China and exported elsewhere in 2007, triggered major recall[4] of those products. A bilateral mechanism for EU-China Industrial Policy and Regulatory Cooperation has been in place since 2001 and some progress had been made, but there is still a long way to go. The economic sectors that have contributed mostly to the deficit have been office and telecommunication equipment, together with shoes and textiles and iron and steel (EC, 2012a). The deficit for 2011 in those categories exceeded total EU trade deficit with China, and, consequently, there were sectors where the EU had clear competitive advantages registering comfortable trade surpluses, such as in "transport equipment", namely motor vehicles, with China's public and private demand for European brand name cars triggering a deficit of over 20 billion Euros in that year.

(4) Reports of those scandals confirmed loose control, regulations and complete lack of scruples of some suppliers in China, but also of major Western companies that turned a blind eye to the conditions under which Chinese workers are operating in their production units. See, for instance, "Scandal in Chinese toy industry deepens", Amnesty International, 31/8/2007, accessed in 23/1/201 at www.amnesty.org.au/china/comments/2642/

It is, therefore, not surprising that China's exports into Europe has generated disparate reactions, with differences in perceptions within member states that resulted from their integration in the global economy and how much they profited with the Chinese market. Therefore, for liberal economies, such as those of northern Europe dominated by big retailers buying cheap from China and selling at brand prices in Europe and elsewhere, products made in China are the lifeblood of their businesses[5]. The most talked-about case is Swedish H&M, the biggest garment retailer in Europe. Scandinavian high tech industries, such as mobile phones, also find their way into the Chinese consumer market either directly or through local production and marketing. The same could be said of Germany, the major supplier of technology and cars to China. However, for manufacturing economies, such as some Southern and Central European member states that rely on traditional industries such as textiles and garments, Chinese goods are a threat not only in regard to EU's internal market, but worldwide (Fox & Godement, 2009). This is, however, only one dimension of the economic divide and asymmetries between Europe and China. Another crucial element is market access to China that comprises of both the level of exports in goods and services as well as European investment in the market. European business in China in their latest position paper identified several issues that should be addressed by Chinese authorities and EU-China bilateral mechanisms to improve market access and operating conditions for European companies in the Chinese Mainland (EUCCC, 2012). Those issues are related to equal access to markets, procurement and treatment under the law, financing and subsidies and technology innovation. In particularly, China was identified by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as having the most restrictive regime for foreign investment in all of the G20. According to the European business community, there are arrays of market access barriers in China including off-limit sectors to foreign investment invoking national security, limits on equity ownership conditioned to forced technology transfer, licensing requirements that foreign invested enterprises (FIE) cannot attain, as well as regulatory practices, such as standardization,

(5) 31.9% of textiles and 44% of clothing imported into EU is supply by China; office and telecommunication equipment of Chinese origin represents 51.5% of EU imports in that category. Source: China- EU bilateral trade and trade with the World, 21/3/2012, DG Trade. EU Commission.

and public procurement limiting opportunities for those enterprises. Being this case, relevant players have appealed to the EU Commission to address these issues and member states to act in tandem; however it has not always happened. On the contrary, acting solely on their self-interest, states fall into the "prisoner's dilemma", frequently nullifying each other to optimize their bilateral relations with the Chinese (Fox & Godement, 2009). They have also called for symmetrical market access and opportunities as those enjoyed by Chinese companies in the EU single market. Ironically, if they succeed, the outcome could be translated into more exports from China to Europe, unless China succeeds in shifting the growth paradigm from an export oriented to a consumer-oriented economy that will also demand for more imports from Europe. Will that be the case?

China and the EU are not really symmetrical in their economic and trade relationship. There is one major formal difference, since China does not enjoy Market Economy Status (MES) with the EU. China's non-market economy status is directly derived from its past as a state planned economy, which started to reform and open-up from 1978 onwards. As a transitional economy, China incrementally introduced market elements, accelerating the process with its accession to the WTO in 2001. With globalization as the background and integration in the world economy as the motor for growth, China rapidly became a global economic force, as producer of goods for exports and a consumer market of over 1.3 billion people. After thirty years of reform and opening up China formally requested EU to recognize it as a "market economy" 2003 (Marques, 2005) and, in 2007, EU finally rejected the pledge arguing excessive state interference, a weak rule of law and poor corporate governance. It is Ironically, EU granted market economy status to Russia in 2002, nine years before it joined WTO, fueling speculation that political consideration and not economic or technical ones are standing between such recognition for China. It is not clear how much of those criteria was Russia abiding two when it was blessed by that EU's benevolence. Apart from the symbolic meaning that the status would give China's progressive road to a market-economy, it would also bring more clarity and justice in the investigations of those cases imposed on its exports. For a market economy, the calculation of "fair price" in anti-dumping investigations is based on its own cost structure, while the same calculation for

non-market economy is based on the cost structure of a "surrogate" economy, that could be any, including a developed country (Marques, 2005). European official documents claim that anti-dumping investigations only represent a minor fraction of the complete EU-China trade, since "EU's trade defense instruments cover only 1% of its total imports from China" (DGT, 2012). But, if that one per-cent represents around 3 billion Euros a year, it is a considerable amount for small and medium sized shoes or textile producers, both in Europe and in China. Moreover, in September 2012, Brussels brought its biggest ever anti-dumping case against Beijing after 25 European companies accused China of exporting solar panels below cost (The Telegraph, 2012). China response was to complain to the WTO, while accusing the European Union of violating rules governing subsidies to its solar-components industry (WSJ, 2012).

Commenting on premier Wen's legacy on EU-China relations, Chen Zhimin pointed out,

> neither the arms embargo nor MES is seen as a matter of real, vital interest in China [...] As 2016 draws near, even MES may be an issue of diminishing value [...] However, these two items have been at the top of the Wen administration's agenda for the past 10 years, and no serious progress has been made" (Chen, 2012, 6).

Being the case, why can't Europe agree that conceding MES to China before it acquires by its own rights from WTO is rather insignificant, compared to other advantages and concessions it could otherwise draw from China, such as solving the issue of improving market access for European exports and investments, or convincing China to further contribute to financial stabilization of the Eurozone? The answer is not simple. Its roots are deeply entrenched in the sensitiveness of some European less competitive traditional industries and the jobs they generate, tied with a regional dimension and its existing social fabric that needs to be kept and alongside divergent interests among member states. China's unfavorable overall image in the world (Wang, 2012), makes it an easy target and useful excuse for those EU member states government's failing to modernize and innovate their own industries and services in face of globalization, despite the availability and influx of EU funds for that

purpose. A generalized lack of consistency between EC rhetoric and normative diplomacy with member's economic realism, are dictating relations with China (Fox & Godement, 2009). For instance, notwithstanding EU's Commission competences in trade negotiations, some member states, if not all, keep regular and meaningful bilateral relations with China in economic matters, in search of the best bilateral deal, frequently in competition with other member states.

CHINESE INVESTMENT IN EUROPE

The current economic and financial mayhem of 2008 is taking Europe to its worst financial, economic and social turmoil, since the European Community was established in 1954. These developments are changing traditional patterns of EU-China economic interdependence, impacting on their future. First, and foremost, the sovereign debt and Euro crisis are inviting China and other economies to intervene by helping European currency to preserve stability in their major export market, the European single market, and filling their national reserves with Euro denominated assets. China's contribution was in buying Euros and Euro denominated assets, increasing the weight of the European currency to over 25% of the total worth of its foreign exchange reserves and contributing with 45billion dollars to the IMF's bailout mechanism. Concurrently, by taking the economic opportunity to make acquisitions of major Europeans credit strapped utilities providers and high-tech companies, Chinese enterprises, most of them SOE's (State Own Enterprises) are furthering the internationalization of Chinese "national champions" and gaining access to top technologies. The asymmetric relation, which characterized the past 35 years of Sino-European economic engagement and interdependence, is about to change.

Chinese Foreign Direct Investment's most famous success story in Europe in 2012 was the acquisition of 27% of Portuguese power conglomerate EDP (*Electricidade de Portugal*) by China's state-owned Three Gorges for the amount of 2.7 billion Euros, which will be accrued by investment in business development amounting the whole operation to around 8 billion Euros (WSJ, 2011). It raised the stake and the cake of Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe in 2012 to unprecedented volumes. According to Rhodium, a private

economic consultancy firm, latest reports on Chinese investment in Europe, "annual inflows tripled from 2006 to 2009, and tripled again by 2011 to US $ 10 billion (Euros 7.4 billion)…driven overwhelmingly by commercial motives" (Hanemann & Rosen, 2012, 7). Another report (Zhang, 2011) indicated that by the end of 2010 the stock of Chinese FDI in Europe was US $ 16 billion (Euros 11.8 billion). Based on those figures, it's not hard to predict that the stock of Chinese investment in Europe by the end of 2013 will surpass 25 billion Euros. Chinese FDI in Europe is a recent phenomenon, with companies registering the average age of only eight years. Chinese companies investing in Europe are either subsidiary of corporations, namely of SOEs, with the latest high-volume investments pointing into that direction, or small and medium sized companies, many of which are individual or family-type enterprises, scattered around Europe and in the manufacturing and service sectors (Zhang, Yang & Van Den Bulcke, 2011).

POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND THE SECURITY DIMENSION OF CHINA-EU RELATIONS

Economic interest was the primary motivation on the European side in its early engagements with China (1975-1989), except for specific needs of member states such as, for instance, the bilateral negotiations that took place between the United Kingdom and China and between Portugal and China, on the future of Hong-Kong and of Macau, respectively, a reminder of Europe's colonial past in China.

Trade and investment opportunities were growing, notwithstanding the occasional anti-dumping cases filled by the Commission against Chinese products. Then, the tragedy in 1989 of Tiananmen's June the 4th events took the world by shock and surprise. The European Council meeting in Madrid in June 27th 1989 imposed sanctions including the embargo on arms trade that is still in force. It took about three years for the relations to get back to normal mode, and, around 1992, when it happened, China and the EU established new bilateral political dialogue mechanism (EEAS, 2012), to debate global issues of common interest as well as political developments in China, Europe and the world. This political dialogue covers a wide range of issues and it includes a

specific dialogue on issues of human rights. EU's approach in the discussion on the issue of human rights with China is based on low profile, dialogue and practical co-operation, which include judicial training, support to township elections and diplomatic initiative on a case basis. It is meant to look for results without calling too much attention from the media, nor raising problems at international forums. The EU believes this is the most efficient way to deal with China, a position that is not consensual. Human rights and the rule of law, or the lack of it, in China is an area for potential friction between the two partners that can be triggered at any time. Notwithstanding strong progress that had been made in economic rights of the Chinese people, with hundreds of million lifting out of poverty as China's is progressing in the development of its economy, cases of human rights abuse in China are constantly damaging China's legitimate call to be respected at the international arena as great country and a global power in the making. Critics of EU's approach are keen to point out that results are usually very slow and that China has still not ratified the UN International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights.

With the advent of the treaty of Maastricht in 1993 and the inception of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), new breath of life was given to external affairs. The Commission's communication of 1994 "Towards a New Asia Strategy", defined EU's engagement with Asia on a bloc-to-bloc overall strategy, but gave enough room for bilateral relations with the Asian giants Japan, India, ASEAN and China (Marques, 2005). ASEM, the Asia Europe Meeting, the summit joining together EU member states and the Commission with Asian member states and the three North Asian powers, Japan, S. Korea and China, on a bloc-to-bloc dialogue saw the light of day in 1996 at the first summit in Bangkok. For economic and political reasons, China became the center stage for Europe's relations with East Asia. The EU Commission policy paper "A long term policy for China-Europe relations", adopted by the Madrid EU Council in December 1995, established the political guidelines for those relations, based on the principle of "constructive engagement and cooperation". The policy orientation targeted three main objectives: a) encourage China to become fully integrated in the international community; b) contribute to reforms in China; c) and, intensify ties between Europe and China (EC, 1995). Further developments at the international stage, as well as within China, namely the

peaceful retrocession of Hong-Kong to full Chinese rule, China's cooperation in dealing with the North Korea nuclear crisis of…and its mature reaction to the Asian financial crisis, encouraged EU to raised the level of bilateral political dialogue with its Chinese counterpart, setting new goals, namely, in the form of the Commission's communication on "Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China" (EC, 1998),

> engaging China further, through and upgraded political dialogue, in the International community; - supporting China's transition to an open society based upon the rule of law and the respect for human rights;- integrating China further in the world economy by bringing it more fully into the world trading system and by supporting the process of economic and social reform underway in the country; - making Europe's funding go further; - and, raising the EU profile in China.

Under those guidelines, EU gave enthusiastic support to China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which took place on December 2001, and built up momentum for a comprehensive strategic partnership to be mutually acknowledged and declared. Although its content is still today sufficiently ambiguous, which invited commentators to question its real meaning, namely the significance of the word "strategic", it was declared at a time when China and the EU were seeing eye-to-eye, much more than now. Both were alarmed by George W. Bush's unilateral approach to global governance, particularly his determination to invade Iraq and force regime change as a strategy to control its oil riches. In response China and Continental Europe were calling for multilateralism and respect for the United Nations and its Security Council.

The famous Sino-European honeymoon, a termed coined by the American political scientist David Shambaugh (2007a), lasted between 2003 and 2005, leaving the impression that the bilateral relation was finally reaching a status that would be able to overcome all difficulties, almost as if a new type of transatlantic relationship was in the making. It was during this period that the most infamous obstacle to perfection, the embargo of the selling of arms to China, declared by the European Council in June 1989 after Tiananmen, almost

came to an end, with Schroeder and Chirac playing crucial roles[6]. However, changes in international environment and internal developments both in China and the EU rapidly shifted the mode of the relations, cooling it off and bringing back to the surface structural differences and long-lasting prejudices. First, Chinese expectations on the arms embargo were not fulfilled on the European side, for three sets of reasons: - internal political changes in Europe, namely the rise to power of Merkel in Germany, and later Sarkozy in France, both of them more liberal minded than their predecessors and opposing any change of positions on this matter; - the opposition by United States, both due to their strategic mistrust of China and their allegiance to Taiwan; - and, last but not least, the eastern enlargement of the EU, with new members also opposing to this change based on human rights issues and USA's political influence. China, by passing the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, authorizing the use of military force against Taiwan if independence was to be declared, made any discussion on ending the embargo impossible and politically too risky for any EU politician or member state. It also confirmed the primacy of China's internal policy over any foreign policy calculations.

The other contentious matter was in trade relations, with vast political implications. 2005 was the year WTO ruled to end all quantitative restriction in international trade regime that had lasted for 30 years, known as the "quota system". It meant for the EU that its internal market would be open to imports from China, particularly in categories where China benefit formed competitive advantages derived from cheap labor, economies of scale and advanced logistics. EU, which over the years raised the high banner of free trade, had to choose between protecting their own manufacturers or ignoring completely its own principles, by invoking the rules governing China's entry to the WTO, placing temporary limits to Chinese imports. The choice made was the latter, which translated into an agreement in June that year to impose quotas on 10 categories of clothing that would last until 2008 (BBC, 2005). Notwithstanding, all of a sudden, in early August, at the demand of Europe's retailing businesses which anticipated those measures and expected to profit hugely during that

(6) For an interesting and informative account of this period of China-EU relations, and the expectations around the lifting of arms embargo and its fallout, see Patten, Chris, Not Quite a Diplomat, Penguin Books, London, 2006

year's Christmas sales across the continent, 75 million "Made in China" items including pullovers, bras, trousers and T-shirts were blocked at European ports. Blame was placed on pressure from France, Spain, Portugal and Italy (Guardian, 2005) protectionist minded member states, against the will of their liberal minded partners of Germany, Netherlands and Sweden. An agreement was finally made during the UK's term in the rotating presidency, under Blair, ending this episode of the EU-China trade war, which was named, humorously, the "bra war". However, those events only confirmed the imminent rise of a harder approach from the EU in its commercial, economic and political relations with China. The communication "EU-China: closer partners, growing responsibilities" (EC, 2006) of 24th October 2006, and particularly the accompanying policy paper on bilateral trade and investment "signaled and made explicit many of the concerns about China that had been bubbling beneath the surface in Europe" (Shambaugh, 2007b). Topics such as political reform, human rights, sustainable development, trade and economic relations, bilateral cooperation on science and technology, migration, people-to-people links, and international and regional cooperation namely on East Asia, Taiwan, Chinese military expenditure and objectives, arms embargo and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were all enclosed in the said document. Those documents and the "laundry list of request" (Shambaugh, 2007b) attached to it, took Chinese officials and Europe watchers by surprise, because it treated China almost as a symmetrical economic power as the EU, not the developing economy it used to be in need of EU aid funds and programs to support its own development. The documents called for China to take more responsibility as the leading emerging economy and global actor; this new attitude caused some discomfort among the Chinese political elite, with low-profile commentaries such "EU's is behaving like the Americans"[7]. The EU also wanted to establish a new agreement with China, replacing the old 1985 "Economic and Trade agreement", which is a second generation agreement with no conditionality nor references to human rights and other normative principles that the EU is expecting to include in the Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA), in line with normative principles defined in the Lisbon Treaty. Negotiations started in 2007, but face a stalemate,

(7) The author witnessed some of these comments coming from the academic community.

failing to conclude until time of this writing, all signals pointing to further delays for at least a few more years to come.

2008 was a difficult year for EU-China relations. In the built up to the Beijing Olympic Games the Olympic flame was taken across the world. This high-profile event offered the best of opportunities to all anti-Beijing causes to demonstrate their opposition to the CPC and the Chinese government. Internally, the unrest in Tibet, and, externally, China's support of the Sudanese regime contributed to continuous criticism of the regime and calls to boycott the Games intensified as the date of the opening approached. Furthermore Sarkozy's decision to meet with the Dalai Lama in Paris, later in the autumn, triggered a crisis with China, who retaliated by unilaterally calling off the China-EU Summit schedule for later that year. The Beijing Olympics was a great success, and it symbolized the power of China, not only in sporting terms, but also as the central emerging player in the world economy and international relations.

In the meantime, the EU started suffering from contagion of the financial crisis that started in the US. Due to its own structural imbalances, namely over excessive foreign debt in many member states of the Eurozone, expanding fiscal deficits and loss of competitiveness in some sectors and regions of its integrated economy, the lack of common remedies- and political will- to solve or respond to some of those illnesses on time, the EU economy went into recession in 2009. It fell again in the second part of 2012, entering into a double-dip recession, which is expected to continue in 2013, this time triggered by the failure of the liberal oriented austerity measures and tightening fiscal policies of all its members (De Grauwe, 2012). The immediate consequence of the global financial crisis for China was the reduction of its exports, due to contraction of the two main markets US and EU. It was estimated that 20 million Chinese migrants workers in the region of Guangdong had to move back home due to output reduction in their factories. However, it is in the political and soft-power projection that this crisis is taking its toll upon perceptions of the EU in China. Firstly, the controversies and internal disunity at the EU, the political struggle and lack of solidarity between the southern members and its northern counterparts, Cameron's position on calling a referendum in 2018 to decide on the country's continuity within the Union, the eruption of constant attacks on the European system of social protection, all of these have weakened the

projection of EU soft-power and further questioned its ability to act as a bloc, namely by defining an Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Because China is suspicious of EU's ability to stand as one, it had long opted for dealing with Europe at multilayered level, with the Commission and with member states some of which are strategic partners.

The new round of dispute in the South China Sea, where China is staging territorial claims against at least a dozen of its neighboring countries has underlined two major recent developments; China's rise and sequential assertiveness in regional security policies; and, Obama's "pivot" to Asia strategy. This strategic move of America's refocusing onto the Asian stage encouraged traditional allies, such as Japan and the Philippines, as well as new friend Vietnam, to look to US as a balancing power to neighboring China. These developments and the rise in nationalist sentiments, has, for the first time in decades, raised fears of a regional crisis with the possibility of violent confrontation among neighbors. With it, a new challenge is been posed to the EU's traditional identity as a "civilian power" in its engagement with Asia, and particularly with China: the security dimension.

This new scenario has its own irony, since recent trends in East Asia's economic interdependence and multilateral and multilayered dialogue were suggesting otherwise, with closer cooperation and coordination in economic, financial and security dimensions, centered around ASEAN (Association of East Asia States). With its multiple formulas of cooperation ASEAN plus three (China, South Korea and Japan), ASEAN plus five (ASEAN+ 3+ Australia and New Zealand), the East Asian Forum (without the US), and even a FTA (Free Trade Agreement) with China, effective since 2010, ASEAN is becoming the center of debates and actions on Asian regionalism. European integration is seen as an example, though not a model, for this region to come closer together, transforming its effective economic market-driven integration into institutionalized relations, securing long lasting peace to the region. Traditionally, the East and South-East have their own focus of tension, namely with North Korea's nuclear games and its ongoing tension with South Korea, the China-Taiwan issue, the India-China strategic rivalry and unresolved border disputes, the management of the South China Sea disputes, the Sino-

Japan dispute around unsettled issues inherited from history, as well and non-traditional security threats, namely terrorism and religious divides.

In this complex regional context, what should be the EU positions? As mentioned before, EU has no hard security issues in East Asia and no hard power to cling to, even if it wanted to become an actor in such domain. It is also advisable, in EU's global interest and actorness in promoting peace and international cooperation, to keep its identity as a civilian power, which does not prevent it from streamlining and improving coordination and operational ability of the military capabilities of its member states. Particularly, EU should not pretend to be another Asian power, since its interest will be better protected if it maintain its soft-power approach and "civilian" identity and cooperate with the region in seeking stability and security.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE DIALOGUE

So far, this paper dealt with two of the three pillars of EU-China relations, particularly, trade and economic interdependence and political and security dialogues. China and EU have established a comprehensive strategic dialogue since 2003, with the corresponding institutional fanfare of summits between top leaders, three high-level dialogue on economic and trade matters, security and governance and people-to-people, 60 sectoral dialogues on almost every subject covered in the relations, academic exchanges and comprehensive cooperation program as well as development aid, China in Europe years and vice-versa, to mentions the most visible side of those joint events. However, most of those actions and particularly the understanding of its meaning had been the privilege of elites. Europeans misperceptions of China are often base on wrong information and stereotypes. For instance, the author Jing Men, in referring to perceptions in Europe about China, cited Pew Research Center 2012 where is reported that 62 percent in Germany, 50 percent in Britain, 57 percent in France and 57 percent in Spain named China as the world's top economic power. China's support to the Euro and EU bailout did not have any positive effect among Europeans, on the contrary. China's favorability ratings dropped from 51 percent in 2011 to 40 percent in 2012 (Jing, 2012). There is still a huge deficit in communication and trust at all levels, which has its

roots in geographic and cultural distances that were never bridged, but also in information deficit and the free flow of ideas between the two sides.

Therefore, both China and the EU recognized the need to greatly improve people-to-people relations in their partnership, creating conditions and opportunities for more communication and knowledge to be shared at all levels by their public. There is an increasing number of Europeans living, studying and doing business in China, as well as the other way around. Chinese tourist are spending more in Europe than anyone else, and some European governments recently set up attractive resident schemes through investment and real state purchasing, which could be interesting for Chinese buyers looking for a permanent access to Europe.

Also, Chinese migration to Europe has been on the rise. The total number of Chinese immigrants in the EU is still a guess. According to the Council of Europe, the number of nationals from the PRC legally residing in Europe was estimated at 200.000, with Italy, Germany, Spain, UK and France attracting the highest numbers (Laczko, 2003). This figure must be very far from reality by just comparing what happened in Italy. Merchionne (2007, 133) presented a research with estimates of over 130 thousand legal Chinese migrants in the country and some 10 thousand "non-legal", against the backdrop of 50 thousand quoted by the estimates by the European Council, a threefold increase in a period of about six years.

The shops and restaurants owned by Chinese immigrants in Europe are already part of the urban landscape in many European cities, and in countries such as Portugal even in small towns. "In Europe, the Chinese have long been regarded as a migrant group that is hard-working, frugal and enterprising" (Li, 2010, 6). According to the same author, besides the 45,000 Chinese restaurants across the whole of Europe, trade and commerce, including wholesalers, supermarkets, stall keepers and street peddlers, there have been an increasing number, since late 1990's, of goods wholesalers and trading centers of various sizes set up in different European countries. However, this late trend and Europe's own economic problems has adverse effects as it accentuates some negative misconceptions and prejudices, namely that Chinese communities do not integrate in their host country, that they are self-centered and that their businesses selling mainly cheap 'Made In China" products is destroying

other local commercial ventures. For instance, the finding of Chinese illegal immigrants near Florence, producing "Made in Italy" garments only added fuel to a burning issue[8].

Governments in Europe have seldom given attention to those self-sustained, socially marginalized communities. However, this attitude has been changing lately, because minority's issues are increasingly relevant, China is becoming a superpower and Chinese migration has rocketed (Benton, 2011). There are only very few instances of European citizens of Chinese origin participating in high profile positions in Europe, contrary to what is already happening in the US. Chinese communities in Europe could directly benefit from closer EU-China relations, and could play important cultural and economic roles, to help bridge the gaps mentioned above.

Recently China has set up Confucius institutes across Europe as part of its soft-power projection and taking into account the great number of European Academic institutions hoping to cooperate with China. There were 97 of those institutes in 32 European countries in 2011, and growing with more universities applying to host them (China Daily Europe, 2012; Hanban, 2011). Those institutes have the function of teaching Mandarin, the official language of China, and promoting cultural exchange. Confucius institutes are cooperation projects between Beijing and hosting academic institutions, serving purposes of both sides. However, because there is money from the Chinese government, there have been cases of contestation and boycott in some universities. It is an indication of how deep and strong is the divide between China and Europe, and how urgent it is for such distances to be overcome, for the future benefit of peoples of both sides of Eurasia.

In the same token, Hong-Kong and Macau, as Special Administrative Regions of the People's Republic of China, with hundreds of years of experience in bridging Europe and China, and with their own autonomy and competence in dealing with external relations, as conferred by their respective Basic Law, could and should play a stronger role in people-to-people relations between EU and China.

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(8) Two tragedies, the suffocation of 58 Chinese in a lorry at Dover in England in 2000, and the drowning of 23 Chinese at Morecambe Bay in 2004, are two horrific instances of human trafficking, involving Chinese triads or organized crime in Europe.

IN SEARCH OF A NEW PARADIGM FOR EU-CHINA RELATIONS

In a recent article published on the electronic page of the Chinese Institute of International Studies (CIIS), the think-tank controlled by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Vice Minister Song Tao attributed the success of China-EU to the following reasons (Song, 2012):

- Advocacy for a multipolar world as its strategic foundation;
- Mutual benefits and win-win outcomes as its essential feature;
- Advocacy for plural civilizations as a unique advantage of China-EUexchanges.

It was a very positive assessment of the state of the relations. However, empirical evidences, some of which was quoted in the course of this paper, are painting a more sober and grey picture, as recognized by several commentators on both sides of the equation (Fox & Godement, 2009; Chen, 2012; Jing, 2012; Geeraerts, 2013). Trade is still the source of many irritants, though it could be said, to contextualize the issue, that for partners trading at such huge volumes of goods and services it could happen anyway, under the WTO framework. For instance, EU has long standing trade issues with the US, and vice-versa, but those are not charged with the same level of prejudice and recrimination as trade conflicts with China. EU and US has been waving a long battle at WTO regarding government subsidies to their respective aircraft industries, namely but not limited to Airbus vs. Boeing (CNN, 2012).

However, progress must be made in China and in the EU, since those irritants have their transaction cost and many are being politicized, which is the real danger in regard to the future of the strategic partnership. EU should, as it promised during the latest joint communiqué of the 15th EU-China Summit, to resolve the MES issue in a "swift and comprehensive way" (CEU, 2012) and China should look at the problems of market access posed by European businesses, and make progress in that respect. They should also give priority to all major issues that are restraining higher and more efficient economic interdependence, namely in areas such as two way investment, intellectual property, business and tourist visa issues, to engross the flux and interchange of capital and people across the two sides.

China and EU must continue its dialogue and deepen understanding on the political changes on both sides, and continue to improve effective dialogue on human rights issues.

On the global political front, China and EU should work together at a bilateral and multilateral level in search of peaceful resolutions in major traditional security crisis, namely in the Middle East, Central Asia and East Asia. They must also work together on horizontal issues such as nuclear-proliferation, combat against terrorism and other non-traditional security issues. EU should be able to upgrade its political unity in foreign affairs and act independently from the US, to be a viable alternative as a civilian power exuding soft power, and not a sideshow of American foreign policy. China should also work harder to show the world and particularly its neighbors about its true intention of "peacefully rising" and status-quo power, by responding to eventual provocations with the self-confidence of a great power.

EU and China should promote more exchanges and dialogue on the benefits of regional integration, with openness and flexibility, while recognizing differences and without predetermined solutions. EU has the problem of advancing integration to new levels, or otherwise fall into a trap of structural inefficiency that the current state of affairs will lead to. China has the challenge of working with neighbors that are culturally and politically diverse, and old historical wounds to mend, as with Japan. Moreover, both regions are subject to long lasting relations with the US, which is, simultaneously, an Asian and a European power. An independent and strong EU will be useful in building a stable and equilateral EU-US-China triangle.

In terms of cooperation, EU's expertise in sustainable development will be of much use to China in its quest to build a more sustainable, balanced and better society. Particularly, challenges such as urbanization, alternative energy solutions and energy security, social safety nets, regional development and convergence, are areas that would be beneficial to China.

Both EU and China must face the future knowing they must adapt their economy and politics to new challenges and new times. EU must advance its global competitiveness, while keeping its edge on innovation, sustainable growth and social development. China must change its economic paradigm centering its primacy in developing internal market and consumption driven

growth, while solving the imbalances resulting from its last thirty more years of unprecedented growth and keeping harmony within its ever changing society. The new leadership that was elected at the 18th Congress of the CPC and will formally take over power from the retiring 4th generation of leaders, have shown signs that some reforms will have to be made and the world is waiting for further clarification and confirmation on that matter. Both EU and China are also facing challenges in its external environment as the international systems is also rapidly changing with new emerging actors, new challenges and opportunities, new societal developments and an evolving combination of unipolarity with multipolarity, multilateral systems and international regimes that are needing reform, and the growth of bilateral arrangements, such as growing bilateral Free Trade Arrangements (FTA's) and Regional Trade Arrangements (RTA's). Impulses of nationalism are growing everywhere, not only in East Asia, with the global crisis calling for more protectionism and the upholding of national interest. At the same time, international civil society is becoming more visible and stronger and social networks have shown their effective power as tools for global communication and people's mobilization, everywhere! It is in a context of change, that EU and China must seek a new paradigm for their relation, on an ever level and balance field, with respect for each other's identities and cultures, in a plural but, simultaneously, holistic and integrating way.

EU and China had, over almost 40 years developed its bilateral relations based on complementarities between their respective economies, deepening economic interdependence through trade and investment. The political and strategic dimensions as well as people-to-people interaction played an important but secondary dimension. Today, as China is becoming a major economic power and a global political actor, traditional complementarities between China and EU, based on trading, are not so evident anymore. China and Europe and increasingly producing the same cars, solar panels, airlines and other goods with technological contents, and China is becoming less competitive as a low-cost factory of the world. Shifts in its economic model of growth will require higher propensity for consumption in its domestic markets, which can only be acquired by raising disposable income and improving the social safety net available for its people. China's new stage of development will

bring new opportunities and complementarities with the EU. Moreover, China and EU enjoy a unique geo-political complementarity, since both regions are important members of the geopolitical family inhabiting the great Eurasia landmass. They have particular responsibility towards contributing to peace and development in this great region of the world, the home of civilizations and of a great part of humanity. The new paradigm for China Europe relations must be founded upon these realities and responsibilities. Thousand years ago, the Silk Road took people from East to West back and forth. Then, in the XVI century, Portuguese traders, navigators, scholars and priests, found a new way for Europe and China to trade- the maritime Silk Road was invented. Today, there are new ways across the plains and mountains of Eurasia that must be invented to bring the peoples of Europe, Asia and China closer together.

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FRANÇOIS GIPOULOUX

Asian Mediterranean
China at the Core of two Periods of Globalisation (16th-20th century)[1]

Mediterranean is a powerful concept, elaborated by Braudel in his seminal study on *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II.* It encompasses economic, social and cultural dimensions. In the forteenth century, Genoa, Venice, Barcelona were global places, controlling wold-wide economic flows. This supremacy derived from the structuring of a crucial maritime area, Mediterranean. What seems to be most remarkable in Braudel's analysis of the Mediterranean maritime world is how borders dematerialized, how flows strated to define space and how different stages or levels of development clashed against one another.

During the 18th century, thanks to the overlapping of its trading networks (Arabic, Indian, Portuguese and Chinese) the South China Sea has been at the core of European and Asian economic exchanges. This paper deals with the following questions: Is Asian Mediterranean a conceptual tool applicable to Asia? More specifically, can the economic corridor of East Asia, hinged onto several interconnected maritime basins: Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, South China Sea, Sulu Sea, Celebes Sea be considered a valid illustration of the braudelian concept, during the two periods under consideration: the end of the 16th century and the end of the 20th century? Is a network of independent cities the prominent actor of this maritime space?

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Mediterranean is a powerful concept, elaborated by Braudel in his seminal study on *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*.[2] It encompasses economic, social and cultural dimensions. In the forteenth century, Genoa, Venice, Barcelona were global places, controlling wold-wide economic flows. This supremacy derived from the structuring of a crucial maritime area, Mediterranean. Braudel mostly focused on the cities along the Mediterranean coast, at the time of Philip the second.

We are no longer in the 16th century, and Asia, not the Mediterranean, will be the subject of our discussion. However, what seems to be the most remarkable in Braudel's analysis of the Mediterranean maritime world is how borders dematerialized, how flows started to define space and how different stages or levels of development clashed against one another. Braudel demonstrated the dichotomization between centers and boundaries, at a time when countries' borders seemed to blur. He also pointed out the fluidity of geographical divisions largely based upon a political partitioning of the world.

During the 18th century, thanks to the overlapping of its trading networks (Arabic, Indian, Portuguese and Chinese) the South China Sea has been at the core of European and Asian economic exchanges. Is Asian Mediterranean a conceptual tool applicable to Asia? More specifically, can the economic corridor of East Asia, hinged onto several interconnected maritime basins: sea of Japan, Yellow sea, South China sea, Sulu Sea, Celebes sea be considered a valid illustration of the braudelian concept, during the two periods under consideration: the end of the 16th century and the end of the 20th century? Is a network of independent cities the prominent actor of this maritime space?

In the maritime republics of medieval Italy, independent port cities and merchants and mariners communities played a major role in maintaining the security of maritime areas. They were also able to create sophisticated legal instruments for the pursuit of their commercial goals. While legal instruments such as bills of lading, commercial contracts, the development of international commercial law and, more generally, a business environment relatively free

(2) Braudel, Fernand (1949). *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*. Paris: Armand Colin. See also Rohlen, Thomas. "A "Mediterranean" Model for Asian Regionalism: Cosmopolitan Cities and Nation States in Asia". Stanford University: Asia Pacific Research Center, May 1995.

from state intervention have been largely responsible for the success of the Mediterranean in Europe, we must ask ourselves whether it is possible to detect the same autonomy of port cities and development of commercial law when examining the case of the great emporia in East and Southeast Asia.

To answer these questions, one has to keep in mind a peculiar historical context. Two periods of globalisation have been at work between the 16th and the 20th centuries. The first one ocurred when the four continents were linked on a regular and stable basis, i.e. after the conquest of Manila by the Spaniards, in 1571; the second one took place in the last decades of the 20th century, as a result of the dramatic drop in the cost of transportation and telecommunications, combined with wide deregulation in the financial sector. Moreover, the appreciation of the yen, following the Plaza agreement, launched an unprecedented expansion of Japanese industrialisation across Asia through foreign direct investment. The integration of China into the world economy accentuated this trend.

ASIAN MEDITERRANEAN: A CONTROVERSIAL CONCEPT

The association of the concept of Mediterranean basin with maritime Asia has early occured. As soon as the thirties, the Dutch scholar Jacob Cornelis Van Leur considered such a combination.[3] Later on, George Coedès, in his magistral study on the *Etats hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie* (1944) gave the concept its first explicit formalisation. According to him, Southeast Asia is centered upon a "veritable Mediterranean, formed by the China Sea, the Gulf of Siam and the Java Sea. This enclosed sea, in spite of its typhoons and reefs, has always been a unifying factor rather than an obstacle for the peoples along the rivers".[4] Then Denys Lombard, Pierre-Yves Manguin, Anthony Reid, recoursed, though diverse degree, to the Mediterranean metaphor in their works on Asian

(3) See Leur, J.C. Van (1955). *Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History*. La Haye-Bandung: Van Hoeve. For a very comprehensive review of the concept's application to Asia, see Sutherland, Heather, "Southeast Asian History and the Mediterranean Analogy ", in: *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*,34 (1), pp 1-20, February 2003.

(4) Coedès, Georges (1989). *Les états hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie*, (1944). Paris: De Boccard, [The Indianized states of Southeast Asia], ed. Walter Vella and tr. Susan Brown Cowing, Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968, pp. 3-4.

maritime economy.[5] However K.N. Chaudhuri undoubtedly used Braudel conceptual framework in the most systematic way.[6]

According to Chaudhuri, human and physical unity of coastal territories of the Indian Ocean confers the region a cohesion strenghtened by maritime trade and cultural networks. While Pirenne made Islam, instead of Barbarian invasions or Christendom, responsible for the dismantling of classic Mediterranean world, Islam rise occurs concomitanly with Tang China emerging, and with as sophisticated urban civilisation, in which Arabic and Chinese languages imposed themselves as *linguæ francæ* in the Indian Ocean.[7] Chaudhuri explicitly draws on Braudel, and on the three analytic foundations of its logic of history: space, time, and structure. Instead of Braudel, however, Chaudhuri deals with the Indian Ocean in the broder sense on a 11 century timespan. He also abandons europeocentrism to analyse Asia as an ententy explicitly lead by market.

The concept of Asian mediterranean has also raised doubts and interrogations. Among the strongest reluctances, are those formulated by Sanjay Subramanyam[8] who questionned the very relevance of the notion of Mediterranean when applied to Asia. For him, it is not a homogeneous space, economically, politically or culturally speaking. Social links were strong in peculiar points of the area, more distended elsewhere. Subrahmanyam then comes to question the concept itself, asking whether Braudel would not have overestimated the role and position of France and Spain, while underestimating the role played by the Ottomans in the Mediterranean area.

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(5) Lombard, Denys (1990). *Le Carrefour insulindien: essai d'histoire globale*, Paris, EHESS; Manguin, P.-Y. "The amorphous nature of coastal polities in insular Southeast Asia: restricted centres, extended peripheries", in: *Moussons*, 5, 2002; Lombard, Denys & Aubin, Jean (eds.) (1988). *Marchands et hommes d'affaires asiatiques dans l'Océan Indien et la Mer de Chine 13e-20e siècles*, Paris: Éditions de École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales; Ptak, Roderick & Rothermund, Dietmar (eds.) (1991). *Emporia, commodities and entrepreneurs in Asian maritime trade, c. 1400-1750*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, See also Smail, John. "On the possibility of Autonomous History of Modern southeast Asia", in: *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, 2, July 1961, pp. 72-102.

(6) Chaudhuri, K. N. (1990). *Asia before Europe: Economy and civilisation of the Indian ocean from the rise of Islam to 1750*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

(7) Chaudhuri, 1990.

(8) Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. "Notes on circulation and asymetry in two 'Mediterranean ' , 1400-1800", in: Gillot, Claude; Lombard, Denys & Ptak, Roderick (eds.). *From the Mediterranean to the China Sea*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1999, pp. 21-43.

ASIAN MEDITERRANEAN: AN ANALYTYCAL TOOL

How to intersect the Braudelian concept of region with the changes Asia has gone through twice during the globalisations of the 16th and 20th century? What I find remarkable in Braudel's analysis of this maritime space is that borders break up, space is defined by flows, and different temporalities jumble together. Thus the reading of the Mediterranean concept I suggest here will be neither geographical, nor even historical but *institutional*. It first describes a polycentric configuration model of global cities with in my view four common features:

> Global cities such as Genoa, Venice or Amalfi drew their autonomy from their special position, at the hinge of several competing jurisdictions.

To define the connection between place and network, the French geographer Jean Gottmann elaborated the concept of hinge (*charnière*): he thus speaks of *hinge place* or *hinge region*, *historical hinge*, *multiple hinge*, and so forth. In his view, for instance, Constantinople acted as a hinge between capital and empire, between Europe and Asia, between Romans and Greeks, between land and maritime power.[9]

At the fringe of the German empire, Genoa had its municipal immunity recognised by Beranger II, king of Italy (then Lombardy), as early as 958 AD. The city gained independence in 1162, and jealously fought to preserve itself against the incroachment attempted by both Frederick I and Frederick II of Hohenstaufen.

Thanks to its geographical and political situation at the hinge of three rival empires (Lombard Carolingian, Slavic and Byzantine), Venice enjoyed a wide measure of autonomy and became a commercial linchpin between the three, with a commercial empire stretching from the Adriatic to the Crusaders Orient through the Aegean Sea and Dalmatia. It was the first maritime power in the Occident and at its peak played a role comparable to Athens in Ancient Greece.

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(9) Cf. Gottman, Jean. "Capital cities", in: *Ekistics*, vol. 50, n° 299, March-April 1983, pp. 88-93; see also Corey, Kenneth E. & Wilson, Mark L. "Jean Gottmann, contributions inoubliables à la théorie et à la planification urbaines", in: *La géographie*, L'orbite de la géographie de Jean Gottmann, n° spécial hors série 1523 bis, Janvier 2007, p. 137.

Amalfi relied on Constantinople but as early as the 8th and 9th century the city became an important stake in the fierce rivalry between Byzantines and Lombardians from Salerno. It assumed an autonomous government led by a *comes*. This institution was skilfully played out of the tussle between Byzantines and Lombardians, and set forward a "habile diplomacy between the Pope, and the Arabs from Sicily".[10]

Governed by ship owners and maritime traders together with the Viscount and the Archbishop, Pisa enjoyed its first municipal legislation in 1162, while the Empire had recognised its municipality since 1081.

Maritime spaces were secured by an armed force not controlled by the state

The maritime Republics imposed their commercial supremacy by confronting the two maritime powers which controlled the Mediterranean: the North African Arabo-Berber corsairs and the Byzantines.

At the beginning of the XIIth century, Venice and its Illyric allies controlled the Adriatic and thanks to its Byzantium affiliation caught the inflow of Oriental products and distributed them in Europe. Later, it built up its fleet since neither the Byzantine nor the Germanic Empire had a Navy capable of coping with the pirates infesting the Adriatic: Hungarians in Dalmatia, Saracens in Sicily and Bari. Amalfi also played on its dependence on Byzantium to strengthen its economic relations with the Levant, before the Normans annexed it to the kingdom of Sicily (1131).

Between the 10th and the 12th century, Pisa committed itself to fighting the Arab pirates along the coasts of Southern Italy, Corsica, Sardinia and North Africa. The military and merchants also collaborated their efforts in logistics such as troop transportation during the Crusades. Were the Crusades a result of the power of the Italian maritime presence in the Mediterranean or just an opportunity to entrench its control? The question is without easy answers. The Crusades sped up the predominance of commercial and military activities in the Maritime Republics. The Genoans were the first to understand this and

(10) Renouard, Yves (1969). *Les villes d'Italie de la fin du Xe siècle au début du XIVe siècle*. Paris: Sedes, T1, p. 65.

considerable profits were gained from supplying and providing transport for the Crusaders. The more cautious Pisans found it more lucrative to raid the Arabo-Sicilian coasts of North Africa.

Genoa and Pisa allied to drive away the Saracen settlers from Balearics, Sardinia and Corsica. The Tyrrhenian Sea liberated, the alliance then endeavoured to eliminate piracy in the western part of the Mediterranean, pushing towards Sicily, African coasts and Balearics.

> Commanding commercial flows mattered more than ruling territories or taxing their people.

As Renouard put it, "Venice created a bare colonial empire, with trading posts and ports as its only territorial foundation, at least during the initial centuries."[11] The word colony, applied to Venetian or Genoans trading posts around the Mediterranean, is misleading. In the middle Ages, they were merely foreign presence with varying permanence. More warehouses than settlements, they store merchandise for export and set taxes. Foreign merchants set up shops and sometimes accommodated their visiting colleagues. Without a stable population, the *fonduq* (hostel) was in fact the preferred operations and logistics base for the international trade: trading posts carry commercial transactions, nothing more. Foreign policy was only aimed at maintaining and extending this commercial network." Possession of territories and carrying weapons when not at sea are pointless: needed products can be bought and mercenaries paid to fight."[12]

> New economic and legal institutions are established outside the framework of the State

It is undoubtedly in a very particular context – the highly fragmented political structure of the European Middle Ages – that the origin of risk sharing practices and efficient deployment of capital through shareholding companies

(11) Renouard, 1969, T. 1, p. 79.
(12) Renouard, 1969, T. 1, p. 80.

can be found. This "optimal fragmentation" to borrow an expression coined by Jared Diamond[13], leads to an unprecedented situation: significant portions of wealth are controlled by what we would call today independent legal entities. Hence, real estate holdings of the Church are in effect administered by economic concerns that are called dioceses, religious orders or even by the Church itself. The regulatory environment's growth produced new corporate bodies – cities, guilds, philanthropic organizations (hospices, hospitals etc).

The Mediterranean commercial system used sophisticated legal instruments extending beyond the state framework and already set the law as consistent, continuous and international. In that respect, maritime law was from its inception more international than municipal constitutions, statutes or common laws. Merchant law conveyed the globalised medieval society's rejection of an imposed order and the emergence of a more natural one.

Impatient and worried about business, merchants could not afford to wait for universities to codify the principles of a common law even though the law was a result of infinite territorial customs applied to autarkic communities. Customs, not law, have been at the heart of commerce since the very beginning of trade. Merchants went beyond local barriers to provide their innovations. Urgency necessitated a new, professional law to be drawn up from seafarers and traders involved in fairs and markets. A law based on trade practices and fairness, freed from local idiosyncrasies and authorities.

Western Europe's commercial hubs then acquired trans-national standing. From the start, maritime law had set out principles and codified applications beyond political borders. The Trani laws (1063), a Pisan commercial code (*consuetudine di mare*) attested from 1075, and the *Tavole amalfitane* (1274) summed up maritime law and customs in 66 chapters. These formalisations demonstrated the continuity and uniformity of maritime law in the Mediterranean. The conventions of commerce guaranteed the interests of merchants as well as ship owners'.

By the middle of the 12th century, maritime laws were operative in Barcelona, Tortosa and Marseille. They codified freight loading and unloading,

(13) Cf. Diamond, Jared (1997). *Guns Germs and Steel: the Fate of Human Societies*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.

transport costs, contracts, weapons placing, rules on ships salvaging, tolls and crew-merchants relations.[14] In the major Mediterranean cities for instance, the Catalans had *alfondecs* or grain exchanges. These were in fact "hostel-markets" which enjoyed a set of rules then known as *consulates of the sea*, a basis at the time for the organisation of international trade. Consuls arbitrated on disputes with local authorities and could sign agreements with them. These *consulates of the sea* were a compilation of rules and customs and unlike law did not entail formalism. In 1435, James the Ist of Aragon enacted the *Ordinance of Barcelona*, the first legal document dealing with insurance - the first policy being in fact recorded in Genoa in 1347. The rule limiting third party liability of ship owners to an amount based on tonnage dates from this period.

THE AIAN MARITIME SPACE, FROM THE 16TH TO THE 18TH CENTURY

Was there a tradition of urban autonomy in Asia? There were few examples and they did not match in details but they revealed the vitality of merchant autonomous entities: The kingdom of Srivijaya in Sumatra from the end of the 7th to the 10th century; Malacca before its conquest by the Portuguese in 1511; The Ryukyu archipelago, a middleman between Japan and China; Formosa during the brief episode of the Ming loyalist Cheng dynasty, from 1661 to 1683, date of its conquest by the Manchu.

THE MARITIME KINGDOM OF SRIVIJAYA

Let's start with Srivijaya. The history of this maritime kingdom is not very well documented.[15] The sources that are available to us mainly consist of a few rare Chinese documents, travel notes left by foreign visitors, funerary or dedicatory inscriptions, archaeological discoveries and artistic relics. Even the capital's location remains hypothetical, although it was most likely situated at Palembang, in the 11th century. However, contrarily to the agrarian kingdoms

(14) Cf. The maritime code of 1258 by James the 1st of Aragon as quoted in Cave, Roy C. & Coulson, Herbert H. (eds) (1965). *A source book for medieval economic history*. New York: Biblio & Tannen.

(15) Cf. Wolters, O.W. (1970). *The fall of Srivijaya in Malay history*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. The importance of Sivrijava was noted as early as 1918 by Georges Coedes who however also stressed the difficulty of authenticating names of places from Chinese texts.

of Java, Srivijaya is most certainly the first and most powerful of all the great Malaysian empires. At its heyday, Srivijaya's influence prevailed on the whole of Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula and the Kra isthmus, as well as the western part of Java. Its supremacy was largely based upon a powerful navy that could keep piracy in check. During nearly three centuries, this naval strength enabled Srivijaya's economy to flourish mostly through maritime commerce. Its strategic position at the Southeastern corner of Sumatra and the allegiance of its vassal Kedah, guaranteed its control over the Malacca Strait. Similarly, its authority over the Sunda Strait allowed the kingdom to dominate maritime exchanges between India and China. Srivijaya therefore, developed relationships not only with the archipelago's other states but also with India and China.

This maritime kingdom's power rested on a naval strength that was based on a monopoly over international commerce – but such a subtle articulation of power was fragile. The loss of its vassals or of its naval supremacy could threaten the Kingdom's very existence – and this is precisely what happened in the 11th century.

The tributary system linking China and the court of Srivijaya was quite elaborate. Chinese merchants, already very active in the Malaysian region, gradually chose Srivijaya as one of their favorite destinations. Their involvement in maritime commerce was in great part generated by the growing demand for Southeast Asian resins and spices. Furthermore, these traders also quickly became indispensable middlemen in the trade of Indian products such as incense and ivory. At court, Chinese merchants were often used as interpreters or translators and sometimes even mandated to conduct diplomatic missions. This merchant community, through its commercial practices, transcended national differences.[16] The cautious discretion evidenced by Chinese texts on the ethnic origin of Srivijaya's merchants enabled the latter to carry on their trade more freely. But the development of direct contacts between Chinese merchants and local markets progressively dissolved the entrepot's supremacy.

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(16) Salmon, Claudine. "Srivijaya, la Chine et les marchands chinois, X^{e}-XII^{e} s. Quelques réflexions sur l'empire sumatranais", in: *Archipel,* 63 (2002), pp. 57-78. See also Wolters, Jean Aubin and Hall, Kenneth R (1985). *Maritime trade and state developement in Southeast Asia*. Honololu: University of Hawaii Press.

The decline of this prosperous commercial hub between India and China is just as much linked to the expansion of Chinese maritime commerce as it is to the rebellion of the Srivijaya's vassals. It appears that the kingdom's demands for higher port fees angered its neighbors, who then started to trade directly with India and China and eventually defeated it. Around the year 1000, Srivijaya was still controlling the largest part of Java but soon lost it to Cola, a South India's merchant kingdom that saw Srivijaya as the major impediment to its expansion on the maritime routes linking South and East Asia. In 1025, Cola took and pillaged Palembang. At the end of the 12th century, Srivijaya had become a minor kingdom and its role in Sumatra's affairs further declined to the benefit of Malayu, a vassal of Java based in Jambi. The fall of Srivijaya shortly antedates the emergence of another great merchant center of maritime Asia, Malacca.

MALACCA – CITY-STATE AND MERCANTILE EMPIRE

Malacca's strategic position attracted merchants at a very early date. Situated on the western coast of the Malaysian Peninsula, the city lords over the strait linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Thanks to the quality of the services it provided and to the moderation of its tax system, Malacca became the region's largest entrepot and the center of the Malaysian world. In the mid 15th century, the city's population reached 100,000 inhabitants, who for a large part were foreign merchants. At that time, Malacca was in effect the Strait's most powerful State. In an effort to compete with Siam for the control of the Malaysian Peninsula, the entrepot established trading posts in Sumatra. Following the visit of Admiral Zheng He, in 1409 Malacca started to collaborate with Ming China to fight piracy or non-official trade. The main goal was to re-establish the free circulation of commercial flows or, to be more precise, to incorporate them in the tributary system. Malacca, by launching the cultivation of pepper, deliberately focused its trade towards the west – the emporium collected a great number of goods to be sent to India and Europe.

From the 16th century onwards, Malacca and Java dominated trading networks throughout South-East Asia. From Malacca, this network was connected to a multitude of others leading to India, Persia, Syria, Eastern Africa, and the Mediterranean, thereby creating the largest commercial system

of the times.[17] M.C. Ricklefs described in great detail the commercial network of which Malacca was the centre. It stretched from the Eastern coast of Sumatra to the Sunda and the central and Western parts of the island of Java. It also connected the western part of Java to the western coast of Sumatra, the central and eastern parts of Java to Sumatra. Further links included Java and Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa, Timor, Sumba and the Mollucas.[18]

The city also initiated relationships with Southeast Asia (Siam) and Pegu on the Burmese coast, and was connected to eastern Asia (China and Japan). Its success was largely based upon its ability to become the major player in spice trading in Southeast Asia (cloves from the Mollucas, nutmeg from the islands of the Banda archipelago) and the distributor of Indian textiles. Most of these activities were carried out by an international body of merchants and intermediaries.

MARITIME COMMERCE OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS

The Ryukyu Islands were a turntable for exchanges between China and Japan throughout the Edo Period (1603-1868) and in particular during the seclusion (*sakoku*) period. The networks of Chinese mariners and merchants, who had been forced away from the Chinese coasts because of restrictions on maritime commerce imposed by the Ming, were again very active in exchanges between the Ryukyu and other tributary countries.

It was Emperor Taizu of the Ming who in 1372 first encouraged contacts with the archipelago. This resulted in the visit of a tributary mission. The administration of the Kingdom of Ryukyu pledged allegiance and offered merchandise to the Chinese Empire. In exchange it received diplomatic recognition and assurance of protection against external attack. Thus, the kingdom was included in what we would describe today as a regional security and commercial alliance system. This system relied entirely on the economic and military hegemony of China. It was accomplished by sending Chinese delegates to important ceremonies such as the crowning of a new monarch.

(17) Ricklefs, M.C. (1981). *A History of Modern Indonesia*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 18-19.
(18) Ricklefs, 1981.

This relationship was further reinforced by academic exchanges that allowed Ryukyu nationals to go and study in China.

Commercial activities grew within a very distinct international context. During the Edo Period, the Ryukyu Archipelago was subject to two tutelages – it was part of the fief of Shimazu, located in Kyushu, and yet still paid tribute to China.[19] The commercial system of the Ryukyu's was based on entrepot trade for products coming from Southeast Asia – Siam, Patani, Malacca, Palembang, Java, Sumatra, Vietnam and countries from the Sunda area. Japanese products (swords and gold) were exchanged for ivory, tin, precious stones, pepper and other spices, as well as sappan wood used in traditional medicine or in the dyeing industry.

Large quantities of these products were then re-exported towards China, Japan or Korea. Since most Southeast Asian nations paid tribute to China, Chinese became the lingua franca for both governmental and commercial exchanges. The form of entrepot trade that the Ryukyu's developed through its commercial relationships with the rest of Asia and more particularly with Southeast Asia depended upon an intricate network of merchants, navigators and Chinese translators based in Southeast Asia from Luzon to Sumatra and from the Annam to the Siam.

All the commercial activities that were part of this tributary commerce belonged to a royal monopoly in which private trade had no place – officially at least. These activities started in 1372 when diplomatic relations were initiated between the courts of the Ming and Chuzan, the largest and most prosperous of the three principalities that formed the Ryukyu's. It is apparently thanks to Chinese captains and ships that Chuzan could launch this flourishing maritime trade. Funds from the Ryukyu's were used to acquire the exotic Southeast Asian products that were to be sent to China as tribute and also – more importantly to traders, resold privately. The court of the Ming would reimburse the mission costs and provide new goods. It is important to underline the subtle mechanics of this *modus operandi* – funds werere public, purchases commissioned and profits were, for a large part, private. The port of Naha was at the center of these exchanges.

(19) The relative autonomy enjoyed by Ryukyu ends in 1609 with the invasion of the Japanese Satsuma Clan.

The government control of foreign trade, which remained a largely bureaucratic enterprise, was extremely heavy-handed. All departing foreign-bound vessels needed to obtain the *Shissho*, a certificate issued by Ryukyu authorities at Shuri.[20] These certificates showed a registration number that was frequently changed in order to differentiate pirate ships from *bona fide* ones. During the 16th Century, numerous naval missions using Ryukyu ships reached Palembang, on the Southeastern coast of Sumatra and also Sunda Kalapa (Batavia), on the western coast of Java. Relations with Malacca went far back in time. Twenty or so ships from the Ryukyu's visited the great entrepot between 1460 and 1511, the year of the Portuguese conquest.[21] Sulfur and horses were transported from Ryukyu to China, and on the voyage back the cargo included porcelain, silk, brocade. satin and other textiles, medicine, alum and cereals. From Japan to the Ryukyu's, the most sought after products were swords, lances, bows, armors and helmets as well as harnesses, screens, fans, lacquer and gold. On the return trip, from Ryukyu to Japan, ships were loaded with red pinewood (*caesalpinia sappan*) used as a dye in China, pepper that could bring extremely high returns in China (750 to 1,500 times the original cost), cloves, nutmeg, camphor, gold, tin, ivory, sandalwood, perfume and incense, coral, mercury, opium, saffron, rhinoceros horns, timber for ship building, etc.[22]

Maritime routes linked Naha to Fujian and South China and from there diverged into many branches – towards Annam and Siam and then onwards to Palembang and Java, or from Siam and Patani towards Malacca and thence to Sumatra and the Sunda Islands. The golden age of the Ryukyu's trade lasted from 1385 to 1570. The decline that followed was caused by a number of factors – the deterioration of the maritime policy of the Ming, the rise in power of pirate fleets that started to devastate the Chinese coasts, the arrival of the Portuguese, and lastly the ban on maritime activities (*haijin*) that hit Fujian and Guangdong merchants.

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(20) Sakamaki, Shunzo. "Ryukyu and Southeast Asia", in: *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 23, n° 3, May 1964, p. 385.
(21) Sakamaki, p. 387.
(22) Sakamaki, p. 387

TAIWAN AT THE TIMES OF ZHENG CHENGGONG

One century after the fall of Malacca, Zheng Chenggong (1624-1662), a Ming loyalist rebel and his son Zheng Jing (1661-1683), founded a short-lived kingdom in Taiwan. This was to be the last example of an independent territoriality in East Asia. From two bases – Amoy and Jinmen, Zheng started a naval war against the Manchus, who had banned maritime commerce. Taiwan became an emporium for all of Southeast Asia: silk imported to Japan from China transited through the island, and deer hides were exported towards Japan and used in the manufacturing of armors or shields.[23] This maritime empire that owed its power more to the control of trade routes than to actual territory, spread out from Japan to Siam via the Ryukyu's, and from the Philippines to Vietnam.

WERE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS PROTECTING MERCHANTS AUTONOMY DEVELOPED?

The four examples of merchant power we have listed are the only equivalents of the *repubbliche marinare* we can outline. But Venice not only had its navy, its merchants and its armed galleys but also autonomous institutions and law. The international trade in Asia operated in two ways, both different from the Mediterranean model. One was cramped in a bureaucratic corset, the tributary trade. The other, unofficial and in turn called private commerce, smuggling or piracy thrived when government officials supervision shrank. It declined when the officials reasserted control.

The official trade was in fact a tributary commerce (*chao gong mao yi)* as all foreign countries wishing to trade with China had to pay tribute, thus clearly establishing the Chinese suzerainty.

The unofficial trade was the other face of Chinese commerce. It covered a wide spectrum of activities, from private business to smuggling which took up roles the official trade had relinquished, fulfilling creditworthy demand and extended further into more predatory forms such as piracy, an ancient tradition with definite functions in South East Asia. Within a specific maritime area it operated as a kind of levy for protection arrangement. It also asserted

(23) Cf. Shepherd, John Robert (1995). *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800*. Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc.

authority on a maritime space by keeping away other would-be players. It took a while for a line to be drawn between legitimate (the state) and illegitimate (the criminals) violence and plundering. Sea raids on neighbouring communities or ships looting, piracy was part of the political order in the maritime societies of the Malay Archipelago. A toll came with a right of safe passage through pirate controlled waters. To crack down on piracy and to subjugate rivals were two sides of the same coin.

PLACES OF TRADE

1. First was the emporium. It was a market where a great variety of products was gathered and dispatched on a steady basis.[24] But local market it was not. Its domain was long-haul trade. It brought in and shipped products from a vast area. Monsoon seasons ruled commerce and the emporium's primary function: to allow the merchant to hold on to his stock until the price was right. But the emporium remained a peddler's market unlike the warehouse market dominated by commercial companies.

The city was built around the emporium, providing regular trade services: shipping, insurance, credit and business news. The place was often fortified against pirates and bandits. Different rationales operated in a maritime emporium and in the continent or country to which it was attached, it was an island even if it was a port: government intervention was minimal. Among instances of emporia: Malacca, shortly before the Portuguese arrival in the 16th century; Aceh, Riau and Johore soon afterwards.

When Malacca fell in 1511, commerce in its catchments area migrated to Aceh, North Sumatra's sultanate and to Banten on Java's North West coast. Aceh became a major emporium for pepper and Indian cloth, and having bought Portuguese weapons, proceeded to conquer North Sumatra and embarked on lengthy conflicts with the Portuguese, and with Riau and Johore. Riau would be for a long time the cross-roads of the Indian, European and Chinese worlds. Banten defeated a Portuguese fleet in 1527, kept growing and became West Java's and South Sumatra's main pepper warehouse during the 16th century. In

(24) Cf. *Rothermund, Dietmar.* "Asian Emporia and European Bridgehads", in: Ptak & Rothermund 1991.

1601, the VOC vanquished a joint Spanish and Portuguese fleet in Banten but started its decline after Batavia's foundation.

An emporium may have been expected in the Malacca strait but not necessarily in Malacca. Its location owed less to geography than to the easily withdrawn cooperation of two groups: local authorities and merchants who came for business. Their negotiations aimed to lock in the other party's agreement, preventing default.

Prices were generally free. But we can observe price setting could be seen in some cases known as *pancadas:* auctions negotiated between authorities and merchants where whole shiploads were sold in one lot. They occurred in Manila, Nagasaki and in Malacca, before the Portuguese arrival. These often abused measures aimed to avoid severe price fluctuations created by brutal changes in supply.

The emporium provided predictability, transparency and stability in transactions. In Malacca, a set of rules and sophisticated constitutional procedures protected the interests of merchants.[25] They floundered with the arrival of Portuguese ships and the establishment of very large companies (VOC, EIC and the others Swedish, Danish and French). The former wished to control trade routes and the latter freed themselves from price swings in an emporium-type market by adopting a global vision of commerce.[26]

2. Second was the warehouse, an import-export hub, with large storage facilities. The freight was unloaded, repacked and re-exported. Shipping networks were consolidated. Shipping, insurance, all the export-related activities became specific and independent trades and professions. The warehouse was closer to production areas, or became itself a production base. More nimble, it was the emporium coming of age with industrial capitalism and steamboats: shipping and supplies no longer relied. Singapore and Hong Kong were the continuing cases in point from the middle of the 19th century onwards.

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(25) Cf. Meilink-Roelofsz, *Marie Antoinette Petronella* (1962). *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630*, The Hague: Nijhoff, p. 42.

(26) Steengaard, Niels. "Emporia, some reflections", in: Ptak & Rothermund 1991.

OFFICIALDOM'S ASCENDANCY AND MERCHANT DIASPORAS

Eastern Asia however, was a different story. Long haul junks built in Fujian and Guangdong, manned by Chinese crew and officers, following Chinese trade regulations on ship and cargo handled China's commerce.[27] During the 11th and 12th centuries, its merchants took over the Arabs hold on its trade with South East Asia. Five Chinese junks were in Malacca when it fell to the Portuguese in 1511, and 150 Chinese merchants were permanent residents in Manila when it was taken by the Spanish in 1571.[28] A large Chinese community of merchants and craftsmen was also discovered by the Dutch in 1619 when they invaded the city which would become Batavia.[29] All these settlements dated back to the Song dynasty, the golden age of China's maritime commerce, private and official.

Merchant diasporas made up for the absence of a mercantilist state of the type found in Europe in the 16th-17th century. They also acted as a counterweight to officialdom's ascendancy or a way around it. The concept worked best applied to trade between different cultures when middlemen, brokers and "culture runners" were needed. Calling on anthropology, history and economics, helpful studies focus on the Bugis, Banians, Armenians and other "merchant diasporas" in their relations with local communities.[30]

THE TWO GLOBALISATIONS

THE DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION

Globalization has been described as a process encompassing political, economic and cultural changes caused by large-scale circulation of migratory flows,

(27) See Cushman, Jennifer W. (1993). *Fields of the Sea*. Ithaca: Cornell University. See also Yoneo, Ishii (ed.) (1998).*The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia. Translations from the Tôsen Fusetsu-Gaki, 1674-1723*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies.

(28) T'ien-Tsê, Chang (1969). *Sino-Portuguese Trade from 1514 to 1644: A Synthesis of Portuguese and Chinese Sources*. Leyden: E. J. Brill, p. 33.

(29) Blussé, Leonard (1986). *Strange Company: Chinese settlers, Mestizo women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia*. Dortrecht: Foris, pp. 81-84.

(30) See for instance Curtin, Philip D. (1984). *Cross-Cultural Trade in World history*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

information, ideas, capital and wealth.[31] It is generated by new long-distance connections often established through various diasporas.

A first globalization took place at the end of the 16th century. The year 1571 constitutes an easy milestone since it is the year the Spaniards took Manila and therefore introduced stable and regular exchanges between the four continents. The rising of a world market coincided with the European hegemony.[32] However, the latter only happened after a long period of time rife with rivalries and open conflicts. Following the Spaniards, the Portuguese, the French and the Dutch, the British were latecomers in Asia and did not overcome Dutch supremacy until the second half of the 17th century.

The second globalization can be dated to 1985. It seems to me this date is a pertinent milestone because of the particular context of the 80's. First came the spectacular fall of transport and communication costs, and deregulation. The revolution in the systems of transportation and communication, and capital movements, happened hand in hand with the transformation of regulatory bodies and the weakening of the functions of the nation-state. The strong reappearance of Asia on the global scene, following two significant events is also of utmost importance. The first of these events happened shortly after the Plaza Agreements (September 1985) when members of the G7 group agreed to collaborate towards a decrease in value of the American currency. The *endaka* – the rise of the yen – that followed caused a surge of Japanese investments in Asia, which in turn contributed to the spreading of the Japanese industrialization model throughout the region. The second event was the irruption of China in the global economic system, through a network of international subsidiaries, based in the coastal regions, during the 1990's.

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(31) Cf. Waters, M. (1995). *Globalization*. London: Routledge; Dollfus, Olivier (1995). *La nouvelle carte du Monde*. Paris: PUF, coll. *Que sais-je?* n° 2986,

(32) A good synthesis of this question can be found in the three volumes of Braudel, Fernand. *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century*, Vol. 1. *The structures of everyday life*; vol. 2. *The wheels of commerce*; Vol. 3. *The Perspective of the World*. New York: Harper and Row, 1981, 1982, 1984, and Jones, E.L. (1987). *The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

SUBREGIONAL ECONOMIC ZONES AND GLOBAL HISTORY

The example of Asia is here again quite enlightening. The way international relations are structured and formalized shows a significantly different approach. In the 1990's Japan produced an economic and historic literature on subregional economic zones, or areas belonging to different national spaces, that greatly enhanced our understanding of these very unique dynamics.[33] This new type of analysis occurred in a specific context – the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of political blocks, the boom of Japanese investment in Asia and the integration of China in the global economy. New concepts such as "maritime regions" or "oceanic communities" appeared.[34] But can these be considered as pertinent alternatives to the concept of nation-state, which are what historians and governments recognize as coherent and natural categories?

The conceptual thinking that gives ocean basins a central position has the merit of lessening the arbitrary distinctions between Europe and Asia and of highlighting the lasting interactions of oceans and ocean basins.[35] One must, however, still clearly define a few factors concerning these maritime macro regions – their limits in time, their boundaries and their interactions with other regions. The Sulu Sultanate during the 18th and 19th centuries was a buffer zone between two spheres of influence – the Spanish sphere centered around the Philippines and the Dutch sphere that dominated Indonesia and its adjoining seas.[36] Signs of an economic and social integration can be found in the Atlantic and Pacific basins as early as the 16th century, whereas to a certain

(33) For a critical anlasysis of these various points of view, cf. Gipouloux, François (1994). *Regional economic Strategies in East Asia, A Comparative Perspective*. Tokyo: Maison Franco-Japonaise,

(34) Cf. Lewis, M. W. & Wigen, K. E. (1997). *The Myth of Continents: a Critique of Meta-geography*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 204.

(35) Bentley, Jerry H., "Sea and Ocean Basins as Frameworks of Historical Analysis", in: *Geographical Review*, Vol. 89 n°2, *Oceans Connect*, Apr. 1999, pp. 215-224.

(36) Cf. Warren, J. F. (1981). *The Sulu Zone, 1768-1898 : The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State*. Singapore: Singapore University Press. From the same author, see *The Sulu Zone: The World Capitalist Economy and the Historical Imagination*. Amsterdam: VU Press, 1998.

extent, maritime history after the 16th century dissolves into global history.[37] To use the example of silver, the amount transported from Acapulco to Manila is more or less equivalent to the quantity that transited from the Atlantic to Europe, but was not as large as the amount transported by land, to China in particular, where it would be traded for silk, lacquer and porcelain.[38]

To fully understand how these maritime spaces were structured, one must consider the way they were articulated as hubs or nodes. At first there is obviously a physical space dependant on the quality of its infrastructure, but gradually this space goes beyond the territory framework to reach a virtual stage – it becomes a place where skills, knowledge, creativity and imagination reach a critical mass. It is at this juncture that technical norms, ethical codes, regulations of international commerce etc, are created. How can one map these extremely tight connection networks? What scale should one use?

The world history analysis of exchanges between civilizations, leads to valuable research angles. The goal is not to think of a world history that would only juxtapose national histories but to study *transnational* phenomena. Economic exchanges (commercial and financial flows), the diffusion of innovations, scientific discoveries, migratory flows, environmental history, the history of cultural upheavals and the history of religion are some of the phenomena that are an intrinsic part of the maritime growth of 16th century Europe.

Two key elements of the world history's paradigm seem to be particularly relevant: The nation-state is no longer the only key to history, international relations and even to some extent economic development. The critics of 'europeocentrism' highlight histories that have had a different impact on Europe. They bring to the fore what Pierre Chaunu wished for in the late 60's "the global opening up of civilizations and cultures".[39]

The methodology of global history has put an end to the notion of time being singular, and substitutes, with its long approach, interlarded and intermeshed temporalities. The integration and differentiation processes of history form a wired system interlinking micro-histories and intercontinental histories.

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(37) Warren, 1981, p. 220.

(38) Flynn, Dennis O. & Giraldez, Arturo. "Born with a 'Silver spoon': The Origin of World Trade in 1571", in: *Journal of World History*, Vol. 6. N° 2 (1995), pp. 201-221.

(39) Chaunu, Pierre (1969). *L'expansion européenne du XIIIe au XVe siècle*. Paris: PUF, p. 332.

QUESTIONS IN LIEU OF CONCLUSION

WHY WAS THERE NO TRADITION OF LASTING CITY AUTONOMY IN CHINA OR JAPAN?

I must say I am not satisfied with the opposition, formalised by learned historians of Asian economy (Subrahmanyam, Chaudhuri, Lombard to quote only a few) between maritime Asia allowing prosperous cosmopolitan commercial networks in its port metropolises and agrarian empires, more concerned with bureaucratic control of their territory than involved in foreign trade: Java, Mogul India, China. The same dichotomy could be found between merchant and continental empires in Middle Ages Europe, and yet it did not prevent cities from gaining autonomy.

WHY WERE ASIAN EMPIRES INCAPABLE OF BUILDING NAVIES?

Indeed, Jin attacks on the Song, and Mongol expeditions against Japan mobilised navies of awesome strength. But China and most of the other Asian naval powers never had the upper hand in protracted clashes with western forces. Similarly, one can wonder why securing maritime space was never attempted by armed forces not controlled by states. Andrea Doria like figures of *condottiere* renting out their naval strength to various royal powers never emerged in Asia. Why?

3. Can we find corroborated traces of legal instruments attesting ancient and stable private commercial law: bills of lading, insurance contracts, and so forth? If not, why were no legal institutions created by merchants in China or Japan while overwhelming bureaucracy and regulations appeared prevailing?

4. There is no denying of the sophistication of merchant practices, or of the influence of cosmopolitan traders. Then why were no powerful commercial tool like *charter companies* created in Asia? In other words, why was there no accumulation of capital? Or, going back to an old question raised by Chaudhuri, why were the merchants unable to move their capital towards state-sponsored spheres of public interest?

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VITORINO MAGALHÃES GODINHO

Portugal and Asia in the 16th century

In 1509 Diogo Lopes de Sequeira was in Malacca, on board his ship, playing chess; the son of the richest merchant in the city came aboard to see him, a Javanese: they also played this game, though without quite so many pieces; invented by the Persians, it spread to the Far West and to the Far East (Barros, Década II, book IV, chap. 4). But Father Francisco Vieira, a prisoner of the natives of Ternate, had not eaten anything for thirty days, telling his captors: "You lot, what have you got to give me? Yams and sago? Am I a black man?! Give me bread and wine" (Doc. Insulíndia, II, 318). When Vasco da Gama found Muslim pilots in Malindi to take him to Calicut, the Portuguese pilots compared their instruments and navigation methods during the voyage: dialogue was promptly established. But to build a new Goa, we are told by Andrea Corsali (Ramúsio, I, 178v.) that the Portuguese destroyed an ancient temple, called a pagoda, on the island of Divar; and the Italian remarked: "was built with marvellous gimmick, with figures of some ancient black stone sculpted in great perfection, some of which were left ruined and spoiled, however these Portuguese not hold them in any esteem". The Portuguese merchants easily got along with the Gujaratis, since they used the same figures and letters for counting. They were like the Italians in terms of bargaining and trading. But in Japan the Portuguese had at first been regarded as quarrelsome and coarse, because they spoke very loudly and gesture boisterously: encounters and divergences of civilizations, vectors of collaborations and conflicts.

PORTUGUESE IN ASIA

In 1527, the population of Portugal stood at about 1.400.000, and was almost 2 million in 1640; Italy had around 11 million people, France 16 million, Spain 7 and a half. Somewhere between 18 and 19 million people lived in the Turkish Empire (including Egypt). But India, from the Mauryas to Akbar, must have had a population of between 100 to 140 million (Nath, chap. 5), while that of the empire of Vijayanagar counted about 30 million people. The population of China increased from some 60 million at the end of the 15th century to 175 million at the end of the 18th century. The whole of Japan had about 20 million people in 1614. The first point to be aware of is thus the striking demographic disproportion between Europe and the East; in the latter, moreover, vast areas were either deserted or sparsely populated.

The number of Portuguese who went to the East and were dispersed there was tiny in relation to the Asian population. In 1512 it is calculated that, before the arrival of the armada in that year, there were 1.200 (Cartas I, 91). In the following year the Governor prayed that: "God willing, we might number 2.500 with those from Malacca" (Cartas I, 125-6); the king believed that there were up to 5.000 men there, but "we could never assemble 3.000". In January 1516, the number had risen to 4.000 (Corsali, in: Ramúsio, t. I, 180v.). The Portuguese would spread throughout the whole eastern world, many of them becoming embedded in the local society, such that D. João de Castro could write in 1539: "the number of Portuguese in these parts is great, and so there is nothing, from Sofala (Beira, Mozambique) to China, that they have not walked upon" (Cartas, 3); and he reckoned that "it could easily be that six or seven thousand Portuguese are scattered around India"; and yet the governor found it impossible to muster 2.500 to fight the Turk (Cartas, 5).

Let us have a look at some of the enclaves where the Portuguese stayed. There were around 40 or 50 married Portuguese and mixed-race people on the island of Mozambique in 1583 (and 400 shacks of Africans – Van Linschotten, chap. 4); half a century later, there were as many as 70, not counting mixed-race, and between these and the *mocoques,* the numbers rose to 120, whereas there were never more than 200 men in the garrison; the Portuguese paid no head to agriculture, but only to dealings and trade (Resende, 92v). In Sofala, around 1635, there were only 3 married Portuguese, and a further 2 to be married

(Resende, 76). In the area of the Cuama rivers (Zambezi), meanwhile, in Chuambo, we find 4 Portuguese (besides the captain; Resende, 80). There were up to 10 Portuguese living in Sena in 1572 (Theal, II, 185-6) and by 1635 about 30 married Portuguese (Resende, 81v). In the kingdom of Manica we find some married Portuguese in Chipangura (fewer than 25), Matuca (even fewer). In Tete, in the same year, there were 20 married white people (Resende, 82), not counting those manning the garrisons and forts. There were Portuguese living on the Quirimba islands, too, "on the spoils of *terra firma*, from which they take ivory and amber" (Resende, 96). The garrison that backed up the fort of Mombassa (established in 1594) had 100 soldiers; in 1635 efforts were still being made to repopulate the settlement, abandoned by the Muslims, with 15 or 20 married Portuguese, sent for from Pate and Zanzibar; but they were confronted with many problems. In Ethiopia, Father Miguel da Nóbrega reckoned that, in 1553, there were around 200 "very wealthy" Portuguese (Documenta Indica, III, 37). There were some 30 Portuguese in Muscat, in 1546 (S. Lourenço, II, 208). Hormuz counted with between 10.000 to 12.000 neighbours in the first half of the 16th century, which the Turkish siege of 1553 reduced to about 3.000. There were 150 married Portuguese (and local Christians), and the garrison housed 600 soldiers (Documenta Indica, III, 100-1); in the early 17th century the married Portuguese numbered around 200 (in addition, there were merchants and soldiers, who came and went), and over 7.000 Christians, while Muslims, Jews and gentiles numbered over 40.000 (not to mention Persians, Turks, Moguls and other non-Christian merchants, who came and went – Madrid, Bibl. Nac. 3015, f. 81v). Diu, which eventually came to have 10.000 inhabitants, had around 3.000 in the period 1621-1633, among whom were just 60, poor, Portuguese (and around 100 local Christians, all skilled craftsmen – Relação das Plantas, 20); the number of married Portuguese and other Christians did not grow in 1635 (Resende, 162v). In Chaul, there were 350 men in 1546 (S. Lourenço, III, 225). Couto reckoned that in 1581 the city of Goa was peopled by over 60.000 Christians (Década X, book I, chap. 7); in 1554, on the arrival of the mortal remains of Francisco Xavier, "all the people was assembled, I think there was five or six thousand souls", as Father Nunes Barreto tells us (Documenta Indica, III, 77); between 1621 and 1633 there were estimated to be 3.500 dwellings (besides the convents),

of which 100 were Portuguese (remarkably, the town had had more than twice as many people as it had then, to which the ruins bear witness – Relação das Plantas, 31); actually, at the beginning of the century, the number of Portuguese was estimated at more than 3.000 (Espínola, B.N. Madrid, 3015, 32v). When Cochin was the seat of the Portuguese administration and the chief port for the "vessels of the kingdom", there were many Portuguese there, but the population was particularly fluid: in December 1524 (they had still not left), some 4.000 men (Castanheda, book VI, chap. 78); the roll-call for the following February resulted in a count of 2.220 (Lembrança, f. 5). But the head-count of 1546 yielded a figure of only 560, of whom 343 were married (S. Lourenço, II, 321), and at the beginning of the 17th century, it would be about a thousand. In São Tomé de Meliapore, there were a hundred Portuguese couples in 1545 (Gonçalves, book II, chap. 17); just over fifty years later there were over a thousand. In Malacca, before the Portuguese arrived, some 10.000 homes were counted (Cartas, III, 5-12); in the mid-16th century, the number of Portuguese capable of bearing arms was at least 260 (Missões Insulíndia, II, 55); and after another thirty-three years had passed, the number of Portuguese families was no more than a hundred (Van Linschotten, chap. 18); towards the end of the century Godinho de Eredia counted 600 married Portuguese and around 2.000 vassals (EREDIA, 72).

Since Albuquerque, a general policy of encouraging and settling Portuguese through intermarriage with the local people had been followed. For instance, a royal charter of 1518 granted favours and privileges on the married Christians, and on those who married in Goa thereafter, in the form of all the lands and estates, whether palm groves or others of the kind that might be utilized (Arch. Port. Oriental, fasc. v.); lands not used would be given to them uncultivated; the governor and the overseer would restrict the land belonging to Moors and which was utilized, and only those already married would benefit from the apportioning (Arch. Port. Oriental, fasc. V, 41-3). In 1596 Pawlowski, a Pole, noted that although the Indians were dark-skinned, the Portuguese married them and had children, obviously of mixed blood. Unions were often *de facto* in nature: thus, in São Tomé de Meliapore, when Francisco Xavier got there in 1545, "many were living as though married, but were not" (Gonçalves, book II, chap. 17). Father Jerónimo Fernandes remarked in 1561 that they preferred

mixed-race women. The unions were relatively long-lasting, and there was a certain amount of polygamy: the married men of Cochin, when they came to the Comorim Cape to trade horses, "take concubines and bring them there on horseback at great expense, and their women and children remain starving here [in Cochin], which is a bad example for the local people" (the magistrate complained in 1547 – S. Lourenço, II, 391). The Jesuits accused the Portuguese in Malacca of enjoying the charms of the beautiful Malay women on Sundays, instead of attending church. Afonso de Albuquerque, furthermore, lamented that the caulkers and carpenters who came from Portugal, with local women and work in a hot country, after a year were no longer men (Cartas, I, 21). But the Portuguese did not only arrive under the protection of the national flag. Far more common was their dispersal, throughout the entire East, as settlers or outsiders, in the service of local potentates, or involved in trafficking. Thus, you could find Portuguese in Turkish Basrah, indifferent to the viceroy's ban on Hormuz commerce with this trading centre (Letter III from Simão Botelho). In 1605, the Bernadine Friar Gaspar met four Portuguese, merchants, in Lar, in Persia, and two more in Baghdad (chaps. 13-4 and 19). In 1582 there are 923, seamen, in the service of the Mogul fleet in Bengal. In the last thirty years of this century, Fedrici notes that there are around 90 Portuguese merchants and vagabonds in Martaban (Ramúsio, t. III, f. 393).

TRADE ROUTES

The Indian Ocean and the Southern seas are the lifeblood of the whole of the region; the oceanic web of mercantile relations penetrates deep into the continents (with their sub-continents and peninsulas) and among the endless strings of islands. Arriving from the sea, the Portuguese remained faithful to the notion of a maritime base, even when they were striving for domination of the land – as was the case of Albuquerque's policy. The idea was to seize port cities that commanded sea-going routes, expanding into the adjoining territory, sometimes quite extensively, to ensure supplies for survival, strategic materials (timber and coir for shipbuilding), and valuable trading goods (gold, copper). Why did Albuquerque take Goa? Because it was the bridle of all of India, it was security for all Portuguese merchant shipping routes, it was the main support

for all the goods bound for the kingdoms of Narsinga and the Deccan; once it was taken, it was the end of all hopes of a Moorish alliance (Cartas, I, 92). What about his operations in Aden and Bab el Mandeb? See what the ex-Jew Francisco de Albuquerque wrote in December 1512: "And with your highness being master of the Strait you will be master of all India, because whoever holds the key to the coffer will be lord of the riches it contains, and thus the whole key to India lies in the Mecca Strait", since the "merchants from India are obliged to search out those with whom to trade" (Cartas, III, 47). Giving balance to his work, Albuquerque notes: "I am leaving India with the chief leaders taken into your power, and where the only task left to do is to tightly close the gate to the Strait" (Cartas, I, 380-1). What would be the importance of the Colombo fort to the Portuguese afterwards? All the ships coming from Malacca, China, the Moluccas, Pegu, Bengal, etc., for safe passage, would have to seek this tip of Ceylon, and sailing the Southern waters was, in 1582, the main bulk of Portuguese trade from India (Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas, p. 75). All the Eastern rulers, whether Moorish or Gentile, are either friendly to the Portuguese crown or feudal subjects, and almost all paid them *páreas* (tribute paid as a sign of vassalage) "out of respect for the sea that the Portuguese have been making themselves master of, because of the mighty power they have in huge fleets of galleys and multi-decked ships, with which they impede all their shipping and trade" (Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas, 16-7). But the sea did not rule everything, and the revival and intensifying of overland travel was to be one of the main factors in the decline of the Portuguese ocean domination.

The only navigable waterways in East Africa were the Cuama (Zambezi) rivers, which were sailable as far as Tete. On the whole, goods were transported on men's backs (likewise in Abyssinia, apart from the large caravans, such as the ten that each year linked Diarbekir to the imperial court of Dembia, a twenty-five day journey, of the two annual ones between that court and Cairo, 50-day journeys – Cartas I, 192-3). As Friar João dos Santos says (Santos I, book II, chap. 8), the *caffres* earn their living by renting themselves out to carry goods on their backs, like beasts of burden.

In "tawny Asia" (as Gourou calls it), that is, from the Mediterranean ports and eastern Egypt, including particularly Arabia and Persia, up to the Indus river, the caravans were largely composed of camels, accompanied by horses

(for military protection). A camel can carry a load of between 150 to 200 kg – less than an ox, but more than a horse, which can only carry 50 to 100 kg. A camel carrying a load can travel between 30 and 48 km in a day; mounted by a rider, it can cover more than 60 km; an ox can travel further, managing 72 to 90 km a day. In the Near East, river transport was combined with transport by caravan, whenever possible. From Alexandria it could get to Cairo, by boat, along the Nile, in one week. From Cairo to Toro was 6 days on foot, while from the same departure point to the Suez was a good 5 days ride on horseback. From Toro it would take fifteen days by boat to Zidene. Another route went from Cairo by boat on the Nile, taking 8 days to get to a point where the desert could be crossed in 3 days, guided by Arabs, to Al-Quseir (or Kosseir); from there it was a fifteen day trip by boat to Suaquem; from either of those ports one could sail to Bab el Mandeb. But many vessels, entering the Red Sea, preferred just to go as far as Jeddah, an 8 or 10 day voyage if the wind was favourable; from that port it was a day's walk to Mecca, another 4 from there to Al Madinah (Medina), and from Al Madinah to Cairo would take some 40 to 66 days, overland (Pires, 331-2 and 336; Bocchier, 1518, pp. 239-40; Livro de André Pires, 35v.-36). We will not describe the other river-land routes of the Levant. As for Persia, it is enough to indicate that from Hormuz to Tabriz – one of the main links in the eastern world – would take 50 days with a camel train (Pires, 340).

The north of India (Hindustan) was the transition zone for other means of transport. The kings and captains of Gujarat and the Deccan used camels to carry their uniform in battle (Orta, II, 74), and important people also used them to carry their baggage. The English hired these animals in 1621 to carry their goods between Mandu and Surat (English Factories, I, 231); and the same means of transport was used from Agra, passing through Burhanpor, to Surat (in March it is a train of 350 camels, in December there are 194 – English Factories, I, 257; Letters received, II, 8). Sugar, however, was carried by ox, not camel (English Factories, I, 102). Between Ahmadabad and Surat, the indigo caravan would travel; they used carts on this route. From Sarkhej to the same port (which is the departure point for Persia), it was the sugar caravan. It took 35 to 40 days from Agra to Surat. From Patna to Agra the carts took 30 to 35 days (English Factories, I, 191, 199). These carts had wheels and were

pulled by oxen – 10 or 12 for each one – and they travelled along routes that were marked out by lines of trees or walls; the caravan would contain anything from a hundred to two hundred carts (in 1621 there is a reference to one with more than 260; but they would only travel in small groups, of about 4; an escort was always necessary). In Hindustan, too (not forgetting the river traffic, either), there were countless trains of oxen used not as draught animals, but as beasts of burden, "as we do to the mules", says the Venetian envoy who went to Diu in 1538. The Russian Nikitin had already noted in 1470 that in India, oxen and buffaloes were both ridden and used to carry loads on their backs. The Venetian explains: "they ride them like horses, and pierce their nostrils and put a rope through them to serve as a bridle" (this is also described by Tavernier, 2nd Part, book I, chap. 3). With respect to the yoke, Tavernier observed that the horns were not used (as in Europe), but a leather collar, four fingers wide, is put over the head and held by the hump on the neck. In 1512, going to Benastari, where the Moorish fort of *Hidalcão* (Adil Shah, Sultan of Bijapur) stands, was a caravan of oxen bringing provisions (Cartas, t. I, 107); and the Portuguese knew of large trains of oxen laden with merchandise would enter Goa, before it was conquered (Pires,. 375). Pyrard de Laval notes that in Goa goods were transported on the backs of men or oxen, there being no carts or wagons (p. 71). Tavernier talks about the absence of draught vehicles in southern India; and beasts of burden or bearers prevailed there, although there were wheeled carts, used to carry cereals, stone for building, and salt, for instance, as inscriptions and written records show. There was even a tax on such vehicles (Appadorai, 424-7 and 456). Sassetti explains (p. 263) that on the coast, they harness oxen and buffaloes to pull carts, but further inland, in the forests, they just used them as beasts of burden, in never-ending trains of 8.000 or 10.000. For loading and unloading ships and beaching ships, elephants are used in the Malabarese, Goan and Concan ports (Sassetti, p. 262 and 273; Pawlowski, 12-XI-1596).

But the waterways, no matter how small, are all used: so pepper was shipped down from the hills in boats that navigate the rivers as far as the ocean ports. The passengers ride on oxen or in palanquins, carried by porters (8 for each, in shifts of 4). Many roads – 'royal roads' – connect the most important towns; along the way were inns for the travellers, at least in Malabar (Ibn Batutah). It took eight days from Goa to Vijayanagar, capital of the Narsinga empire. In the

east of India three kinds of transport predominated. All the rivers were utilized by small boats of all kinds, launches, *paraus* and *calaluzes*. The Burmese and Siamese were thus able to get to the kingdoms of Pegu and Jangomay, and proceed overland from there to China (Pires, 289). In Myanmar, the supplies for the army in the field were taken by a caravan of porters, carrying baskets on their heads (Fedrici, in: Ramúsio, II, 393). On Java, merchandise was carried in ox-carts (Pires, 420).

TRADE GOODS

In Asia as a whole, the paramount trade circulation was not only based in luxury goods and of interest to privileged circles; it affected the lives of huge masses of human beings. Merchandise ranged from ivory, pearls and diamonds, to the horses on which military authority depended, and to coins and monetary instruments needed for everyday transactions, as well as to common rice, which was the staple food of the great majority of the population. Let us have a closer look at some of the more important trade goods.

IVORY

Areas where elephants are found: East Africa, Ceylon, Myanmar and Thailand; Malabar (not domesticated) and the Deccan, in the part bordering Bengal, in Orissa and in Bengal. But it was the ivory from the coast of *Cafraria* (southeast Africa) which dominated the world market, and in this laid the main trade. Up to the middle of the 16th century, between 120 and 150 *bahars* left Sofala and Mozambique each year (that is, between 432 *quintais* and 4 *arratels* = 25.336,8 kg and 539 *quintais* and 8 *arratels* = 31.671 kg); but around 1550 exports shrank considerably, with only 20 *bahars* (just over 4.223 kg) being sent to India in 1551. The reason for this fall seems to have been the policy adopted by the captains of these markets, who wanted to control this highly lucrative trade exclusively but lacked the necessary resources (Letter IV by Simão Botelho, 1552). At any rate, the extraction of African ivory recovered dramatically in the short term. Garcia de Orta, writing about the period up to 1563, estimated it was 6.000 *quintais* – 308.400 kg (I, 305); the apparently excessive difference in relation to the previous numbers may be explained by including all the trade of this

nature, both legal and clandestine. According to Couto (Soldado Prático, 238), more than 200 *bahars* came from *Cafraria*, that is, over 718 *quintais* and *arrobas* (=42.228 kg). Between 1630 and 1636, Fr. Paulo da Trindade suggested that the trade amounted to over 3.000 *arrobas* (750 *quintais* = 44.064 kg). The figure given by Orta thus looks frankly excessive, although the traffic could have largely escaped inspection by the authorities. The captain of Sofala and Mozambique often managed to get permission to export on his own account (or to sell the licence, wholly or in parts); for example, Pantalião de Sá obtained one in 1559 for 100 *bahars*, which he could sell in India to whoever he wished (Theal, V, 249). This ivory was overwhelmingly channelled to Gujarat, where much of it was made into armlets (all the women wore at least twenty armlets, which they would break on the death of a relative), but some also went to China. In Ceylon and Myanmar they made chests, combs and several other items of it (Orta, I, 305). In Cambodia there were also large amounts of elephant tusks (according to the Pires, 390). "Ships from the kingdom" came from Portugal to carry ivory (from the cost of Guinea) to India, although usually in small quantities; in 1516 the ship *Nazareth* took nothing less than 51 *quintais*, 3 *arrobas* and 22 *arratels*, delivered by the *Casa da Mina* (Cartas Quitação, 233).

PEARLS

Pearl fishing had the following geography: *a*) in the Red Sea, next to Dahlak and neighbouring islands, bordering the port of Massawa; this fishery, sometimes called "of the Kamaran islands" because they are to the west of them, are mentioned by Albuquerque, Tomé Pires (letter in 1516), by Corsali, Castanheda and Orta; *b*) in the Persian Gulf, near the city of Julfar (on the west bank, before the Qatar peninsula) and, mainly, round the Bahrain islands, as well as at the port of Al Qatif; *c*) in the Gulf of Mannar, between the coast of southern India from the Comorin cape and the north-west part of Ceylon; *d*) next to the Suluk archipelago, between the north-east tip of Borneo and the west point of Mindanao (Conde de Ficalho); *e*) in the Far East and around the island of Hainan, and neighbouring islands where seed pearls were fished, often known as "from China", because they are from the sea of the same name.

The opinion was unanimous that the pearls from the Hormuz straits were far superior to those from the other fishing locations: the *Suma Oriental*

(Pires, 338) says that the finest seed pearls were fished there, whiter and rounder than those from other parts, and, in the same period, Corsali also declared their excellence, as well as saying that the biggest harvest was to be had there; for Orta, they were the biggest and best; some decades later, Van Linschotten declared they were the finest in the whole of the Levant, and truly deserved the name "oriental pearls" (chap. 5), and in 1610 Pedro Teixeira extolled them, saying they were far superior than any others in terms of beauty and weight for the same volume (pp. 28-9), praise later confirmed by the expert, Tavernier.

As early as 851 the *'Ahbar As-Sin W'al Hind'* of the Moorish trader Suleiman has a record of this fishery; the Chinese chronicle of the voyage by Mangu Khan's envoy to his brother Hulagu, in Baghdad, in 1259, describes it. The best fishing season was the two months of July and August, though it sometimes began in June; September was a less important period; some 200 *tarradas* [local reed boat] (and sometimes up to 600 – Relação das Plantas, 19), half of which were from Bahrain, with others from Julfar and Nihlelu; fishing was usually carried out along the Qatar peninsula, between Julfar and Bahrain; sometimes pearls were fished at the entrance to the strait, near Muscat and Ras el-Had: with little flow, those who fished there could come out the richer, with luck. Certain signs would guide the fishermen to the banks, and they anchored and sent a diver down, with a rope tied under his arms and a clip on his nose, to prevent water entering, as well as a heavy stone clasped between his feet, to descend more easily. The diver would reach a depth of 10 to 12, or even 15, fathoms to fill a leather bag with oysters, still covered with sand and mud; when the bag was full, he would give the rope a tug to warn his colleagues, above. There were, of course, fatal accidents from time to time. The oysters were emptied onto sheets, in the open sun, to make it easy to remove the seed pearl and pearls. At the beginning of the 16th century, it was estimated that the annual value of this fishing was around half a million *ducats*, known, with a further 100.000 pearls concealed, for fear of the tyranny of the Vizier; tribute paid to the king of Persia amounted to around 80.000 *patacas*. The captains of Hormuz tried to control the fishing on various occasions, but they failed to install a permanent factor there (Bretschneider, I, 145; Tenreiro, chap. LVII; Teixeira, 28-9).

Fishing the "sea of profit" (Salabham, the Mannar Gulf), which goes back to the Hindu period, was of much greater direct interest to the Portuguese State in India, while the Vijayanagar empire had no interest in it. Up to 1200, Paravas used to fish these waters, under the Pandya kingdom: by that date, Muslim sailors begun to visit the main centre of this trade, the wealthy city of Kayal; thanks to the trade in horses, which they imported here, they were protected by the Pandyas and established themselves, peacefully spreading Islam and intermarrying with the Paravas; the mastery of the sea enabled them, after the downfall of the Pandyas, to exercise dominion over the local rajahs, leaving the fishermen subject to the Muslim merchants. This situation led to a number of uprisings, all to no avail, until the 16th century. The arrival of the Portuguese allowed the Paravas to break free from Muslim domination – replaced by the Christian rule since 1523-1525, with the expedition of Manuel de Frias to Kayal and the establishment of a trading post in Calecare. They tried to drive away Christianity, but they were finally converted by the Jesuits, from 1543 until around 1600. The Nayaks of Maduari strove to regain the coast from 1529: the Portuguese withdrew to Mannar and Jaffna, and applied a naval blockade, forcing them by the mid 16th century to let them back and not to interfere with the Paravas; to keep on good terms, moreover, they gave the rajah various gifts and one day's fishing per year. In 1560, the Portuguese took Jaffna and built a fort on the island of Mannar; they thus eliminated the threats from the interior (back in 1547, the Badegas, subjects of Vijayanagar, had taken the coast, and Nyque Travadim sought help from the Portuguese). But a series of conflicts broke out between the missionaries and the Portuguese government, as the former wanted to prevent the state from interfering (the Tuticorim fort was meant to compel their obedience); public revenue was considerably affected: at the end of the century, revenues for Mannar were no more than 9.000 *pardaos*, while expenditure rose to 18.000 or 20.000 (Arch. Port. Or., III, 1st part, 61); these conflicts prevented any fishing between 1604 and 1612. In 1658 the Dutch seized control of the fisheries from the Portuguese (according to Arunachalam, chap. 6).

Fishing lasted 50 days, beginning in March or April and continuing to mid May. Each year, the good swimmers came along first to choose the place that seemed to have most oysters; a village of thatched huts would be built nearby,

on the coast, just for the fishing period. Some 400 or 500 boats would assemble there; the small ones would be manned by two oarsmen, two men to hold the ropes, and the diver; the larger ones would be divided into compartments, with a diver (*karoá*) and his two helpers, and the total crew could number as many as 60 to 90 men. They were protected by two Portuguese galleys. The technique of diving and gathering was identical to that in the Hormuz straits. There, too, there were deaths to lament each year. Efforts were made to see that the catch did not exceed a certain limit, to maintain the standard of the seed pearls. At the end of the season, the oysters were opened and distribute by groups, according to quality and weight. A large fair was held in Tuticorin from mid June to mid September-October. Between five and six thousand people would gather there. The pearls were sorted and the dealers or Portuguese merchants priced them and made deals. The first choice went to the Portuguese; another to Bengal; another to Kanara, and another to Cambay. Until the 16th century, it appears that the fishermen paid 1/10 to the rajah. Under the Portuguese, ¼ went to the king, ¼ to the captain and soldiers, ¼ to the Society of Jesus, and the fisherman would keep the remaining ¼.

Apart from the conflicts between the State and the Jesuits, other crises arose, for two reasons. On the one hand, the wealthier businessmen diverted into maritime trade, because there was more money to be made there; on the other, the poor people went back to gathering whelk (S. Lourenço, II, 380, referring to 1547): sacred, it was used as a wind instrument, a lamp, or as a libatory cup; bracelets and armlets were also made from it (Orta, II, 124; Fedrici, in: Ramúsio, III, 390; Sassetti, 349-50; Teixeira, 29-31; Appadorai, 464-6).

The pearls from Mannar were neither as large nor as valuable as those from Bahrain, but were finer than the ones from Hainan, which nevertheless gave a profit of 10 to 1 in trade with China, lining the pockets of the Portuguese who occasionally remembered to bring them to India when they could get 5 to 1 by bringing them by way of Myanmar or Malacca to Bengal. Seed pearls from Borneo are large, but of poor quality. Portugal did import pearls from Mannar and Bahrain, but the main sources were in Asia.

Diamond mining likewise took place in clearly demarcated regions: the main one was along the Krishna river axis and straddled the northern part of the Vijayanagar empire and the southern part of the Deccan empire, extending through the kingdom of Orissa to the northeast – these were the best ones; the other zone was the southeast of Borneo, in the Tamjompura (Tanjung Puting) and Laue region; they were not found elsewhere. The first are often called "from Golconda", because many of the dealers came from there. They were found in two kinds of ground: in sandy soils, where they could be found in the sand, with no need for washing; in clay, they had to be dug out, and lumps of earth had to be taken by women to a tank to be washed; the mud was pulled off and any residual sand was sifted off in a sieve, and any hard bits were beaten with wooden clubs. Each merchant had his own mining area, where 50 to 100 men would work; when washing was needed, there were two carriers for each miner. Specialised workers earned 3 *pagodes* a year, with a right to a bonus if a valuable discovery was made. In Orissa and on the Chota-Nagpur plateau, diamonds were mined in the sandy riverbed, when the water level lowers and the harvest was over (this work complemented farming), until the rains return. The annual output in India is reckoned to have been about 20 *lakhs* (2 million) rupees. Vijayanagar and Goa were the chief markets for "Golconda" diamonds, followed by exports to Gujarat, Martaban and Myanmar, as well as to São Tomé de Meliapore via Pulicat. The Turks acquire most of them. Those from Borneo all went to Malacca (despite the Castilians from the Philippines having tried to gain control of the trade for themselves: Pires, 450; Orta, II, 195-213; A. de Morga, 220; Moreland, 151.3; Appadorai, 460 ff.). In the second half of the 16th century and during the whole of the next one, diamonds became a major item of import into Europe via the Cape route.

Rubies were found in Ceylon – few, but of excellent quality, Orta tells us – and in Brama (Burma), in the Capelangam hills, from where they were sent to Ava (the main city of Arrakan), radiating out to Myanmar and Thailand; from Pegu they came to Bengal and Narsinga (in this case, through the port of Pulicat), on the one side, and went to Malacca and Pacem (Sumatra), on the other (Pires, 381 and 387; Orta, II, 217-220). When Gama anchored in Calicut, he was greeted by a Muslim in Castilian: "*Buena ventura, Buena*

ventura; muitos rubis, muitas esmeraldas" (Good luck, good fortune; many rubies, many emeralds).

HORSES

Barros remarked that the horses from Persia and Arabia were the mainstays of power that the king of Narsinga (Vijayanagar) and the captains of the kingdom of the Deccan used against one another. This is why Alubquerque had based part of his policy on the fact that control of this trade would put the kingdoms of Deccan and Narsinga in his hands (Cartas, I, 439 and 199). The Euro-Asian steppes form the northern edge of the Oriental world are the regions we are here concerned with: they are the true domain of the nomad horsemen. To the south, the horse was still extremely important in "tawny Asia", as a mount and as a beast of burden; this is where thoroughbred lines were raised. Horses were not raised and bred in the Indian subcontinent, and the animal was used neither for draught nor to carry travellers: it was a resource of war, regarded as being of rare excellence, and so the cavalry was the dominant social force and the crucial card in the balance of political-martial power. This is why only horses and precious stones were sold in India for golden *pardaos* (B. N. Madrid, 3015, ff. 99-100). Not only were horses not bred in India, they did not know how to feed them properly there, nor break them in (it seems that the merchants prevented breakers going there), so that they quickly weakened and had short lives – which ensured a constant demand (Appadorai, 552 ff.). This was the most profitable trade for the merchants and for the rulers of the ports (because of the duties collected).

The Arab horses were worth more than the Persian ones; the best were bred in the Lahsa region, two days' journey from Bahrain (Castanheda, book V, chap. 59), and so there was a busy export trade to these islands and to al Qatif; the other large exporting ports lie on the eastern tip of Arabia, at the entrance to the Gulf of Oman: they include Qalhat (Corsali, in: Ramúsio, I, f. 187), Quriat (Thevet, book X, chap. 4) and, obviously, Muscat. To the west, Aden was where southwest Arabian horses came from (Pires, 335), and even places further south. Hormuz was the market for horses from Persia, Khorassan, Turkistan and Neghostan, as well as a great many Arab ones. If a horse died or lost weight during the voyage, the king who was buying it would pay for it just

the same. The trader who brought horses to sell enjoyed the privilege of being able to trade his other goods before the other merchants, and paid no customs duties on them.

The number of horses imported by India was around 10.000 a year in the 13th and 14th centuries; in the early 16th century, 1.000 to 2.000 animals or more (Barbosa, 271) came from Hormuz alone; at the dawn of the 17th century, it is reckoned that 1.500 came aboard vessels from Hormuz and Muscat (B. N. Madrid). Having seen the extraordinary importance of this trade, the Portuguese tried to control it, through Albuquerque. His policy was designed to make all the Hormuz ships carrying horses from Persia and Arabia to go to the port of Goa, and a Portuguese armada was spread along the coast to enforce this; the governor ordered huge stables to be built, and placed 300 local men to gather grass; furthermore, he reserved the best houses for horse dealers and allowed them the privilege of the immediate loading of spices. The port of Goa thus became favoured and it attracted the Narsinga and Deccan caravans, which came to the city to acquire horses; these two kingdoms were obliged to accept the peace imposed by the Portuguese, since the victory of either depended on who had horses; and the port of Baticala, which had been the main port of entry into India for horses, was abandoned (Cartas, I, 199). In addition to all the trappings and harnesses being free of customs duties, any ship bringing 10 horses did not pay any other dues or charges.

From its embarkation until Goa, each horse cost more that 40.000 *reis*, 19.500 *reis* of which (or 40 golden *pardaos*) were paid in duties owed to the Portuguese State for going to the interior (B.N. Madrid). The trade earned between 300% to 500% (Cartas I, 410). Traders came from Portugal to buy Arab stallions in Aser, for 100 *ducats* or more and sell them in India for 1.000 (Viaggio, 1538, f. 275 in: Ramúsio, t. I). The king of Narsinga, Crisnarao (Krishna Deva Raya), on going to the aid of Rachol, which were being threatened by Hidalcao (Adil Shah, Sultan of Bijapur), bought 700 from the Portuguese at 235 golden *pardaos* each. Between 1512 and 1516, ordinary horses were sold in Goa for 400 to 500 golden *pardaos*, good ones at 700 to 800, while the very best fetched a price of 900 to 1.000 (Pires, 338 and 376, Corsali, in: Ramúsio, t. I, 178v). In 1565 a horse cost 20 *cruzados* in Persia and in between 500 to 1.000 in India (Mestre Afonso, 188).

Albuquerque's policy of making Goa the only market did not work, however, although it did weakened Baticala; the problem was that Cochin had also became interested in the trade: the married men in this Malabar city took horses on their pinnaces to the Comorin Cape (S. Lourenço, II, 347, 380, 391, about 1556-1547); they also entered through Chaul (55 in 1536, for instance, T. T., C. C., II-131-188); Dabhol, which had been so active in this trade at the time (Nikitin, 29), and Cannanor did not lose all their share of the traffic. In 1590, however, another attempt was made to bestow this monopoly on Goa, compelling merchants to provide a guarantee upon leaving Hormuz; as the revenue from horses had decreased significantly, the king ordered that it be revoked in 1594 (AHU, no. 281, ff. 72v and 306).

The Portuguese visited the supplying markets: a factor was established in Aser in Arabia (to the west of the Kuria Muria islands), for example, and some forty Portuguese merchants were continuously engaged in the trade, while also selling spices. A significant number of Khorassan and Muslim merchants also went to India (Orta, I, 143); the Malabarese and Gujaratis went to Xaer (Shihr), in Arabia, to get horses (Castanheda, book. VI, chap. 23).

SLAVES

In virtually all the societies around India's borders, and in the Far East, slavery existed, and the slave trade was practised. Both could be found in an advanced stage of development in the mercantile zones, not playing an essential role in the productive process, whether agricultural or even in mining and general industry; they added to the comfort of the wealthy, were used in transportation, and plied the oars in all kinds of boats. The Portuguese took advantage of the institution and did not disdain the trade.

On the island of Madagascar, the indigenous peoples lived off livestock and farming and had many slaves; and Muslim ships came to the island ports from Malindi and Mombassa to deal in slaves and supplies (Cartas, t. I, p. 3). In 1553, for example, the king of Portugal was asked to grant the Goa town Council a licence to send a ship to the island of São Lourenço carrying 80 male *caffres*, to be sold for 10 *pardaos* each, at the most, divided by the householders, with an obligation that they were to row in the city's galliots (Missões Insulíndia, II, p. 116).

In the Moorish cities on the African coast and adjacent islands, such as Mombassa, the whites had black slaves – although more in subservience than actual subjection (Fernandes, 17-20). Gold was not mined by slaves, however, although each black who agreed to devote himself to it could choose to be helped by slaves. The coast exported them, particularly to northern India. Accordingly, in 1521 there were two Moorish *sambuks* from Brava in the Cambay inlet, with cargoes of black slaves and sandalwood (Castanheda, book v, chap. 68). The armada sent from Lisbon to Goa in 1567 took 300 *caffre* slaves on board in Mozambique, destined for domestic work in India (Welch, 56). Van Linschotten, noting that a great many were sent from Mozambique to India, explains that they were much sought after for laborious, unpleasant work; they were much stronger than all the other slaves (chap. 4, p. 11). The Pole, Pawlowski, records in 1596 that children, having been sold in East Africa by their parents for a ball of cheese, a red cap, rings, glassware, are taken, naked, on board the ships and galliots, to fetch a price in India of 16 *florins*, for males, and 7 for females. In the 17th century, the flow continued: it was well known in Lisbon in 1608 that many captive *caffres* went from Mozambique to Goa – India was becoming sated by such large numbers (Monções, I, 65); and it was even acknowledged that the royal Exchequer was sending them on its own behalf, to a fleet of galleys, but it did not bar private individuals from the trade. But the Portuguese establishments in Africa also resorted to this type of labour on a regular basis. Pero da Fonseca, captain of Sofala and Mozambique, refers to "my slaves", and his successor sent them to the Kingdom (Cartas dos Viso-Reis, 144), some taken from Moors without payment. The clerk of the trading post of Sofala received from the viceroy on 16-12-1561, 80.000 *reis* for salary and maintenance, 50 *bretangis* as a discount from the salary for the price of the cost to the king, and one slave instead of men from the regiment, (Theal, V, 249-50). Francisco Barreto took more than 2.000 clothed slaves from Sena to Mongaz in 1572 (Monclaro, in: Theal, III, 188). Around 1635, in Sofala, the 3 married men and the 2 unmarried men have some captive slaves; in those parts, only those who are captives of the Portuguese are converted to Christianity (Resende, 76); in the kingdom of Manica, Christianity was widespread, "among our captive *caffres*" as well as others (f. 82v); in Sena, in 1561, the 10 or 15 Portuguese based there had some 500 slaves, according to Father Luís Fróis

(Theal, II, 106-7); and around 1635 the 35 married whites each had 40, or 50 – or even 100 – captive *caffres*, who they employ as rifles (Resende, 81v); in Tete the 20 couples had many captive slaves, all good with firearms (82v.-83).

In fact, all the trade and dealings that the Portuguese engaged in around the Mokaranga (Monomatapa empire) region used *caffres*, either prisoners or people they knew (f. 85). Tavernier later described the Portuguese who became lords of the Cuama rivers, each one with some 5.000 slaves (2nd part, book II, chap. 25) – mention must be made of the «*fumos*» or time limits. Here is Friar João dos Santos' description of the activities of the captain of Mozambique (book II, chap. 19): each year he sent a boat up river from Lourenço Marques, whence they brought amber, ivory, slaves, honey, butter, rhinoceros horns and hoofs, hippopotamus teeth and hoofs; another boat or panga brought him the same goods from the Cape of Currents and the Inhambane river; one *panga,* and often two, would come every six months to Sofala and the exchange of goods would consist of the same items, plus a good quantity of gold and rice, including with many slaves; and from the Cuama rivers, too, three or four *pangas* made an annual journey also exchanging many slaves – and the same for the *pangas* that went to the Angoxa island; to the island of São Lourenço he sent a boat or large ship; there it took on board cows, goats, amber, grass cloth (which the Portuguese used as mats, and clothes for the *caffres*), and slaves; a large quantity of which came from the islands of Quirimba to Cape Delgado (whence came maize and rice, ivory, cattle, turtles).

If we leave *Cafraria* and go to Abyssinia, we find another large market supplying slaves, mostly in the Damute kingdom, to the west of the land of Prester John, above the kingdom of Xoá and to the southwest of Lake Tana; here the Christian Abyssinians became captives of the gentiles, who then sold them to the Muslims; they easily converted to Islam, moreover. These slaves were highly prized by the Moors, and they were worth a lot more than the others, being regarded as sharp-witted and loyal; they came from the interior, leaving from the port of Massawa, filling Arabia, Persia, India, Egypt and even Turkish Greece (Barbosa, 256; Álvares, part I, chap. CXXXIV).

In India, if the productive process was largely informed by the cast system, in the farming sector, feudal serfs, the Tuias (Tiyyanmars), had a certain importance. They looked after the palm groves and carried whatever

was needed on their backs (we have already seen how this mode of transport developed); they were granted to the lands of the Nairs by the king (Barbosa, 333). But there was genuine slavery: not only was slave labour impure (a quality shared with several casts), but slaves were not free, they were bought and sold, had no choice of giving, did not pay fines (they suffered corporal punishment), and ranked alongside cattle, jewels, land, and clothes in an inventory of goods. They originated in several ways: *a*) by birth; *b*) inability to repay a debt – the debtor was handed over to the creditor; *c*) by being taken prisoner; *d*) by being sold, along with his family; *e*) through the sale of women whose behaviour was blameworthy according to religious vigilantes; *f*) through being vagrants, without family or master – the governor sold such vagabonds; *g*) through importation; *h*) by a widow giving herself up to a temple when she did not wish to immolate herself, or even unmarried women surrendering themselves to the temple. The temples had countless slaves (*devaradiyar*), marked with the sign of a trident to signify divine service (Appadorai, 313-22; Mahalingam, 20-1). There was no merchant, however modest, who did not have 10 to 16: they would work for him at home or carry him about, keeping him in the shade, etc. (Pawlowski). Slaves were used as crews for rowing the galleys and other boats. The Russian Nikitin, who was in the Moorish capital of Beder (Bidar) around 1470, also saw the trade of slaves, alongside that of horses, silk, etc. (p. 12,). We have shown that many were sent to the North of India through *Cafraria*: Fedrici (Ramúsio, III, f. 387) noted their arrival in Chaul from Malindi, and other African ports (together with ivory, gold, amber), in exchange for cloth and glass beads which were despatched from there; and from 1621-1633 the Relação das Plantas (p. 30) reveals that the traffic was continuing. Famine led parents to sell their children in India itself: thus when it spread to the Coromandel Coast, the Malabarese went there with boats laden with rice and coconuts and filled with slaves bought from their parents for 4 or 5 *fanams* (Barbosa, 354). They were also sold for the same amount of 5 *fanams* throughout the whole of southern India during the great famine of 1630, whence they were sent to the North and to the islands of Southeast Asia (Mahalingam, p. 21).

The Portuguese took advantage of the existing situation in India, too. In 1510, the constable of the fort of Cannanor had two slaves who helped him making gunpowder (Cartas, II, 74-5). In 1515, there were 151 slaves in the

galley *Santo Espírito*, and in the *São Vicente* there were 44 (154). In Chaul, in 1546, there were 350 Portuguese, and "the slaves are many and fearless" (S. Lourenço, III, 225). In Diu, the 60 Portuguese couples residing there had a great number of slaves between them in the period 1621-1633 (Relação das Plantas, 20). Pawlowski tells us that in Goa people would be carried in litters with mattresses and rugs, carried by four black slaves: a fifth went in front with a parasol, and two boys followed behind; not a single fisherman, however poor, went without a sunshade bearer. Pyrard tells us, not without a certain exaggeration, that "the greatest wealth and revenue of those [Portuguese] from Goa, is the labour of their slaves that bring them every night, or at the end of the week, what they must eat:; without taking into account those slaves they hold in home to serve them"; these slaves also sold their produces at the market: preserves, etc.; others were cabin-boys; the girls sold love – their own or that of their mistresses (Voyages, II, 99-100).

In Portuguese India, 5.000 or 6.000 slaves were taken each year, from which the king saw no profit; and so it was suggested that a number should be taken for the galleys and the rest, duly evaluated, should be sold (Cartas dos Viso-Reis, 185). In fact, the oar-propelled vessels were a constant source of demand; a law was passed that magistrates should sentence vagrants, delinquent boys and other criminals to the galleys, for one or more years (depending on the offence); but the legal authorities in Chaul, Bassein, Daman and Diu were sometimes careless about this, such that a provision of 30-10-1601 was necessary to remind them of the obligation under various penalties (Provisões, I, 58). Governor Nuno da Cunha, seeing the prisons filled with gentiles and local people imprisoned for debt, decided to hand them over to their creditors; but in a letter of 6-03-1532, the king limited the effect of this to four years, and the debtor could opt to stay in prison (Cartas do Reis à Cidade de Goa, I, f. 4). Chaul seems to have supplied Goa; in 1547, 29 blacks men and 1 black woman fled the city, for which the factor was to blame, for he neither guarded them properly nor sent them on to that destination (S. Lourenço, II, 152); but they also came from the Maldives (in 1548 Jerónimo Butaca sent a Turkish slave from there to Cochin (III, f. 34).

In Malacca, before it was taken by the Portuguese, there were 3.000 *ambarages* ('Hamba Raja') royal slaves, who received provision rations from the

king or who supported themselves and their family by earning. Albuquerque preserved the institution on behalf of the Portuguese crown (Barros, Década II, book VI, chap. 6). Large numbers of ships came to that trading post, carrying cargos of blacks and prisoners taken from Java, Borneo, Siam, Pegu, Bengal, China, Sunda, Macassar, Timor, Solor, and other Southeast Asian areas (Missões Insulíndia, I, 365); the Portuguese also had Papuan slaves "people full of talent", in the words of Father Baltazar Dias (I, 254). From Malacca to Siam, the main merchandise was slaves, male and female (Pires, 387). When Albuqerque went to seize Malacca, he took 200 men "most of whom were blacks from *Ribeira de Lisboa*" (Cartas, I, 123); in the three vessels he despatched to the Spice Islands and Banda, in November 1511, were, in addition to 120 white men, 20 captive slaves for the pump (I, 68). A description by Father Jerónimo Fernandes, in 1561, depicts the situation: the homes of the Portuguese in Malacca "look like convents of nuns with all the slave-women living there" (Missões Insulíndia, II, 363). "Many slaves and cattle" were exported from Pattani, a port in the Thailand gulf (B. N. Madrid, 3015, f. 101),

The Portuguese in the Moluccas Islands also had slaves, even the priests (Missões Insulíndia, II, 14 and 316). Slavery existed among the natives of the Philippines; after the conquest of the archipelago, the king of Spain ordered that this should continue as before; but a Papal letter of 1591 abolished the slavery of natives (whose labour would have to be remunerated), so the Spanish then had *caffre* and black slaves, brought by the Portuguese via India and later Macau (Morga, 322 and 328-9).

The issue of slavery featured in several legal measures. In the time of Henrique de Menseses (1522-1524), there was a royal provision that granted freedom to slaves who converted to Christianity; but Martim Afonso de Sousa countermanded it (S. Lourenço, II, 279). In 1557, the king decided that if Muslim or gentile slaves became Christians then their masters would have to sell them to Christians; they did not gain their freedom (as had been granted in the royal provision of 1522-1524), they remained slaves, since the granting of freedom caused problems for their erstwhile owners (Livro Vermelho de Goa, ff. 29v-30); the law only appears to have been published in India two years later, in 1559: under it, a merchant or any other foreign Jew, Muslim or gentile who went anywhere under the dominion of the king of Portugal in parts of

India, and whose slave or slaves converted, was forced, before leaving, to sell them to Christians. However, they would not obtain their freedom through this process, since the canon law framing their convertion to the Catholic faith could not bestow a temporal freedom (ff. 46-7).

Slaves came quite regularly to the Kingdom from the Asia. In 1510, therefore, Albuquerque sent 24 to the Queen from Cochin (Cartas, II, 85). Simão de Miranda, captain of Sofala and Mozambique, also sent *caffres* to Portugal, some taken from Muslim traders, without payment (Cartas dos Viso-Reis, 144). In 1520, Lisbon considered that the slaves shipped from India were of no use in their service and that they were very costly in maintenance and water, and so a ban was imposed in the king's ships, unless they were needed as manpower on board, in which case they could number no more than twenty; but there was no impediment on their coming in the "ships of the merchants who had to bring our spices" (Arch. Port. Oriental, V, 52-3). But nothing changed: even in 1634, there were slaves on board the *Nossa Senhora da Saúde* and the *Santíssimo Sacramento*, some of whom died of thirst as the ships arrived at the island of Terceira (Azores) with great lack of water (AHU, India, *letter from Princess Margarida,* Lisbon, 26-III-1636).

The Dutch also joined the slave trade in the East. In 1622, the English in Pulicat highlighted how the Dutch bought all the slaves they could on the eastern coast of India, having received an order from Batavia (Jakarta) to acquire 30.000, that were to supply the islands of Banda and others of the Southeast Asian seas. The *Dortdricht* alone took on 800 at this port, in September (Letters received, II, p. 127).

FOODSTUFF

If we move on to the populations' subsistence base, we can get a rough idea of the overall kinds and geography of food, as follows: *a*) subsistence, based on maize, complemented by raising animals and cultivating fruits: black East Africa; *b*) subsistence, based on bread made from wheat or barley flour and livestock rearing: Abyssinia; *c*) subsistence, based on dates and livestock products, complemented by cereals: Arabia and the Persian Gulf; *d*) subsistence, based on rice: India, Indochina, southern China, and in the large trading and industrial cities throughout the East in general, especially in the ports; *e*) subsistence,

based on sago and yams: Indonesia; *f*) subsistence, based on wheat: Persia, northern India and northern China.

The mainstay in *Cafraria* was maize, which the blacks prefer to rice; this maize was called either "from Guinea" (Fernandes, 4v) or "zaburro" (Indian millet, meaning the same as the first term – Theal, II, 110 and 129 – letters from priests, 1561), is quite distinct from millet, which is also mentioned, but was of little importance. A kind of wine was made from that maize – *pombe* – highly valued by the natives (the Portuguese drank palm wine). Maize fed the Portuguese garrisons along the coast (6 *alqueires* a month per person [*alqueire* = about 13 litres]). It was eaten in pap; it was also mixed with rice to make a kind of cake, called *mocate*. But there were also vegetables, as in Portugal, and a wide variety of fruit: figs, pomegranates, oranges, limes, grapes, bananas, pineapples. The raising of chickens was especially important, as was every kind of livestock rearing – cows and oxen, sheep, goats, pigs. Coconuts were eaten as a fruit, but the milk was also taken, and they were used to make oil; the commonest oil, however, was sesame. Honey and butter were commonplace, and much traded – the island of Mozambique got them from the Lourenço Marques river, Cape of Currents and the Inhambane, Sofala, and Cuama rivers. Sugar cane was cultivated not for sugar, but the canes themselves were eaten – "it forms a great part of the sustenance they subsist on". Rice was mostly eaten in the towns; it was produced in the area between Sofala and the Cuama rivers, and next to Sena, with that coming from the island of Pemba being particularly important, since it supplied Mombassa (the island of Mozambique was supplied with rice from the first-named regions); but in Madagascar it was the staple food (there was much livestock-rearing on this island, too). The other economic activity that played a crucial role in sustaining the coastal peoples was fishing. India sent wheat and rice to the African towns, and wine, olive oil, cheese, and olives were sent from Portugal.

In Abyssinia, the staple was bread (made from wheat or barley) and the products of animal grazing; but there were areas where maize was preferred; beans, broad beans, chickpeas and fruit were also eaten (grapes, peaches, oranges, lemons, apples); but wine was not drunk (except at the court of Prester and in that of the Patriarch); meat was eaten mostly by the wealthy and at feasts, but the ordinary people also ate it on occasion, either raw or grilled. There

was no fish. Abyssinia exported provisions and imported quantities of dates (Álvares, book II, chap. IX; Pires, 328).

Arabia, with its symbiosis between trading ports, farming areas and nomad horsemen and camel herders, had bread, livestock, vegetables, fruit – such was the situation in the said Blessed Arabia, Yemen (Couto, Década X, book I, chap. 11). In Yemen, in the city of Zabid (*Zebite*, at the entrance to the Strait, facing the Kamaran Islands) and its outskirts there was "meat and truly wheat"; in addition, both here and in Aden (which is the exporting port) raisins are produced; but one of the critical items of food is dates; dates are also of importance further north, and from the point of Quriat to Ras el Had, which exports them in *terradas* (light canoes) to the Red Sea areas; several coastal settlements subsist from fishing. In the region of Qalhat, Muscat, Quriat, etc., dates were the bread of the people, while the rich ate rice and a few other cereals from abroad; but here, as elsewhere, there was milk and butter (Corsali, in: Ramúsio, I, 187). From the Suez, ships came with Egyptian goods to supply Jeddah and Mecca.

The island of Socotora represented the meeting point of the food systems of the surrounding lands: the islanders ate dates as their bread, drank milk, used butter; but they also ate rice, though little (it came from abroad) (f. 181); in 1506, the *Santiago* took on board there (as plunder) 85 loads of maize, 5 of rice, a tub of butter and 4 of dates (Cartas de Quitação, n. 518).

A trading post like Hormuz, on a barren island, posed problems of sustenance that caused significant movement in the ocean economy. Certainly all its water, and some of the meat and other supplies, came from the neighbouring island of Qeshm, while most of the rest came overland (Cartas, I, 13, 14, and 19); but rice came from India – and if no ships came, there was famine (Cartas, I, 30). In November 1521, for instance, a vessel came to Hormuz from India laden with rice, sugar and other goods (Castanheda, book V, chap. 83). Butter was brought from Basrah, Reixel, Diul-Sind (Dewal) and Mangalore (Livro dos Pesos, 1554, p. 23). Even in 1603, a Persian trader sent his ship from Basrur to Hormuz with a cargo of rice. The gulf town sent dates to India in exchange (Castanheda, book V, chap. 83) – this fruit that even served the besieged Portuguese *as bread* in 1521.

In the north of India, meanwhile, as far south as Balaghat (the interior plateau, beyond the Ghats), there was much wheat and very little rice, and so bread was eaten (Orta, II, 139), Gujarat was the transition point between the two areas: it produced wheat, barley, rice, sugar and even though meat was not eaten, milk was drunk (Corsali, I, f. 179v). In this world, animals are not raised for meat. Here, we have left Gujarat and Balaghat, and we are in a civilization in which, as Sassetti says (pp. 362 and 419), "rice is their bread", and forty years later, like an echo, Solis wrote: "it is the bread for those of India" (Solis, 1628, f. 23 v). These descriptions applied mostly to the coastal regions. But a distinction has to be made between areas of production and areas of consumption.

The two major productive zones on the west coast of India were Bassein and Kanara. It was from Bassein that the overseers of the Exchequer ordered rice for the Warehouses of Goa, in 1547 (S. Lourenço, II, 417); and again in 1631 (AHU, India, box 10); rice left this port for Cambay and Diu, on the one hand, and for Muscat and Basrah on the other, and to the southwest, to Mozmbique (Relações das Plantas, 1621-1633, p. 27). We should consider, for a moment, the problem of provisioning Goa, before we move further south. From Gujarat, it received wheat through Diu (T. T., C. C., II-123-203, of 13-II-1535: 215 *candis*): bread was clearly essential for the Portuguese, as Albuquerque said (Cartas, I, 203): there, eating wheat bread, meat and very good fish, they have the colour of men – which does not happen when rice is eaten. Up to 1511 and after, rice was commonly eaten in this city; but twenty-five years after it was conquered and metropolitan habits took root, most of the Portuguese used bread like they had back home, made from wheat that they imported, as Barros proudly tells us (Barros, Década II, book VI, chap. 9). However, even there rice again became important. In March 1510 Albuquerque sent two ships to Baticala to fetch it (book V, chap. 4); and in the winter of the following year, pinnaces went to Baticala, Mergui and Honawar several times to fetch supplies (book, VI, chap. 10). In 1581, a fleet of ships took provisions from Kanara to Goa (Couto, Década X, book II, chap. 1). In the 17th century it continued to obtain rice from Cambay and Surat on the one hand and from the Kanara ports on the other. The women there ate rice, fruit, milk; the men (Portuguese, obviously), ate a lot of meat and drank plenty of wine; the slaves had a half measure of rice

and cucumbers a day (Pawlowski). Kanara produced "a super-abundance of sustenance of all kinds, to supply all of India": it produced rice, particularly the best rice (*giraçal*), sugar, and sugar preserves. Exports took place through the ports of Honawar, Baticala, Basrur and Mangalore (going from north to south), and were sent chiefly to Malabar, but also to Goa (which got a large part of its provisions from here), to Muscat, on the Arabian coast, and as far as Mombassa and Mozambique, on the one side, and Malacca, on the other. From Basrur alone, it is reckoned that, between 1621 and 1633, more than 100.000 loads of rice were imported (Pires, 349-50; Livro das Cidades, 62; Relação das Plantas, 33-5).

Malabar, rich thanks to its spices, cloth, fishing, shipping and trade totally "lacks rice and it has nothing quite of the same nature" (Suma Oriental, p. 358), "is sterile of foodstuff", yielding little rice (Sassetti, 1585, p. 419), and so it suffered from a great shortage of provisions (Livro das Cidades, 62). As Couto explains (Barros, Década II, book II, chap. 11), none of the kingdoms of Malabar had anything other than palm groves – and these provide them with the provisions they need and equipment for ships. The Malabarese subsisted on rice, milk, sugar, fruit and some of them ate bread made from (imported) wheat and honey (Roteiro, 40 and 43). From Tanor northwards, they bought supplies of rice especially from Kanara; to the south, from the Coromandel; they also got rice from parts of Dabhol and Chaul and from Gujarat in general. In March 1525, seventy paraus of Malabarese Muslims went up the rivers of Basrur and Mangalore to get rice, because there was none on the coast "and there would be famine unless they fetch it from abroad" (Castanheda, book VI, chap. 91); the Portuguese also went to Baticala that year to get supplies for the forts of Cannanor, Calicut and Cochin (chap. 90). In 1546, a *catur* and a *cotia* brought wheat and rice from Cambay to Malabar (S. Lourenço, II, 215). For Cochin and Goa alike, butter came from Diu, as did oil, garlic, onions, vegetables. The two cities, the main places where the Portuguese settled, obviously received wine, olive oil and Dutch cheese from Portugal. Even though many preserves were made in Calicut, the produce of the land was insufficient to sustain the population, and so provisions came by sea among which were coconuts from the Maldives (Lopes, XXIV, 208 and I, 186; Pires, 359).

Nor did the Maldives archipelago have other produce, apart from coconut and everything that could be extracted from it – it was the main centre for the common coconut palm – except what could be brought by freight, chiefly from Cochin (S. Lourenço, II, 423v); many of the married Portuguese in Cochin lived of this trade, and so there was great consternation in the city when, in 1548, the governor forbade private citizens from engaging in it: the only way for them to avoid poverty was to send rice to the island and bring back coir and cowries (II, 22).

In Ceylon, no meal was complete without butter and milk; although wheat was not grown on the island, rice was, and so were peas and sesame; the main complementary food was coconut, which yielded oil, wine, sugar, and was also eaten as a fruit; they had melons, sugar cane, vegetables, and raised some animals: information given by a Chinese, Ma Huan (p. 214). But while Ma Huan thought that "all the islanders have plenty of everything they need for life", a century later a Portuguese suggested that "the island has so little in the way of sustenance itself that if, in any year, no sampans were to come from the Coromandel with rice, they would only have weeds and grass to eat and they would find people in the woods and roads who had died of famine" (Carta dos Viso-Reis, n. 15); Ceylon thus relied on the rice grown in the Coromandel. On the tiny island of Vacas, in the Palk Strait between Ceylon and the continent, Portuguese from Mannar and Jaffna were involved in livestock raising (Colóquios, II, 232 and 236). The coast from Quilon to Cape Comorin also got rice from elsewhere, by sea, as harvests there were poor; it came from Orissa and Bengal (Tao i chih lio, 1339, and Hsing ch'a sheng lan, 1436, in: Rockhill, XVI).

Despite seeing the Coromandel households selling its children in times of famine, to get rice from the western coast of India, it is nevertheless one of the major rice producing areas, along with Gujarat, Kanara and Bengal. Pedro Teixeira even came up with an imaginative etymology that illustrates the role of the region: the name is a corruption of *Choro Bandel* (= rice port) "for the great amounts produced there and carried abroad" (Teixeira, 1610). Francesco dal Bocchier says (1518, 243) that the Coromandel supplied all of Malabar with rice (we have seen that it was mostly the part to the south of Tanor). In 1509, Diogo Lopes de Sequeira seized three vessels close to Travancor coming

from there with such a cargo for western India (Barros, Década II, book iv, chap. 4). In Negapatam, in the early 16th century, 700 vessels were loaded with rice, all at the same time. The Coromandel Coast also supplied all the rice to the area around Malacca (Empoli, 80).

From Bengal to Burma, food consisted basically of meat, milk and rice (Marco Polo, book II, chaps 45-47). But there was also a significant production of wheat in Bengal (Roteiro,. 90). Large cargos of rice and sugar (it was one of the biggest sugar-producing areas) and wheat were sent from here to Cochin and other ports (Fedrici, in: Ramúsio, III, 396). No rice was grown on the Nicobar Islands (whose native peoples frightened the sailors with their "primitive" civilization), subsistence was based on yams, jackfruit and fishing (Ma Huan, 211).

We shall now turn to the problem of supplies for another of the major trading posts: Malacca. Rice was produced on the peninsula, around Kedah, and in good quantities (Pires, 387). But around the city, the land was so marshy and there was so much tree cover, sparsely populated and scarcely farmed (the climate is unhealthy), that "the life of Malacca is only what sustenance it gets from the sea"; only in Bentayan (*Beitão*), a league from the mouth of the river Muar, did the Malays build estates, with houses to enjoy and durian orchards (Barros, Década II, book VI, chap. 1, and book IX, chap. 5). Father Baltazar Dias asserted in 1556 that the land itself provided nothing. As we saw earlier, they got rice from Kanara and the Coromandel (and Empoli considers that it was actually the second of those regions that supplied the most). It seems, however, that a great majority of the necessary foodstuffs came from Java, especially rice (Barros, Década II, book IX, chap. 3). The Javanese merchants controlled all the trade in supplying sustenance to Malacca (Godinho de Erédia, 1613, part 1, chaps, 2, 7 and 14). Junks also came, laden with cargo, from Myanmar – as in 1512, for instance, a famine year. If the staple in this area was rice, plus durians and chicken, when the Portuguese established themselves there it must have stimulated the import of wheat from India (Bengal), and some meat (Missões Insulíndia, II, p. 237). More wheat than ever before, and a large amount of dates, came in 1551; the siege, from June to September, was a time of great hunger, when the palm groves were destroyed; towards the end of the last month, however, ships returned, laden with much rice, chickens, onions, garlic,

lentils and eggs (pp. 60 and 65-7). The supplies for the soldiers and seamen paid for by the State consisted of rice (T. T., C. C., II-116-105).

The island of Java had abundant, very cheap food, and so it supplied Malacca and the Moluccas; it was particularly rich in rice, chicken, cattle and fruit (Missões Insulíndia, II, 436). But for the Portuguese there (and for their armadas), the wheat came from India: and so, in 1526, the factor of Goa handed over to the royal administrator (*almoxarife*), who was on his way to Sunda, 18 *candis* – though he should have given him 41: it was not easy to get hold of wheat (T. T., C. C., II-132-62). Cambodia had similar eating habits to Portugal: rice (plenty of good quality), meat, fish (Suma Oriental, p. 390). On the smaller islands close to the southern coast of Sumatra, however, habits changed: on one of them, the staples consisted of sago flour, yams and bananas (Álvares, 152, Missões Insulíndia, II, 406). On Solor and nearby islands, they ate some rice, maize, many yams and chicken, grains, beans, pork, goat, honey (Dias, 1559, *idem*, 345). The priest explains that, as many of these islanders were used to eating pork (those from Macassar, for example), they were unwilling to receive Mohammed (348).

The case of the Moluccas is a good example of this. The priest, Master Pancrudo, in his description of the islands, says that "it is a land without bread, or wine, or meat; they only eat fish and their bread is like ashes, mixed with glass, because it glistens; the one who eats rice is the king" (1561, *idem*, 375). In the absence of rice, the commonest staple is sago (Madrid, B. N. 3015, f. 41v). Sago comes from the pith of certain trees, like palm trees, but thicker; put in a bowl with water, with the bark removed, it is stirred and falls to the bottom, the liquid is drained off, and it is quickly sieved, and without waiting for leavening they pour the flour, which is really white, into red tiles, with deep divisions, where it is cooked; it is eaten hot, and tastes like slices of bread (Dias, 1556, Missões Insulíndia, VII, 251-3; Castanheda, book VI, chap. C). The people were poor, and were always in the fields with their crops; as in Southern Africa, it was mostly the women who cultivated the land. The other leading activity was fishing, and, in short, this archipelago had two kinds of sustenance: bread made from flour of the pith of a tree and fish (Fróis, 1559, Missões Índia, VII, 327-64). The Portuguese sent some rice from India, and, to a lesser extent, wheat (in 1526, therefore, 33 *candis* and 6 *mãos* from Goa, T.

T., C. C., II – 132-60). The people farmed vegetables, fruit, yams and grains (Missões Insulíndia, II, 444). But sago was the predominant food: and so that it could provide sustenance for the priests who travelled the islands there was someone with special responsibility for it in the Moluccas fort.

We have mentioned bananas several times ("Indian figs"); it would be a good idea to briefly mention where they are produced: Guinea, the Sofala coast and the Abyssinian coast, Egypt and Syria, Concan between Chaul and Goa, Bassein, Malabar, Bengal (where bananas of special quality were introduced from Martaban, Myanmar); from the East, they were taken to Brazil, New Spain and Peru; the "ships from India" would bring bananas to Portugal (Orta, I, 330-3).

This brief overview of the food provision situation in Asia shows that not only the big trading centres, like Hormuz, Goa, Calicut, Malacca, and smaller towns on the coasts, but even whole regions relied on maritime traffic for their basic supplies. Solis' observation that command of the sea is the key to plenty or want is confirmed, as is Corsali's statement, more than a century earlier: that with the Portuguese armada being master of the seas, and then of the ports, it controlled the shipping of supplies and thus reduced everyone to submission.

ASIA WORLD-ECONOMIES

Taking the economic structure of Asia as a whole, from a spatial point of view, the web is woven of the following principal threads: *a*) Narrow localization of certain key traded products, through the profits they ensure, even though demand is small: cloves in the Moluccas, pepper in Malabar, Sumatra, Sunda, and Kanara; *b*) The existence of certain industrial zones, the focal points of strong radiation: Persia, Sind, Gujarat, Bengal, China; *c*) The contrast between gold-producing zones – Monomotapa, to the west, the Malacca peninsula and Sumatra, extending to Borneo and the Celebes, to the east, China – and silver-producing zones – central and eastern Europe (this is outside the geographical scope considered here, but extremely important), Persia and Japan, and, later, Mexico and Peru (also beyond our scope, but equally crucial), controlling wide monetary circulation, complemented by the places where copper and pewter were produced (European, Malaccan, Chinese) and the collection of shells

which were used as money (cowries from the Maldives); *d*) Complementarities of zones with abundant production of goods (Gujarat, Kanara, the Coromandel, Bengal) and both the trading posts with their high consumption and the less privileged areas in terms of provisions, and which had to obtain essential goods from the former. We can now briefly summarize these main economic-geographic complexes in Asia.

Southern East Africa was characterized by the trilogy of gold, ivory and slaves; there was a great deal of coastal trade between the urban-trading Muslims, subsequently Portuguese, enclaves on the coast and adjacent islands – Sofala, Mozambique, Zanzibar, Quiloa, Malindi, Mogadishu – circulating from these chiefly to northeast India (Gujarat): from there, they took on cargoes of clothing and beads, some supplies, iron; amber was also sent there. The East African ports had relations with Madagascar, too, but these were somewhat sporadic; the island sent slaves (which India wanted) and rice; the Portuguese in Mozambique would also go there from time to time, but not in great numbers. Abyssinia alone played a superficial part in the eastern world; rather, it participated in the African hinterland and the Levant: the only ports through which it breathed were Zeyla and Berbera, in the Gulf of Aden; it exported gold, slaves (in great demand), ivory, and imported coarse cloth of many kinds, beads, dates from Hormuz and raisins from Aden.

The Red Sea is one of the main routes linking the East with the Mediterranean; if, on the one hand, the coastal and island peoples subsist from fishing, pearl harvesting, date palms (we will soon talk of the peoples of Arabia), it is through here, on the other, that gold coins, silver, copper, cinnabar, mercury, coral, cloth of every quality and in all colours, opium, rose water, mirrors, glassware pass to India and Malacca. In the opposite direction, the goods headed for Italian and Catalan cities, Dubrovnik (former Ragusa) and Marseille, included spices and drugs, and precious stones. Suaquem alone would receive two or three ships each year, laden with cloth from Cambay; in 1513, at the time when Albuquerque entered the Strait, more than 60 Moorish vessels anchored here, and in Aden there were 13 large ships (7 of them over 800 tons), which the Portuguese torched; in 1520, there were two ships from Cambay in Massawa; in September 1524, a vessel went from Aden to India laden with spices (worth 60 000 *cruzados*, and merchandise worth 200.000). Aden did not just trade

with the Red Sea ports and Socotora, but with Hormuz (where it sent horses, goods from Cairo, madder-plant and raisins), Gujarat, Goa, Malabar, Bengal, Myanmar, Siam (rice was also shipped from these distant lands), and Malacca.

Arabia was known for its horses, aromatics and dates (besides madder and raisins, especially from Yemen); from the early 17th century, it was noted for *caoa* (coffee); a world where settled farmers (especially on the coasts) coexisted with nomad herdsmen (in the deserts of the interior) and caravaneers, consuming clothing, leather, iron, from abroad; in the Strait were the ports of Jeddah (serving Mecca) and Zebite, and, later, Mokka; its main trading centre was obviously Aden, close to Bab el Mandeb; but on the Hadhramaut coast (that of incense and myrrh), there is Xaer (Shihr), and Zufar, facing the Kuria Muria islands, and above the Gulf of Oman, we find the area including Qalhat, Quriat, Muscat, Suhar and Khor Fakkan; for example, in August 1507, there were 10 *sambuks* and 4 ships in Quriat.

The Persian Gulf was another major route of communication between the East and the Mediterranean Levant; if the coastal peoples were poor (subsisting largely on dates, with some barley or products of animal husbandry; even so, many supplies were imported), there was the pearl fishing and busy short-haul traffic linking the Muscat coast to that of Hormuz, and from there, to that of Basrah. This was the route taken by the spices and drugs from Malabar, Ceylon and Southeast Asia to their destinations in Persia and Turkey, Damascus, Aleppo (and from these last two, then on to Venice, Genoa, etc.); rice, sugar and iron came here from Baticala (highly profitable merchandise – which is why, in 1517, Saldanha went with 13 large, laden ships, and in 1523, D. Duarte de Meneses followed with 4 galleys, 3 galleons, 3 rounded caravels and 3 smaller boats). A lot of coinage went from Basrah to Hormuz, as well as silver, camel-hair cloth, saffron, paper, fabric, while the Venetians, in particular, brought glassware. Hormuz re-exported much Persian fabric to Ethiopia, and silvery *larins* to India (it was the silver route, while the one passing through the Red Sea was the gold route), as well as Persian and Arab horses, silks, velvets and Persian carpets, dates, raisins and quince preserve, Arabian incense and myrrh; it received copper from Portugal via Cochin; and so the people here lived "in constant motion and change, because everything is loading and unloading" (Documenta Indica, III, 104-4). At the dawn of the 17th century, the vassals

of the Great Turk alone brought 2 million of silver coins. The maritime axis of Hormuz-Basrah was extended by the camel caravan routes that went from Tabriz, on the one hand, or crossed the desert to Damascus, or followed the Euphrates part way up river and then cut across to Aleppo, on the other; but, as the Aden-Toro maritime axis was duplicated by the overland caravans from Mecca to Damascus or to Cairo, caravans also travelled from the land border at Hormuz to Shiraz and Tabriz. In 1546, for instance, a train of 400 camels arrived at that insular trading post laden with silks, brocades, carpets and fruit (S. Lourenço, II, f. 31). If Persia breathed the ocean air through Basrah and Hormuz, she was nevertheless linked to the Far East by transcontinental routes; and so there arrived from China and Siam, from one place to another, musk, rhubarb (which would spoil at sea), camphor, eagle-wood, silk, porcelain; there was a caravan each year, and the journey took six months. The Persian economy was defined by its silk, carpet and rug industries, as well as other textiles, and horse-breeding, fruit production (notably dates), and the minting of *larins* (coinage), widely used as far as the Far East.

Sind (the river Indus region) and Gujarat form a complex where the textile industry predominates, as well as the production of opium and indigo; it was said of the Mogul empire that all its power came from three herbs: opium, indigo and cotton, which were worth more than all the gold mines of other lands (Relação das Plantas, 1621-1633, 20-21). In Sind, over 30.000 looms were counted, and as many ships as went there were filled; refined (*candil*) sugar was produced and exported in great quantities as well, and there was plenty of butter, leather goods with silk embellishments that were used as rugs, shawls, table-cloths, and then there were cases, boxes and chests made of wood and inlaid with mother-of-pearl; imports included precious metals, seed pearls, copper, dates and coconuts, and even cotton, as the raw material for weaving. The same industries thrived in Gujarat, that is, the finest fabrics were produced (cannequins, *bofetas* (baftas), *iorins*, *chautares* (chowtars), cottons, damask towels like those of Flanders), the production of dyed fabrics used dragon's blood, as well as indigo, and alum, and foodstuffs abounded – rice, wheat, sesame oil, butter, sugar – and soap was made in large quantities and Malaga-style pottery goods of poor quality were made.

With respect to external trade, it could be said that the kingdom of Cambay branched out in two directions: the right arm stretched to Aden and the left one to Malacca, as the chief sea routes, though its ships sailed to others, to a lesser extent (Suma Oriental, p. 367). From Cairo and Damascus came gold and silver, mercury, carmine, copper, rose water, camel-hair cloth, cochineal, coloured woollen fabric, glass, weapons - merchandise from Italy, Greece and Damascus – and from Aden, besides these, came madder, raisins, horses, opium; on the return trip, the sips carried cargoes of Southeast Asian spices and Chinese porcelain, rice, wheat, soap, indigo, butter, oil, lac, Malaga wine, cloth for trade with Zeyla, Berbera, Socotora, Mogadishu, Malindi, Quiloa, Arabia. It sent fabrics and beads to Southern Africa. To Hormuz went cargoes of goods from Malacca (that is, Southeast Asia and China), rice and other food supplies, in exchange for horses, silk, alum, seed pearls, loads and jars of fresh and dried dates, precious metals, *larins*. All the valuable goods from the Moluccas, Banda, China came from Malacca, and quantities of gold, in exchange, mostly, for cloth. In the first half of the sixteenth century, Gujarat was the pivotal point of trade between the strait of Mecca and Hormuz, to the west, and Malacca, in the east. The chief city was Cambay, "the Cairo of India", as Indian Josefe called it; there were few ports, and at low tide this one was partly dry, so that whereas formerly the main one was Barygaza (Baruche), in the early 16th century it was Goa, and then Diu; Surat rose to prominence by the end of the century and had its apogee with the "heretics of the North": until then it had been Diu that was, in the words of Thevet, "the storehouse of all the merchants who deal in Cambay". In Sarkhej and Ahmadabad, the English bought about 20.000 pieces of taffeta a year in each of those markets.

The coast from Daman, in the north, to Dabhol, in the south (Gujarat and Concan), relied on these two ports, plus those of Bassein and Chaul, all of which were filters for the kingdom of Deccan. This realm was rich in rice, areca and betel, and some wheat was grown there, and cattle raised, while their looms produced *beirame* – a fine white cotton fabric – and an infinite array of linens, and cloth that was both white and coloured. The coastal area was similar, with textiles being particularly strong: upper Daman, to indigenous Chaul, Tana and Bassein refined the raw silk from China, taffetas, cannequins; in the second, carpentry manufactures chairs, chests, etc., coated with lacquer.

This is the teak region, the finest timber for ship-building, another thriving industry here, along with all kinds of crafts. From the interior of the Ghats came wheat, iron, steel, saltpetre. *Caffre* and Abyssinian slaves, gold, ivory, opium, indigo were imported by sea. Clothing was sent to East Africa, rice to Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and coconuts and areca to Gujarat. Ten to fifteen ships would come here each year from Cochin and Cannanor, laden with "large cured nuts, and walnuts with sugar of the same nut called *giagra*" (Fedrici); and merchandise from China and Southeast Asia entered via the Malabarese ports, some of which was re-exported. Dabhol was the port of entry for Arab, Khorassan, and Turkish horses (Nikitin, 1470).

After the region we have just been discussing, but before we get to Kanara, on the Concan coast, when the Portuguese captured it, Goa had an important production of betel and areca, regarded as the finest in India, and which were shipped to Aden, Hormuz and Cambay (Pires, 375); the goods Goa asked for were camel-hair fabric, scarlets (cloth), brocades, coral and copper – both finished and as raw materials –, and some mercury (Cartas, I, 445). Subsequent Portuguese policy sought to concentrate the horse trade here, or at least to greatly increase it, and re-export the animals to Vijayanagar, as well as velvets, damasks, strickles, Chinese silks, saffron, scarlet cloth, whence it received diamonds, jewels and golden pagodes (Fedrici, III, 389). In 1554, for instance, Diogo do Soveral described it as "a city larger than any in Portugal, except for Lisbon", and he compares its streets to the Lisbon busy street of the *Mercadores* (Documenta Indica, III, 114), and in this he was borne out by Fedrici: "this is a city of paramount commerce of all kind of merchandises traded in those parts". While Cochin was the eastern end of the Cape route in the 16th century, in the early 1530s, Goa snatched the chief administrative functions from it, and by the late 1550s, it began to be visited by the "kingdom's ships"; this transfer of naval and trading operations, consummated in the 17th century, was encouraged by the rise of Kanara pepper to the detriment of that from Malabar. In Kanara, the ports of Mergui, Honawar, Baticala, Basrur and Mangalore bustled with activity, through which it exported sugar, iron, rice, pepper, myrobalans, sugared preserves and clothing. It was the region of the greatest abundance of supplies, and it produced, too, basic strategic shipbuilding materials: timber, coir, iron, saltpetre (used by the Portuguese to

make the gunpowder needed by the "State of India"). Baticala was for a long period the port through which Vijayanagar breathed, and the port of entry for the horses from Hormuz. Kanara traded mostly with the Red Sea (each year saw many ships coming and going), Hormuz, Malabar, the last-named with respect to maritime relations; it imported coral, seed pearls, rubies.

Now for Malabar, the "pepper country", didn't offered this spice alone: there was ginger, cardamom, areca; the looms of Calicut produced silk cloth, and many preserves; the other industrial centre was Cannanor: fine cotton garments, tables, prized earthenware crockery. Malabar was the source of copper, mercury, carmine, coral, both wrought and in branches, brocades and velvets, scarlet and other cloth, saffron, carpets, rose water, musical instruments. In the time of Varthema, some 200 ships would anchor in the port of Cannanor each year, from various places. Quilon and Calicut were the limits of Chinese maritime trade, and at the beginning of the 16th century, the latter port was handling relations with the Mecca strait. Cochin was to seize first place in the pepper market, making it the end of the Cape route; trade with the Maldives was also handled here. These islands were very significant, thanks to their cowries (the basic currency in regions as far apart as the interior-south of China and Guinea), coir, hugely important in eastern ship-building, coconuts, amber; their main import was rice, since the islands lacked staples. In the 17th century, Goa also replaced Cochin in this trade, thanks to the greater importance of its *Ribeira* (arsenals); but in the first phase, the number of vessels in circulation rose: no less than 12 in October 1526 alone (Castanheda, book VII, chap. 10); the trading post paid 1.000 *bahars* (= 2 828 *quintais*) of the barrels of rice that the ships brought to the islands, and more in coir, as well as the administrative costs (book VI, chap. 89).

Ceylon was the market for fine cinnamon (most of which it supplies to the West), precious stones – sapphire, topaz, hyacinth, etc. –, and elephants; close by are the pearl fishing banks of Mannar; the island also produced a large amount of areca and walnuts, and coir for rope-making: it imported rice, Cambay fabrics, silver and copper, rose water.

The Coromandel was important for rice production and for weaving cotton and bombasine fabric, and it was also close to the seed pearl fishing banks; it supplied Malabar, Ceylon, Malacca; its ports – Nagapattinam, São Tomé

de Meliapore, Masulipatam, Pulicat – maintained links with Martaban and Myanmar; since its clothes were extremely useful for the trade in costly spices from Southeast Asia, in the 17th century the Dutch formed one of their crucial links from Batavia here. Orissa shared many of these features, also being defined by rice and textiles; 25 or 30 ships would load up here each year (Fedrici, III, 392). The base remained in Bengal, but it was complemented by more varied produce, notably fine, white sugar (a great deal was sent to Cochin); among the cotton cloths, we should mention wimple (*beatilhas*), *sinabafos, baracanes, sultampures*; ginger was used in the renowned local preserves. The port of Satagam (or Sadegam) – "honestly nice for a Muslim city, and very abundant" – would see 30 or 35 ships load up each year with rice, cloths, lac, vast amounts of sugar, ginger preserves, myrobalans, long pepper, butter, sesame oil and many other goods; the route from Cochin to this port was usually plied by small boats; cowries came from the west Indian coast (from the Maldives) along with *larins*, and, later, Spanish *reales*; from here, rubies from Pegu were re-exported, and its port of Coximim received a ship every year laden with fine white bombasine, and bombasine of other qualities, taking gold and silver on its return trip. In June 1511, Albuquerque's armada seized a junk, between Sumatra and Malacca, on its way from Bengal with a cargo of merchandise worth 120.000 *xerafins*, without counting the rubies that the Pegu merchants were carrying. Almost all the cloth that the ships brought to Portugal came from the small Bengal port. In Patna, the English were able to buy some 20.000 pieces a year.

The kingdoms of Burma, Jangomay and Arrakan were, in the case of the first two, in the hinterland, and the third, though it extended to the sea, did not have a maritime character (it had just the one port, Maiajarim, of little importance), so that dealings with India were maintained through the ports of Pegu – Coximim, Dogom, and Martaban. The musk and rubies from the Kyatpyen region (Capelangam) met together in the city of Ava, and thence to the ports; the three regions also exported gold (in large amounts), benzoin and lac, and imported pepper and sandalwood (which was re-exported to China), mercury, carmine, *sinabafos*, damask, satins, brocades and white garments from Bengal. Pegu, open to the Indian, thanks to the three ports mentioned above, and Siam, through that of Tenasserim, breathing the same ocean, and to the east overlooking the Gulf that bears its name, was rich in rice and other

staples – butter, oil, salt, vegetables, fish; on the other hand, international trade was growing, in lac and benzoin, in silver and rubies, in Brazil-wood, and in gold. Industry in Siam produced copper and brass articles (in large amounts), cheap cloth (for poorer people) and coarse silk thread. Also important was timber for shipbuilding, in Pegu, and, in the same place, sugar (more for local consumption than for export). The ports of Pegu sent some 15 or 16 junks and 20 or 30 *pangajavas* laden with these goods to Malacca, Sumatra, Pedir, and brought back coarse pottery (the main merchandise), large amounts of mercury, copper, carmine, tin and *fuzeleira*, pepper from Sumatra, damasks; each year a Gujarati ship went to Martaban and Dogom bringing copper, carmine, mercury, opium and cloth, and returned with lac, benzoim, rubies, pepper. Some 20 or 30 ships a year went from Siam to Malacca, and brought back slaves – the chief merchandise – sandalwood, pepper, cloves, walnuts, *sinabafos* and various cloths (quelis), mercury and carmine, opium. Trade with China involved 6 or 7 junks. A Gujarati ship came once a year, too. From the Maldives, the essential cowries. The east coast Siamese ports, which all harboured many junks, traded with Cambodia, Champa, Cochinchina, Java and Sunda, Sumatra, Pedir, Anderguery, Palembang, and Malacca.

The Malaysian peninsula, the northern part of which belonged (more or less strictly) to the kingdom of Siam, was rich in gold – Golden Khersonese, Khryse, Suvannabhumi – long pepper from Kedah, and pewter (tin). In Patane, in 1525, for example, there were 16 junks laden with people and merchandise (Castanheda, book VI, chap. 102). Malacca was regarded by the Florentine Corsali, in 1516, as "the land of larger trade than in other part of the world", and a priest, Baltazar Dias, agreed with the merchant in 1556: «This is the land that is, so they say, bigger in trade than Venice». The opinion of these two was further supported by the Dutchman, Van Linschotten, at the end of the century: "It is the market, or emporium of the whole of India, China, the Moluccas and the other islands around there, from all of which places, as well as Banda, Java, Sumatra, Siam, Pegu, Bengal, Coromandel and India, ships would approach here, constantly coming and going, laden with cargoes of every imaginable merchandise; the men here do not have another life than to earn their living by sailing to distant parts". This fragile city, made entirely of wood and accustomed to fires breaking out, formed the hinge between the Far East and India; there

were easily a hundred ships and junks in its port, as well as countless *calaluzes,* champans (sampans), and other small ships. (Empoli, 1514).

The larger islands of Sumatra and Java were markets for gold and pepper, commodities whose importance grew during the 16th century, culminating in the 17th century with the Turks and Dutch. The islanders were great merchants and sailors. In Minangkabau they made fine daggers, which they sold to Malacca. These two islands imported mercury and carmine, scarlets (cloth), brocades, velvets, any cloth from Cambay, othert cloths, and *sinabafos* from Bengal. To illustrate the trade at one of the ports: between 1512 and 1515, there came to Pedir two ships from Cambay, two from Bengal, one from Benuaquelim and another from Pegu; and 20 junks and *lancharas* sailed from there with rice (Pires, 395). Traffic was busy with the Red Sea, and it increased towards the second half of the century, when Europe began to acquire a taste for the pepper from this region, preferring it to that of Malabar: in 1585, Sassetti tells us that it was in the port of Aceh that ¾ of the spices bound for the Mecca strait were loaded (p. 312); relations commenced with Istambul between 1621 and 1633, and the Turks had a trading post in Aceh that handled a "million in gold" (Relação das Plantas, p. 46): this led Lisbon (1610, Monções, I, no. 115) to believe that "the things from the kingdom of Aceh are the most important they have in these parts, for there is more pepper than in all of the South, and you can load as many ships as you wish here, and get a lot of gold and other valuable goods". This would be the heart of the economic power of Holland in the East, although it kept commercial linkages with China.

Borneo and Celebes (Sulawesi, Makassar) were also major producers of gold, and copper; Borneo also had quantities of camphor, and Celebes was a source of sulphur and saltpetre; *calaluzes* left here for Ternate, taking gold bracelets and bringing clothes from India, which served as currency in the eastern isles. We have seen that pearls were also fished in the local waters. But of more importance were the Banggai islands, to the east of Celebes: a lot of iron was mined here, from which they made axes, machetes and knives, sending them to Ternate. Banda was the island of mace and nutmeg, Ternate, Tidore, Moutiel, Bacan (Batjan) formed the clove archipelago, and received quantities of Indian cloth. Timor meant sandalwood, in this geographic-economic context.

Let us move swiftly back to continental Asia. As the land of Cambodia has so many rivers, it had many *lancharas* (small boats) sailing around the coast of Siam, often engaging in piracy (Pires, 390); its produce included *pau-sapão,* musk, wax, leather in quantity, rice, pigs and chickens: from abroad, it took white garments from Bengal, cloves, carmine, mercury, beads. The *Chams* played a significant role in developing maritime navigation in the Far East, often in conflict with the Chinese. Champa and Cochin-china was the region of aloe-wood, calambac (less of the second than the first) and eaglewood, and it also produced a great deal of loose silk, coloured, and all kinds of taffeta; there was more gold and silver in Cochin-china than in Champa.

China was the aspiring source for silver for the rest of the world and received ¾ of the pepper from Southeast Asia and ¼ of that from Malabar; in the international context, its economy was based on silk, porcelain, gold, copper «chests». Before 1548, the Portuguese took, in just three months, 1.300 *quintais* of silk (Década I, book IX, chap. 2); in the early 17th century, it is reckoned that Canton exported 4.000 *quintais* of silk to Macau and 2.200 to Japan (B. N. Madrid, 3015, f. 98v), bringing back silver; gold and silk went to Spanish Manila. Among imports, ivory was still in the forefront. Chinese trade and maritime commerce was mostly concerned with the Far East, in the late middle ages, and spread influentially to the West, as far as the Persian Gulf and Aden; they returned to India in the closing years of the 1500s, after a not quite total interruption of a hundred and fifty years. When Japan rejected multi-decked shipping and closed its ports to the Portuguese, in 1639, trade passed into the hands of the Chinese, many of whom were also in the Philippines; up to 1660, more than 50 Chinese junks went to Japan every year, and afterwards the numbers fell to around 25; around 1675, *Formosa* (Taiwan), a Ming bulwark, was another island that sent 15 junks annually to the Japanese empire (Hall, 449-50). The Ryukyu Islands exported a large amount of gold to Malacca. The Portuguese had plied a regular route from Cochin to China since 1522; the traffic involved three ships or junks each year; at the end of the 16th century it moved to Goa; in 1614, no fewer than 11 ships arrived there from China and Malacca (AHU, India).

Among the other truly long connections, we should mention that of Goa to Pegu (calling at Cochin and S. Tomé de Meliapore); that of Cochin, and then

Goa, to Malacca; the voyage of Gujarati ships, usually about four, from Cambay to Malacca, carrying cargo worth anything from 15.000 to 30.000 *cruzados*, in the 1520s. In addition, every year saw ships between the Mecca strait and Pegu, carrying woollen cloth, scarlets, velvets, opium, gold ducats, and between the Mecca or Aden strait and Malacca, either directly or calling at Gujarat.

SO WHAT, THEN, IS THE EAST?

The *Suma Oriental* by Tomé Pires, from 1512-1516, "describes all regions lying between the Red Sea to the *Chins* (Chinese)", including the Philippines, the Ryukyu Islands and there is even a reference to "*Jampom*". Duarte Barbosa began with Sofala and Monomotapa, going as far as the Ryukyu Islands again; a century later, Barreto Resende opened his book of descriptions saying that "the State of eastern India, as I found written in some places, begins at the Cape of Good Hope, which lies at a height of 34 and a half degrees from the south part, and comes to an end in the Lanquim or Namgim inlet, beyond China, which lies 34 degrees to the north" (Resende, 75).

Through the various regions of this vast world, there is a common line which some quotations draw attention to. Talking about Abyssinia, Francisco Álvares explains (book II, chap. IX) that there would have been many products and much more cultivation if the lords had not treated the people so badly: but they took everything. The Russian Nikitin, around 1470, notes that in the populous Muslim kingdom of Beder (Bidar), in India, the people lived in abject poverty, while the nobles enjoyed the utmost opulence and luxury (p. 14). Tomé Pires, the botanist, remarks that in Cambodia the people were poor, and the nobles extremely rich (p. 365), and some years later, in 1519, Aires da Gama writes to the king, about Cannanor: "as Your Highness knows, the people of India are generally very poor which is the reason why alms of cheap rice leads many of them to become Christians" (Missões India, t. IV, p. 221). Another Portuguese report stressed that, in Ceylon, the common people "are so poor and so in subjection to the Island's nobles" (Cartas dos Viso-Reis, no. 15).

The Portuguese clearly did not alter the social structures, and many became part of it. In 1518, Pedro Corço, in Cochin, advised king D. Manuel that "the people of Goa have been praying a great deal because they are being robbed and

oppressed worse than the Muslims by the grape-pickers that Your Highness brought here three years ago, because they come from Portugal penniless and are not satisfied with 20.000 *cruzados*, unless they support the whole of India on their shoulders; it seems to me that if India takes this path, it will be destroyed and there will be no master to keep the Turks from coming here. The poor people have not enough to eat and less to wear, because in India they are not paid wages, nor sustenance, nor goods; and Your Highness is as badly paid as they, because these grape-pickers take all the money". Diogo do Couto also realised that these "miserable people are those alone who in war endure the damage it brings" (Couto, Década X, book II, chap. 2), and the captain of Jaffna, in 1626, disclosed to the king: "the powerful people everywhere are always privileged, and the miserable ones here in India are greatly oppressed by them" (AHU, India, box 10, of 20 November). At times, there were those who reacted, as did this same captain, who, knowing that the Overseer who surveyed the register in 1623 did not take this into account, proposed: "the lords must shoulder the burden that is wrongly placed on the poor by ancient charters". Some years later, in 1633, the Captain-general of Ceylon wrote thus to the Vice-Roy, the Count of Linhares: "I am going to the Island to hear the complaints of the poor and the wrongs done to them by our Portuguese, because I am convinced that the basis of the conquest has to be Justice and reason, because we have subjected the bodies with weapons in vain, if the souls of the natives are estranged from our benevolence" (Diário do 3º conde de Linhares, 66).

In contrast to the situation of the common people, the poorest, the opulence of the nobles and the wealth of the trade, which amazed an Italian like Empoli and led Albuquerque to put forth this image: "This India is a great lake of merchandise, and there is a great amount of gold and silver, and there is much profit to be made" (Cartas, I, 274). In fact, so great were the profits to be made from trading in Asia and so abundant was the merchandise and wealth of India, that it is a joke to talk about the profit from pepper (pp. 404 and 273). Two thirds of a century later, the Fugger correspondent in Cochin also reports that "buying and selling here is of greater profit than sending goods to Portugal" (The Fugger News Letters, I, p. 46). That led the Portuguese who went to Asia to settle there and spend their lives in this new environment, as the pilot João Galego and governor Van Diemen explained over a period of

fifty years (writing to the directors of the Dutch East India Company, VOC). The vicissitudes of the Cape route must not be confused, however, with those of the Portuguese presence in Asia, in constant adaptation and a succession of transformations.

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Vitorino Magalhães Godinho (Lisbon, 1918 — Lisbon, April 26, 2011) was the most important Portuguese historian of the last half century. His doctoral dissertation (*L' économie de l'empire Portugais aux Xve et XVI siècles. L'or et le poivre. Route de Guinée et route du Cap.* Paris: Sorbonne, 1958) shifted the historiography of the Portuguese maritime expansion and modernize afterwards history and social sciences in the spirit of the French Analles School. From 2005 we worked with Prof. Godinho in the translation of his main papers for the English-speaking world that barely acknowledges his master works. Unfortunately, his death only allowed the translation and revision of four articles, being one this present publication which is also our humble homage to his brilliant scientific and civic legacy.

STUART BRAGA

A Book Burning in Macau
The Supression of C.A. Montalto de Jesus' Historic Macao

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The act of burning an author's book is a powerful image of mindless authoritarianism, as though ideas could be crushed by action. Carlos Augusto Montalto de Jesus, the author of *Historic Macao*, one of the principal secondary sources of this thesis, suffered this ignominy when the second edition of his book provoked such outrage that it was burned in public in the very place whose history he had sought to honour. Montalto de Jesus himself left Macau, never to return. Another 60 years passed before the government of Macau republished his book, in Portuguese. It was, observed a later writer on the history of Macau, 'one of the most remarkable cases of censorship registered in the whole history of Macau'.[1] There have been other losses of important books there, and, in the case of the Jesuit College of St Paul, the loss of a whole library when the Order was expelled in 1762. Yet the burning of several hundred copies of *Historic Macao* on 11 March 1929 was of a different order. It was the result, not of indifference or neglect, but of vindictiveness, and it is significant that the administration which ordered the destruction of this book did nothing to commission a response to what had so deeply offended them. Book burners do not create. They only destroy.

The publication of *Historic Macao* by Montalto de Jesus in 1902 was a landmark for the Portuguese enclave. Nothing had been written in English about its history since Ljungstedt's *An historical sketch of the Portuguese settlements in China*, based on two smaller books published in Canton in 1832 and 1834, an enlarged edition being published in Boston in 1836. Ljungstedt's principal aim was to expose what he saw as the hollow pretensions of the Portuguese claim to sovereignty over Macau. Montalto de Jesus' aims were to assert that claim and to celebrate the heroes of Macau's tenacious survival, notably Arriaga, Amaral and Mesquita. *Historic Macao*, the title he chose, suggests a travelogue or guide book. The reality was a serious attempt to do justice, from a Portuguese perspective, to the history of this ancient place. He had no previous experience in writing history, and little experience in writing at all. He had been a clerk, probably in Jardine, Matheson & Co. until he was said to have emptied an ink-well over the head of his immediate superior, a fair-haired Scot.[2] Unemployable

(1) SÁ, L.A. de *The boys from Macau*, translated by A. Guterres, p. 44.

(2) An unsigned introduction to the reprint of the 2nd edition of *Historic Macao*, issued by Oxford University Press in 1984, p. vii.


Historic
Macao
BY
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KELLY & WALSH, LIMITED
PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS
1902.

Title page of the 1st edition, 1902

in Hong Kong from then on, he became what would now be called a freelance writer, drifting from place to place, but spending most of his time in Shanghai, more tolerant of eccentricity than rigidly hierarchical Hong Kong.

Born in Hong Kong in 1863, he was in his fortieth year when *Historic Macao* appeared. It is interesting that the author wrote in English and published his book in Hong Kong, a clear indication that there was insufficient interest in Macau to publish there in what was for the Macanese a foreign language. His English was fluent, though often pompous and pretentious. He would choose an elaborate word or a cumbersome string of words in an attempt to demonstrate his literary proficiency.[3] While vehemently asserting Portuguese sovereignty, he was also severe in his judgement of the follies of succeeding authorities in the eighteenth century when opportunities to recover Macau's lost prosperity were frittered away. He was blunt and forceful in his assessment of the parlous state of affairs in Macau at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Despite this, he took what might be termed the official line on several contentious issues. The first was the issue of Portuguese sovereignty, about which no dissent could be tolerated in Macau. The second was the way in which Colonel Vicente Mesquita was to be regarded. Mesquita was the leader of a small force which mounted a successful counter-attack against a far more numerous Chinese force threatening Macau in 1849. Mesquita at once became a celebrated hero, and eventually a statue was erected in his honour in the most

(3) A typical example is his description of the reaction of people in Macau to the sight of the mutilated and headless corpse of Amaral, assassinated on 22 August 1849: 'stricken Macao realised in all its overpowering horror the heart-rending penalty of her regeneration'. *Historic Macao*, p. 341. C.R. Boxer dismissed this habitual style of Portuguese historical writing as 'turgid rhetoric'. *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 158.

prominent public place in Macau, on the *Largo do Senado* in front of the *Leal Senado*. Montalto de Jesus gave a lengthy and eulogistic account of Mesquita's heroism. There were illustrations of Mesquita and two earlier heroes, Arriaga and Amaral. Thirdly, Montalto de Jesus championed the cause of Macau in the precarious situation it faced after Hong Kong became a British colony in 1841.

Once its contents became known, Montalto de Jesus' book was well-received in Macau, where the author became a minor celebrity. He was officially thanked by the *Leal Senado* and recommended for royal honours, though nothing came of this.[4] Encouraged by this success, he went on to write *Historic Shanghai*, published at Shanghai in 1909. It dealt largely with the origins of modern Shanghai and the turbulent period of the Taiping rebellion in the 1850s and 1860s.

Not an economic historian, Montalto de Jesus wrote little on the city's massive development in the following half century. There is no mention at all of the Portuguese community in Shanghai. As in Hong Kong, the Portuguese community, while numerically one of the largest foreign communities was insignificant as far as other foreign communities were concerned. It may be his lack of understanding of the importance of economic development that led to so much trouble for Montalto de Jesus between 1926 and 1929, culminating in the public burning of every copy of the second edition of *Historic Macao* that the authorities there could lay their hands on.

In the early 1920s, buoyed perhaps by the success of *Historic Shanghai*, Montalto de Jesus embarked on a second edition of his earlier book on Macau. Despite the turmoil in China, it was a time of growth for Hong Kong until the serious industrial trouble between 1922 and 1926 crippled the economy there. Macau too enjoyed a brief respite from the long period of decline that had set in almost three centuries earlier. For many years, its administrators had dreamed of the possibility of major harbour works that would enable large ships to call there. A plan at the beginning of the twentieth century to dredge the West River leading to the Inner Harbour was opposed by the Chinese government and so came to nothing. Knowing that the shallow Inner Harbour could never again

(4) Ibid., p. vii. The assistance of Fr Manuel Teixeira was acknowledged in the introduction. It is likely that he was the source of this information.

Macao's Harbour Works C.A. Montalto de Jesus, Historic Macao, 2nd edition, 1926, facing page 480. The completed scheme comprised less than half of this ambitious plan.

be a commercial port, the planners instead conceived of a large reclamation on the south-eastern side of the small peninsula, with a large sea-wall thrown around what would become a new Outer Harbour. The extensive reclamation would provide space for docks, industry, residential development, a railway terminus and even a 'park for seaplanes'.

Unaccountably, the territory's dire water problem was not included in the plan. If this vision were to become reality, a large increase in water consumption was inevitable, but most of Macau's water was already supplied by lighter from streams in the Chinese hinterland. Access from deep water to the Outer Harbour would be provided by a channel 300 metres in length dredged through the shallow, silted-up western side of the Pearl River estuary. In the parlance of the days of sail, this was the 'Macau Roads'. In brief, the scheme proposed to turn the great drawback of Macau's problem of shallow water into an advantage: the silt would be dredged and used for reclamation. Similarly, at the end of

The new Governor of Macau Tamagnini Barbosa, was welcomed in 1931 with a dummy locomotive, a strong hint that the railway line to Canton should go ahead during his administration. The locals seem puzzled. J.M. Braga Pictures collection, National Library of Australia

the twentieth century, another scheme designed to lessen Macau's dependence on Hong Kong constructed an airport with a runway entirely reclaimed from shallow waters east of Taipa and Coloane. In 1922, with brighter prospects than there had been for many years, the decision was made to go ahead with the *Porto Exterior* project. Its promoters hailed it as the beginning of a new golden age for Macau, and the local press seized on their extravagant promises.

A motor road and a railway to Canton were an essential part of this vision. Therefore, when a new governor, Tamagnini Barbosa, arrived in 1931, he was greeted, not only with the usual dragon boats, a guard of honour and ceremonial arches, bedecked with flowers, but also a dummy locomotive, optimistically labelled, 'Made in Macau'. The expectation was clear: the construction of a line to Canton should be high on his agenda. To the optimists, Macau was poised on the brink of a great leap forward.

In preparing his new edition, Montalto de Jesus seemed oblivious to the major port works going on around him, though he included a map of them.



'To my dear friend Jack Braga these lines are inscribed as a token of recognition for his kind efforts in getting up this second edition of the work. The Author.'

All the old features were there in his book, and this time victors' laurel wreaths were placed around the pictures of Arriaga, Amaral and Mesquita. Although he had been in Macau only since September 1924, less than two years, Jack Braga, already a keen historian of Macau, gave him strong support. He assisted him in having it printed at the *Tipografia do Orfanato Salesian,* the press of the Salesian Orphanage, the covers being printed by a commercial printer. The grateful author gave him three copies, and in one he wrote,

> 'To my dear friend Jack Braga these lines are inscribed as a token of recognition for his kind efforts in getting up this second edition of the work. The Author.'[5]

In 1902, he had concluded gloomily, seeing no future for Macau, but in 1926, he cast around for a positive note on which to finish his book. His solution was to suggest that

> it would be no derogation at all if helpless Portugal wisely placed Macau under the providential tutelage of the League of Nations as a safeguard against further ruinage,[6]

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(5) It is in the National Library of Australia, BRA 2104. Another copy is at BRA 2754.
(6) C.A. Montalto de Jesus, *Historic Macao*, p. 514.

adding that

> for such a measure there is a notable precedent in the judicious internationalisation of Shanghai and its marvellous outcome.

In short, he dared to hope that Macau might yet surpass Hong Kong, which in 1926 had been virtually brought to its knees by the strike and boycott of 1925.

Founded in 1919 following World War I, the League of Nations was nominally responsible for the administration of parts of the former Ottoman Empire and the former German colonies in Africa and the Pacific. These were mandated to the victors – Britain, France and the United States. Australia administered the north-east portion of New Guinea. Besides these territories, the League directly administered an awkward hot spot, Danzig on the Baltic Sea. Danzig was dwarfed by its larger neighbours, Germany and Poland, both of whom wanted it; it could not survive without outside protection. Montalto de Jesus appears to have considered that Macau was in a similar position. Moreover in 1926, the League appeared to be an effective champion of world peace and international justice. Reviews in the *South China Morning Post* and the *Hongkong Telegraph* on 14 June 1926 applauded the idea.[7]

Until then, the book had gone unnoticed in Macau, despite the fact that it was printed there. There was then an immediate outcry in the Macau press. On 16 June, *A Patria* let fly with a torrent of words. It described the offending new chapters in *Historic Macao*, as

> a supplement full of insults aimed at Portugal, at the manner of our colonisation, at the method of our administration in the Colony, at the population of Macau; he treacherously even went as far as appealing to foreigners, who would have interfered in the Colony's administration held by the Portuguese for five centuries.

It continued,

(7) L.A. de Sá, *The Boys from Macau*, pp. 44-45.

> We regret that newspapers from Hong Kong did not recognise immediately the falsifications and infamous purposes and why such a book could be considered more than a product of a sick imagination in every respect, at best, by Macau and Portugal. We are sure that the Government of this Province, faced with the Hong Kong press releases, will take the necessary steps that such a grave situation requires.[8]


Historic Macao

INTERNATIONAL TRAITS IN CHINA
OLD AND NEW

BY

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AUTHOR OF
Historic Shanghai, etc.

SECOND EDITION
REVISED AND ENLARGED,
NINETEEN ILLUSTRATIONS

MACAO
SALESIAN PRINTING PRESS AND
TIPOGRAFIA MERCANTIL
1926

Title page of the 2nd edition, 1926.

Montalto de Jesus meant well. He thought he had proposed a way out of the deep pit into which Macau had sunk. However, he seemed to imply that Portugal was, like Germany, unworthy to be a colonial power. Moreover, Macau, like Danzig, could not survive on its own. Still worse, it was a slap in the face to the Macau government which had invested a great deal of money and effort into a major project which was confidently expected to save Macau from obscurity and perhaps even collapse.

There was an immediate rush by people associated with the book to distance themselves from it. The owner of *Tipografia Mercantil*, who had printed the covers, took out an advertisement to declare that he had printed 'truly nothing else'. The Director of the *Tipografia do Orfanato Salesian*, Fr. José Lucas, declared in a long letter to *A Patria* on 18 June that he had been a victim of deceit.

The author abused the trust of all. If there was a slight suspicion of the author's intentions in his book against Portuguese national pride, I, as a devout Portuguese, and those who consider themselves patriots, no matter the economical sacrifice required, would have refused the publication of such

(8) Ibid., pp. 44-80. De Sá made much of this brouhaha, devoting more than thirty pages to it.

material considering the attempt made against the country's honour ... No payments were made in advance for the printing of the book and we have yet to receive any payments.

Fr. Lucas placed the blame squarely on Jack Braga's shoulders.

His friend J.M. Braga, of whom we had and have considered to be a good person and a man of character until the present day, told us he was speaking as a member of a committee to engage us in the printing of the 2nd edition of the said book and to that effect provided us with the paper for the printing.

Jack Braga could hardly ignore this. He too wrote to *A Patria*.

> I am reluctantly writing to you as my conscience is clear and for the only purpose to satisfy some of the friends who have advised me to write. I and some of my friends, acting solely with noble motives, managed to organise a group of persons who desired that precious historic data be made known about the history of Macau, and had guaranteed the purchase of a certain number of copies ... I myself did not see what was added to the 1st edition although he [Montalto de Jesus] had promised to show me the supplement to his first publication.

Another correspondent to *O Combate* on 24 June refused to accept this disclaimer, pointing out that as '*Senhor* Jack himself delivered copies to some of the subscribers he had himself procured, was he still not aware of its contents?' Jack was able to weather the storm; Montalto de Jesus was not.

The outcry against Montalto de Jesus was shared by the enraged Macau authorities, who responded as the papers sought. They withdrew the book from sale and seized all copies they could lay their hands on. According to de Sá, this was 300 copies. The author was brought before a court and fined $400 plus costs, or four months in gaol in default for breach of the press laws, apparently for sedition.

Now destitute, he fled to Hong Kong, complaining that

> I had to seek refuge in the Little Sisters of the Poor Home in Kowloon after being given this charity and having to live among old Chinese folk. This in itself is a condemnation of our Government since foreigners who,

> recognising the value of my work, were amazed to find the historian of Macau placed among coolies and Chinese beggars when visiting me in this home. I became ill and suffered from arthritis and heart problems. My executioners should rejoice from my sufferings — the greatest condemnation and suffering by any Macanese, in stark contrast to the homage rendered to me by many intellectual centres of Europe and America.[9]

He still knew how to tell a good story. Returning to Macau in 1928, he sought restitution of the seized copies. In a submission to the governor, he also sought

> recompense for the moral damage ... so that I can depart from this place with decency so as to forget the injuries and to die far from this ungrateful country for which I sacrificed all including my own health.
> Macau 26 April 1928
> Carlos Augusto Montalto de Jesus

Histrionics like these were unlikely to achieve a positive outcome. When his request was refused, he retorted sarcastically that the books might as well be burned. He was aghast when the authorities responded some months later to his ill-judged defiance by doing just that, in a public bonfire in the *Largo do Senado* on 11 March 1929. Later, he told a newspaper reporter in Shanghai, more sympathetic than those in Macau, that more than five hundred copies had been burned.[10]

Jack Braga had little sympathy. On 17 March 1929, he commented in his diary,

> In the evening I went to Monteiro's for dinner, and the subject was Montalto, who is going about moaning about the burning of his books last Monday, but as it was at his own request he has only himself to blame. What a fool he is. So full of vanity that he has wrecked his life

(9) Statement made in the Police Headquarters in Macau 26 April 1928. L.A. de Sá The Boys from Macau, p.50.
(10) China Press, 23 June 1929. Press cutting in J.M. Braga Papers, 4300/14. Possibly an exaggeration; de Sá's figure was 300.

rather than accept the advice of friends, from his very youth to the present day.[11]


Mr. Carlos A. Montalto de Jesus

C.A. Montalto de Jesus
China Press, Shanghai, 23 June 1929

Jack Braga refused to surrender his copies. He may have had little sympathy with the situation Montalto had put himself in, but he disagreed profoundly with the authoritarian reaction of the Macau government, even keeping an envelope with some of the ashes.[12] Instead, he sent the third of his three copies to a bookbinder and had it bound in vellum, a distinction he reserved for his most precious books. In this copy, he carefully added notes augmenting and referencing Montalto de Jesus' work. He also contacted the author, seeking his comments and additional material for a possible third edition that might one day eventuate. These were also added in his neat, minuscule writing to this special copy.[13] He added a note of warning to later readers: 'These additions must be considered in the light of the bitterness felt by Montalto de Jesus after the suppression of the Second Edition of the book'.

Montalto de Jesus had intended to make a constructive suggestion. Instead it had been seen as an affront. No greater insult to an author can be imagined that the public burning of his book, and Montalto de Jesus left Macau, swearing never to return. Hatred followed him. The *Jornal de Macau* reported on 28 November 1929 that '*esse inimigo dos Portugueses*', 'this enemy of the Portuguese people', was in Shanghai. However, Hong Kong papers and a Shanghai paper,

(11) J.M. Braga, Diary 1929, National Library of Australia, Braga Collection, MS 4300/1.

(12) According to B.H.M. Koo, in a paper 'Researching José Maria Braga', delivered in 2004 at the Ricci Institute in Macau, p. 2. Although I have worked extensively in J.M. Braga's papers at the National Library of Australia, I have not seen this envelope.

(13) Although it is a printed book, these notes mean that it has been catalogued as a manuscript. National Library of Australia, MS 4369.

the *China Press,* supported this 'aged, broken-hearted historian',[14] who died there more than two years later, aged 69, on 19 May 1932.[15]

It took more than fifty years for Montalto de Jesus to be rehabilitated. In 1984, his book, whatever its faults, was reprinted by Oxford University Press as one of a series of important books on Far Eastern history. By then, the League of Nations had long since vanished and prosperity had at last come to Macau, but not through a revived maritime trade. In 1990, a Portuguese translation, *Macau histórico,* was published in Macau in the series *Livros do Oriente*. A Chinese translation followed in 2000.[16] However dated its opinions and obscure its language, the book still had no riposte or effective successor.

(14) China Press, 23 June 1929. J.M. Braga Papers, MS 4300/14.

(15) North China Daily News, Shanghai, 29 May 1932, quoted by Paul B. Spooner, PhD thesis, 'Macau, The Port for Two Republics', University of Hong Kong, 2009, pp. 1406, 1411. The 1984 reprint of Historic Macao, perhaps (mis)informed by Teixeira, erroneously reported that he had died at Hong Kong in 1927 at the convent of the Little Sisters of the Poor. C.A. Montalto de Jesus, Historic Macao, p. ix.

(16) Information from Paul Spooner, June 2009.

JOHN M. JACKSON

Barbarians at the Gate
Sino-Portuguese Relations, 1513-1522

Geography and shifting cultural landscapes prevented China and the West from maintaining more than sporadic, tenuous contact for thousands of years. The 1513 arrival of Portuguese maritime traders in South China established the first significant, sustained contact that the Middle Kingdom would have with the West. The first decade of Sino-Portuguese relations was plagued by misunderstandings, arrogance, and depredations that eventually resulted in the expulsion of Portuguese traders from China in 1522, setting the tone for East-West relations for several hundred years.

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With British victory in the Opium War of 1842, the once-formidable Chinese Empire was thrown into disarray. In ending the war, the Treaty of Nanking (and the supplementary Treaty of the Bogue) "opened China to the West and marked the beginning of a century of imperialist exploitation (Wakeman 137)." By extension, these initial, unequal treaties can be credited with the Ch'ing Dynasty's eventual downfall and the later advent of communist rule in China.

Far from being a sudden onslaught, however, the Opium War was the culmination of East-West conflicts that had escalated since Portugal's "re-discovery" of China more than 300 years earlier. Almost from the beginning, the two cultures clashed; the first decade of the Portuguese presence in China (1513-1522) served as a telling prelude to later events. China's initial relationship with Portugal, the empire's first significant, *sustained* contact with Western Europe, was plagued by mutual arrogance, misunderstanding, and distrust—characteristics that set precedents for future East-West relations. The events of 1513-1522 were direct results of the ethnocentrism of two strong, divergent cultures, and the early misunderstandings and misdeeds foreshadowed the more serious conflicts that would arise in subsequent Sino-European relations.

As significant as these events were, they have received relatively little attention from modern scholars. Writing in 1934, T'ien-tse Chang theorized that the scant research on early Sino-Portuguese encounters in the historiography of East-West relations could be explained by the nature of the surviving documentation. "Although important material exists," he wrote, "it has lain hidden in languages... which are either not much studied by Western historians, or unfamiliar to Chinese scholars" (1). Apart from Chang's work, the situation has remained largely unchanged. Historian Ronald Bishop Smith mined much of the primary source material in Portuguese archives, but Smith seems to have had little interest in translating the documentation into English. The few relevant English-language works, such as Le-min Chen's *Unexpected Visitors from the Iberian Peninsula*, remain rare and largely unavailable to Western researchers. Therefore, much of my research has relied upon general histories of Sino-European interaction. Although these sources are not exhaustive studies of the Portuguese in China, they provide important background for understanding the problems that arose in this first age of China's experience with the West.

To say that the two cultures—European and Chinese—existed in complete isolation from one another prior to 1513 would be a misstatement, however. History records several earlier eras in which it seemed that East and West would be permanently linked. In each instance, however, prevailing circumstances prevented the two cultures from maintaining significant, continuous ties.

The demand for Chinese silk in the Roman marketplace first brought China and the West into indirect contact through intermediary traders of Western Asia. Deprived of reliable descriptions of China, the Romans understandably invented fantastic myths regarding the people and lands of the distant East. These legends of Eastern savages served to reinforce Rome's self-image as the world's cultural epicenter (Franke 1-2).

Dissatisfied with their dependence on Asian middlemen, Roman merchants established a direct sea route to China in the second century CE. Though the new route did not transport large amounts of silk, the competition it gave the Eastern traders made the fabric an affordable commodity for the masses (Hudson 76-77). Roman contact with China was short-lived, however. Even as the westerners dispatched unofficial merchant "embassies" to the Chinese court in the third century (Chang 2-3, Hudson 90), the Roman Empire was losing vitality. Although the Romans had been able to introduce the products of their hegemony—chiefly glass and textiles—to the Chinese marketplace (Hudson 96), the demand for Roman goods proved insufficient to entice the Chinese seek out trade. Thus, economic forces prevented the two powers from maintaining direct contact.

It would be another millennium before China and the West re-established any form of significant direct communication. In the interim, the silkworm had been introduced to Europe (Hudson 120) and Nestorian Christianity had found its way to China (Cameron 19). China continued to trade extensively with other nations, but its foreign contacts were restricted to Arabs and Persians, who maintained a strong presence in the Far East (Franke 7).

The Mongol conquest of China in the thirteenth century provided another opportunity for permanent Sino-Roman relations to develop. "When the Mongols unified Eurasia during the Yuan period," Wakeman writes, "it was momentarily possible for merchants like Marco Polo to travel under the protection of the great Khan all the way from the eastern Mediterranean

to Peking" (112). Though its veracity and accuracy have been questioned by modern historians, Polo's account of his 17 years as an officer in Kublai Khan's court provided the West with its first in-depth description of China—albeit from an imperial Manchu point of view (Franke 12). Clinging to ancient myths surrounding the East, Polo's contemporaries found his description of China unbelievable (Franke 14-15). Still, Europe looked hopefully to the Mongol Empire in a search for allies against its Muslim enemies (Hudson 135). Communication and trade between East and West flourished during the Yuan period. Especially significant to the Europeans was access to the spice trade of the Far East (Hudson 160).

The establishment of the native, conservative Ming Dynasty in 1368 again closed China to the West. With Muslims controlling the lands and seas dividing them, Europe and China were further isolated from one another for the next 150 years (Cameron 124). During the Mongol hegemony, Europe had become increasingly dependent upon East Asian spices—seasonings that made winter-stored meats more palatable (Cameron (127). After the Ming's establishment, the European demand for spices proved a windfall for Western Asia's traders, who sated the European spice demand at an enormous profit for themselves. Just as it had with the ancient silk trade, Europe's isolation from China again made it dependent upon intermediaries for Eastern goods (Cameron 127). And just as the earlier silk monopoly had spurred Roman exploration, so too did the spice monopoly incite Europeans to seek alternative routes to Asia.

The search for new eastern routes was not a cooperative one; the late fifteenth century found the major European powers competing to capture Asia's lucrative spice trade. In this struggle to reach the East by ocean, perhaps no other nation was better prepared than Portugal. Bounded on the east by Spain, the Portuguese were driven to exploit the neighboring Atlantic Ocean for trade routes in establishing economic ties to the wider world. Portugal's long coastline fostered the development of strong maritime trade and nautical superiority; meticulous cartography and skillful shipbuilding lent the Portuguese added advantages in maritime exploration (Boxer 27).

Not only were the Portuguese more prepared for exploration than most other powers, they were perhaps more motivated as well. Longstanding conflicts with Islam made the Portuguese eastward push a religious crusade as much as an

economic one. Writes Boxer (xxii), "It was this mixture of the deeper passions—greed, wolfish, inexorable, insatiable, combined with religious passion, harsh, unassailable, death-dedicated—that drove the Portuguese remorselessly on."

As the Portuguese searched for a way to circumnavigate Africa and reach the East, they sought to spread the domain of Christendom. They were sanctioned in their efforts by a papal bull of 1455 granting them carte blanche to "subdue and to convert pagans (even if untainted by Muslim influence) who may be encountered in the regions lying between Morocco and the Indies" (Boxer 21). With papal authority, the Portuguese conquered those peoples they encountered. As the "discoverers" of new lands, they felt no remorse for the atrocities they visited on native populations (Chang 66). On the contrary, the Portuguese regarded these new lands as theirs to enjoy and exploit as they wished. Furthermore, states Chang, "Considering themselves the vassals of God, they justified themselves in whatever they did to the 'heathens' of Asia" (67).

The Portuguese juggernaut continued rapidly south along the African coast, then around the Cape of Good Hope, and finally into the Indian Ocean by 1495. The Portuguese raped, pillaged, and plundered with a philosophy that equated piracy with trade and conquest with divine righteousness. Ever victorious against weaker powers, the Portuguese may indeed have felt they were divinely blessed. It was only when the Westerners entered China that their advance was countered by a power that—at that time—could match their own.

While the strength of Portugal was based largely upon the recent scientific advances of Europe's explosive Renaissance, China's own technological achievements had been acquired through centuries of steady technological development (Cameron 127, Franke 5). Even as Europe was making monumental leaps forward, Chinese culture by contrast had become somewhat static. The empire's technological acumen was perhaps dulled by self-aggrandizing complacency and a conservative dynasty apprehensive of threats to its rule (Cameron 123). Still, China remained the East's dominant power.

Although the Chinese were perhaps no less ethnocentric than the Europeans, the imperial court's arrogance manifested itself much differently. Since the earliest of times, the Chinese had regarded all other peoples as *yi*, or "barbarians" (Cameron 13). Though they were able to distinguish differences

among other cultures, the Chinese placed these cultures together at the bottom of a social hierarchy that left room for only themselves at the top (Wakeman) 111). China had been, in fact, the most developed Asian culture for centuries. Through longstanding tradition, the lesser nations of Asia acknowledged China's dominance by dispatching gifts via tribute missions to the Chinese court. These missions did little to inflate the dynasty's coffers; as a show of their largesse, the Chinese reciprocated with gifts to their tributaries that were even more valuable than those received (Chang 27). Rather, these tributes were important in reinforcing the image of China as a benevolent paternal figure to other nations.

The Chinese hierarchical ideal did not go unchallenged, however. The Japanese and Mongols, for example, were little inclined to concede Chinese superiority. "Yet," as Wakeman writes, "there were enough countries seeking trade and intercourse with China who paid their respects as tributaries to lend credence to the ideal" (111). Though it recognized the military strength of other nations, China never relinquished its self-perception as the Middle Kingdom—the home of true civilization. Through years of contact with their militant neighbors, the Chinese had learned to appease them—to "manage the barbarians"—and still gratify their own conceit. The arrival of the unfamiliar, imposing Portuguese in Asia would eventually present a new challenge to China's position in the cultural hierarchy.

Chinese merchants first encountered the Portuguese at Malacca in 1511 (Chang 33). In the 16 years since the Portuguese had first entered the Indian Ocean, they had effectively ousted the Arabs and replaced them as the intermediary between Europe and Central Asia (Hudson 193). Not complacent with their prior successes, the Portuguese continued looking for opportunities to expand their new Asian empire. In 1509, the Portuguese sailed east to Malacca seeking spices as well as information about the Chinese, of whom they had heard reports since first landing in India in 1498 (Franke 19). As the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Malacca was an important trading center. Though Ming China had largely withdrawn from maritime trade, its merchants still sailed to Malacca. The island was, in fact, one of the many Chinese tributaries (Hudson 195).

At Malacca, the Portuguese—under Diogo Lopes de Sequeira—found an entrenched Arab mercantile presence. Jealously clinging to their last stronghold in the Far East, the Arabs persuaded the Malaccan sultan to attack the newly arrived Portuguese. Sequeira escaped, but not before many of his men were captured or killed (Hudson 199).

While the Portuguese returned to India and considered their defeat, the Sultan of Malacca became involved in a petty war with a rival kingdom. In 1511, the sultan apparently forgot his place in the Chinese empire. He requisitioned the junks and crews of visiting Chinese merchants to transport his troops in battle (Chang 33, Hudson 199).

Meanwhile, Affonso de Albuquerque—the newly appointed Portuguese viceroy of India—had arrived at Malacca with a new fleet of 18 Portuguese ships and soon began negotiations for trade concessions and the return of Portuguese prisoners (Hudson 199). When these negotiations collapsed, Albuquerque prepared to lay siege to the city. As he did so, the Chinese merchants—still indignant over the sultan's presumptuous appropriation of Chinese merchant vessels—offered their assistance to Albuquerque. The Chinese were much impressed when Albuquerque declined, expressing concern for the merchants' safety. Actually, writes Hudson, the Portuguese were probably more interested in insuring that they would be the sole beneficiaries of victory's spoils (201).

So ended the first Sino-Portuguese contact. The Chinese merchants returned home and reported Portugal's military strength and apparent friendly intentions toward the empire. They also reported the insubordinate actions of the Malaccan sultan. The Portuguese, meanwhile, had conquered Malacca and immediately set about administering this new possession. Albuquerque left a protective force in Malacca and returned to India, dispatching reports to Portugal's King Manoel and awaiting further instructions regarding the Chinese (Hudson 202).

Perhaps impatient with official channels, Portuguese merchants were soon undertaking their own voyages to China. Though sanctioned by Jorge de Albuquerque, the new governor of Malacca, these initial missions had no official status. Rather, they were private efforts to assess the feasibility of developing trade relations with the Chinese (Franke 20).

The first of these "merchant embassies" was headed by Jorge Álvares, who landed at the Chinese island of Tunmen in 1513. At Tunmen, Álvares erected a stone monument bearing the Portuguese coat-of-arms and engaged in trade (Franke 200). Álvares' stay on Tunmen was a commercial success. He not only witnessed the abundant riches of China but also sold his own goods at great profit. Álvares quickly determined that transporting the spices of southern Asia to China would be as lucrative as sending them on to Europe (Hudson 202-203).

In a letter written in 1515, Italian Andrea Corsali described Álvares' voyage. The Italian granted high praise to the Chinese: "They are a people of great skill," he wrote, "and on a par with ourselves." Even here, though, the idea of European superiority is apparent. Though Corsali acknowledged that the wealth and skill of the Chinese matched those of Europeans, he described the Chinese as being "of an uglier aspect, with little bits of eyes." The Chinese were also, in Corsali's estimation, "pagans" (Chang 36).

Even before firsthand descriptions of China's wealth reached Europe, the Portuguese were preparing for an official diplomatic mission. On April 7, 1515, Fernão Peres d'Andrade sailed from Lisbon bound for India. There, he would assemble a flotilla and sail for China via Malacca (Chang 38). After several misadventures, d'Andrade left Malacca in June 1517. Accompanying him was Tomaso Pires, a Portuguese apothecary who was fated to serve as the Portuguese ambassador to the Ming Court (Cameron 133).

Upon arriving in the Bay of Canton in August 1517, d'Andrade applied to the local *pei-wo*—the coast guard commander—for permission to proceed to Canton. After a delay of some days, the pei-wo granted permission (overstepping his authority in doing so), and d'Andrade sailed up the Pearl River to Canton (Chang 41).

At Canton, d'Andrade committed the first of many Western blunders, ordering his ships to hoist their flags and fire a cannon salute (Cameron 134-135). The Chinese were outraged by what they considered an open display of military aggression in a port of trade. Though they were ostensibly pacified when d'Andrade explained that the discharge had been intended as a display of respect, the Chinese long remembered the breach of protocol. Writes Franke, "Thus began the long series of misunderstandings, mutual mistrust, and

contempt, which were to cause so much harm in the future, and which right up to the present time are characteristic of the relations between China and the West" (21).

Despite the early faux pas, d'Andrade seems to have conducted himself well and regained Chinese goodwill. Appeased by d'Andrade's apologetic manner, the Chinese allowed him to engage in trade and to land his embassy. Illnesses among his crew and threats of piracy to the force he had left at Tunmen forced d'Andrade to shorten his visit, however. The Portuguese commander returned with his squadron to Malacca, but not before offering remuneration to any Chinese who held claims against the foreigners (Cameron 138).

The Portuguese embassy, under Pires, remained in Canton, where they were schooled in Chinese protocol. The local Bureau of Trading Junks superintendent, Ku Ying-hsian, finding no precedent for relations with the Portuguese, prepared a report for the throne and awaited permission to send the embassy to Beijing (Franke 21).

While Pires awaited word from Beijing, another Portuguese flotilla arrived at Tunmen in August, 1519. Led by Simão d'Andrade, a brother of Fernão, this second mission rapidly destroyed any goodwill that the earlier mission had established (Chang 47, Cameron 143). Through arrogance and avarice, Simão d'Andrade reinforced the Chinese perception of the Portuguese as another horde of barbarians. Under d'Andrade, the Portuguese erected fortresses on Tunmen and assumed control of the island's commerce (Chang 47-48). Encountering no opposition, they settled in and practiced the methods that had already earned the Portuguese so much wealth and enmity elsewhere in Asia. They refused to pay customs duties, beat a Chinese customs official, and generally ignored Chinese authority. Moreover, the Portuguese incited local brigands to attack villages on the mainland and took captives to export as slaves (Franke 27, Cameron 143-144). Soon, rumors radiated out from Canton about these new barbarians, and the Portuguese reputation for savagery knew no bounds. Tales of Portuguese cannibalism—however unlikely—illustrated the view that the Chinese had of their new visitors (Cameron 143). Considering the many real atrocities committed by the Portuguese, it is not surprising that the Chinese could believe them capable of this one as well.

Meanwhile, Pires and his companions lingered in Canton, awaiting permission to journey to Beijing for an interview with the Emperor Wu-tsung. Finally, in 1520, permission was granted; the officials at Canton had been bribed not to inform the court of Simão d'Andrade's misdeeds on Tunmen (Chang 49). On January 23, Pires left for Beijing with his entourage, gifts for the emperor, and a letter from King Manoel (Cameron 142).

Peres' mission proved a total failure. When opened at Beijing, the original letter from Manoel to the Emperor Wu-tsung proved to differ greatly from the translation prepared by Chinese interpreters. Though the interpreters claimed the translation had been altered to reflect Chinese customs of address, the court believed it an act of duplicity; they also found Manoel's letter to be arrogant and presumptuous. After all, adhering to its longstanding precedents in its relationships with other cultures, the court considered Pires a tribute-bearer, not the representative of an equal nation.

Unfortunately for Pires—and future East-West relations—his arrival at Beijing also closely coincided with belated news from Canton of Simão d'Andrade's activities. Accompanying this blow to Pires' credibility was an envoy from the Malaccan sultan, eager to remind the court that Portugal had seized Malacca—a Chinese tributary—just a few years earlier (Cameron 142-143).

Surprisingly, even after these charges had been leveled against the Portuguese, Emperor Wu-tsung seems to have been magnanimous in his initial assessment of them. "These people do not know our customs," he said; "gradually, they will learn them" (Chang 50).

Two high court officials, Ch'iu Tao-lung and Ho Ao, were less forgiving, however. They reiterated the aggressions of the Portuguese: the seizure of Malacca and the conduct of Simão d'Andrade. Neither did they forget Fernão d'Andrade's firing of cannon at Canton in 1515. In recounting the Portuguese offenses, Ho assailed the presence of foreigners in China as a threat to the empire's well-being. While Ch'iu's suggestions centered on restoration of the Malacca tributary, Ho argued for the expulsion of all foreigners from China (Chang 51). Due in large part to Ch'iu and Ho's influence, Pires and the other Portuguese were declared spies and ordered to be escorted back to Canton. They arrived there in August 1521 and were to be detained while the Chinese

considered their fate (Cameron 144). (As events unfolded on the coast, the embassy›s fate was sealed; they would languish and die in Canton prisons (Wakeman 114.))

As Pires returned to Canton, orders came from Beijing that all trade was to cease and all foreigners expelled. A new Portuguese merchant fleet had just arrived at Canton, however, and refused to depart. It was perhaps inevitable that armed conflict would erupt; apparently feeling that their patience had been taxed beyond endurance, the Chinese attacked. Though reinforced and possessing superior artillery, the small Portuguese fleet was greatly outnumbered. After a long standoff and a final fierce battle, the remaining Portuguese force escaped and returned to Malacca (Chang 54-55).

Apparently unaware of the situation's gravity, the Portuguese sent another fleet, commanded by Martim Affonso de Mello Coutinho, to Tunmen in July 1522. Not long after their arrival at Tunmen, another naval battle ensued, and the Portuguese were again repelled (Chang 60). The Chinese likely congratulated themselves for their victory over the European barbarians. The empire had been purged of its threat from foreigners, and the Ming Court could again bask in the glow of self-aggrandizement.

The mutual economic benefits to be made from trade would not allow China to remain isolated from the West for long, however. By 1530, Canton was again opened to trade—though not to the Portuguese (Franke 30). Instead, the Portuguese spent the next few decades covertly trading off the Chinese coast while currying the Ming Dynasty's favor. Eventually, they were permitted to return to trade in China. In 1557, the Chinese allowed the Portuguese to establish a trading post on Macao, south of Canton. Acting as trade intermediaries between a feuding Japan and China, the Portuguese developed a lucrative trade at Macao that would last many years (Wakeman 114-115). Though China still considered the Portuguese barbaric, the trade the foreigners brought the empire earned them a grudging toleration. China managed these new barbarians by officially ignoring them and maintaining a strictly commercial relationship (Hudson 238).

The Portuguese were not the only Europeans building empires, however. As Boxer writes, "[The Portuguese] had awakened Europe, and the Dutch and the British were within a hundred years of their discoveries yapping at their

heels, wolfish with greed" (xx). While the Chinese were largely able to deal with foreigners on their own terms for the next few centuries, the Middle Kingdom steadily lost ground to the West. Their early achievements had instilled in the Chinese a sense of inherent superiority, and the resultant isolationism and self-acclamation allowed the West time to bridge the technological gap. And while Europe was as confident of its own superiority as the Chinese, the Westerners had no reservations about foisting their culture on other peoples. Faced with such an imposing force, the Chinese Empire would pay dearly for its complacency. The Chinese were, in Hudson's words, "destined in the nineteenth century and after to be violently invaded, overwhelmed and radically transformed by the progressing civilization of the West" (236).

With the arrival of Portuguese traders off China's coast in 1513, East and West were finally—and irrevocably—linked. The next three centuries would be marked by appraisal, scorn, conflict, and finally, war. In reviewing the events of 1513-1522, then, we can see the commencement of what Cameron calls "a tale of tragic confrontation: a clash arising from what is perhaps one of the fundamental misapprehensions of history—the idea that one race or people is innately superior to another" (13). Indeed, during this first age of sustained Sino-European relations, neither culture was innocent of such arrogance.

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IVO CARNEIRO DE SOUSA

China, Portugal and the Portuguese-speaking Countries

A Long-Term Historical Perspective from Jorge Álvares to the Macau Forum (1513-2013)

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Here in Macau, where I have been living, working and researching for the past seven years, the different memory places – from street names to fortresses, from palaces to churches, from gastronomy to life stories – associated with the long-term Portuguese historical presence are everywhere. Among these memory realms, one can find some statues celebrating the "great Portuguese discoverers" of the 15th and 16th centuries. Amid these, there is a monument in an old public garden in central downtown dedicated to a quite obscure and poorly documented figure of "discoverer", Jorge Álvares. The great statue stands on his pedestal a legend celebrating Álvares' arrival in 1513 to the island of Lin Tin, near Hong Kong, thus presenting him as the "first Portuguese who arrived in China". A fact still disputed, albeit the book on Jorge Álvares published by Luis Keil (1990) and the highlighting papers of José Maria (Jack) Braga (1955), since maybe at the end of the same year, Rafael Perestrelo, a cousin of Columbus, landed effectively in Chinese mainland, probably reaching nearby Canton (Brook 1998, 124). Nevertheless, the documentation available highlights that Jorge Álvares was permitted to land on Lin Tin and spent about ten months at the anchorage of T'un Men, where all the tolerated foreign trade in south China was carried out (Braga 1955, 3-10).

The Statue of Jorge Álvares is absolutely fictional (no portray or physical description of this character is known) and follows up the ideological patterns of Salazar's dictatorship nationalist statuary of the "Portuguese discoverers" planted throughout Portugal and its former colonies, especially from 1940 onwards: grave male figures with their bushy beards, olympic and athletic bodies even when, as in the case of Álvares, were dressed in old medieval costumes when they lived and sailed well into the sixteenth century. In this statue, Jorge Álvares lifts his right arm and hand in a prophetic beckon, while his left hand and backs rest in a stone column (the famous Portuguese *padrão*) rising towards the sky the arms of the king of Portugal. It seems, according to official chronicles, that this *padrão* was left in Lin Tin although, despite being an official archaeological site protected by the government of Hong Kong, it did not leave any traces for posterity. In 1514, a son of Álvares died in Tin Lin to be buried next to this *padrão* (where these stone markers also used to preserve the memory of burial places?), a tragic event that did not prevent our obscure

figure to return to the islands of the Great Pearl River Delta to trade pepper for Chinese goods, mainly silk, until dying and joining is son grave in 1521.

It should, however, be clarified for respect to the "historical truth" extolled by this kind of *petit histoire* that these Portuguese captains (as Jorge Álvares is labeled) in search of rich trade opportunities in Southeast Asia and South China seas rarely were the first to set foot on dry lands that they barely knew even when they were guided by Malay, Javanese or Chinese pilots and traders used to regularly attend these islands and coasts of commerce and smuggling. Normally, before disembarking and start trade talks, Portuguese captains, wealth traders and ship owners sent some small boats with sailors, soldiers and some interpreters (very few Portuguese among mainly Asians) to inspect the security of the site, albeit, sometimes, with the most lethal results for this anonymous crude. In 1522, for example, ships coming from the Portuguese conquered Malacca arrived in Sunda Kelapa (what is now Jakarta) signing with the local king a treaty that provided for the construction of a fortress aiming to protect the Sundanese kingdom from Muslim threats (namely from the Sultanates of Banten and Demak) and to develop profitable pepper trade. A *padrão* was erected at the mouth of the Ciliwung River to celebrate the agreement, today proudly exhibited at the main lobby of the National Museum, in Jakarta. Unfortunately, the Portuguese were delayed a few years to build the fortress, and when they returned, in 1527, the kingdom of Sunda had already been conquered by the Muslim militias commanded by Fatahillah. Sailors, soldiers and interpreters sent to the local were slaughtered (Heuken 2001, 108-114). Usually these tragic adventures did not entered the official chronicles, much less rise to any statue, square or street name with the exception of the winners from the other side: after the independence of Indonesia, the former square of the city hall of old Batavia (*Stadhuis*), in Jakarta *Kota,* was renamed Fatahillah, the name that also identifies the local History Museum as well as a national navy ship. Nowadays, in the Indonesian History textbooks used for primary and secondary schools, Fatahillah is celebrated as a great military hero that liberated Sunda Kelapa from the Portuguese invaders, renaming it Jayakarta (Heuken 2001, 112-113). It is not worth adding that the Portuguese maritime and commercial presence in these parts of Asia – from Java to the Moluccas, from the Moluccas to Borneo, from Borneo to Mindanao, from

Mindanao to the islands and coasts of South China – is full of these episodes of clashes, failures, expulsions and defeats that, naturally, are silenced by the official chronicles, although, in contrast, can be recovered in written and oral local memories, in many cases linked in the last century to the production of other strategies justifying other national discourses. Historians acknowledge (mainly after the referential lessons of Eric Hosbsbawm's *The Invention of Tradition*)[1] that the process of renaming and creating new realms of memory is a key contemporary nationalist strategy, normally disregarding the accuracy of professional and academic history.

The statue of Jorge Álvares was also delayed, arriving to Macau only in 1954 (a year after the centennial celebrations), but it is a few tens of meters accompanied in the same garden by another *padrão* celebrating the five hundred years of Henry the Navigator's death, in 1960, perhaps the last paramount nationalist cultural manifestation of the Salazar regime with colonial and imperial pretensions which spread these commemorative stones from Portugal to East Timor (where it still stands in the main Dili square). The following year, in 1961, India took possession of the last three Portuguese enclaves of Goa, Daman and Diu, while the armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Angola broke out. Portugal was progressively more isolated and condemned by the international community; the liberation movements proliferated in the African colonies fueling a dramatic colonial war in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola that last up to the famous Portuguese Carnation Revolution on April 25, 1974.

None of this tweaks the puerile enchantment with which I learned to glorify the great Portuguese discoverers. I started my primary school in 1965, in Porto, studying in an expensive private institution owned by a Catholic religious congregation of French origins. From the first year, the classes were divided into four subjects: Portuguese, Religion and Moral, Arithmetic, and History. The History teacher from first to fourth grade was a tall priest of his sixty, burly, ruddy, and as excited as hard. He taught us History of Portugal as a unique gallery of kings, heroes and battles, between screams and slaps,

(1) Hobsbawm, Eric & Ranger, Terence (eds., 1983). The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

fueling an epidermal enthusiasm for the Portuguese Discoveries. The logic was simple: from Henry the Navigator onwards Portugal had discovered the world guided by a unique breed of heroes as Gama, Cabral and, above all, the terrible Afonso de Albuquerque, the conqueror of Malacca, Goa, Ormuz and ruthless persecutor of Muslims infidels. Occasionally, in rare moments of reflection, our priest corrected the global excess, explaining critically that because of two shameful traitors, Portugal had failed to discover everything unknown on Earth: Columbus had betrayed the king of Portugal to reach the Americas; being the worst of traitors Fernão de Magalhães (the Filipino Magellan) who had traveled around the world sold to the king of Spain. In this dichotomous logic, the great discoverers were national heroes and founding fathers of a proud transcontinental and multi-racial unique nation, despite the embarrass caused here and there by some ambitious and weak characters circulating in the Portuguese empire rushing for selfishness and avarice, unable to honor Portugal's superior mission of giving new worlds to the catholic world. The great Portuguese discoverers were also our infantile heroes and we all dreamed with their exploits and victories in those distant and exotic worlds rescued by Portugal's generous civilization, the nationalist ideological discourse that we celebrated through the Portuguese Youth with our military alike uniforms every June 10th on the "Day of the Race" (the Portuguese "special race").

PORTUGUESE EARLY TRADE CIRCULATION IN SOUTH CHINA (1513-1521/24)

Strangely enough, this almost childlike logic continues to guide the Portuguese historiography of the first "Portugal-China encounters" (as it is now called), between 1513 and 1521-24. Everything seemed to go well through these trade adventures of Álvares, Perestrello and several others following long lasting commercial linkages between South China and Southeast Asia using the Ming tributary system as well as smuggling and bribing common practices, until the Portuguese king decided to send a formal embassy to the emperor of China, at the time the young and controversial Cheng-te. A fleet commanded by Fernão Peres de Andrade left Lisbon in 1515 for this purpose then leaded in Asia by a curious ambassador, Tomé Pires (ca. 1468-1524), an apothecary, member of the Portuguese expedition that conquered Malacca, in 1511, a man in charge

of collecting Asian drugs and author of an important *Suma Oriental* fully reporting on kingdoms, trade and other Eastern curiosities (Cortesão 1994). The appointment of Pires, and not as usual of an important nobleman, stresses the trade goals of an embassy counting also with the presence as commercial agent of the Florentine merchant Giovanni da Empoli, who had written from India on China very profitable trade, a subject presented with exaggerated bright colors in a report brought by Rafael Perestrello to Malacca, in 1516.

In August 1517, the eight ships with the Portuguese embassy reached the Canton Estuary with a letter from King Manuel I. The Chinese official reception was hostile, since the Portuguese were identified as the pirates that conquered Malacca, a tributary kingdom of the empire. The Canton governor consulted the Ministry of Rites in Beijing confirming that there was no official record of the Portuguese ever having offered tribute to the son of Heaven. In February 1518, the ministry requested the imperial authorities in Canton to expel the embassy. However, some wealth members of the Portuguese mission as the influent Muslim merchant Hoja Asan were able to bribe the head of the maritime administration in Canton getting permission to travel to Nanking, in May 1520, and then to reach Beijing (Pelliot 1948, 81-292; Wills 2008, 336-339). Unfortunately, the embassy was unable to secure an audience: the emperor returned to Beijing in January 1521 very ill to die on 19 April 1521, at the age of twenty nine (Geiss 2008, 436). The day after is death, the Portuguese embassy was expelled. In fact, all the foreign embassies and foreigners were expelled from Beijing and after ordered to leave immediately the empire including the trade islands in the Pearl River Delta (Geiss 2008, 438; Wills 2008, 339).

This unsuccessful diplomatic mission received in the Portuguese historiography another one of those famous dichotomous explanations through the accusation of one of those scapegoats moved by greed and vanity, unable to honor the superior glory of the "Portuguese discoverers". In August 1519, Simão de Andrade, brother of Fernão Peres de Andrade, traveled from Malacca to T'un-men with three junks. In the trade island, this other Andrade decided to build a provisional fort, executed a Portuguese, demanded priority in trade exchanges and even knocked down the hat of a Chinese official representing imperial authority. Simão de Andrade and other Portuguese also bought Chinese children, probably from *tanka* families that were not allowed to live

in mainland. These children and some other Chinese slaves were also present in Tomé Pires' embassy and amid traders, fueling anthropophagic rumors that the Portuguese were buying these young children to cook and eat them. In any case, Simão de Andrade stayed almost one year in the Canton River Island, leaving without problems in September 1520 (Wills 2008, 337-338). One can speculate that his unpunished abuses were reported to Beijing (there is not any documental prove of it) and associated with other diplomatic mistakes (some Portuguese historians stressed the erroneous translation of King Manuel letter that nobody ever saw) ruined the first Portuguese embassy to China (Wills 2008, 339).

These factual undocumented explanations accounted from a Portuguese official perspective based in epochal chronicles on maritime heroes, brave captains, diligent ambassadors, good and bad brothers, lack the essential, the identification of a historical process. Political, diplomatic or any kind of formal agreement between China and Portugal was totally unattainable during the Ming period. Other than a civilizational long-term suspicion of other cultures, the Ming limitative perspective of foreign political and trade relations was framed by a tributary system cored on the centrality of the emperor, his ceremonial and symbolic universal leadership preserved through the bureaucratic vigilance of the Mandate of Heaven distance towards the non-Chinese. Organized far from this highly ceremonial system, Tomé Pires' embassy on behalf of a non-tributary and ignored country was condemned to fail, regardless bad translations, arrogant brothers and misbehaviors. In consequence, the Portuguese missions that arrived in South China from 1522 were violently attacked while the Chinese authorities arrested their captains, traders, sailors, slaves and the returning embassy of Tomé Pires who died in China, in 1524. Until 1528, the Ming authorities kept military fleets to protect the maritime South against the return of the Portuguese that were excluded from the non-tributary taxed trade when it re-opened in Canton, in 1530 (Wills 2008, 340).

However, albeit these contradictions, distances, ignorance and more than huge demographic or economic differences between China and Portugal, in a connective historical perspective some paradoxical similarities were strangely evident in 1521. In this year, the Chinese emperor and the Portuguese King

died, in this case ending up the imperial optimism spread throughout Western Europe in expensive Latin Renaissance letters praising Portugal's leadership of a new coming Christian universal empire defeating the Muslim expansion. At the same time, both Cheng-te and Manuel were enthusiastic clients of astrologers, and the Portuguese king wouldn't allow his ships to leave Lisbon without a favorable horoscope. They were both engaged in widening the role of their ceremonial courts as the key realm of high sociability and political central stage. They were both committed to expensive apparatus investments, from palaces to arts, from public festivals to processions, albeit the social misery of their subjects addressed through luxurious manifestation of royal piety. They didn't allow the financial ministers of their kingdoms to use their private fortunes to pay the royal treasures' huge debts and crisis. In consequence, they increased heavily taxes upon peasants, merchants and cities, broadening fiscal and political centralization. Curiously, Cheng-te and Manuel were also excited lovers of festivals of fireworks, and the Portuguese King famous royal entries in Lisbon gave us the first documental references to fireworks spectacles in Portugal.[2] Powers (this type of monarchic absolutist powers) were not as different as one normally thinks, but the two epochal societies were in fact largely diverse and framed by distinct civilizations.

The Portuguese early 16th century maritime circulation and conquests in Asia were able to disrupt Muslim trade in the Indian Ocean, mainly between Mozambique, the Red Sea and the West coasts of India, but barely affected the traditional trade patterns in Southeast Asia and South China Seas. The Portuguese were not only expelled from Java, but also from Sumatra, while Malacca was besieged almost every year, requiring large naval and defense investments, embarrassing its former tranquil trade platform role. Therefore, the Portuguese commercial presence in Southeast Asia and South China Sea was mainly developed after 1524-1528 by private traders, their local allies and partners, Eurasian descendents and families accommodated to the paramount profits of traditional triangular intra-Asian commerce, exchanging Indian pepper and clothing by Southeast Asian spices and Chinese silk and other

(2) For the Chinese emperor Cheng-te see Geiss 2008; for the Portuguese King Manuel I it is still useful to read the 16th century chronicle by the great humanist Góis, Damião de. Crónica do Felicíssimo Rei Dom Emanuel. Lisboa: Francisco Correa, 1566-1567, 4 vols.

goods, these also exchanged against spices, silver and other luxurious items. These Portuguese and Eurasian traders were firmly installed in mid-16th century in the main linkages of this trade network, obeying to the official Portuguese "State of India" only when it was advantageous, playing as a sort of shadow empire here offering commercial services, as in Sulawesi, there mercenary skills, as in Cambodia.

Moved by a clear mercantile social mentality, these Portuguese and Eurasian traders were suspicious of the political official control of Portuguese authorities as well as of catholic missionary activities, regarded as an embarrass to trade opportunities in Southeast Asia and, mainly, in the islands of the Pearl River Delta. In consequence, it is not surprising that the first Jesuit missionary to reach the South China islands, the famous St. Francis Xavier, died almost alone in Sangchuang among hundreds of Portuguese traders hostile to his plans of evangelizing China that would damage a profitable trade done often in the back of Chinese Ming authorities (Sousa 2006). In the next coming years, between 1553 and 1557, these traders were responsible for the Portuguese settlement in Macau, much more the result of private investments than official ones. Truly, the multi-secular historical links between Portugal and China have a long-term *locus*: Macau. And since 2003, with the creation of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries (commonly known as *Macau Forum*), Macau pretends to be a locus of *lusofonia* (lusophony).

LONG DURATION: FERNAND BRAUDEL'S LESSONS

The identification of the main characteristics of the historical relations between China, Portugal and the Portuguese-speaking countries demands a long-term perspective, avoiding the nationalist commemoration of (unilateral) heroes, fictional statues or incidental facts. The idea that understanding the past is not acquired through the reconstruction of events, dates, collections of big names, but can only be apprehended through the rigorous identification of lasting structures, protracted, slow, marking the time of civilizations and their world contacts is due to the referential work of the most important twentieth century European historian: Fernand Braudel (1902-1985). Especially in his three

monumental volumes devoted to the study of *Civilization and Capitalism,*[3] Braudel taught us two key lessons that do not always warn the historical research aiming to rethink lengthy communications between territories spread over different continents and civilizations, as it is with China, Portugal and the Portuguese-speaking countries (the latter sharing the same official language and fragments of a connected colonial history, although not having a common history or even, as in the evident cases of large populations from East-Timor, Mozambique, Angola or Guinea-Bissau, a "common" language).

A first key Braudelian lesson explained that in history the global is always more important and extensive than the parts that comprise it. One can not, for example, study the economic history of Macau just by rebuilding internally or describing particularly the local economy of Macau, being also necessary to identify its economic position in the world, its economic relationships with the global. The economic, social or political history of Macau depends on both its internal achievements as well as its positions in a world system exchanging trades, economies, markets, products, peoples, cultures and ideas. Today, it has become popular, almost politically "correct" amid local intellectuals, to criticize Macau's mono-typed economy by its excessive gambling addiction and large dependency on the huge profits generated by the casinos (five times more than Las Vegas in 2012). However, strictly speaking, this gaming specialization is, so far, the only way through which Macau was able to take competitive advantages from the world integration of investments, capitals, and markets generated by the acceleration of the process of globalization for which China is nowadays both a key engine and one of the most important beneficiaries. It is not possible to envisage any other economic sector of Macau – from services to commerce, from industries to technologies, from universities to research – able to lead (or even to match) another concrete field of global economic competition. Thus, Macau depends nowadays (as in the past) of its peculiar position in a globalize whole that is also the context for the astonishing economic growth of China in the last two decades or the emergence of the economies of some Portuguese-

(3) BRAUDEL, Fernand (1967-1979). Civilisation matérielle et Capitalisme (XVe-XVIIe siècle). Paris: A. Colin, 3 vols. (English translation Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century. New York: Harper & Row, 1981, 3 vols.)

speaking countries (Brazil is clearly the power house of South America and a leading BRICS' partner; Angola, Mozambique and East Timor reached in 2012 the top ten of GDP growth).

Furthermore, since the process of globalization merges different global, national, semi-national and local scales, Fernand Braudel works and some of the world historical researches that he inspired from Imannuel Wallerstein[4] to Andre Gunder Frank[5] defined globalization as a process, a long-term historical process that we discuss today (imagine the scandal) if it has 500 or 5000 years! As a historical process, globalization has not a substantive reality, doesn't exist by itself out of time and space, being a label (much more than a clear concept) nowadays trivially used and abused in reference to different movements from world trade to global stock markets, from the interconnection of financial and economic crisis to global currencies' speculation, from the spread of internet to global media networks, but also including the ongoing integration by nation-states of global aims or laws, the development of several sub-national networks of large metropolises as well as the evident global impacts of diverse local entities from terrorist cells to political agitation. In this multi-scale and miscellaneous sense, "globalization" can not be measured, although its different financial, economic and social impacts are able to be expressed in world volumes of trade, capitals or migrations. Therefore, the word globalization expresses the key characteristic of an ongoing historical process, in fact, a long-term historical process of continuous acceleration of world interconnections, from trade to cultural communication, from financial capitals to people, from diseases to medicines and several other diverse domains.

A second keystone Braudelian lesson is even more revolutionary and has complex epistemological consequences. The French historian explained repeatedly that historical time comprises three different rhythms framing differently the past and, through it, the legacies of the present and future: the short time of the facts – a battle here a new king there – can change as

(4) Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974). The Modern world-system. Capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world-economy in the sixteenth centuyr. New York: Academic Press.

(5) Frank, Andre Gunder & B. K. Gills (eds., 1993). The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? London–New York: Routledge; Frank, Andre Gunder (1998). ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. Berkeley: University of California Press.

much as the players of political and social power, but never deeply modifies the circulation of a local and regional economy in the world, much less radically shakes cultures and cultural practices, never shifts civilizations. A second level of historical time, defined by Braudel as a medium-duration, lasting one or two centuries, is normally attached to a dominant economic structure, a sum of repeated economic conjectures or a social group recurrent domination through patrimonial, oligarchic or corporative power. This sort of medium-term historical time can change economic and social structures in consequence of severe economic crises, social movements or revolutions able to shift political regimes, even forms of division of labor, capital distribution or social organization, but can hardly transform profoundly civilizations. Therefore, in Braudel theory, the utmost important target of historical research is the understanding of the long duration of the almost immobile key elements of the past (*longue durée*), the time-consuming connections between man and landscape, societies and cultures, creating lasting civilizations.

In his master work, *Civilization and Capitalism,* the French historian concluded that the elementary material structures (food, housing, clothing and transportation) of the different past civilizations were basically different prior to the process of industrialization, thereafter responsible for opening since the late 18th century a long-term process of global material civilization unification. Following Fernand Braudel, contemporary globalization was mainly the process of convergence and homogenization of civilizations through an increasing global trade and market share of the same basic material structures, from the flats in which we live nowadays to the cars that we use, the jeans and shirts that we wear or the industrial mass food that we consume.

Today, fortunately, our perspective of global history changed without return. The long academic predominance of a Eurocentric perspective on universal history has been criticized in almost all fields of social sciences, from history to economics. One can not continue to teach world history as I learnt it in primary and secondary school or even at the university: the first true "intelligent" man born in the biblical territories of the Middle East; the first true classical civilization arose in Greece; the first great world (in fact, Mediterranean) empire was the Roman; feudalism is a genuine European creation with some imperfect imitations elsewhere (as Marx "Asiatic mode of

production"); and industrial capitalism is the greatest invention of Europe, spreading since late 18th century from London to New York to master the entire world[6] (in this case, Marx is still useful, at least to contradict and defy the masters). This truly extreme occident-express subsuming the world history in a Eurocentric tunnel was taught by schools and textbooks as evidence, from factual evidence to undisputable conceptualization, building up a system of knowledge attached to some of the key ideological and political characteristics of an European colonialism traditionally taught to date back precisely to the "Age of Discoveries", a period in which the Iberian powers' maritime expansion is also normally presented as the first true globalization.

It is very difficult – if not completely awkward – to continue to teach that our Modern World was suddenly created with the arrival in 1492 of Columbus to the *West Indies* and of Vasco da Gama in 1498 to Calicut, true West India. Rigorously, both famous Admirals (as they are labeled through a memorial distinctive process from those much less important "captains" as Jorge Álvares) were in search of the same: the rich spices and trade of Asia. Columbus died believing he had found the true Indies, and his dream of reaching the East seafaring towards West was exactly the same guiding Fernão de Magalhães world circumnavigation. In the 16th century, the Portuguese didn't discover in Asia nothing else than an ongoing wealthy locomotive of intra-Asian trade and tried to catch a profitable coach. In fact, in this period, the economies of India or China were much more wealthy than most of all the European economies combined, as Adam Smith recognized it later in his famous *Wealth of the Nations*, first published in 1776. Until early nineteenth century, China alone was far more productive, from agriculture to transportation, than all Western Europe (Pomeranz 2000). In economic terms, the global historical discontinuity, as Braudel explained it, is a 19th century process, combining European colonialism, imperialism, and mainly industrialization.

Nevertheless, five hundred years ago, the Portuguese were able to invade trade communications between the Asian economies, trying to control through naval superiority the strategic points that, from Ormuz to Malacca,

(6) Blaut, J.M. (1993) The Colonizer's Model of the World. Geographical diffusionism and Eurocentric history. New York-London: The Guilford Press; Blaut, J.M. (2000) The Colonizer's Model of the World. Eight Eurocentric Historians. New York-London: The Guilford Press.

structured the triangular commercial linkages between the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and South China Seas. The successive conquests of Goa, in 1510, Malacca, in 1511, and Ormuz, in 1515 (although occupied in 1507 and lost in 1508) thwart the Muslim trade in the Indian Ocean, leading to the organization of an interconnected network of enclaves in several harbor-towns and islands that were fortresses, trade factories and cities. Through this network the Portuguese offered to the intra-Asian trade faster, safer and cheaper maritime intermediation supported by naval artillery virtually unbeatable in the 16th century. Besides, the Portuguese built up a key annual maritime connection between India and Lisbon through the *carreira da India* able to function almost continuously up to the end of the 18th century with a low lost of ships and cargo supplying the European markets. This maritime system (much more than a maritime "empire" that the Portuguese were unable to create in the vast seas of Asia) competed with advantages against the centuries-old transcontinental Silk road (and its maritime counterpart), although this and several other terrestrial routes continued to distributed Eastern spices and Chinese goods to the Ottoman Empire, the Eastern Mediterranean and the grand commercial Italian towns (Sousa 2004)

In the 16th century, Portugal had a population ranging from 1,5 to 2 millions inhabitants, scarcity of natural resources, poor agricultural production, very low industrial outputs, and continued lack of capitals in silver that were needed for the Asian trade adventures. It is almost a miracle, that a small and basically poor European country was able in mid-16th century to control almost fifty enclaves in Asia that didn't gather more than 10.000 European Portuguese for a total population around a quarter of million. Viceroys, governors, captains and other authorities of the Portuguese "State of India" (as was labeled the network of enclaves from Mozambique to Malacca, Macau and Solor-Timor) were repeatedly complaining about the difficulty of mobilizing some hundreds of Portuguese to defend fortresses and trade factories, relying in local alliances and soldiers, broad distribution of trade profits amid local elites, countless bribes and gifts exchanges as well as systematic (in fact, official since Afonso de Albuquerque) marriages with Asian women then producing along with other sexual "encounters" Eurasian families and offspring.

The Portuguese "State of India" was not might enough even to control some few thousands of Portuguese and Eurasian that spread in Southeast Asia and South China as traders, adventurers and mercenaries. In some cases, building up communities that among the *kristang* of Malaca, the *mardijkers* of Tugu, near Jakarta, or the Timorese fishermen of Bidau, nearby Dili, still claim proudly today a Portuguese origin. The relations of these present-day communities to the Portuguese 16th century enclaves in Asia is now much more mythical and symbolic than historical, reminding us that the Portuguese official presence in the East was largely dissolved in the first decades of the 17th century, unable to resist the Dutch V.O.C. offensive and its local alliances, only surviving in the West Indian enclaves of Goa, Damam, and Diu, liberated (invaded and occupied according to Salazar's regime perspective) by India in 1961, and lasting in Macau and East Timor up to 1999.

MACAU AS A GLOBAL PLATFORM

Macau was the final synthesis and achievement of the Portuguese presence in the East. Final achievement since afterwards, with the exception of the conquest of Daman, there was not any other Portuguese new settlement in the maritime coasts of Asia, rather a continuous contraction up to the key lost of Malacca, in 1641, to the Dutch; final synthesis since Macau merges initial private entrepreneurship with later official investments, trade opportunities convoking local alliances and capitals, bribery and a long-term gift-giving gift-receiving system along with the built up of the last Portuguese Christian town in the Far East, walled, surrounded and surveyed, not different from the *intra-muros* invented in Malacca to spread out amid several European colonial towns in the East. In formal terms, the Portuguese administration of Macau lasted up to the 1999 handover, transforming the enclave along with East Timor in the final remaining of the former Portuguese colonial empire.

Unfortunately, Macau has much more *stories* than history, even less a historiography inspired by the Braudelian *longue durée* challenges. However, Macau is the result of a long-term history building up unique structures and global functions, and it is one of the oldest paradigmatic products of the intercontinental globalization of trades, capitals, emigrations and cultural

encounters. The "mysterious" (accounted by the most fantastic stories of pirates, mandarins, smugglers, traders and adventurers) survival of a Portuguese (in fact, also European, foreigner and international) presence in Macau over 450 years is due to three key long-term and "global" factors. First, the enclave was a long-term business platform capable of mediating the Chinese industrial productions (silk, porcelains, furniture, and luxurious goods) to the markets of Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, South America and Europe. This was a unique global role in the well known historical context of the Ming closure of Chinese markets to foreign trade, although in South China, mainly in Guangdong and Fuquien, there was ongoing external commerce legal and illegal as well as continuous pressures to open China to world trade, a regional element widely exploited by Macau traders.

Secondly, Macau was the mainly gate that allowed the Chinese imperial court and intelligentsia until the end of 18th century to gather information on the European Scientific revolution, from ideas, philosophies, and theories to equipments. As we know, the Catholic missionaries who moved within China in 17th-18th centuries were mainly accepted by their scientific and technical expertise rather than through the novelty or challenges of their religious word normally regarded between suspicion and violent marginalization. In spite of the last decade dissemination of different academic (and others) essays stressing the lack of basic economic and technological differences in the comparison of the Western and Chinese Modern History, this simple "scientific" evidence still stands up: China didn't have a historical transformation comparable to the European Renaissance and the modern scientific revolution, and this explains, quoting and enlarging a relevant Pierre Chaunu remark, why Columbus, Vasco da Gama, Descartes or Newton were not Chinese.[7]

Third, Macau has always been a land of exile and exiles tolerated historically by both Chinese rulers and Portuguese colonialism: a rare safe haven. Exiles of wars, revolutions, social clashes, political oppositions, private agents and

(7) "That Christopher Columbus and Vasco da Gama weren't Chinese is something which is worth some moments of reflection. After all, at the end of the 15th century, insofar as the historical literature permits us to understand it, the Far-East as an entity comparable to the Mediterranean is in no way inferior, superficially at least, to the far-west of the Eurasian continent" (Chaunu, Pierre (1960). Séville et l'Atlantique (1504–1650). Paris: SEVPEN, VIII (1), p. 50).

merchants, countless adventurers or the thousands of refugees from the II World War in the Pacific were always able to find shelter in Macau, to recompose their social situation and in several cases to build their economic wealth through their intercontinental connections.

The history of Macau added up to this peculiar survival system a political paradoxical regime cored in a long-term accommodation pattern. The enclave has always been and administrative territory claimed by China and controlled by its political cartography, in spite of being a part of the Portuguese colonial empire which ensured its formal government and administration. A paradoxical situation that, through permanent negotiation, share of profits, capitals and trades, regardless some important social incidents, was largely mobilized by China as a global opportunity supported by those three long-term historical factors merging international business, European science and transcontinental exile of persons and capitals.

These three long-term functions were reproduced and specialized from the first Portuguese settlements in the enclave, around 1553-57, until early 19th century. This long period is a sort of pre-industrial first history of Macau, resting in a stable population between 12000-15000 people, largely feminine, and supported by a wide range of transcontinental trade linkages. During this period, the Portuguese and Eurasian population was accounted between 4000-5000 people: it was not a minority, and therefore didn't require the word "Macanese" to identify itself. This peculiar society built up that walled Christian city fuelled of churches, chapels, shrines, fortresses and private buildings creating a very European enclave acknowledge by both Portuguese and Chinese maps, drawings and descriptions. Some few of these sites are nowadays the larger part of Macau UNESCO world heritage since 2005, although the memory realms of most of the others vanished.

Demographic, economic and social structures changed fast during the first half of the 19th century framing a second long-term history of Macau. The demographic data is more than clear. In 1800, the population was still estimated in 12.500 inhabitants according to the previous three centuries' demographic system. In 1828, the *Memory of Macau* by the artillery colonel José Aquino de Guimarães Freitas, publishing the military census of 1823, highlights the demography's pattern changes, presenting a "Christian" population living

in the parishes of *Sé*, St. Lawrence and St. Anthony of 606 men over 14 (the marriage legal age), 473 under 14, 2701 women, and 537 slaves, while the Chinese population is estimated "over 8000" and "growing due to the excessive tolerance and trade development (Freitas 1828, 15). In 1842, the general population was estimated in 34.500, and the first government census, done in 1867, accounted 71.842 inhabitants, but 15590 were still maritime population living in boats. The Macau's population grew fast reaching in the 1927 census 157.175 people. The pre-industrial demographic patterns were completely over: the huge majority of the population was Chinese, fueled by thousands of male young emigrants from the neighboring areas. The same minority of four to five thousand Portuguese and Eurasians rebuilt their socio-cultural identity around the word "Macanese" already explained in Freitas' *Memory,* and consolidated by the press: the "Macaista Imparcial" started being published in 1837, followed two years after by "O Correio Macaense". At the same time, hundreds of these Macanese emigrated towards the new regional trade platforms: Singapore was founded in 1819 and Hong Kong in 1846, after the first Opium War. Macau trade engaged in several illegal and tolerated activities, from opium to collies, from gold to weapons. In parallel, the processes of industrialization reached the enclave: steam ship appeared in 1824 and the first Macanese steam ship company opened in 1832. A vivid capitalism of countless small shops and factories changed the urban landscape of the territory. This second history of Macau gave us the Chinese demographic predominance, new streets, commercial areas, temples and characteristic shops framing the old Christian town nowadays dominated by commerce and restaurants (Sousa, 2010, 78-98).

From the first decades of the 19th century onwards, demographic, economic and social change came from alterations in the intermediation pattern of Macau (from investments to capital accumulation) and from socio-economic shifts (from crisis to conjectural transformations) in Chinese productions and labor supplies. The 19th century historical discontinuity in the modern localization of Macau was generated by trade international competition in the world-system intermediation between world-economies; accelerated by an industrialization demanding industrial emigration; and framed by European colonial 19th century political, economic and social offensive in Asia and the Far-East. Macau changed completely, including the structure of public revenues: between 1875

and 1910, the taxes gathered by the government collected 20% to 30% from Chinese lotteries, more than 30% from the Fan-Tam, the famous traditional Chinese "roulette", and about 15% from opium trade. With the exception of opium, do we notice nowadays anything really new?

In fact, after the return of the enclave to the People's Republic of China sovereignty in 1999, the Special Administrative Region of Macau (MSAR), under the political principle of "one country two systems", has seen a decade of very impressive economic growth mainly fueled by the 2001 liberalization of the gaming industries, nowadays accounting for more than 50% of GDP, 84% of fiscal revenues and around 21% of the workforce. In consequence, from 2002 until 2012, Macao GDP annual growth rate averaged 13.93%, marked out between the maximum growth of 51.80% in June 2004 and a record low of -9.90%, in June 2009, in this case as a clear result of the international financial crisis. Therefore, despite the geographical smallness of the MSAR (29,9 Km^2) and its limited population (around 580.000), the territory reached in 2012 a GDP in real terms of US$ 43 billions and an astonishing GDP per capita of US$ 76.588, the fourth highest in the world (3 times Portugal; 6 times Brazil; 8 times PRC; 12 times Angola; 15 times Cape Verde; 35 times São Tome and Principe; 50 times East Timor; 53 times Guinea-Bissau; 80 times Mozambique). Macau become the world's largest casino market, attracting through low and relaxed tax laws wealthy investors predominantly from Mainland of China which, along with other factors, contributed for a rampant mainly imported inflation, huge estate speculation and a paramount revenues inequality. At the same time, serious attempts to diversify the economy are almost rhetoric, lacking serious research and intelligent proposals based on the rich history and unique cultural heritage which make the real diversity of Macau.

Concerned with the mono-typed economy of Macau and unfair social redistribution of the gaming companies' oceanic profits, the PRC central government declared in the State 12th Five-Year Plan, in 2011, its formal support to the transformation of MSAR in a world center of tourism and leisure as well as a platform of services for economic and trade cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries. Through the first goal – a global platform for leisure and entertainment (another polite way of saying gambling), conventions and tourism –, Macau is invited to contributed for the economic

integration and internationalization of the Pearl River Delta Region (presently gathering eight Chinese provinces to Hong Kong and Macau), one of the main primary industrial territories of China, nowadays facing the challenge of shifting from a manufacturing based economy towards a global competitive technological hub. Concomitantly, the central government demands Macau to further increase its economic role as a platform of services for Chinese trade and investments in the Portuguese-speaking countries (Portugal, Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and East Timor)[8], a project in progress in the last decade since the creation of the *Macau Forum*, in 2003, bridging network opportunities through Macau and gathering representatives from PRC and the seven Portuguese-speaking countries members of the organization. This second platform is more than vital for the advantageous economic integration of Macau in the Pearl River Delta which, in turn, can find in some Portuguese-speaking countries, namely Brazil and Angola, the energy resources, primary commodities and market connections the region needs to realize its technological and global competitive development.

In 2010, the last ministerial summit of the Macau Forum was attended by the former PRC premier Weng Jiabao and some Presidents and Prime-Ministers from the member-states updating the international role of the MSAR as an institutional privileged political bridge of China to the Portuguese speaking countries. Although most of Chinese trade, investments and aid in the Portuguese-speaking countries springs out from bilateral relationships, including special commercial agreements, having very little to do with the Macau Forum activities, through this mechanism the PRC aims to give to MSAR a specialized platform task congruent with its long-term history, hoping to receive in return Macau's special way of sheltering, receiving and communicating with the Portuguese-speaking countries. Truly, Macau is probably the only place in the world were the word *lusofonia* (lusophony) has a sociological and cultural alive framework other than solely political or nostalgic motivations. In fact, the demographic characteristics of MSAR were able to accommodate in the last half century some few thousands Portuguese-

(8) The other Portuguese-speaking country, São Tomé and Príncipe, an Atlantic archipelago near the Guinea Gulf, is not represented in the Macau Forum, since she stills recognizes Taiwan and has not official diplomatic links with the PRC.

speaking residents which share not only the same language, but also several common places of sociability, from restaurants to cultural events. According to the last 2011 census, for a total population of 552,503 (12 August 2011), 1,835 (0.3%) residents were born in Portugal, 0.9% was of Portuguese nationality, and the Portuguese and Sino-Portuguese or Eurasian ethnicity totaled 8,106 (1.5%), while 959 residents came from Africa, mostly from the African Portuguese-speaking countries (Censos 2012, 10-11). At the same time, the census found that Portuguese was the usual language for only 0.7% of the population, while 2.4% declared been able to understand it (Censos 2012, 12-13). Therefore, from all these different angles – demography, ethnicity and language – the Portuguese-speaking population of MSAR refers nowadays to a huge minority that, regardless its national origins and diverse types of settling in Macau, shares some basic identity structures crucial for its social and cultural presence.

Unfortunately, there are not available or ongoing researches on the Portuguese-speaking countries communities in Macau. Other than some few lines on the Portuguese historical presence (much more on the political Portugal than the social Portuguese) and a more prolific literature on the Macanese, but generally lacking scientific skills, quantitative and qualitative research on the other Portuguese-speaking groups doesn't exist. There is, however, the general impression that the long-term global function of Macau as a safe haven attracted exiles, refugees and others individuals and families from the different former Portuguese colonial territories: one to two hundreds of Portuguese and Indo-Portuguese from Goa, Daman and Diu found shelter and new lives in Macau after 1961; some tens of Eurasians, East-Timorese and Sino-Timorese were refugee in Macau during the civil war and the Indonesian occupation of East Timor in 1975; there are also some tens of Portuguese, mestizos and Africans from Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Guinea-Bissau that decided during the colonial wars and independence processes to rebuilt their lives in Macau; and there were some tens of Portuguese sheltered in Macau during the Portuguese revolution, as well as some, although quite few and mainly young, trying nowadays to find in Macau the job opportunities that Portugal denies them. At the same time, the Portuguese-speaking countries communities in Macau share an almost common set of social positions firmly installed in the middle and upper-middle classes: the "lusophone" residents in

the territory are mainly lawyers, jurists, public servants, professors, architects, engineers, journalists, businessmen; there are no signs of poverty or social marginalization and it is quite difficult to find a "lusophone" resident with a proletarian profession. Furthermore, these Portuguese-speaking countries' small communities were also able to find long-term political and social protection among the local Eurasian Macanese, a situation that became even clearer after the handover. In fact, in the last decades, the Macanese added up to their key intermediation functions between Portuguese and Chinese a constellation of cultural and associative investments aiming to preserve their language (the Portuguese and the almost disappeared *patuá*[9]) and singular cultural heritage. In spite of the huge absence of published research evidence, summing up, Macau *lusofonia* is unique and doesn't exist in any other Portuguese-speaking country.

Truly, Portugal is as expected the country with the largest population coming from the different Portuguese-speaking countries. Other than the half million of individuals returning to Portugal during the 1975 processes of independence from the former African colonies, and the tens of thousands of emigrants from these new countries that emigrated and acquired in the last decades Portuguese nationality, according to the 2011 census there are amid the 394.496 foreigners living in Portugal more than 52% from the Portuguese-speaking countries: the largest foreign community is the Brazilian with 109.787 (28%); the second largest is from Cape Verde (38.895 - 10%); the Angola emigrants were 26 954 (6,8%); 16.360 legal emigrants were from Guinea-Bissau (4.1%); 10.408 were from São Tomé and Príncipe (2.6%); being the emigrants from Mozambique and East Timor less than 1%. These communities are mainly based in the metropolitan area of Lisbon which hosts 51% of the Brazilian emigrants and almost 75% from the other Portuguese-speaking countries. In particular, the municipalities of Sintra and Amadora accommodate 35% of the emigrants from Cape Verde, 26,6% of the total from Angola, and 37,3%

(9) The Macanese Patuá (from the French "patois") is a distinctive language still receiving different historical and linguistic academic interpretations. Their traditional speakers labeled it Papia Cristam di Macau (Christian speech of Macau), and on February 20, 2009, UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger declared Patuá as a "critically endangered language" gathering only around 50 speakers (UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger: http:// portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=29008&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_ SECTION= 201. html=).

of those from Guinea-Bissau (População 2012, 4-6). Unfortunately (or not), these communities don't share between themselves and with the Portuguese national resident population nothing even remotely close to the sense of *lusofonia* that one finds and feels in Macau. By the contrary, several thousands of these emigrants are in the low social ranks of the working classes (15,2% are cleaning workers, 8,8% sellers in stores, and 7% construction workers) or across the borders of marginalization, living in crowded slums organized through strong ethnical processes functioning almost like ghettos. The legal, social and labor integration of these emigrants is still very difficult, even harder in these times of huge financial, economic and social crisis, whereat the "lusophonic" rhetoric of some Portuguese politicians, academics and intellectuals sounds completely odd. That is way the Angolan emigrants that were the largest foreign community in 2001 decreased more than one third, since several thousands of emigrants returned to Angola (along with tens of thousands of new Portuguese emigrants) trying to benefit from its ongoing fast economic growth. This case means that even the "lusophone" mosaic of Lisbon and the neighboring towns that doesn't really exist in other parts of Portugal can disappear fast if all the former Portuguese colonies become engaged in sustainable processes of economic and social development.

In contrast, the Macau government promotes every year a *Lusofonia* festival, gathering associations from all the Portuguese-speaking countries, including São Tomé and even the former enclaves of Goa, Damam and Diu. Imitating the traditional popular festivals of North Portugal, this official event merges boots from the diverse "lusophone" local associations along with, in the last years, Chinese provincial stands. During the year, several other cultural manifestations, celebrations or dinners (with the respective very Chinese lucky draw element) sponsor by MSAR government through the Macau Forum emphasize this "lusophone" framework, concretizing an investment that is mainly political and symbolic since the trade relations between Macau and the Portuguese speaking countries is very low, almost insignificant.

A LONG-TERM CONTEXT: THE PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM

Despite those political strategies and enthusiasms, pleasant cultural festivals and a lot of ingenuous invention of traditions and folklore, the history of the relations between Macau and Portuguese-speaking countries is a constellation largely undiscovered. Although Macau built up a blooming tobacco trade with Brazil since 18th century, being instrumental to inform the Brazilian elites on China civilization, cultures and arts as well as simply on rice or tea; albeit the key role of Chinese prisoners from Macau who, exiled in Guinea-Bissau, introduced there rice agriculture in late 19th century; in spite of the large use of Mozambican slaves, first, and soldiers, afterwards, in Macau private militias and army; despite the Angolan exiled in the enclave or the long-term trade exploitation of sandalwood, slaves and beeswax from Timor enriching the Macanese merchants, these and several other chapters on the historical relations between Macau and the Portuguese-speaking countries are almost unknown. Moreover, even the history of the relations between Portugal and Macau, much more complex than the long-term political survival rule involved, needs major revision and new insights since it continues embarrassed by the ideological memory attached to the 20th century Portuguese colonial science with its well known submissions to the Salazar regime. Strictly speaking, the memory of Portuguese colonialism, in general, and particularly on Macau was built faraway from the very notion of colonialism itself: the Portuguese nationalist historiography privileged an almost sweet narrative on the inimitable singular history of Portugal's (colonial) empire, normally presented as a-political and a-social, although extolling a clear nationalist-colonialist political ideology. The paradigm of this mellifluous cosmovision of the history of Portuguese colonialism is, almost paradoxically, the theoretical work of an intelligent Brazilian academic, a sort of grand prince and founding father of the modern social sciences in Brazil: Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987).

From *O Mundo que o Português Criou*[10] ("The world that the Portuguese created"), published in 1940, and the memories of his personal voyages to some overseas Portuguese colonies (in rigor, very few selected places) organized by

(10) FREYRE, Gilberto (1940). O MUNDO que o português criou: aspectos das relações sociais e de cultura do Brasil com Portugal e as colônias portuguesas. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio.

the Salazar government, edited in 1953,[11] to the influential *O Luso e o Trópico*[12] ("The Luso and the Tropics"), a book launched in 1961 and translated into many foreign languages, Freyre elaborated the idea of the unique singularity of Portugal's transcontinental empire, based on a special capacity of the Portuguese to adapt to tropical societies through sexual miscegenation creating societies that experienced a true "racial democracy" much more important than the modern "political democracy" used in the 1960s to criticize Portuguese colonialism. Although profoundly contradicted by the historical works of Charles Boxer[13] and other social scientists, demonstrating the same racial and social segregation in the history of Portuguese colonialism, Gilberto Freyre *lusotropicalismo* seems extraordinary resilient and still influences the political and diplomatic Portuguese foreign relations, being normally a topic recalled by Portuguese ambassadors and consuls during the June 10 annual celebrations (which are not labeled anymore "Day of the Race", receiving after the 1974 Revolution the denomination of "Day of Portugal, Camões and the Portuguese Communities" – it would be simple to use only "Day of Portugal", but the other titles are there to recall the inevitable memory of Portuguese discoveries and supposed "universalism"). Instead of building a modern idea of *lusophony* preserving and sponsoring cultural diversity in official Portuguese-speaking spaces, there is still an influent political and academic discourse stressing the exclusive Portuguese *lusophone* routes based not only in a common (official)

(11) FREYRE, Gilberto (1953). AVENTURA e rotina: sugestões de uma viagem a procura das constantes portuguesas de caráter e ação. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio; FREYRE, Gilberto (1953). UM BRASILEIRO em terras portuguesas: introdução a uma possível luso-tropicologia acompanhada de conferências e discursos proferidos em Portugal e em terras lusitanas e ex-lusitanas da Ásia, da África e do Atlântico. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio.

(12) FREYRE, Gilberto (1961). O LUSO e o trópico: sugestões em torno dos métodos portugueses de integração de povos autóctones e de culturas diferentes da européia num complexo novo de civilização, o luso tropical. Lisboa: Comissão Executiva das Comemorações do V Centenário da Morte do Infante D.Henrique; LE PORTUGAIS et les tropiques: considérations sur les méthodes portugaises d´intègration de peuples autochtones et de cultures diffèrentes de la culture européenne dans un nouveau complexe de civilisation, la civilization luso-tropicale. Lisbone: Commision Exécutive des Commemorations du V Centenaire de la Mort du Prince Henri, 1961 ; THE PORTUGUESE ans the tropics: sugestions inspired by portugueses methods of integrating autocthones peoples and cultures differing from the europen in a new, or luso-tropical complex of civilisation. Lisbon: Executive Committee for the Commemoration of the Vth Centenary of the Prince Henry the Navigator, 1961. 2v.

(13) BOXER, Charles R. (1963) Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire (1415-1825). Oxford: Clarendon Press; BOXER, Charles R. (1965). Portuguese Society in the Tropics. The Municipal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia, and Luanda (1510-1800). Madison-Milwaukee: The University of Wisconsin Press.

language, but also in a common history and culture that doesn't really exists between the Portuguese-speaking countries, from ethnography to literature, from music to cinema, from religions to basic cultural practices.

The colonial societies and enclaves organized under the Portuguese empire were neither free nor much less egalitarian. Local populations, their languages and cultures were not respected, much less their political rights and religious diversity. In all the spaces where the Portuguese colonial presence had superior military might as in Goa or in Brazil, local cultures, monuments, religions and habits were attacked with violence. In other colonial territories, in which the Portuguese were as scarce as its limited military capacity, as in late 19th century Angola, Mozambique, or during the Manufahi wars in East Timor, from 1911-1912, a systematic policy of dividing local populations and manipulating ethnicities through indirect rule and alliances was used to impose colonial power and administrations through wars supported by indigenous soldiers clashing with other natives. Elsewhere, namely in Southeast Asia or in Macao, a policy of accommodation was dominant. Nevertheless, the *lusotropicalismo* ideology was not bland enough to avoid the precipitation of Portugal since 1961 in a dramatic colonial war in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, contradicting definitively any "racial democracy" or special capacity to understand and dialogue with the others. In this sense, the Portuguese colonialism was really different from the other European colonial powers: it last too much, becoming a historical anachronism, and postponing the peaceful transition to independence of its colonies in an African continent where all the other countries were independent.

Since 1504, the Portuguese circulation in Asia received an institutional organization labeled "State of India" – first based in Cochin and after in Goa – headed by a Viceroy or Governor normally from Portuguese high nobility, and spreading captains, judges and other administrative positions trough the Portuguese enclaves, fortresses and factories from Mozambique to the Far East. In some cases, Macau included, the Portuguese controlled spaces organized there own municipal powers and most of them had charitable Houses of Mercy, the famous *Misericórdias,* both institutions granted by royal favor. The highest political, military, judicial and administrative positions of the "State of India" were reserved to European Portuguese, mainly from low noble origins.

Following up the detailed Boxer historical research on Goa, Macau, Bahia and Luanda, the municipal powers and the *Misericórdias* were also reserved to Portuguese and, exceptionally, some half-breed offspring, generating power and charitable monopolies that excluded systematically the local populations. The Portuguese seaborne empire, as Boxer liked to label it, was also largely cored in slavery exploitation, accounted in several millions of Africans in the case of Brazil. As far as Macau and Timor, slaves were not only a profitable regional trade "product" but also an essential element of indenture labor, from ships to households, from industries to hospitals, as well as the main female source for the production of Eurasian families. Therefore, the historical foundations of Gilberto Freyre's *lusotropicalismo* were neither evident nor "scientific": the Portuguese didn't and don't show up any special "racial" or "cultural" gift to adapt to "tropical societies" (most of the five million of Portuguese emigrants live and work in Europe) and the extolled "racial democracy" or systematic miscegenation didn't exist outside the few households of the minorities of rich Portuguese traders, landlords or overseas aristocracy obliged to built up their extensive families with local women, mainly from low social ranks or selected among slaves. Unfortunately, the historical research of these subjects is almost ignored by the Portuguese historiography, while receiving in contrast an increasing academic attention from Brazilian, Angolan or Mozambican historians.

Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, S. Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea-Bissau or East Timor have not only different long-term histories, but also a very different historical understanding and cultural representations of Portuguese colonialism and the liberation struggles that ended it. In turn, the PRC was ignored or heavily criticized by the Portuguese dictatorship (diplomatic ties open only in 1979), while the Chinese internationalist solidarity supported the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau as well as FRETILIN in 1974-75 in East Timor, a political engagement that is not ignored nowadays when trade and economic relations bloom between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries. Diversely, some political, diplomatic and academic sectors in Portugal, in some cases still misunderstanding and overlooking aristocratically the democracy, cultivate an anachronistic worldview in which Portuguese colonialism and

liberation movements are strangely erased as formative historical elements of the Portuguese-speaking countries nation-building processes, from 1882 in Brazil up to East Timor in 1999. Therefore, most of the Portuguese universities' graduate and post-graduate courses of History and other human and social sciences don't simply teach and research Portuguese colonialism at the expenses of a heightened frequency of themes, myths and the former national heroes emerging from the "Age of Discoveries". In consequence, these heroes, more or less mythicised, are still preferred to baptize streets, bridges or public buildings, while it is very difficult to find revolutionary or anti-colonialist Portuguese political leaders (even less from the former Portuguese colonies) lending their names to an important public space. This also means that Portugal's political and diplomatic circulation in the world returns repeatedly to a discourse extolling the nations' singular and "universal" culture responsible for building a unique transcontinental presence: the word empire is nowadays as expected avoided, while the word colonialism is completely ignored.

Rigorously, it was not the Portuguese colonial presence, colonialism and empire that were ideologically different from other European colonialisms; it was (and still is for several politicians, diplomats and academics) the 20th century nationalist ideology recreating Portugal's history that claimed the Portuguese colonial difference as the main pillar of a different and unique nation: the difference is not the past but the discourse on the past. The Spanish colonial empire, for example, was structurally similar to the Portuguese empire, displaying the same political and administrative system with viceroys, governors, captains and judges also appointed for three years, mostly coming from the Spanish lower ranks of nobility. The Spanish empire shared the exact same religion, Catholicism (the counter-reformist and Tridentine Catholicism), and the same system of clergy monopoly achieved through the powers of patronage and an impressive network of parishes, monasteries, convents and confraternities controlling evangelization, charity and social assistance. Other religions, local, traditional or universal, were persecuted normally through a dominant alliance between the Church and colonial power. The Spanish empire had the same production of subordinate mestizo elites, mainly creole, essential for sustaining the colonial power administration but later able to build up the independence of South American countries in the first decades of

the nineteenth century. The Spanish empire was not basically different (as all the other European colonial powers) from the Portuguese empire in political, social, religious or cultural terms, but mainly because of its different endurance and influence in the national identity discourse: the last remains of the Spanish empire – Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines – were lost by the crown of Spain in 1898 during the war with the United States of America. Afterwards, the extraordinary generation of '98 gathering prominent intellectuals, writers, essayists and philosophers, names as referential as Miguel Unamuno, Pio Baroja, Valle-Inclan, Antonio Machado or Ortega Y Gasset, rebuilt a national memory of Spain far from the collapsed empire, recalling memory realms of a "Hispanidad" grounded in the medieval period and returning to Southern European, Mediterranean and Iberian grassroots.

In contrast, the Portuguese colonial empire lasted over three quarters of a century until the revolution of April 25, 1974, a military coup that represents a much larger political and social transformation absolutely inseparable from the colonial war and the liberation struggles in the former Portuguese African colonies. However, in 1974, the nationalist ideology based in the "singularity" of the Portuguese empire and its unique gallery of discoverers was already largely consolidated in the memory realms of Portugal, history textbooks, curricula or national symbols, philosophies and literatures highlighting those myths, kings, infants, explorers and travelers which were even able to paradoxically inspire the modernist Fernando Pessoa's poetry or the impressionist paintings of Almada Negreiros: the nationalist discourse was already firmly anchored in Portuguese collective memory. Therefore, another history – scientific, impartial, addressing processes and a global perspective (the *perspective of the world* stressed by Vitorino Magalhães Godinho)[14] – and a new collective awareness of the history of Portuguese colonialism didn't spring out from the 1974 Carnage Revolution: names of streets and squares, bridges and major public sites, statues and key places of memory remain today essentially the same between nostalgia of the golden age of discoveries and bizarre ideas on a universalism that the Salazar sponsored Portuguese provincialism and ruralism was unable to remotely

(14) Godinho, Vitorino Magalhães (1958). L' économie de l'empire Portugais aux XVe et XVI siècles. L'or et le poivre. Route de Guinée et route du Cap. Paris: Sorbonne, (doctoral dissertation); Portuguese edition: Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial. Lisboa, Ed. Presença, 1983, 4 vols.

match. The revolutionary and progressive generation that transformed the 1974 military coup in a true democratic political transformation was also unable to create a new national collective memory which normally still returns back to the nationalist topics of a unique past and a singular benign Portuguese world presence achieved through a colonial empire that was generous, humanist and universalist, definitively different from all the other much more "arrogant" European colonialisms.

For the research topic of this paper, only the astonishing present-day resilience of this Portuguese nationalist discourse with more or less "lusophone" updates or "lusotropicalist" remembrances can explain the paradoxical pretension of celebrating the trade adventures of Jorge Álvares, in 1513, in the Pearl River Delta islands, as the beginning of "five hundred years of China-Portugal friendship" (including conferences, exhibitions, medals, philatelic issues and several other products presented as "cultural")[15]. As discussed above, Tomé Pires embassy was condemned to fail as later succeeded with the 1566 mission led by Gil de Góis that was not even recognized by Ming regional authorities.[16] Two centuries later, the large Portuguese official embassy directed by Francisco Xavier Assis Pacheco e Sampaio was solemnly welcomed in Beijing, on the first of May, 1753, but after five weeks of visits, banquets and absence of negotiations, the ambassador left the court of Qianlong without any formal agreement other than the previous recognition that the kingdom of Portugal was not tributary of the Chinese emperor.[17] More than a century later, the first formal treaty of

(15) "Portugal-China: Encontros de Cultura" (Portugal-China: Encounters of Culture) is a set of academic and cultural events proposed for 2013-2014 promoted by the Lisbon Town Hall, the Lisbon Faculty of Fine Arts, National Press and Mint, and the China Observatory (information available at http://www.ul.pt/portal/page?_pageid=173,1727518&_dad=portal&_schema= PORTAL and on youtube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= ACtO994LkF0). The program presentation ended up with the launching of a commemorative medal-screen. The Marine Academy also prepares a conference "In the China Seas: on the arrival of Jorge Álvares, in 1513" ("Nos Mares da China. A propósito da chegada de Jorge Álvares, em 1513"), and its President stressed that the event aims to "invite the people to try to think about the value and importance, which I think is a Portuguese privilege, to have been the first Europeans to get to that side of the World", thus forgetting, at least, our good story teller Marco Polo and with him hundreds of years of the most diverse voyages to China prior to 1513 achieved by traders, missionaries and other European adventurers.

(16) 1566, December 29 - Letter of Antão de Noronha to the Portuguese King Sebastião reporting that Gil de Gois was not received as ambassador in China (ANTT, Corpo Cronológico, parte I, m. 108, n.º 24).

(17) 1752, November 20, Macau – Letter of Francisco Xavier Assis Pacheco e Sampaio to the Marquis of Pombal accounting the preparations of his embassy to China and the emperor recognition that Portugal was not tributary of the Chinese empire (ANTT, Ministério do Reino, Conselho Ultramarino, Ms. 603, n.º 18.)

friendship and commerce signed between China and Portugal in Tianjin, on August 13, 1862, was not ratified, whereby the first valid Luso-Chinese treaty of Friendship and Commerce was signed and ratified in Beijing, on December 1, 1887. Next, a simple trade treaty between the two monarchies was signed in Beijing, on October 15, 1902, while a larger commercial and friendship agreement signed in 1904 was not again ratified. Afterwards, in spite of the well known close links through Macau between the Portuguese Republican revolution of 1910 and the Chinese Republican revolution of 1911-1912, the two Republics signed only a preliminary treaty of friendship and commerce in 1928 when the first Portuguese democratic Republic was already dead and substituted by a dictatorship. However, even the two ratified Sino-Portuguese official treaties of friendship and commerce of 1887 and 1928, as well as the trade agreement of 1902 were not enough to preserve any bilateral amity after the Chinese Revolution led by the CCP. Albeit the formal letter sent by Zhou Enlai to the Lisbon government stressing interest in opening diplomatic relations with Portugal, the Portuguese dictator, Salazar, refused at end of October 1949 to recognize the "communist regime".[18] Furthermore, he was convinced that the CCP revolutionary victory in China would be the end of the Portuguese administration of Macau (Fernandes 2008, 231).

Salazar was wrong. The Portuguese official administration of Macau survived up to the 1999 handover, while a vivid presence of almost two thousands Portuguese still lasts nowadays. Actually the present day Portuguese presence in MSAR is much more important and influential than its quantitative residential expression: there is in Macau a TV and a Radio network in Portuguese; three free newspapers are published daily in Portuguese; a primary and secondary school persists as Portuguese; there are several Portuguese cultural associations; an important public and private leading work of Portuguese lawyers, jurists and judges is highly demanded and appreciated; some hundreds of Portuguese work in public services; not to refer other Portuguese key contributions to the specificity of Macau, from historical heritage to the role of Portuguese law. This Portuguese contemporary presence

(18) 1949, October – Letter from Zhou Enlai presenting interest in enplaning diplomatic relations with Portugal and Salazar's documental refusal (Arquivo Histórico Diplomático, PEA, Conf., M. 20).

is much more a historical achievement of the Macau society itself ands its long-term historical functions rather than the result of Portugal's policies regarding the territory, even less during the dictatorship. In fact, regardless the hostility of the Salazar regime towards the PRC, Macau became again (as in the Ming isolationist period) a key trade platform for China, even able to cleverly bypass the Western embargo led by US and NATO when the PRC intervened in the Korean War, in 1950. Furthermore, after sheltering hundreds of thousands of refugees during the II World War, Macau continued to be a safe haven even for Chinese exiled from the 1949 Revolution, the Cultural Revolution and other political controversial periods. At the same time, the PRC governments and the CCP leadership maintained a coherent policy regarding Macau and Hong Kong aiming to keep the *status quo* and to solve peacefully the situation of the two enclaves as an internal problem of China. In consequence, the PRC refused to allow the inscription of Macau and Hong Kong in the UN list of un-decolonized territories and even faced the Soviet and non-aligned countries criticism accusing China anti-imperialist and anti-colonial declarations as mere rhetoric since the country allowed the colonial status of the two European enclaves in the Pearl River Delta (Fernandes 2008, 241).

The long-term traditional accommodation system of Macau prevailed along with those long-term historical functions: a transcontinental trade platform and a safe haven for all different types of political, social and economic exiled. In spite of the border conflict of 1952, the Chinese strong opposition in 1955 to the 400 years' commemoration of Portuguese settlement, several other social and political conflicts disemboguing in the famous "1,2,3" incidents of 1966-1967 which were able finally to integrate formally the Chinese local leadership in the political decision-making, Macau business elites built up strong trade relations with China while the PRC developed since 1949 through the *Nam Kwong Trading Company* an active trade presence that was also politically engaged in the peaceful development of Macau. It is this legacy of social, economic and political accommodation that the democratic Portugal issued from the April 25, 1974 revolution was capable to understand re-opening in 1979 diplomatic relations with the PRC and engaging in a peaceful political dialogue on Macau status leading to the well known 1987 joint declaration, paving the way towards the 1999 handover which built up the Macau Special Administrative Region

of the PRC: "China-Portugal friendship" is not an obscure arcane historical achievement belonging to the Portuguese nationalist memory of a special imperial past, but rather a concrete political and diplomatic contemporary accomplishment joining the democratic Portugal and the Chinese era of reforms through the peaceful return of Macau to the PRC sovereignty founding MSAR under the principle of "one country, two systems".

CONTEMPORARY CHANGES AND CHALLENGES: INDEPENDENCES, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION

The Portuguese-speaking countries are not the "hairs" of the Portuguese colonial empire, even less of any sort of "lusopohone" benign transcontinental and multiracial empire: Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea-Bissau and East Timor are independent and sovereign countries with their own national histories and memories. The world that the Portuguese created, to gloss Gilberto Freyre, was not, is not and will not be a world exclusively "Portuguese" or "lusophone", although the former Portuguese colonies decided to express themselves officially in Portuguese as a condition of national sovereign identity even when, from Guinea-Bissau to East Timor, from Angola to Mozambique, Portuguese is still a minority language. In consequence, political or economic relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries are not a historical inheritance or obligation of any former "lusophone" common history or culture, but a contemporary process involving different sovereign nation-states of official Portuguese language.

Other than several world and regional organizations' affiliations, the eight Portuguese-speaking countries are nowadays gathered in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) created in July 17, 1996, by seven countries up to receive East Timor in 2002 after the restoration of the country's independence. A simple biannual Conference of Heads of State defines CPLP main aims while the programs of action are decided by the Council of Foreign Ministers, which meets every year. Unfortunately (or not), all available very few studies on the CPLP different activities testify the difficulty in transforming the mere inter-governmental top organization into a true transnational community

of Portuguese-speaking countries:[19] projects are scarce; events are few; the budget is more than limited, while Portugal and Brazil are fundamentally commercial competitors in the other Portuguese-speaking countries sovereign spaces, from Angola to East Timor. Therefore, the CPLP doesn't contribute to any free movement of people, capitals or equipments amid the Portuguese-speaking countries; political common initiatives from peace-keeping to crisis management are no more than symbolic; there are no common programs and projects for poverty alleviation, environmental sustainability, social development or solidarity; common cultural, educational or research programs are almost inexistent despite some commemorative initiatives as the 2005 ministers of culture's decision of holding a "Lusophone Culture Day" every 5 of May; even a common language policy is unable to exit from inter-ministerial summits' solemn declarations albeit the existence of a Portuguese Language Academy which suffers annually to collect the promised national contributions to its restricted budget (Sousa 2001). In 2006, during the second ministerial summit of the Macau Forum, the Executive Secretary of CPLP, Ambassador Tadeu Soares, sent an official letter to the first Chief Executive, Edmund Ho Hau Wa, inviting the MSAR to become Associate Observer of the organization. An affiliation that probably Macau doesn't really need as was fully proved by the success of the organization in the territory of the first "Lusophony Games", precisely in 2006, gathering 733 athletes from eleven countries, adding up to the eight Portuguese-speaking nations other than MSAR India and Sri Lanka.

It is also relevant to acknowledge that the eight sovereign Portuguese-speaking countries have different international strategies and diplomacies, including a different history of international relations, as it is the case with China. Brazil signed the first official Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with China in 1881, opening its first consulate in Shanghai, in 1883 (Oliveira, 2004, 10). Then, after the Popular Revolution and the Korean War, pressed by US and Western powers Brazil closed diplomatic relations with the PRC resumed officially later in 1974. The trade relations between the two continental countries increased rapidly until building up the present-

(19) The last official publication sponsored by CPLP aiming to reflect the organization dynamics is CPLP 12 Anos: construindo a comunidade (2008). Lisboa: CPLP; the organization only published two issues of its official journal "Revista CPLP", 0 (2011) and 1 (2012). Other resources available at http://www.cplp.org.

day strategic partnership that through the BRICS shares much more than simple commercial benefits. Howsoever, the volume of trade between the two countries increased fast from US$6,68 billions in 2003 to US$85 billions in 2012: in 2009, the PRC became the first trade partner of Brazil, and in 2011 the bilateral trade exceeded the Sino-Russian commerce, therefore transforming China-Brazil trade in the most important economic relationship between the BRICS' countries.

In turn, the Chinese relations with the African Portuguese-speaking countries date back to the early stages of the formation of the African liberation movements in the 1950s. Founded in September 19, 1956 by Amílcar Cabral and his brother Luís Cabral, building up from the previous tiny MINGC (Movement for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, created in December 1954), the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) encountered in the PRC its first relevant international supporter prior to the irruption of the armed struggle in Guinea-Bissau, in 1963. In August 1960, Amílcar Cabral visited China with a delegation comprising Luciano Ndao, Richard Turpin e Dauda Bangurá: this was the first external diplomatic mission of the liberation movement rewarded with formal recognition from the CCP. It seems that Cabral was particularly enthusiast of the Chinese experience in the revolutionary mobilization of peasants which could be an inspirational pattern for the field struggle in Guinea-Bissau. Luciano Ndao and Dauda Bangurá stayed in Beijing to receive military education and in January 1961 ten young militants of PAIGC joined the Military Academy in Nanjing (Cabral 1984, 95-96). However, the Sino-PAIGC relations came to deteriorate due to the Chinese-Soviet split, and between 1967 and 1969 the CCP suspended its support. After the independence of Cape Verde, in 5 July 1975, the diplomatic relations with the PRC were officially established in April 25, 1976, leading to an ongoing cooperation nowadays increased by an active Chinese aid and cooperation, mainly in the construction of state buildings, contrasting with the marginal volume of huge unbalanced trade exchanges: in 2011, Cape Verde exported to China only US$ 10.750 (0.02% of total trade) and imported US$ 39.348.175.

In contrast, albeit the PRC early backing of PAIGC, the relations between China and Guinea-Bissau are less linear. After 26 years of diplomatic relations, the Bissau government decided in 1990 to break with the PRC in favor of Taiwan.

Later, in 1998, the country restored diplomatic relations with the PRC and the ties between China and Guinea-Bissau became particularly strong through an important aid able to build up, as in Cape Verde, the Guinean National Parliament and several other public buildings, hospitals and infrastructures. Nonetheless, in 2011, the total bilateral trade was still quite low: Guinea-Bissau exported to China merchandises worth US$ 3.438.284 (3.70%) and imported almost the triple, US$ 9.415.767.

It is between 1956 and 1960 that can be found the historical process leading to the foundation of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) through the progressive merging of the Angolan Communist Party (PCA, founded in 1955), the Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola (PLUAA, created in 1956), the Movement for the National Independence of Angola (MINA, organized in 1958) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Angola (FDLA, dating also from 1958 and supported by Congo-Brazzaville).[20] The first Chinese contacts date from this period, including documented support to the National Union of Workers of Angola (UNTA), created in 1960 to integrate the MPLA political struggle (Xavier 2005, 80). However, the PRC solidarity was not confined to a single liberation movement and other than the initial support addressed to the MPLA, China also financed and trained the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA, founded in 1966), engaged after the independence in a dramatic civil war against MPLA from 1975 to 2002. In consequence, Angola and PRC established diplomatic relations only in 1983, followed by almost two decades of modest economic contacts and limited Chinese assistance *(Sant'Anna 2008, 19). In the last decade, trade exchanges bloomed fast: in 2011, Angola exports to China amounted to US$ 19.747.259.676 (46,41% of the total) while imports stood at US$ 94.661.344 (3.11%); one simple year later, at the end of 2012, Angolan exports to China, mainly crude oil, increased to* US$ 33.458 millions while imports from China rose even faster to US$ 4.044 millions, although not changing the key fact that Angola is the Portuguese-speaking country with the most positive bilateral trade balance percentage.

(20) The chronology of the MPLA foundation is not consensual among historians, but a quite correct summary can be found in Sousa, Julião Soares. "MPLA: Da Fundação ao Reconhecimento por Parte da OUA (1960-1968)", in: Latitudes, nº 28, décembre 2006, pp. 11-16.

The PRC support to the national liberation struggle in Mozambique was much more linear: China upheld the movement that guided the country towards the independence, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), founded in Dar-es-Salaam, on 25 June 1962. Similarly to the Angolan historical process, FRELIMO sprang from the fusion of three previous nationalist movements: the Mozambican African National Union (MANU), the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI). In 1963, five FRELIMO missions visited PRC; one headed by Eduardo Mondlane (1920-1969) the prestigious historical leader of the movement. Chinese furtherance included military training in Tanzania as well as weapons and material donations (Sant'Anna 2008, 27). After the Mozambican independence, on 25 June 1975, the government immediately recognized Beijing and opened up diplomatic relations. In return, the PRC bestowed the new independent nation with a loan of US$56 millions and started the still ongoing aid program of health assistance through which Chinese doctors and nurses treated thousands of poor Mozambicans and trained hundreds of technical staff (Horta, 2007). Nevertheless, trade relations between Mozambique and China were and still are modest – exports to China in 2011 reached US$ 177.160.554 (3.78% of the total) and imports soared to US$ 248.307.049 (9.73%) –, albeit the significant presence of Chinese companies in the construction of infrastructures, from the roads network to the habitual public buildings, including the International Airport of Maputo and the National Sports Stadium. As in several other African countries, China's growing economic presence attracted a recurrent criticism accusing Chinese workers of taking the jobs opportunities that should be given to Mozambicans. Although the number of Chinese workers in Mozambique is relatively low, around 10.000, it became clear in the last three years that Chinese companies will mobilize and train more local work force (Robinson, 2012, 3-14).

Far from Africa, in the geographical boundaries between Southeast Asia and Oceania, East Timor is another example of the PRC warm support to the liberation movements in former Portuguese colonies. At the same time, colonial East Timor had old historical trade links with Macau as well as a vivid Chinese community of merchants and a small community of Sino-East Timorese. The PRC granted an ongoing support to the main liberation movement,

the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), founded on 11 September 1974 from the previous Timorese Social Democrat Association (ASDT) and gathering former East Timorese students returning from Portugal where they organized the Movement for the Liberation of Timor-Dili (MLTD) and the Unite Front for the Liberation of Timor-Dili (FULINTID). Facing the internal opposition of conservative movements, as UDT, or even groups favorable to the integration in Indonesia, as APODETI, FRETILIN came victorious from a brief civil war leading to the proclamation of independence on November 28, 1975. This was followed by the Indonesian military invasion of East Timor which started on 7 December 1975 and led to an illegal occupation of twenty four years leaving a dramatic legacy of thousands of deaths, missing, injured and huge destruction. The PRC was one of the few countries to support consistently FRETILIN, including in UN Security Council, although giving limited support to Ramos Horta diplomacy and denying the military armament requested by the movement during a visit to Beijing on 29 December 1975 (Braithwaite, Charlesworth & Soares 2012, 47-60). Diplomatic formal relations between PRC and the new Democratic Republic of East Timor (RDTL) were established on May 20, 2002 and strong cooperation links are widening in the last years. Trade exchanges are highly unbalanced, since in 2011 China exports amounted to US$ 42.784.189 (14.38% of the total) and East Timor only sold US$ 236.141 (0.36%), mainly coffee. However, as in the African Portuguese-speaking countries, Chinese aid in East Timor constructed since 2002 some of the most new impressive buildings: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headquarters, Dili new military barracks, the Defense Forces building, and the new Presidential Palace where the main hall was labeled Beijing Room. All these facilities were built up using mainly Chinese imported work force thus giving rise to those criticisms quiet common in Africa, blaming unfairly China for not creating the jobs that the local large unemployed population demands.

Out of this historical summary on the relations between PRC and the Portuguese-speaking countries stands nowadays São Tomé and Príncipe, one of the four African countries that still maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan along with Chad, Malawi and Burkina Faso. However, in the colonial past, the nationalist liberation movement in the small archipelago received fraternal Chinese support and solidarity. In 1960, exiled nationalists

organized in Gabon the Committee for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (CONCP) leading in 1972 to the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (MLSTP). Leaders of the MLSTP visited the PRC and a formal agreement between the movement and the CCP was signed in the early 1970s. MLSTP was then responsible to guide the country towards the independence in July 12, 1975. Diplomatic and political relations with PRC were formally opened, and the first President of the new country, Manuel Pinto da Costa, visited the PRC in 1975 and 1983, signing a trade agreement. The Chinese cooperation supported agricultural projects, created a training center for bamboo and straw weaving, and built up several infrastructures and public buildings as the grand Congress Palace in which works since 1995 the Parliament (China, 2006). Suddenly, on May 6, 1997, the Santomean government decides to sign a political, diplomatic and economic agreement with Taiwan and the PRC suspended formal relations with the country up till now, although the CCP is normally invited and represented in MLST congresses while Chinese exports to the country reached in 2011 US$ 3.179.845. In contrast, although not being a member of the Macau Forum, this organization sponsors an Association of São Tomé and Príncipe, gathering the few Santomean living and working in Macau; the country is also represented every year in the "Lusofonia" festival and commemorates in the territory its National Day.

In spite of the growing (mainly Western) criticism towards Chinese trade, investments and aid in Africa (and elsewhere), accusing the lack of transparency, the state rigid economic control, the paramount use of Chinese workers or the absence of democratic demands in cooperation agreements and projects, the PRC diplomatic and economic presence worldwide shows a singular lasting political continuity. In fact, the PRC external policy is still grounded in the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,* agreed between China and India in 1954 to become a key principle of the non-aligned movement during the famous 1955 Asian-African conference of Bandung, in Indonesia. Based on the defense of (1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence, the five principles were formally integrated in 1982 in the PRC Constitution and are still nowadays the axial principle of China

friendly relations with all countries of the world from trade to aid, from investments to cooperation (Quinn-Judge 2011, 684-685). Actually, what changed in present-day Chinese international circulation are not its quiet stable political principles, but rather the key growing presence of China in the process of economic globalization. Fortunately, the emergence of China (in rigor, the historical re-emergence) and several other countries, from Brazil to Indonesia, from Mexico to Turquey, is reshaping the scales and opportunities offered by a process of globalization that became more plural and multilateral. At the same time, this emergent economies stress the new role of South-South and developing countries cooperation, finally dissolving the old world trade patterns inherited from the European colonial dominance. Moreover, these processes are shifting the sociology of globalization towards the Asia-Pacific region that will host around 2020 a middle class of more than 1,5 billions of individuals, therefore shifting the region markets furthermore from primary production to consumption.

These global patterns also preside to the economic relations between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries in the last years: it is a relation mainly driven by an enormous trade growth, albeit the importance of some Chinese investments and aid, and hugely dominated by two large developing countries, Brazil and Angola. In effect, this last decade of growing trade exchanges between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries displays a clear quantitative pattern: the trade between China and Brazil (US$85.484 millions in 2012) is more than the double of China-Angola trade (US$37.502 millions in 2012) which, in turn, is almost ten times the volume of trade between China and Portugal (US$4.019 millions in 2012) that represents roughly four times the volume of trade between Mozambique and China (US$1.344 millions in 2012), being the remaining bilateral trade of China with Cape Verde, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau and even São Tomé and Príncipe quiet marginal, totaling in 2012 around only US$148 millions. These figures highlight the leading targets of China trade with Portuguese-speaking countries: it is still the importation of natural resources from Brazil and Angola the driven trade force and the two countries are responsible for 95% of a commerce reaching in 2012 a total volume worth US$128,497 millions. Solid numbers contrasting with the residual trade between MSAR and the Portuguese-speaking countries, albeit ten years of

Macau Forum activities: MSAR exported in 2011 goods worth US$6.789.877 (0.71% of total trade) to Brazil, US$625.100 (0.07%) to Portugal, US$95.782 (0.01%) to Mozambique, US$11.795 (0.009%) to Angola and virtually nothing to the other Portuguese-speaking countries. In parallel, along that year, Macau paid US$7.126.686 (0.15%) of imports from Brazil and US$3.655.544 (0.08%) to Portugal while the other Portuguese-speaking countries were not able to sell to the MSAR.

These last figures are not enough to build up relevant economic relations between MSAR and the Portuguese-speaking countries. In rigor, the PRC doesn't clearly need MSAR or, in particular, the Macau Forum to sustain trade relations largely cored in bilateral relations with Brazil and Angola to import mainly natural resources. The PRC central government insisted in the last years that MSAR must be a platform of services between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries and not a mere trade or tourist agency. It is precisely services – from banking and financial services to commercial intelligence, innovation, specialized training, academic and research networks, cultural and transcultural mutual acknowledgement, – that the PRC would like to behold in MSAR added by its singular *lusofonia* and language expertise, including the special important skills of dealing with trade laws and agreements, administrations or courts, businessmen and companies in Portuguese. It is services (very specialized services) that China and the other developing countries will demand in the next decades. Truly, the historical and cultural environment of Macau offers a unique framework for the development of a large set of intermediation services between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries as long as intelligence, innovation and research are able to lead the process. In this case, Macau can become the most pleasant *locus* for China relations (and understanding) with the Portuguese-speaking countries.

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Book Reviews

PATRÍCIO, ANTÓNIO

Fragmentos poéticos

(int. José Augusto Seabra; ed. Carlos Morais José; co-ord. Luís Sá Cunha). Macau: COD, 2013.

It was recently edited in Macau a former unpublished work by the Portuguese important poet, writer and playwright António Patrício (1878-1930), entitled "Fragmentos Poéticos" (*Poetic Fragments*), and mainly gathering more than one hundred brief aphorisms. Patrício was born in Porto where he graduated in Medicine, in 1908, then deciding to embrace a diplomatic career, when he had already published a book of poems, "Ocean" (Oceano), a dramatic play, "The End" (O Fim), and a collection of short stories, "Unquiet Evening" (Serão Inquieto). His first diplomatic appointment was as consul of second class in Canton, between 1911 and 1913, a key period in the literary and philosophical maturation of António Patrício. Witnessing and supporting the Chinese Republican Revolution, enjoying the transcultural communication with Macau and Hong Kong societies, our diplomat-poet wrote in Canton one of his most intriguing playwrights "Peter the Raw" (Pedro o Cru), revisiting the famous 16th century Portuguese Renaissance master-work "Castro" by António Ferreira to display typical decadentist and symbolist topics merged with a nostalgia that some nationalist literary criticism insists to be singularly Portuguese (albeit

being a common place in the most diverse national literatures). In the next years, Patrício was diplomat successively in Manaus, Bremen, London and Caracas until returning in 1928 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Lisbon. From this epoch are several poetic writings posthumously published, in 1940, in a volume of "Poems" (Poemas), and two other tragedies, "Denis and Elizabeth" (Dinis e Isabel, 1919) and "D. John and the Mask" (D. João e a Máscara, 1924). These texts evolve from a primary frequency of Nietzsche towards a solidary pietism at the edge of a very unorthodox neo-Christianity merging the themes of love and death, Eros and Thanatos. In 1930, Patrício was appointed Minister for the Portuguese embassy in Peking, a diplomatic position that our poet received with sincere joy. Recalling his Cantonese experience, firmly inscribed in his mind as a keystone memory realm, António Patrício expressed his pleasure in returning to China, declaring that "I am now going to see a people fighting and suffering for his freedom". Unfortunately, Patrício died when his ship stopped in Macau, unable to fulfill the novel Peking mission.

Published with a highlighting foreword by José Augusto Seabra, the "Poetic Fragments" are a sort of "notebook" fixing over a hundred aphorisms which express the main philosophical reflections guiding all poetic and dramaturgical Patrício's literary work. Carefully edited in a beautiful book, these "Poetic Fragments" are an important clue for researching our poet complex and sometimes mysterious, philosophical thought, still rooted in historical Portuguese traditions through the recurrent presence of oceanic and transcendental elements, but also in search of pan-cultural dialogues between East and West. Furthermore, this careful edition recall us that epochal kind of Portuguese intellectual "Diaspora" in the Far East, settled mainly in Macau, but also in Hong Kong, Canton and Shanghai in the first decades of the 20th century, merging names as important as Wenceslau de Moraes (1854-1929), Mateus António de Lima (1862-1948), Camilo Pessanha (1857-1926) or Manuel da Silva Mendes (1867-1931). An intellectual generation that spread out the Portuguese (and European) contemporary philosophy as well as the reception, translation and study of Chinese Philosophies, truly bridging reflexively between Western and Eastern thoughts.

Pedro Baptista

ZHANG, HAIHUI
XUE, ZHAOHUI
JIANG, SHUYONG &
LUGAR, GARY LANCE

A Scholarly Review of Chinese Studies in North America

Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 2013 [VIII+466pp.]

This is a very useful collection of twenty one essays offering an interesting overview of the paramount academic development and booming scientific production on Chinese Studies in North America (mainly in US with some references to Canada) in the last three decades. Gathering leading scholars in some of the different domains in which nowadays Chinese Studies are specialized and even fragmented, nineteen of these essays were originally written in 2009 and published by Zhonghua Shuju 中华书局 (one of the most prestigious publishing houses in China) under the title of 北美中国学 - 研究概述与文献资源 (*Chinese Studies in North America: Research and Resources*). There are two exceptions: the article by Elizabeth J. Perry "Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?" dates from 2007 and was published in *The China Journal* (no. 57), while the only essay written straightly for this edition organized by the prestigious Association of Asian Studies is the highlighting paper by Edward M. Gunn about "US Scholarship on Modern Chinese Literature".

A first thematic section of this book – the largest and most interesting – summarizes the last decades' North-American academic researches on Chinese History following up mainly a diachronic incomplete perspective. The opening essay by Paul R. Goldin addresses "History: Early China" (pp.1-10). The careful revision of trends and major academic publications notices, among others, a serious critical constraint, stressing one "of our most glaring weakness: we have little paleography to speak of. With too few exceptions, American scholars who work with ancient manuscripts and inscriptions rely on transcriptions prepared by Chinese epigraphers" (p.4). Next, Cynthia L. Chennault and Scott Pearce overview the academic research on "History and Society of Early

Medieval China" (pp.11-22): a timeline debatable concept (there is a *media tempestas* or *medium aevum* dividing the Classic Chinese history?) used for studying the three centuries between the Han and Tang empires. Hilde De Weerdt essay summarizes the last investigations on "Song Studies" (pp.23-53) through an article ending in precious bibliographic references, and explaining that "the expansion of the Song studies community since the 1980s suggests that this diversity will continue to grow in the years ahead. Old questions regarding the Tang-Song transition, the localist turn, the impact and uses of printing, the political economy of the Song state, and its status among East Asian states will continue to stimulate debate, while other areas of research, including environmental history and the history of technology, require more input from Song historians" (p.38). Bettine Birge discusses "Yuan Studies in North America: Historical Overview, Contributions, and Current Trends" (pp. 54-78), cataloguing a impressive *corpus* of references. Martin J. Heijdra prefers a much more engaged essay on "Ming History Three Hundred Years of History Still Searching for Recognition" (pp.79-98), a quiet informative overview of the field although embarrassed by an irritant bibliography drifting along some huge endnotes. Nevertheless, the paper correctly acknowledges "the nature of the Ming government-compiled resources (which are secondary rather than primary sources and should constantly be critically evaluated) results in a flattening of detail and may give not only the impression of a standardization of institutions throughout the Ming period but ultimately a view of the Ming period as "stagnant." And hence, by American Qing scholars and Chinese Ming scholars alike, Ming history is often reduced to a mere "pre-Qing period" and the Qing seen as a higher-level culmination of a lower-level Ming period. Similar remarks may be made about the currently fashionable macro-comparisons between China and Europe. These deal largely with the Qing period, and their views of the Ming are those of American Qing or Chinese Ming scholars rather than American Ming researchers" (pp.88-89). Evelyn S. Rawski summarizes "Qing Historical Studies" (pp.99-112) to propose an urgent problematic shift suggested from a set of evident questions raised by a present that re-questions the past: "the dynamic economic growth of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and South Korea in recent decades has undoubtedly altered the assumption, prevalent a half century ago, that the period of European

world dominance had no foreseeable end. From the hindsight of 2000, some historians see World War II as a benchmark in the decline of European empires. The gradual achievement of modernity by various non-European states and of Chinese societies such as Singapore, Taiwan, and the PRC stimulates a restructuring of historical narratives, as well as a revision of world perspectives. Instead of asking why China did not modernize, for example, one should ask how China's historical legacy affected the particular forms in which modernization occurred, or compare the different developmental paths taken by countries" (p.101). These questions are also addressed in Matthew H. Sommer's essay on "The Field of Qing Legal History" (pp.113-132), re-discussing the famous Weber researches on the traditional punitive Chinese Law and judiciary system, a theory facing the challenges of new investigations anchored in primary sources from Chinese courts, legal institutions and civil society. Benjamin A. Elman audits "Science History, 1600–1900" (pp.133-147), a field still dominated by Needham inimitable studies, mainly concluding: "If there has been one constant in China since the middle of the nineteenth century, it is that imperial reformers, early Republicans, and Chinese Communists have all prioritized modern science and technology. We can no longer afford to undervalue the place of science in modern and contemporary China. China's plans to send space expeditions to the moon and Mars in the twenty-first century are in part a response to the shock of heavy-handed Western and Japanese imperialism since 1850. It is therefore important that the role of modern science, technology, and medicine in contemporary China is properly understood not only by historians of science" (p.144). This section on historical academic researches finalizes with one of the best essays of this collection, the paper of Christopher Isett, "Social History and Rehistorizing the Great Divergence Debate in Qing and World History" (pp.148-173). In spite of the general high quality and judicious actualization of these nine historical essays, it seems at least odd the absence of historiography reviews targeting more recent contemporary periods of China history, from the Republic and the Revolution (or revolutions) up to the "Era of Reforms" in which the PRC lives for the last thirty five years (in contrast with the twenty seven years of post-revolution(s) or "Maoist" age).

It is with a certain sense of frustration that the readers of these essays (scholars, researchers and mainly post-graduate students) are only able to find a singular quiet topic overview of North American Chinese Studies on economics. A dysfunction explained by Thomas G. Rawski in his "Studies of China's Economy (pp.174- 191)", declaring with critical candor that, "despite the tendency among academic economists to emphasize theory, technique, and empirical work on the United States and other high-income nations, the study of China's economy maintains a modest but lively presence within the community of North American economists "(p.174). Howsoever, other than a summary of leading research subjects, the essay is intelligent enough to draught some key pertinent questions quizzing again some former acquired historical conceptualizations: "China's astonishing growth over the past three decades, which qualifies as a major event in world economic history, raises obvious historical questions about the wellsprings of this growth eruption. Instead of seeking to explain China's failure to develop—a staple topic during this author's undergraduate studies in the early 1960s—it now seems essential to ask what social and cultural (as well as economic) formations encouraged and supported China's high-speed growth and why such growth appeared only after 1978. What, for example, retarded China's growth during the final decades of the Qing dynasty, roughly 1870–1911, a period of relative domestic stability during which China benefited from postwar recovery (following the Taiping rebellion), a full-fledged market economy, an international regimen of free trade and (after 1895) investment, and a government that was somewhat inclined to pursue growth-oriented reforms?"(p.179) Despite these challenging questions, one can not avoid to reflect on the sluggish academic production on Chinese contemporary economy as contrasted with the frenetic dissemination of books, papers, reports and countless media's ongoing analysis: the academia lost the monopole of active knowledge on economy (finances, business and allia) in favor of much faster and interventive researches responsible for a diverse type of knowledge sponsored by world organizations, financial companies, banks and several other different institutions nowadays competing for the leading world economists and their global markets forecasts (even when they are completely contradicted by unpredictable lasting crisis).

The panorama of sociological essays is also scant, offering solely two overview papers. Xueguang Zhou and Wei Zhao debate "Social Science Research on Chinese Organizations in the English Literature: A Survey" (pp. 192-231), an useful text emphasizing the following remarks: "To conclude this survey essay, we have witnessed impressive progress in the study of Chinese organization in the last three decades, and with the expansion of the research community and the elevation of research sophistication, the future of this field is promising. But, as we alluded to before, there are also major hurdles for future development, and we hope that our review and discussions here will help clarify gaps in our knowledge and areas that need improvement; in particular, we believe that a closer interaction between social scientists and organization researchers in other fields, especially the management field, will provide a major impetus for social science research in Chinese organizations" (p.221). The second paper by Yanjie Bian, entitled "Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility" (pp. 232-263), stresses the importance of this field of sociological (and truly transdisciplinar) research, pointing out that: "Chinese social stratification and social mobility will remain one of the most interesting areas of sociological research in the decades ahead. China presents an unusual research field of sociological experiments for many questions about class stratification, socioeconomic inequalities, and social mobility. A great amount of original research has promoted our understanding of status groups before the post-1978 reforms, but significantly less attention has been paid to emerging social classes in rural and urban China today. This is partly because property rights arrangements in the production system, key to any rigorous assessment of class stratification, are highly complicated and ambiguous, partly because social classes are in the making and do not yet show clear class boundaries" (p.252).

The fascinating field of political studies on China, mobilizing nowadays countless academic and non-academic titles, deserves in this book an isolated essay, probably the most unattractive of all: the 2007 referred paper by Elizabeth J. Perry, "Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?" (pp. 264-291). The text conclusion is quiet muddled and not exempt of certain well known Western bias: "It is entirely possible that the engineers responsible for running the train of Chinese Communism will eventually discover that they cannot

proceed full steam ahead along an outmoded set of rails. Advanced economic development may indeed demand new political arrangements that afford far greater autonomy to legal institutions and civil society. Absent a willingness on the part of its leadership to risk the consequences of such a political transformation, the PRC could devolve into a run-of-the-mill authoritarianism that dispenses with both the ideological and the organizational features of its revolutionary past. Alternatively, and more worrisome still, the new leadership could choose to further highlight the nationalistic implications of China's revolutionary tradition to develop a militaristic or quasi-fascist version of authoritarianism with deleterious domestic and international consequences" (p.280).

The second largest section of essays deals with Chinese Literature following up a traditional chronological perspective. Martin Kern overviews "Literature: Early China (pp.292-316)" throughout an interesting discussion namely remarking: "Likewise, the field of early Chinese literature has remained largely immune to the latest trends in Western literary theory. Perhaps because of the sheer linguistic challenge or its archaic nature, this literature has not lent itself to the kind of intellectual acrobatics that are, more often than not, performed according to an entirely Western choreography. Even the limited number of studies driven by ambitious theoretical approaches are usually grounded in original texts. The postmodern (and other) jargon that over the past decades has marred so much of Western literary scholarship" (p.302). Next, Ronald Egan presents a summary essay on "Song, Jin, and Yuan Dynasties Literature" (pp. 317-329), followed by Wilt L. Idema much more analytical outlook on "Ming and Qing Literature" (pp. 330-343). Then, two complementary essays target the North-American last three decades of academic production on Modern Chinese Literature: the very informative paper by Edward M. Gunn is entitled "US Scholarship on Modern Chinese Literature" (pp.344-376), while Ban Wang summary prefers the panoramic title "Studies of Modern Chinese Literature (pp.377-389)". This paper ends up with a highlighting resume on the two leading scholarly trends battling in this field: "The first is the text-centered approach, as critics focus on the body, subjectivity, hybridity, desire, and the structure of the text. Holding up the text as something meaningful and beautiful in itself, this view leaves untouched the underlying epochal, political, social, and economic

struggles that shape and reshape textual interpretations. The second tendency is to understand broad political and social issues in the world outside the text and bring understandings of these issues to the interpretation of literary texts or aesthetic objects. This engaged approach brings political consciousness into literary studies. Far from destroying the beauty of literary, artistic, and film works, this approach reveals literary texts as not dead museum pieces meant for contemplation on a Sunday afternoon but a forum, an arena of struggle enmeshed in the daily struggle of humans in the globalizing world" (p.388).

Chinese Literature studies are followed as expected by a section on linguistics restricted to Victor H. Mair's overview of "Developments in the Study of Chinese Linguistics during the Last Three Decades" (pp. 390-421). The conclusion underlines some of the new academic and even professional tendencies in this domain: "From the 1990s onward, more and more scholars trained in the United States and Canada have opted to return to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China for long-term employment. The result is that Chinese linguistics has gradually become a unified global phenomenon, with scholars worldwide collaborating on a common set of aims and utilizing similar analytical techniques and methodologies. The earlier pattern of parallel tracks employing different research strategies directed toward dissimilar goals has given way to a universal body of assumptions, methods, and objectives"(p.407)

The present volume still gratifies the readers with an essay on Chinese Music through an original paper by Bell Yung, "Chinese Music: Graduate Training, Resources, and Publication" (pp.422-454). The opening remarks explain that "Chinese music is a relatively new topic of teaching and research at North American universities. It has long been considered a subcategory of musical studies and finds its home mainly in music departments. Within those departments, it is subsumed under the discipline of ethnomusicology, which itself became an established field in American academia only in the 1950s" (p.422). The author acknowledges the need to foster studies building up an academic domain crossing the PRC actual fast economic, social and cultural changes, because "economic growth and political liberalization since the 1980s have promoted research in Chinese music and enhanced the interaction between Chinese and North American scholars. An increasing number of academics from both sides have participated in and read papers at conferences on the other

shore. In addition, a growing number of translations of scholarship have been published, and their quantity and quality continue to improve. In particular, the North American scholars are taking advantage of easy travel to all parts of China to explore new venues for ethnographic fieldwork, and Chinese scholars have learned of the theories and methodologies of Western ethnomusicology. In an innovative new development, many Chinese scholars are now spending six months to two years at North American universities as visiting scholars, thus enhancing the opportunities for mutual understanding. The ready accessibility of vast amounts of primary and secondary sources through digital library facilities on both sides offers new opportunities and challenges. Such cross-fertilization between two scholarly systems and practices long separated and differing in their limitations and ideologies promises to push the frontier of Chinese music research to new horizons" (p.430).

The book finishes with an interesting essay, although more promising than achieved, by Cary Y. Liu presenting the alluring title of "Art History: Comparative Methodology, Pragmatism, and the Seeds of Doubt" (pp.455-466). This paper still lacks clear field research to privilege some general epistemic and methodological debates: "Knowing historically the changing ideas and methods of the general discourse in Western art history allows us to understand better the underlying ideologies that drove, and in many cases still drive, Chinese art historical consensus as it has developed in North America. In retrospect, what may be most "unique in character" in American studies of Chinese art history are the seeds of doubt sown by intellectual pragmaticism and fallibilism that seem to parallel the adoption of scientific research methods for the social sciences. Doubt, however, is not uncommon in scholarly research. Almost every generation of scholars questions and challenges the interpretations and conjectures of its predecessors. Most skeptics and doubters, however, mainly focus on questioning the authenticity of myths, facts, and other sources of knowledge, and their correct interpretation. In contrast, what is distinctive in American inquiry, growing out of pragmatism, is that what is questioned is the very understanding of knowledge as absolute certainty or truth." (p.462)

Despite the impressive informative value of this book, there are some gaps and perplexities that must be referred. One evident default comes out from scientific domains grounded in systematic field research: the volume

doesn't have essays on archaeology, ethnography or anthropology and their interdisciplinary dialogues with history, sociology, politics or economics. Even the blooming constellation of historical Chinese Studies in North America still follows up traditional or dynastic timelines rather than the thematic axial partitions of social, economic, political, cultural and religious history. Furthermore, the lack of mobilization of historical sources other than written material is dominant when oral memories, life stories or ethnographic data can provide countless highlighting diverse archives and libraries. It is relevant to acknowledge, therefore, that these field studies in diverse social and cultural landscapes are also indispensable for understanding the past and present of the different "Chinas" (urban, rural, North, South, littoral, interior, "rich", "poor", "literate", "illiterate", etc.) truly hiding beyond a monolithic idea of China normally springing out from official sources and "literati" or upper-classes representations. At the same time, Chinese contemporary fast economic growth, social transformations or cultural development are not only (if not mainly) an intrinsic or internal achievement: they are also part of the Chinese growing competitive presence in the different scales of the process of globalization. Therefore, Chinese Studies in its most diverse fields demand a global perspective as well as the set of comparative, connective and contrastive researches able to overcome some persistent ethnocentric (Eurocentric as well as Sinocentric) conceptualizations of a China that was and still is largely diverse and complex. Nevertheless, the scope of this book is clearly achieved and I will strongly recommend it to my graduate and post-graduate students, albeit the almost complete absence of studies and references to Hong and Macau, the two special administrative regions of the PRC that not only give a meaning to the "one country, two systems" principle but are also key labs for the most diverse "experiments" on Chinese Studies.

Ivo Carneiro de Sousa

DAVIDS, KAREL

Religion, Technology, and the Great and Little Divergences. China and Europe Compared, c. 700-1800.

Leiden: Brill, 2013 [XII+278 pp., ill]

Fortunately for the reader, Karel Davids' new book is not another brick in the growing and confused debate arising mainly among historians since the publication of Keneth Pomeranz "The Great Divergence. China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy" (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000). Some of Pomeranz's main claims, namely on the historical similitude of China and Europe economic development paths as well as on the contingency and exogenous conditions of the European Industrial revolution, a sort of conjectural or lucky draw that was not cored on endogenous historical advances, raised serious criticism (as in Bryant, Joseph M. (2006). "The West and the rest revisited", in: *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 31(4): 403–444), then generating the most contradictory replies and discussions (a useful summary is available in Vries, Peer (2010). "The California School and Beyond: How to Study the Great Divergence?", in: *History Compass* 8/7: 730–751). This academic debate can not be separated in the last two decades from the blossoming of the most diverse literature on China, following up almost exactly the booming of Chinese economy and trade worldwide. Several academic and a lot of non-academic volumes decided to revisit Chinese history to explain the country's actual unprecedented fast economic growth, and some titles (as Gavin Menzies sensational two best sellers: *1421: The Year China Discovered the World* and *1434: The Year a Magnificent Chinese Fleet Sailed to Italy and Ignited the Renaissance*) even decided to reinvent between imagination and falsification the Chinese past truly "igniting" a new *Chinoiserie* fashion sold in any international airport bookshop.

Religion, Technology, and the Great and Little Divergences is a serious academic book divided in four consecutive chapters: (1) Religion and Visions on the Uses of Nature in China and Europe (p.33); (2) Religion and Human Capital Formation in China and Europe (p. 57); (3) Religion and the Circulation

of Technical Knowledge in China and Europe (p. 117); (4) Religion and Technical Innovation in China and Europe (p. 173). In the useful preface, Karel Davids defines clearly that "this book aims to connect four debates that are usually conducted separately: the debates on religion and technology, religion and economy, the Great Divergence between Asia and Europe and the Little Divergence within Europe" (p. XI). This connective perspective is not achieved naturally through an impossible survey of the oceanic historical pertinent sources still waiting further individual and collective researches, but privileges an analytical and theoretical long-term historical conceptualization. In fact, the author clearly stresses that the "emphasis in this book is on analysis and explanation. It does not pretend to give a full-blown overview of technological changes, material cultures or religious development in China and Europe over 1,100 years. It attempts to answer the key question by means of a long-term, systematic comparison between China and Europe, based on a wide array of literature and a selected set of printed sources, which focuses on four important aspects: visions and uses of nature, human capital formation, circulation of technical knowledge and technical innovation" (p. XI).

The book defines the term "Great Divergence" as "the growing gap in economic performance between Europe and China (and by extension, Asia) since the late eighteenth century. A recurrent question in this ever-expanding debate concerns the extent to which the development of technology in Europe differed from that in China and how this difference, if it existed, could be explained" (p.1). Complementarily, the much less common idea of "Little Divergence" refers to "the increasing gap in per capita income between north-western Europe and the Mediterranean and East-Central Europe in the early modern period" (p.18). A "little" divergence that recalls an old and odd "great" historical divergence (in rigor, politico-religious divisions and wars) between a "protestant" and "hard-working" Northern Europe nowadays obliged to pay the liberal excesses of the "lazy" indebted Italian, Spanish and Portuguese from the Catholic and sunny South unable to follow up the German "protestant ethics" of labor that invented, according to Max Weber famous classic title, the "spirit of Capitalism". Nonetheless, this is not neither clear historical evidence nor a long-term primary divergence: the economic exchanges between the "two Europes" were much more important than religious or ethical contradictions,

and the Iberian 15th-16th century expansion was interconnected with North European markets, loans and common trade capital accumulation. Moreover, the Spanish Habsburg Empire had key footholds in North Europe; the Portuguese maritime empire in the East survived with German and Italian silver huge loans and distributed Southeast Asian spices and Chinese silks through its factory in Antwerp towards Northern markets; the British first industrialization was also fuelled with colonial Brazilian natural resources; and political and commercial alliances from 16th to 19th century didn't follow up exactly the religious and economic "divergences" between South and North Europe. And if historians research seriously the movements of people, professionals, technicians or even missionaries will find German Jesuit priests in 17th century Macau, Portuguese cartographers working for the Dutch V.O.C. or the first Portuguese translation of the Bible being published in Batavia by a Portuguese former soldier in Malacca converted to Calvinism. Political and official historical European divisions explained philosophically by leading academics are normally unable to understand a history from bellow, made up by countless lasting interconnections of traders, soldiers, mercenaries, pirates, vagabonds, priests, monks, disputed professionals, shared markets and common economic profits. At the same time, per capita "divergences" between North and South Europe had a dominant urban and class dimension up to the 19th century capitalist industrialization: the wealth differences between a rich Lisbon trader and a wealth merchant of Amsterdam were insignificant against the huge general misery of early modern peasants or poor cities' artisans.

Karel Davids recalls correctly in his book that the debate on technological "divergences" between Europe and China is normally addressed through a set of leading examples stressing the Chinese specificity or former "superior" singular breakthroughs: "whenever somebody tries to make a comparative statement about technological development in China and Europe before 1800, three emblematic examples invariably crop up: the outburst of ocean voyaging under Zheng He, the failure of the Macartney Embassy and the unfulfilled promise of Song's water clock" (p. 4). In rigor, these three well known paradigms are fragments of very different historical processes. Macartney mission was unable to convince the Chinese Emperor to open the country ports for the industrial British manufactures, but the Embassy several printed accounts, reports and

books spread out in Europe a turning point in the general evaluation of China: the empire previous extolled by Jesuits accounts and philosophers as influential as Voltaire became a stagnant and backward old decadent civilization waiting the progress impact of British modern industrial imperialism. Finished in 1094, the water astronomical clock of Su Song witnesses a case of inventive individual genius that is not basically different from the countless imaginative Leonardo Da Vinci's fantastic sketched inventions. There are a lot of individual imaginative inventions in the history of diverse cultures that were unable to mobilize any social and economic attention: Su Song clock as Da Vinci drawings and models didn't generate technological social equipments that were not demanded by epochal primary economic structures. Performed between 1405 and 1433, the famous seven voyages of exploration and friendship directed by the eunuch "admiral" Zheng He visited Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Peninsula reaching as far as Eastern coastal Africa. These immense convoys of huge treasure ships and smaller vessels were not meant to realize any geographical "discoveries" or commercial projects but to display Ming imperial power through a tributary system in codification during this period. The voyages stopped when the Ming Empire was obliged to secure terrestrial borders engaging in the permanent obsession of a "Great Wall". Foreign trade became a surveyed element of the tributary system, although external legal and illegal commerce didn't vanished from South China, namely in the Pearl River Delta and Fujien regions. In this sense, one can also speculate on two different early-modern Chinas in which the South cored in Canton was largely able to gather European scientific and technological information via Macau: the Portuguese introduced fast in the region and in Taiwan several technological equipments from navy artillery industrial production to the sugar engines reinvented in colonial Brazil. In parallel, the Portuguese received and adapted several Chinese technologies from junks to paper print, from houses windows to water distribution. In late 16th century Lisbon, several factories tried to imitate the Ming white-and-blue porcelains sent to Northern European markets as genuine Chinese. In consequence, it is probably difficult to justify comparative researches on Europe and China early modern technologies as two absolute independent entities, completely ignoring each other: contacts, interconnections and mutual technological adaptations followed trade, piracy,

missionary and adventurers' routes. European trade enclaves as Macau, the South China Sea islands of traders, smugglers and pirates, overseas Chinese settled in Southeast Asia represent key points of contacts sharing technical novelties or experimenting new technological equipments.

The main originality of Karel Davids' book lies in the research effort to connect religious contexts and technological knowledge and innovation avoiding the debate of religious ideas as a Weberian ideal-type deciding economic formations and the technologies it required. The concept of "religious context" is indeed more rigorous than the traditional comparison of religious orthodox values and moral principles that were not always strictly followed by populations and different social groups in China and Europe, albeit religious-ideological controls, repressions or diverse types of inquisitions. In fact, the Chinese past (and still present-day) populations, including several minorities, built up a lasting instrumental relationship with religions' doctrines: religious social practices were part of a larger gift-giving gift-receiving system in which different gods and goddesses, temples and shrines erected by "universal" and "popular" religions were likewise worshiped for the lineage and family broader cultural protection and socio-economic success. However, this instrumental framework was not absolutely distinct from the religious ethos shared by several social groups from Catholic and Protestant early-modern Europe. The recurrent clashes between Portuguese traders and Catholic missionaries in Asia were countless, frequently violent, and could feed up tens of original doctoral dissertations. In the 1580s, for example, the Jesuit bishop Belchior Carneiro settled in Macau complained hardly against the Portuguese traders in the Far-East that were married with several women across different Asian trade towns: they married with Chinese women in the Catholic churches of Macau, but they also married with other women in Japan, Indonesia, Cambodia or Siam following up other religions and traditional mores. Some few thousands of these Portuguese traders and their Eurasian offspring built up in Southeast Asia their own shadow empire of merchants, soldiers, sailors, pilots, mercenaries and adventurers far from the control of the Portuguese "State of India" and the Catholic Church surveillance, mainly following a *mens mercatori* for which gods and saints were also a business resource. Therefore, the orthodox homogeneity of religious principles taught by theologians, priests,

missionaries, discussed by philosophers or appropriated by sates' ideologies, imperial courts, high rank bureaucrats or "literati" is not enough to compare religious contexts that were also social: comparisons do need a social history in Europe, China or elsewhere.

Reinterpreting the main long-term systemic links between religious contexts, technological knowledge and progress, Karel Davids' research concludes that the religious contexts "*did* matter for technological change, but that: (1) this effect was much more important for the *Great* Divergence than for the *Little* Divergence, and (2) differences in religious contexts primarily affected the evolution of technology by influencing institutions and underlying socio-political structures for the formation of human capital and the circulation and creation of technical knowledge". In consequence, the author argues that "variations in religious contexts were relevant to the emergence of differences in technical change and thus contributed to the Great Divergence. The chief point of impact, however, did not lie in the sphere of ideas, attitudes and values, but at the level of institutions, patterns of communications and movements of people connected with religious traditions" (p.30). Furthermore, the research didn't find out in basic hierophany and cosmogonies formative doctrines any relevant divergence in the religious domestication of nature, therefore concluding "that variations in visions of the uses of nature between religious traditions between c.700 and 1800 have simply been too weak or too inconsistent to offer part of the explanation for the differences in technological development" (p.54).

I have in general three main problems with the books placed in line with Keneth Pomeranz "Great Divergence". First, there is a simple chronological timeline embarrass, since it is always difficult to understand the Chinese "convergent" or "divergent" starting point (even a *circa* one) and the common "the end" in 1800: if a long-term historical perspective decides – as it should – to research large portions of time up to the present or, even better, to start from present questions in search of long-term historical processes' answers it would be much more difficult to find a "great divergence", probably broken down in a myriad of "divergences", the set of multiple differences in material culture, social values, scientific and technological achievements or primary demographic systems and landscape domestication structures built by a

lasting Chinese civilization much larger and resilient than the parts assembled historically by it.

The second problem is much more concrete, almost personal, and is related with the habitual recurrent criticism upon Max Weber "thesis" on China (curiously, not on Europe or "protestant Europe"), a recurrent device in the introductions of many Western academic books revising the history of China. Actually, other than the essay on *Confucianism and Taoism* that was originally part of "The Economic Ethic of World Religions, Comparative Essays in the Sociology of Religion", nowadays circulating in English re-editions trough a volume entitled *Religion of China* (translated and edited by Hans H, Gerth. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), Weber didn't create any grand thesis on China "great divergence" (a word that he was intelligent enough to avoid), collecting instead a huge constellation of dispersed contrastive clues discussing cities, laws, bureaucracies, "literati", institutions, sciences, Chinese feudalism and several other subjects accessed through indirect sources studied in German, French, English and Russian epochal bibliography. Insofar, Weber clues on China are spread throughout tens of papers, chapters, books, notes and references (exactly 164 only in "Economy and Society") that must be researched carefully (and red prior to) before any generalization normally coming up from general comments on the comments on Weber writings. Max Weber doesn't have a key "religious" argument (copying and pasting the "protestant ethics" classic argument) regarding China delay in evolving during the 19th century towards a modern capitalist society, a subject that the German sociologist truly didn't explain, even hesitating in accepting religious, cultural or "mentality" common explanations: "circumstances which were usually considered to have been obstacles to capitalist development in the Occident had not existed for thousand of years in China. Such circumstances as the fetters of feudalism, landlordism and, in part also, the guild system were lacking there. (…) Political capitalism was common to occidental Antiquity until the time of Roman Emperors, to the Middle Ages, and to the Orient. The pacification of the Empire explains, at least indirectly, the non-existence of political capitalism but it does not explain the non-existence of modern capitalism in China. To be sure the basic characteristics of the "mentality", in this case the practical attitudes towards the world, were deeply co-determined by political and economic

destinies. Yet, in view of their autonomous laws, one can hardly fail to ascribe to these attitudes effects strongly counteractive to capitalist development [in China]": Weber 1951, 249).

Max Weber as Karl Marx and some few others social thinkers, philosophers and historians are classic authors that suggested also some key highlighting classic theories and conceptualizations: classic authors and theories do have an intrinsic value and must be discussed (after direct reading and study) accordingly. Otherwise, mainly in Weber's case, important clues, suggestions and inspirational interpretations can not be correctly understood, reviewed, developed and changed.

Finally, my third panoramic concern is quiet epistemological, pertaining to the poor academic field of epistemology of history (something almost ignored albeit some traditional normative courses on Philosophies and Theories of History): why does history needs to evolve compulsorily towards a convergence (normally ours) of civilizations, societies and economies? What is the problem with Chinese pre-industrial, industrial or "capitalist" divergences (in fact, differences) from European modern and contemporary economic history? Which is the trouble (in fact, challenge) nowadays with the variety of capitalism (the CCP still labels it socialism) grounding China's fast economic growth, paramount global trade presence or huge poverty alleviation of tens of millions of Chinese achieved throughout the last thirty years? Is it (or not) a "great divergence" (in fact, competition, challenge and opportunity) against the dominant Western liberal variety of capitalism? The right of individuals more or less inventive and of societies more or less liberal to be different now or in the past can not be confused with a divergent or deviant history. The word divergence is not only a bad concept but a clearly wrong one with profound ideological roots and consequences. By building up a "great divergence" agenda for comparative studies on Europe and China the true historical divergences coming out from historical colonialism, imperialism or totalitarian imperial regimes, economic exploitation or social misery disappears while social transformations, revolutions and collective mobilizations are erased. Nowadays, the "great divergence" between China and Western powers, mainly US, is not only cored in economic global competition but is still fortunately also politic: China, for example, insists since 1954 in the virtues of the five

principles of peaceful coexistence and applies them worldwide, including to the growing trade, aid and investment presence in Africa (loudly criticized by Western politicians and media), while the US or several European countries pledged in the last decades for the counter-virtues of limited sovereignty, the right in certain cases to foreign intervention and other international new order requirements, normally transforming fast welcomed "springs" in dramatic winters. Divergence(s) is a good word precisely for politics, domestic or international, to express the salutary sense of contrasting ideas. In the other domains of economic, social, cultural or religious history there are operatory concepts enough for guiding comparative, connective and contrastive historical researches on different past civilizations, societies, economies, cultures and religions. Despite the fascination with "great" and "little" divergences, Karel Davids' new book is a solid step forward in direction of an epistemic renewal of China-Europe comparative studies that must be anchored in complex connective perspectives, privileging long-term comparative subjects, and overcoming current essentialisms and marketing fashions entangling an important field for the academic qualification of global history.

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