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
SINO-PORTUGUESE TRADE


FROM 1514 TO 1644

T' IEN-TSÊ CHANG.

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中 葡 通 商 研 究
SINO-PORTUGUESE TRADE

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SINO-PORTUGUESE TRADE
FROM 1514 TO 1644
A SYNTHESIS OF PORTUGUESE AND
CHINESE SOURCES

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT TER VERKRIJGING
VAN DEN GRAAD VAN DOCTOR IN DE LETTEREN
EN WIJSBEGEERTE AAN DE RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT
TE LEIDEN OP GEZAG VAN DEN RECTOR MAG-
NIFICUS Mr. D. VAN BLOM, HOOGLEERAAR IN DE
FACULTEIT DER RECHTSGELEERDHEID, VOOR
DE FACULTEIT DER LETTEREN EN WIJSBEGEERTE
TE VERDEDIGEN OP VRIJDAG 22 DECEMBER 1933,
DES NAMIDDAGS TE 3 UUR

DOOR

T'IEN-TSÊ CHANG

張 天 澤 著

GEBOREN TE CH'ÜANCHOW, FUKIEN, CHINA



N. V. BOEKHANDEL EN DRUKKERIJ
VOORHEEN E. J. BRILL, LEIDEN
1933

THE
GINO-PORTUGUESE TRADE
PROCESSES TO THE
A SYSTEM OF PORTUGUESE AND
CRIMINAL SOURCES

ACQUAINTED PROSECUTOR FOR THE
THE GINO-PORTUGUESE TRADE
PROCESSES TO THE
A SYSTEM OF PORTUGUESE AND
CRIMINAL SOURCES

DEPARTMENT OF THE
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE
DIVISION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
MAY 10 1934



PREFACE

The Commission on the Causes and the Prevention of the
1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic was organized in 1924
by the Surgeon General, United States Department of Health,
and the Secretary of the War Relocation Authority, United States
Department of War. The Commission was organized to study the
causes and the prevention of the influenza pandemic of 1918-1919
and to report to the Surgeon General and the Secretary of the
War Relocation Authority. The Commission was organized to study
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TO
PROFESSOR WILLIAM HUNG
IN RESPECT AND GRATITUDE



TO
PROPERTY BUREAU
IN RESPECT AND BEARING

PROPERTY BUREAU

PREFACE

The trade between the Chinese and the Portuguese in history is a subject which, in spite of its importance, has been thus far neglected. The reason is evident. Although important material exists, it has lain hidden in languages such as Chinese, Portuguese and to some extent, Dutch, which are either not much studied by Western historians, or unfamiliar to Chinese scholars. But only by synthesizing all these sources can we hope to place the subject in the best light. The Chinese sources have so far received but very little attention, and though some part of the Portuguese sources have become better known, they have been only very inadequately treated.

In 1930 Professor William Hung (洪業, 煨蓮), sometime Visiting Professor at Harvard University, first drew my attention to this field. He further informed me that in the main library of Harvard there is a good collection of Portuguese and Spanish works and manuscripts. I proceeded, therefore, in February of 1932 from Spain to Cambridge, Mass., where the greater part of this research work was done.

I most gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to the eminent historian Professor J. Huizinga of Leiden University for his kind guidance in my study during my stay at Leiden and for supervising this research. To Dr. J. J. L. Duyvendak, Professor of Chinese and Director of the Sinological Institute at Leiden, I must also express my gratitude for kindly reading my manuscripts, furnishing me with many helpful suggestions and placing his library at my disposal. I am also much indebted to Dr. A. P. Usher, Professor of Economic History at Harvard, who went through the

first four chapters of my manuscripts and gave me hints and valuable assistance in various ways; and to Professor R. P. Blake, Director of the Harvard Libraries for his interest in my work and for allowing me to enjoy unusual privileges in the Libraries.

May I also avail myself of the completion of my dissertation to thank most heartily Professors H. T. Colenbrander, A. J. Wensinck and N. J. Krom, whose lectures I was privileged to follow.

My best thanks are due to Mrs. Denys P. Myers and Mrs. Duyvendak for editing my manuscripts; and to Mrs. Chang for reading and correcting the proofs and preparing the Index. Finally I wish to express my sense of obligation to the authorities of the Harvard-Yenching Institute for their support in carrying out this research work.

Leiden, December 1933.

T. T. CHANG.


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ERRATA.

- page 2 for in Altertum, read: im Altertum.
" 4 " actuated a desire, read: actuated by a desire.
" 6 " terrential, read: torrential.
" 21 " cofines, read: confines.
" 25 " of is kind, read: of its kind.
" 28 " attemps, read: attempts.
" 33 " them, read: then.
" 34 " suits, read: suite.
" 38 " china, read: China.
" 39 " even it were, read: even if it were.
" 43 " for the had, read: for he had.
" 44 " priviledge, read: privilege.
" 47 " Prohibiton, read: Prohibition.
" 48 " mouted, read: mounted.
" 50 " honesly, read: honesty.
" 51 " country, read: country.
" 51 " foreigner, read: foreign.
" 58 " embaix or, read: embaix ^{or}.
" 58 " po, read: pto.
" 63 " statemen, read: statement.
" 63 " doubling he south, read: doubling the south.
" 65 " coud, read: could.
" 66 " af, read: of.
" 73 " petition, read: the petition.
" 80 " af, read: of.
" 81 " encourages, read: encouraged.
" 82 " Yüeh-chiang, read: Yüeh-kang.
" 82 " derparted, read: departed.
" 86 " promotory, read: promontory.
" 88 " angreement, read: agreement.
" 98 " scaled, read: sealed.
" 118 " councillor, read: councillor.
" 125 " Portugueze, read: Portuguese.
" 131 " fas, read: was.
" 140 " coutrymen, read: countrymen.



CHAPTER I.
AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF CHINA'S MARITIME
TRADE DOWN TO 1513.

EARLY PERIOD.

The origin of the maritime trade relations between China and the countries or regions lying to her south and to her south-west has long fallen into oblivion. It is quite possible that some sort of coastal trade existed between the present Kwangtung province and eastern Annam or even more distant places lying south of it at the beginning of or perhaps centuries before our era. Further investigation may greatly increase our knowledge about the subject. The fact that contemporary chronological compilers or historians as Ssü-ma Ch'ien (d.c. 86 B.C.) and Pan Ku (d. 92 A.D.) made no mention of such a trade does not necessarily mean that it did not exist, for foreign commerce in a remote part of China like Kwangtung, which could be hardly considered Chinese yet, might not have much interested them.

We can make out from a passage of the Hou-Han Shu or History of the Later Han Dynasty that in the year 132 A.D. the coastal regions in north-eastern Annam were already a terminal point for the navigation from the South Seas ¹. In that year the king of Yeh-tiao ², probably Yawadwipa ³ or the present Java, sent from beyond the borders of Jih-nan ⁴ an embassy to present tributes. The emperor granted Tiao Pien ⁵, king of Yeh-tiao, a gold seal and violet

¹ Hou-Han Shu, Ch. 6, p. 3b and Ch. 116, p. 3a-4b.

² 葉調

³ Pelliot, Deux Itinéraires etc. pp. 266-269 (Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient, Tome IV. 1904).

⁴ 日南.

⁵ 調便.

ribbons. Now Jih-nan, which was the southernmost commandery of the Chinese Empire¹, more or less corresponds to the modern province of An in Annam, thus, if the information of the Hou-Han Shu is correct², and if Yeh-tiao was indeed the present Java or any other country to the south whose envoys came to China by sea, there is no doubt that Jih-nan and its neighbouring regions were a terminal point of navigation.

In the year 166 A.D. occurred an event which, in addition to above conclusion, proves the existence of a long sea-route which joined the southern-most end of the Chinese Empire to the Roman Orient. In that year a party of foreigners who claimed to be sent by the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus arrived by sea in north-eastern Annam, proceeded probably thence overland to the court of the Emperor Huan³ and offered ivory, rhinoceros horns and tortoise shell⁴. We may well question whether the foreigners were not pseudo-ambassadors, and we may reasonably conclude that the mission was merely a private mercantile expedition⁵. What interests us most is the existence of this long sea-route which connected the two empires. Evidently the expedition did not discover a new route, nor claimed it did, for a number of shorter routes had already joined the seaports between China and the Red Sea. We have evidence that before this expedition the Greeks had already knowledge of the existence of a seaport called Cattigara in China which

¹ This part of Annam formed at that time the three southern-most commanderies of the Chinese Empire: farthest north, on more or less the present Tongking soil, was Chiao-chih (交趾) south of Chiao-chih was Chiu-chên (九真) and farther south Jih-nan.

² Hou-Han Shu was compiled in the fifth century.

³ 桓帝.

⁴ Hou-Han Shu Ch. 118. The text dit not make it clear whether the party went to the Court. The name of the Roman "king" is An-tun (安敦) which is generally accepted to be M. A. Antoninus. Liang Shu Ch. 54 also mentions the arrival of these foreigners.

⁵ The author of the Hou-Han Shu justifiably suspected the genuineness of the embassy and pointed out that the articles these foreigners brought to China were not the products of the Roman Orient (大秦), which were known to them (Vide Ibid). Other arguments cf. F. Hirth, China and the Roman Orient, pp. 175-178; and the same author, Über den Seeverkehr Chinas in Altertum nach Chinesischen Quellen (Geographische Zeitschrift, hrsg. von A. Hettner, 1896) p. 447.

could be reached from South India by sea¹; this port must be sought in these coastal regions of north-eastern Annam which was then a part of the Chinese Empire². Nevertheless, the fact remains that the voyage of these visitors from the Roman Empire is the first recorded successful attempt to complete the course of navigation from the far west to the far east.

The existence of this route in the second century of our era indicates that, at that time there were already trade relations between the Chinese port in the Tongking gulf and some other stations or ports lying along the route. Such relations in their even cruder forms must have existed from time immemorial when some coastal towns or villages began to seek some sort of exchange or communication with their neighbours. In the course of time the routes for such intercourse gradually stretched out, from their various centres, along the coasts till they joined each other and thus formed a continuous one. Due to the great difficulty and risks which accompanied a very crude form of navigation, few traders or adventurers would try to make a complete trip from one end to the other.

In A.D. 226, a merchant of the Roman Orient, Ts'in-lun³ by name, came to Chiao-chih (Tungking); the prefect of that place, Wu Miao⁴, sent him to Sun Ch'üan⁵, the Emperor of Wu. Sun Ch'üan obtained from him much information about his native country. About that time some blackish coloured dwarfs had been brought from the district Tan-yang⁶. When Ts'in-lun saw them,

¹ Claudius Ptolemy in his *Geographikè Hyphègèsis*, compiled in c. 150 A.D., Bk 1 chaps 13, 14, 17 said of a "portus Sinarum" called Kattigara and the sea voyage to this port from India etc. Ptolemy lived from the reign of Hadrian to that of Marcus Aurelius. The latest edition of his work is by Nobbe, 1888—1913. We can establish the fact that Ptolemy made use of much older sources, see N. J. Krom, *De Populis Germanis* (1908) pp. 27—35.

² It has been agreed that Cattigara should be sought on the north-eastern coast of Annam. But scholars disagree as to exactly in which part of that region Cattigara was to be found. Some argue that it must be Chiao-chih, ancient pronunciation Kiao-chi, in the Tongking gulf, cf. Richthofen, *China*, 1, pp. 504—510; the same author's papers in the *Berlin Geog. Soc. for 1876*; H. Yule, *Cathay and the Way Thither*, 2nd ed. 1, pp. 5, 193; A. Hermann in the *Berlin Geog. Soc. Zeitschrift*, N. 10, 1913, and the *Geographical Journal*, May 1914, p. 579. While another opinion is that it must be farther south, cf. F. Hirth, *Über den Seeverkehr Chinas in Altertum*, *Geog. Zeitschrift*, hrsg. v. A. Hettner, 1896, pp. 447—448.

³ 秦論.

⁴ 吳邈.

⁵ 孫權.

⁶ 丹陽.

he said that in his country such men were rarely seen. Sun Ch'üan then sent male and female dwarfs, ten of each, in charge of an officer called Liu Hsien¹ to accompany Ts'in-lun back. Liu Hsien died on the road, whereupon Ts'in-lun returned direct to his home land².

On account of its geographical position, Canton, which was destined to become one of the chief ports on the Chinese coast, was the first town in China proper visited by foreigners. During the second half of the third century there were already men from Western Asia, most likely Arabs or Persians, who introduced the cultivation of jasmine on Cantonese soil.³ From this evidence we may safely conclude that the terminal point of navigation had already moved farther from the Tongking Gulf to Canton. It is possible that such extension of the long sea-route took place before the second half of the third century, but the above-mentioned fact remains our first evidence of the presence of foreigners in Canton.

The early relations between China and Japan are shrouded in obscurity. We can not state with certainty when Japan began to have intercourse with China. The visit of some Japanese⁴ envoys to the Chinese court in A.D. 57⁵ is the first recorded case of official relations between the two countries. Just half a century later, in A.D. 107, a Japanese king⁶ again sent presents of a hundred and sixty slaves to the Chinese emperor⁷. We are not informed of the motive of these visits of the Japanese. They were probably actuated a desire to enter into relations with their powerful neighbour as such relations were regarded as increasing their own prestige. But in any case, previous to these visits, the Japanese must have already had some commercial or other kind of intercourse with China, and it was through such that they had obtained information about her.

¹ 劉咸.

² Liang Shu Ch. 54, p. 7*b*. Nan Shih Ch. 78, p. 7*a*.

³ Chi Han (稽含), Nan-fang Ts'ao-mu Chuang (南方草木狀) Chi Han's biography is to be found in Chin Shu, Ch. 89. His book must have been compiled in the end of the third century or in the beginning of the fourth century. Ch. 2, p. 2. Also cf. Notes and Queries on China and Japan, Vol. 1 (1867) p. 40 sq., Vol. 2 (1868) pp. 29, 46—47; F. Hirth, China and the Roman Orient pp. 268—272; J. Amer. Orient. Soc. XXX p. 23.

⁴ 倭.

⁵ Hou-Han Shu Ch. 115 p. 6*a*.

⁶ 倭國王.

⁷ Hou-Han Shu Ibid.

However that may be there is no evident trace left to us of China's trade relations with Japan during this early period under survey.

FOURTH TO SIXTH CENTURY.

The fourth, fifth and sixth century formed the Dark Ages in Chinese history. It is a long period of almost incessant civil warfare and foreign invasion. The universally distressful conditions were of course unfavourable to China's oversea commerce. But thanks to the enterprising spirits of the Indians, the Persians and the Arabs, her maritime trade relations did continue. We learn from the *Liang Shu* or History of Liang (502—557) that the merchants of Ta-ts'in (Roman Orient) frequently visited Indo-China¹. Cosmas says in the sixth century that products of Tzinista (China) were taken to Ceylon, a great commercial centre for centuries, and then passed on to other parts².

It was on board some of their merchant ships that Fa-hsien³ returned to China from India. This well-known Buddhist, after 13 years' travel and study in Central and South Asia, left Tamlook⁴ at the mouth of the Ganges for Ceylon in 413 A.D., from whence he took passage on board a large merchantvessel which carried more than two hundred souls. Catching a fair wind, they sailed eastward for two days. Then they encountered a heavy gale which for thirteen days and nights threatened the lives of the passengers. After having voyaged for about ninety days, they touched at Java⁵. Having sojourned in this country for five months or so, Fa-hsien again shipped on board another large merchant ship with some two

¹ *Liang Shu* Ch. 54 p. 7b.

² Cosmas Indicopleustes, *Christian Topography*, Hakluyt Soc. edit. p. 365.

³ 法顯.

⁴ Tamlook was in Fa-hsien's time the principal emporium of trade with Ceylon and South-eastern Asia, and it remained so for centuries. It was visited by numerous Chinese pilgrims in the seventh century.

⁵ The Chinese name is Yeh-p'o-t'i (耶婆提) which has been identified with Yawadwi(pa), an old Sanscrit form for Java, and this identification has been generally accepted. Recently G. Ferrand declared that Yeh-p'o-t'i must be Sumatra and not Java, because the route between Ceylon and Canton went along the coast of Palembang (*Journal Asiatique* 11: 20, 1922, p. 221). The chief objection to Ferrand's opinion is that Yawadwipa, from which evidently Yeh-p'o-t'i is derived has never been used for Sumatra. On account of the adverse weather, the ship of Fa-hsien diverged from its course so that we can not expect it to have followed the ordinary route.

hundred men. A north-east course was set in order to reach Canton. Over a month had elapsed when one night in the second watch (9—11 P.M.) they encountered a violent gale with terrential rain. After they fortunately survived this danger, the sky continued to be dark, and the captain and officers who had to observe the sun, moon and constellations in order to navigate, lost their bearings. They went on for seventy days until the provisions and water were nearly exhausted. The merchants consulted together and came to the conclusion that they had gone out of their course. Thereupon they took a north-westerly direction; and after twelve days and nights more, arrived at the southern coast of Lao-shan in the prefecture of Ch'ang-kwang on the Shantung promontory¹.

Fa-hsien is the first Chinese who has left a record of a voyage from India to China. His voyage reveals to us that great discomfort and the greatest possible danger and hardship accompanied seafaring. "Only by observing the sun, moon and constellation was it possible to go forward". In cloudy and rainy weather, the vessel drifted "at the mercy of the wind without keeping any definite course". Besides these dangers which accompanied a cruder form of navigation at the time of Fa-hsien when the use of the compass was still unknown, there were pirates who were the terror of seafarers. Fa-hsien said that the sea was infested with them; to meet them meant death². Indeed, for decades in the fifth century, the Lin-i³ pirates of south-eastern Indo-China even so harried the Chinese who lived on the southern coast of China, and plundered cities and towns, that the Emperor Wên of Sung had to send, in 446, a punitive expedition into Annam which subdued the country and effectively stopped at least for some years its piracy⁴.

A.D. 589 TO 873.

The period between the overthrow of the State Ch'ên in A.D. 589 which brought about the complete unification of China under the

¹ Fa-hsien, *Fo-kuo-chi* (Tsin-tai-mi-shu edit.) pp. 35—43.

² *Ibid.* p. 41a.

³ 林邑.

⁴ *Sung Shu* Ch. 97 p. 1. F. Hirth and W. W. Rockhill quoting (*vide* *Chau Ju-kua* p. 7). McGowan (*History of China*, pp. 209, 210), speak of "the Tongking pirates who plundered cities and towns". This is wrong, for these pirates were of Lin-i which lay farther south (c. 17° 8' 22") and unlike Tongking, it was not under the direct administration of the Chinese, see *Sung Shu* *Ibid.* McGowan does not mention his authority.

Sui Dynasty and the gradual disintegration of the glorious T'ang Empire toward the end of the ninth century is one of great importance and interest in the history of China's maritime trade. During this period the trade increased very much in volume due to which two coastal towns, Canton and Ch'üan-chow, rose to the position of big ports; the number of foreign traders visiting China became large, and important foreign settlements came into existence on the Chinese soil; and the state taking a keen interest in all matters relating to maritime commerce, began to regulate and promote it. Coincident with all these developments, the unprecedented religious zeal and intellectual craving characteristic of the period caused many to brave the ocean and visit the holy lands of Buddhism. These pilgrimages throw much light on the commercial and cultural relationships between China and the countries lying to her south and southwest.

This period of greater peace and prosperity was heralded by an imperial mission sent by sea to Siam (Ch'ih-t'u) by the Emperor Sui-yang in 607. Both the Emperor's curiosity about this part of the earth and his hope for some material gains or perhaps even political domination accounted for the dispatch of this mission. After having sojourned in Siam for more than two years, the explorers returned to China in 610 with Siamese envoys, and were bountifully rewarded for their exploit¹. We do not know of any important consequences of this mission on China's foreign trade. It remains the first official mission which made a sea voyage as far as Siam.

By the opening decades of the seventh century, the foreign traders must have already formed colonies in Canton and probably also in Ch'üan-chow and Yang-chow². For it was some of these Arabs who introduced Islamism into China³. In the middle of the eighth cen-

¹ Sui Shu Ch. 24 p. 8a, Ch. 82 p. 2b-3a.

² 揚州.

³ The Min Shu (閩書) compiled in the end of the 16th century or in the beginning of the 17th century from older sources, by Ho Ch'iao-yüan (何喬遠), a native of Ch'üan-chow, says (vide T'u-shu Chi-ch'eng, Chih-fang-tien, Ch. 1052, compendium p. 5a) that sometime between A. D. 618 and 626 four disciples of Mohammed brought Islamism to China. One taught at Canton, one in Yang-chow, and the two others at Ch'üan-chow. P'an-yü-hsien-chih (番禺縣志) Ch. 53 p. 7a says: „When sea-trade was opened in the T'ang Dynasty, Mohammed, the moslem king of Medina

ture the Mohammedan colony in Canton, which they called Khanfu (خانفو), must have become powerfully large, so that in a conflict with the Chinese they were able to sack and burn the city in 758, and then make off to sea with their loot¹.

As the Mohammedans formed big settlements in Chinese ports, it is interesting to notice how they were governed. It was the policy of the Chinese to accord to foreigners who resided in a group in their territory, some sort of self-government, while reserving to themselves the ultimate authority. Foreigners were allowed to use their own laws and observe their own customs and usages so long as they could live in order and in peace with the Chinese. The Chinese authorities would not consider interfering in matters which concerned exclusively the foreigners, except when this proved necessary. A statement made in the ninth century by the Arabian merchant Solaiman gives us a specimen of the kind of government the Moslems had. One of their number was appointed by the Chinese authority to judge the disputes which arose between his coreligionists residing in Canton. On feast-days when Moslems came together, he said prayers, delivered the Khutbah and prayed for the welfare of their sultan. As the right man was appointed, the settlement was well governed, for Solaiman adds „The merchants of Irak never rise against his decisions; indeed, he acts according to the truth, and his decisions are conformable to the book of God (Koran) and to the precepts of Islamism”².

Although historical records at our disposal do not permit us to estimate even roughly the volume of trade during this period, yet the presence of so many foreigners in the Chinese ports sufficiently indicates the importance of the trade carried on. Another proof of

sent his maternal uncle, the priest Su-ha-pai-sai (蘇哈白賽) to China to trade. He built the Kuang tower (光塔) and the Huai-shêng mosque. He died soon after the tower and the mosque were completed”. According to Dabry de Thiersant, the maternal uncle of Mohammed, Wahb-Abu-Kabcha, came to China in the year 628 or 629; vide *Mahométisme en Chine*, Tome 1 p. 86 et sqq. Cf. also G. Deveria, *Origine d'islamisme en Chine*, pp. 319–325.

¹ T'ang Shu Ch. 10, p. 7a, Ch. 198, p. 11b. Cf. also Bretschneider, *Early Chinese and Arabs*, pp. 10–11, and Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou-Kioué*, p. 173. On the identity of Khanfu of the Arabs with Canton, see Chau Ju-Kua (*Hirth and Rockhill's translation*), pp. 20, n. 3, 22, n. 1. and also *Géographie d'Edrisi* (P. Amédée Jaubert's trans.), Tome 1, pp. 84–85, 90.

² J. T. Reinaud, *Relation des voyages faits par les Arabes et les Persans dans l'Inde et à la Chine*, Tome 1, p. 13.

this is the establishment by the government of a Bureau of Trading Junks or Shih-po-ssü¹. In the eighth century or probably somewhat earlier, such a Bureau was instituted for the first time in Chinese history. The foreign captains of ships were to register in the Shih-po-ssü, and their manifests also were to be submitted to it; it then collected duties and freight charges². As to the method of collection and the amount collected, the narratives of the Arabian and the Persian merchants of that time contained in the Chain of Chronicles give us more detailed accounts than we can find in any other contemporary records:

„When a vessel comes from abroad, the merchandise is to be delivered to the government officers who lock it up in certain houses. The merchandise is 'subject to dark'³ during six months, until the last ship (of the monsoon season) arrives. Then the Chinese retain three-tenths of each kind of merchandise and hand back the remainder to its owner. What the king of China desires to have, he gets it at the highest price and he pays for it promptly; he does not permit any injustice to be done on that account. One of the articles which the king retains is camphor which he pays for at the price of fifty fakkūgi per manna and a fakkūgi is equivalent to a thousand copper coins. The camphor which is not put aside for the king, is sold at one half of this price and is put in general circulation⁴.

Security is a primary condition of commercial prosperity. For more than two centuries and a half before the last decades of the ninth century, the coastal provinces of China enjoyed a pretty high degree of peace, order and good administration. Except for occasional outrages like the sack and burning of Canton by the Arabs in 758⁵, and the recurrent devouring fire which was a scourge to all

¹ 市船司.

² Li Chao (李肇), T'ang Kuo-shih Pu (唐國史補), (Tsin-tai-mi-shu edit.), Ch. 3, p. 22b. Li's work is of the beginning of the ninth century, and recording facts of the period from 713 to 824.

³ This means "guaranteed against any accident". According to the Arabic treatise entitled Tarifāt, 'dark' denotes a security which the seller deposits with the purchaser as guarantee, on the part of the seller, of the good quality of the article bought. The purchaser deducts from it damages caused by accidents which might occur. Vide J. T. Reinaud, op. cit. Tome 2, p. 26 n. 76, and also Tarifāt (Constantinople edit.), pp. 61, 82.

⁴ سلسلة التواريخ or Chain of Chronicles was published with French translation by Reinaud; op. cit. Tome 1, pp. 34—35.

⁵ Vide Supra p. 13.

prosperous mediaeval towns and ports¹, the lives and property of both Chinese and foreigners were safe. Indeed the government of the period belongs to some of the best in Chinese history. It is thus quite natural that the Persians and the Arabs did not fail to praise the good administration to which they owed so much of their prosperity in trading with and in residing in China. Having collected the narratives of these merchants, the Arab Abu-Zaid-al-Hassan of Siraf said at the end of the ninth century or at the beginning of the tenth:

“Due to the extreme solicitude of the government, China was in former times, before the disturbances which have overtaken her in our days, in an unparalleled state of order.”

The author proceeds to cite in detail the case of a stingy merchant of Khorasan. He tells us how he quarrelled over the price of his goods with a powerful and prominent eunuch who had been sent to Canton to buy some imported articles for the Emperor, how, after some heated disputes, the eunuch set apart the portion of goods he desired in spite of the protests of the owner, and then how the latter went to the capital to appeal to the Court and obtained justice from the Emperor, who, after having inquired into the actual state of affairs, severely punished the eunuch. Then he continues:

“One of the proofs of the admirable order which reigned of yore in the empire, contrary to her present plight, is the way in which judicial decisions were made, the respect which the law found in all hearts, and the importance which the government, in the administration of justice, attached to the choice of men who had proved themselves to possess sufficient knowledge of legislation, to have honest zeal, a faithful love of truth, a very determined will not to sacrifice good law in favour of influential men, and invincible scruples about the property of the weak and about anything which might be in their power”².

¹ Giving the causes of the small quantity and expensiveness of Chinese goods in Bassora and in Bagdad, the Chain of Chronicles says that the conflagrations which often took place in Canton were one of the causes; for they devoured the merchandise there. The houses in Canton were built of wood and split reeds. Vide Reinaud, *op. cit.* Tome 1, p. 12.

² All this is to be found in the second book of the Chain of Chronicles; see Reinaud, *op. cit.* pp. 105—113. The case of the eunuch as the merchant is also told in *كتاب مروج الذهب ومعادن الجوهر* Kitāb murūj al-dhahab wama‘ādin al-jawāhir Arabian text with French translation by C. Barbier de Meynard and Pavet de Courteille under the title *Les Prairies d’Or*, Paris 1861, see Tome 1, pp. 309—312.

This peace and order, this excellent administration of law and justice, brought an influx of foreigners even from distant Western Asia. They came to look upon China as their homeland, and, without distinction of race or religion, lived peacefully together in the Chinese towns and seaports.

But as happens with all governmental machines, the T'ang government occasionally experienced oppressions and exactions. In such cases the foreigners might refuse to visit Chinese ports, and thus caused important financial losses to the government and hardships to those Chinese who depended upon foreign commerce for making their living.

In 792, the Governor of Lingnan, under whose jurisdiction was the important port of Canton, petitioned the throne, complaining that recently most of the vessels from abroad only got as far as Annam and traded there. He requested that a delegate from the central government together with an official from his province be sent there to close the market. The Emperor Tê-tsung was going to grant his request when he was interrupted by Lu Chih¹, a very influential official of the Court, who remonstrated with his prince thus: "Merchants come from distant countries only to seek profit; if treated well, they come, if embarrassed, they quit. Heretofore Canton has been the port where the trading junks assemble, now suddenly they no longer do this, but go to Annam². If this is not due to extravagant exaction it must certainly be because they have not been well treated. They (the provincial authorities) do not blame themselves, but come to disturb the mind of Your Majesty"³. Such vigilance on the part of the central government must have been rather effective restraints on the local officials, for cases of similar nature and gravity occurred but very rarely throughout the period under survey.

As to the commodities of this maritime commerce, we learn from Solaiman that the chief imports into China were ivory, frankincense, ingots of copper, turtle-shells and rhinoceros horns with

¹ Lu Chih's (陸贄) biography is to be found both in Chiu T'ang Shu Ch. 139 and in Sin T'ang Shu Ch. 157.

² Annam had been a protectorate of China since 679, and did not become independant again until 968.

³ Tzū Chih T'ung-chien (資治通鑑) (Ta-chung Shu-chū edit., Shanghai, 1926), Ch. 234 p. 3.

which the Chinese made girdles¹. Pearls, other jewels and precious substances which drained much of China's gold and silver in a later period, were not mentioned by Solaiman. This must have been due to the law which forbade trading in precious and rare articles; some of the foreign traders were punished with imprisonment on account of fraud². We presume that the principal Chinese exports were porcelain and silk. The latter had been coveted by foreign merchants for centuries.

Another significant event of the period is the gradual rise of Ch'üan-chow or Chinchew to the position of an important entrepôt. Since the ninth century, probably even earlier, the southern sea-trade of China had been partially shifted to this port near Amoy, and situated at the mouth of the River Chin³. For centuries before this, Ch'üan-chow had had commercial intercourse with Japan and Korea, but now its traffic increased remarkably, through the visits of merchants of other countries. An evident advantage of trading there was that one could more easily obtain Japanese and Korean products as well as those of remoter parts of China which could not be readily reached from Canton. As we shall see, in the eleventh century Ch'üan-chow already had grown into one of the largest ports of the Far East, this position it held for three centuries, and under the name Zaytun⁴ its fame spread far and wide in the mediaeval world.

The principal route between China and West Asia runs from Canton on one end to Siraf on the coast of Fars (in Persia) on the other. It is interesting to follow it from one end to the other. If ships were to go to China, goods from Bassora, Oman and other places were taken to Siraf to be shipped. After being supplied with provisions and fresh water, the vessels set sail. They went to Mas-

¹ Reinaud, *op. cit.* Tome 1, pp. 33—34. The name used by Solaiman for rhinoceros is boshān or kerkeden. An interesting description of this animal is to be found in the same book pp. 28—30.

² Li Chao, T'ang Kuo-shih Pu, Ch. 3 p. 22b.

³ 晉江.

⁴ There was much discussion as to whether Zaytun should be Ch'üan-chow or Chang-chow, a city north-west of Amoy. The opinion which is now universally accepted is that the Zaytun of the Sung and Yüan periods (960—1368) was Ch'üan-chow. It may have been loosely used by the Portuguese of the 16th and 17th century for Chang-chow where they went after having been expelled from Canton, and forbidden to go there again.

kat, again were supplied with fresh water, and then steered their course for Kulam (Quillon) of Malabar. With a fair wind, the journey between Maskat and Kulam was one month. At Kulam the vessels had to pay a toll and obtained some fresh water. After this they passed by the Nicobar Islands where they made a little pause and then sailed eastward for one month and reached Kalah which must be somewhere in the Malay Peninsula or in Sumatra. From there the vessels doubled the Peninsula, visited some other ports on the way and at last reached Canton after having journeyed for 70 days more from Kalah without counting those of their sojourn in the various ports ¹.

Despite the enterprising and adventurous spirit of the period, no striking progress in the science of navigation was made. Ships, passengers and cargoes continued to be at the mercy of the elements. Solaiman says that owing to frequent ship-wrecks Chinese goods were quite insufficient to meet the demands in the markets of Bassora where they commanded a high price ². The compass being still unknown in this period, the ships were guided by the sun, moon and stars. If the sky was overcast, the wind might easily carry them far off their course. Then, if not wrecked, they might be driven to places other than their destination, very likely be plundered and the crew subjected to maltreatment or forced to sell their goods ³.

It is difficult for us to believe the reports about the size of the ships engaged in such trade. Some of them were said to be so large

¹ Solaiman's report, see Reinaud, *op. cit.* Tome 1 pp. 13-19. The names of some of the ports he mentions have not been successfully identified, for instance, the location of Betumah, Kedrendj, Senef, Sender-Fulat is still problematic. Some valuable information regarding the itineraries of the time has been fortunately preserved in the Chên-yüan Shih Tao Lu (貞元十道錄) compiled by Chia Tan (賈耽) between 785 and 805 (Vide Chiu T'ang Shu, Ch. 138 p. 4a-6a and Hsin T'ang Shu, Ch. 166 p. 1a-b). A complete text of Chia's book is no longer extant, but quotations from it are to be found in the T'ai-p'ing Huan Yü Chi (太平寰宇記) by Yo Shih (樂史), published in 976-983. Some useful remarks on the names of some ports in Chia's work are in Pelliot's *Deux Itinéraires de Chine en Inde* (Bul. Ecc. Franc. d'Ext. Or. IV, pp. 131 et sqq.) and in Hirth and Rockhill's translation of Chau Ju-kua, pp. 10-14.

² Reinaud, *op. cit.* Tome I, p. 12.

³ Cf. Solaiman's report, *ibid.* Robbing of such vessels by the natives was the universal practice.

and so high out of the water that ladders several score feet in length had to be used to get aboard. It was customary to keep pigeons on board in order that messages might be sent to those at home once the ships were out of sight of land ¹.

This period of prosperity and enterprise is also one of vehement religious zeal. Devout Buddhist priests or young scholars who longed to gratify their craving for the philosophy of India were quite willing to endure many hardships and even to risk their lives for the sake of visiting the holy land of Buddha. In 629, the famous pilgrim Hsüan-tsang started on his travels through Central Asia and India. The pilgrims who went to India after him took at first the overland route by Balkh, Peshawar, Tibet and Nepal, but in the second half of the seventh century the sea-route became more often used ². Canton was the port of embarkation. Very often the pilgrims called on Java or at Palembang in Sumatra, stayed there for some time before they proceeded further, for these places were also centers for the study of Buddhism ³. Then they again went on board, passing the Nicobar Islands and made for Ceylon whence

¹ Li Chao, T'ang Kuo-shih Pu, ch. 3 p. 22b. Cf. also Hirth and Rockhill, *op. cit.* p. 28.

² In I-tsing's (義淨) biography of sixty pilgrims journeying to India, thirty-seven of them took the sea-route. Vide Ta-T'ang Hsi Hsing Ch'iu Fa Kao-sêng Chuan, (大唐西行求法高僧傳) by I-tsing. This work has been translated with notes by Chavannes under the title *Mémoire Composé à l'Époque de la Grande Dynastie T'ang sur les Religieux Éminents qui Allèrent chercher la Loi dans les Pays d'Occident*, 1894.

³ The well-known Chinese Buddhist, Master Hui-ning (會寧) went to Java purposely in 664-5, and remained there three years to work with a priest of that country Jñānabhadra by name. With this scholar, he translated the Nirwāna (大涅槃經後分) of Tathāgata (Buddha) and the burning of his body in the Āgama texts (Vide I-tsing, Ta-T'ang Hsi Hsing Ch'iu Fa Kao-sêng Chuan, biography of Hui-ning. Sumatra was also a great centre for the study of Buddhism. Among the Chinese who went to study there was I-tsing. He left Canton in 671 and made his way to the Sumatran country Çriwijaya (Palembang) where he spent six months in the study of Sanscrit grammar. Then he made for Malayu where he stayed for two other months. Having returned from India where he spent ten years in the famous Buddhist university of Nālanda, he again settled down in Çriwijaya for about 10 years and engaged in writing and translation. (Vide Sung Kao-sêng Chuan, Chap. 1 par. 1, and Chavannes, *Mémoire composé etc.* pp. IV-VIII, 119).

they took ship for Tamlook at the mouth of the Ganges, and thence reached their holy places in India. The voyage was invariably made with the north-west monsoon in winter, and the return voyage to China in summer with south-west monsoon.

A.D. 874 TO 960.

The disintegration of the T'ang Dynasty came with remarkable rapidity during the last quarter of the ninth century. At the time of Hsi-tsung's (A.D. 874—889) succession to the throne, the country was already in a very depressed and unsettled condition. In consequence of the disturbances during his predecessor's reign, the government was in a state of bankruptcy; large demands had to be made upon the people and the taxes had to be considerably increased. Many were reduced to the verge of starvation. The government failed to take measures to meet this distressing state of things, and consequently large numbers had taken to brigandage. The rebellion became very disastrous after a man of the name of Huang Ch'ao¹ joined the rebels and became their leader. City after city was taken by them, and although occasionally success attended the imperial armies, Huang Ch'ao generally had his way. The rebels overran the provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien and Chêkiang and sacked and ravaged a large number of cities.

In 878, Huang Ch'ao's men laid siege to the city of Canton where the panic-stricken inhabitants closed the city gates to them. The city was at last taken, and the followers of Huang Ch'ao, giving vent to their fury, massacred the citizens. The number of inhabitants killed must have been great in view of the large commercial population in the city. But the sensational report of Solaiman that besides the Chinese who were slaughtered, there perished one hundred and twenty thousand Mohammedans, Jews, Christians and Magi², is hardly believable. There may be much exaggeration in it as is often the case with this kind of reports.

On account of this chaos, China's foreign trade relations were seriously disturbed. Foreigners were afraid to come to Chinese ports, trade had then to be carried on in a place called Killah (Kalah)³. Here the ships from Siraf and Oman met those from

¹ 黃巢.

² Reinaud, *op. cit.* Tome 1, p. 64.

³ Vide *Supra* p. 13.

China¹. Main industries were destroyed, and China could no longer supply the foreigners with the products they demanded. We learn from Abu-Zaid-Al-Hassan how the silk industry was ruined, and silk ceased to be exported to foreign countries².

The rebellion of Huang Ch'ao was at last suppressed in A.D. 884, but the disintegration of the Empire continued, and the soldiers ran amok. In spite of all the efforts made by the Emperors and their ministers to preserve peace, disturbances of a very serious nature broke out again and again until at last an unscrupulous general called Chu Wên³, formerly under Huang Ch'ao, through cruelty and intrigue usurped the real power of the government. In the year A.D. 907, Chao-hsüan, the last Emperor of T'ang, feeling the danger of his position, and wishing to propitiate the usurper who was the real ruler, sent an imperial edict to him, containing his resignation, together with the great seal of the empire. Chu Wên was graciously pleased with this, and made the young ruler Prince of Ts'i-yin, but he took care to have him sent to a safe place in Shantung where he was carefully guarded by a strong detachment of soldiers. And thus fell before a common adventurer and one with no special genius or ability, the glorious T'ang Dynasty, after having governed the country for two hundred and eighty-nine years.

After the collapse of the T'ang power in 907, five ephemeral dynasties rapidly succeeded one another. In this state of disorder and anarchy, industry and commerce naturally could not thrive. As a matter of fact, the sea-trade of China did not show any important signs of recuperation from its ruined state until after 960 when the House of Sung reunited the greater part of China and founded a new dynasty.

A.D. 960 TO 1279.

In contrast with the T'ang, the Sung Dynasty which lasted from 960 to 1279 was not one of military conquests and of Chinese domination of their neighbouring peoples. It was peaceful, literary and strategical in its inclinations rather than warlike, bold and ambitious. As a result the northern provinces of the Empire were lost to the foreign invaders from the north. But with capitals at various towns in modern Ho-nan province and finally at Nanking and

¹ Maçoudi, *Les Prairies d'Or*, p. 308.

² Reinaud, *op. cit.* pp. 64, 65.

³ 朱温

Hangchow, it had a complete monopoly of southern affairs and the ocean trade. Indeed, in the matter of sea-commerce, it has left an enviable record, exceeding that of T'ang.

As soon as peace and order returned, industry and commerce revived. This can be seen from the steps taken by the government to regulate it. In 971 the Canton Inspectorate of Maritime Trade was reorganized to meet the demands of a rapidly increasing volume of trade and to obtain for the government a larger share of the profits. Some years later, a General Customs Collectorate was inaugurated in the capital. Orders were issued that all imported aromatics and goods of value, whether in the Liang-chê province¹ or at Ch'üanchow, Canton or in Kiao-chih (Tongking), were to be stored in government warehouses. In 999, for the convenience of the foreign traders, custom houses were opened at Hangchow and Mingchow, (the present Ningpo in Chêkiang province)².

As to the method of taxation and the customs duties, the P'ing-chou K'o T'an gives us the following information³:

"After the junks reached Kwangchow (Canton), they were anchored by the five islets beneath the Pavilion of Trading Junks⁴. The sub-District Deputy Magistrate sent soldiers to watch over them, this is called 'Registering and stopping at the Bar'⁵. Upon the arrival of any junks, the Chief Commissioners and the Superintendent of the Trading Junks⁶ went on board to examine the cargoes and levied duties, this is called 'Taxing for Release'⁷. On

¹ 兩浙 i. e. Kiangsu and Chêkiang.

² Sung Shih, Ch. 186, p. 8a.

³ Chu Yü (朱彥), P'ing-chou K'o T'an (萍洲可談), Shou-shan-ko edit. ch. 2, p. 1. Chu's work must have been compiled in the beginning of the 12th century. The latest date mentioned in it is of the period 1111—1117. Chu's father was an official at Canton in the latter part of the eleventh century. Describing the island Hainan (海南), south of Kwantung, Chau Ju-kua (趙汝适), the Inspector of Trading Junks at Ch'üanchow in the 13th century, i. e. toward the end of the Sung period, says that in five places in that island there were maritime customs collectors (市舶). See Chu Fan Chih (諸蕃志), section on the Island of Hainan. These must have only been agents of the Canton Bureau, for we have found nowhere any positive statement that separate customs Bureaus had ever been established in Hainan.

⁴ 市舶亭. ⁵ 編欄. ⁶ 市舶監官. ⁷ 抽解.

a basis of ten parts for the whole, pearls, camphor and all articles of fine quality are levied one part in kind, (i.e. ten percent). Tortoise-shell, sapan wood and all other coarse grade articles are levied three parts in kind, (i.e. thirty percent). Besides this duty, each official market levies a small tax. After these charges are paid, the merchants have the remainder.

"Ivory tusks of thirty catties weight¹ or over and frankincense, after duties being levied, should be disposed of exclusively in the official markets, because they are state monopolised goods². Merchants who have rather large ivory tusks must cut them into pieces of less than three catties in order to escape the official markets. Prices in all official markets are low, and besides other articles are given in exchange; goods are thus greatly undervalued, the merchants are therefore much displeased.

"Should anyone, before the ship has paid its clearance dues, dare to remove from it any part of the cargo, no matter how small the quantity, the remainder of the cargo is confiscated, and besides this, he is punished according to the gravity of the offence. So it is that the traders dare not violate the laws."

The above quotation gives us, among other things, information about the customs rate. But one would be mistaken if one supposed that the rate was uniform in all Chinese ports throughout the period under survey. As a matter of fact, in the second half of the twelfth century customs duties on valuable goods like rhinoceros horns, ivory tusks and pearls became so high that the trade in them ceased to be profitable³. In the various ports too, there were sometimes differences in charges, but this was mainly due to the exaction of some local officials. The merchants, prompted by their own interest, went to the one making the lowest charges; consequently a port where the customs authorities were more extortionate was bound to decline, and the commerce would be diverted to another⁴.

Throughout the period, the government insisted that trade between foreigners and Chinese should be carried on under the supervision and regulation of the state; no private trade was tolerated by law. The chief reason was that, besides the fear of

¹ "Thirty catties" (三十斤) must be a mistake of "three catties" (三斤), see a few lines further.

² 權貨.

³ Sung Shih ch. 186, p. 11a.

⁴ Chu Yü, P'ing-chou K'o T'an, loc. cit.

smuggling of contrabands, customs duty was one of the chief revenues of the government¹. But in view of the repeated issuance of orders to this effect, it is evident that the prohibition law was not effectively carried out. The History of Sung tells us that during the Southern Sung period (1127—1279), the revenue of the Bureaus of Trading Junks was indeed large, but "the golds, silver, copper and iron being rapidly shipped (out of China) by the ocean-going junks, the loss (to China) was also very great. The draining of copper cash was the most serious of all. The prohibition law was indeed severe, but the crafty methods (of the greedy merchants) became more thoroughly practiced"².

Recognizing the profitableness of foreign trade, the government, besides regulating and supervising it, tried to promote it. Between 984 and 987, a mission of eight officials was sent by the Emperor T'ai-tsung with credentials under the Imperial seal and with supplies of gold and piece-goods of silk to encourage the traders of the South Sea and the Chinese merchants who went abroad to come to China. Special trading licenses were issued³.

The result of the Government's efforts to promote trade soon became apparent. Goods began to flow into the Imperial storehouses. They were soon stuffed with ivory, rhinoceros horns, pearls, jades, scented woods, drugs and valuable goods. The state after taking or setting apart what it needed for itself, bartered the remainder with the people for gold, piece-goods of silk, hay and rice⁴.

Some idea of the magnitude of the trade can be gathered from the amount of import duties levied. From 1049 to 1053 the annual total revenue of the Customs was more than 530,000 units of count, but from 1064 to 1067 it increased by 100,000 units more. In 1076 the total of the revenue of the Bureaus of Trading Junks in Hangchow, Mingchow and Canton amounted to 540,173 units. The figures do not show any decline toward the later part of the period, for in 1175 the annual amount was still over 500,000 units⁵. From

¹ Sung Shih Ch. 186, p. 8*b*.

² Sung Shih Ch. 186, p. 11.

³ Sung Shih Ch. 186, p. 8*a*.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 8*b*.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 8*a-b*. These 'units' are puzzling to the students of economic history. At a time when international trade was carried on without a universally accepted basis or medium of exchange, duties were to be levied in kind and counted in units. As to what should be the unit of a certain kind of merchandise depends upon its nature, e. g. a weight unit called 'chin' or catty (c. 1½ pound) was used for ivory, a length unit called 'p'i'

these figures we obtain some conception of the importance of the legally imported merchandise which must be three to six times more than the totality of its duties, and of the value of the exported goods and coins, which must about equal that of the imports. Besides the legalised trade, there was a considerable amount of smuggling which the government did not succeed in restraining.

As to the principal articles of trade, the History of Sung supplies a list of them, imports and exports¹. They were gold, silver, Chinese cash, lead, tin, piece-goods of silk of all colours, porcelain, cloth², scented woods and drugs, rhinoceros horns, ivory, coral, amber, strings of beads, "pin" iron³ tortoise shell, cornelians, chü-ch'ü shells⁴, rock crystals, foreign cloth, ebony, sapan wood etc. In the latter part of the tenth century, China was trading with the Malay Peninsula, Java, Champa, Borneo, some of the Philippine Islands, Sumatra etc. as well as with the Arabs⁵. Although this list in the History of Sung does not mention particularly the countries on the Indian coasts, it would be unimaginable that none of them had trade with China. To these countries we must add Japan and the Liu-kiu Islands. The importation of Japanese lumber was mentioned by Chau Ju-kua, the Chinese Superintendent of foreign trade in Ch'üanchow in the latter part of the twelfth century⁶. It is interesting to note that historical material regarding trade between

was used for piece-goods, an individual plant-unit 'chu' was used for plants, and so on and so forth. The names of the units were min (緡), p'i (匹), chin (斤), liang (兩), tuan (段), t'iao (條), chu (株), ko (箇), k'o (顆), ch'i (臍), chih (隻), li (粒) for the various kind of articles. It is thus not feasible to calculate these units in terms of modern money. The importance of the trade is nevertheless quite clear. ¹ Ibid.

² In the text 市 which means 'market' must be a mistake for 布 which means 'cloth'.

³ 鑛鐵 in the text. Hirth and Rockhill think this was probably the 'ondanque' of which Marco Polo (I, 91) speaks as a product of Kerman, a word which Yule thinks may be ^{هندوانی} "Indian steel" which enjoyed fame all over the east. See Chau Ju-kua (English translation), p. 19, note 2.

⁴ A huge species of oysters.

⁵ Sung Shih, Ch. 186 p. 8.

⁶ Chau Ju-kua, Chu Fan Chih, section on Japan. Chau's book gives a clear and interesting description of the countries which had trade with China in the latter part of the 12th century and also of the products of these countries.

China and Japan is scarce, in spite of the close relations between the two countries. The explanation probably is that what the islanders could bring to China was nothing unusual in Chinese eyes. There is no doubt that their sea-products could find good markets in China. As to the trade with the Liu-kius, it does not seem to be very important. The History of Sung says of the Liu-kiu Islands that they possessed no rare commodities and that the Chinese traders did not go there ¹.

About the wealth abroad, Chou Ch'ü-fei writes in c. 1178: "Of all the wealthy and prosperous foreign lands, none could be compared with the realm of Ta-shih ² (the Arabs); next to them is Chê-p'o ³ (Java), the third is San-fo-ts'i ⁴ (Palembang), and then come the other countries" ⁵.

About the trade routes of his time, Chou continues ⁶:

"Palembang is an important thoroughfare on the sea-routes by which the foreigners come (to China) and return. The ships leave Palembang, sail due north, after having passed the Upper and Lower Chu Islands ⁷, and sailing across the Sea of Kiao-chih (Tongking Gulf), they come within the confines of China. Those wishing to make Kwangchow (Canton), enter the port by T'un-mên ⁸, while those wishing to make Ch'üanchow, enter it by Cupchi point ⁹.

"Ships coming from Java, first sail a little north-west, after having passed the Shih-erh-tzū rocks ¹⁰, they take the route of the Palembang ships at a place near the Chu Islands.

¹ Sung Shih Ch. 491 p. 1a.

² 大食.

³ 闍婆.

⁴ 三佛齊.

⁵ Chou Ch'ü-fei (周去非), Ling-wai Tai Ta (嶺外代答) (Chin-pu Shu-chü edit.), Ch. 3 p. 5a.

⁶ Ibid. p. 5a-b.

⁷ 上下竺. They must be the Pulo Aor, south-east of Tyoman, or those islands near Singapore.

⁸ 屯門.

⁹ Cupchi point (甲子門) is still an important station of Kwantung province. It is a very safe anchorage and a refuge for junks sailing between Hongkong and Ch'üanchow.

¹⁰ 十二子石. On the Chinese maps of the 16th century they appear to be north of the Carimata Island off the S. W. coast of Borneo. Cf. G. Phillips, J. N. C. B. R. A. S. XXI, 40 and map. For criticism on Phillips's article, cf. J. J. L. Duyvendak, Ma Huan Re-examined, p. 17 et sqq. in Verh. d. Kon. Akad. v. Wetensch., afd. Letterk. nieuwe r., Dl. XXXII No. 2, (1933).

"Merchants from the Realm of the Arabs (Ta-shih) first take small vessels making for the south until they reach Quilon (Ku-lin)¹. Then they go over to big boats which sail eastward and make Palembang. After this they come to China by the same route as the Palembang ships.

"The other countries, like Champa (Chan-ch'êng)², Kamboja (Chên-la)³ are all near the southern part of the Sea of Tongking (Chiao-chih), not half so far away as Palembang and Java, and these latter in turn are not half so far away as the realms of the Arabs. One year is enough for all foreigners to make a round trip to China except for those from the realms of the Arabs, who need two years."

Regarding the type of ships which braved the waves of the ocean and the method of navigation, Chu Yü, writing in the first quarter of the 12th century, makes the following remarks⁴:

"The ocean-going junks sail in the eleventh or twelfth moon to avail themselves of the north wind, and come back in the fifth or sixth moon to avail themselves of the south wind⁵.

"A junk is square like a bushel⁶. If there is no wind, it can not move. The mast is firmly planted, and the sail hangs down on one side of it, with one of its borders attached to the mast like a door (on its hinges). A sail is called Chia-t'u which is a dialectical or foreign word⁷.

At sea one makes use not only of a stern wind, but also of wind off or toward the shore. It is only a head-wind which drives the boat back. This is called 'making use of the wind of three directions.' In case of a head-wind, one heaves the anchor and stops.

"In the fifth moon of the year, the governor of Canton prays to the God Fêng-lung⁸ for wind.

¹ 故臨.

² 占城.

³ 真臘.

⁴ P'ing-chou K'ê T'an Ch. 2 pp. 1a-2b.

⁵ These are the so called monsoons.

⁶ A Chinese bushel (斛) has the shape of the frustum of a pyramid.

⁷ I do not know the origin of the word Chia-t'u (加突). Hirth and Rockhill suggest (Chau Ju-kua, p. 30) the word 'Catur' said to have been in use on the Malabar coast as the name of a kind of ship in the early days of the Portuguese.

⁸ 豐隆神.

"On board a large Chia-ling¹ ocean-going junk, there are several hundred persons, on board a small one, more than a hundred persons. They have some big merchants as head-man, assistant head² man and manager of miscellaneous matters. The Bureau of Trading Junks gives them a vermilion-coloured sign or seal which permits them to use the light bamboo for the punishment of their followers. If any of the company dies, his property is confiscated.

"The merchants say that it is only when the ship is large and the number of men great that they dare put to sea, for there are many robbers abroad. They plunder also those who are not bound for their countries. For instance, if a ship be bound for Champa, and by chance it get off its course and enter Kamboja, then both ship and cargo are confiscated, and the men are bound and sold and are told: 'It was not your purpose to come here.'

"In foreign lands, though there may be no tax on commerce, there are however, insatiable demands for so called "gifts". No matter whether the cargo is large or small, the same demands are made, therefore small ships are not profitable.

"The ocean-going junks are several hundred (Chinese) feet in length and breadth. The traders divide the space by lot and store their goods therein. Each person gets several feet of space. He stores his goods below and sleeps on top of them at night.

"A great part of the cargo consists of pottery, the small pieces are packed in the larger, till there is no space left.

"At sea they are not afraid of wind and waves, but of getting shoaled, which is called 'ts'ou-ch'ien' (running aground), then there is no way of getting off. If the ship suddenly springs a leak, they can not mend it from inside, but they order their 'devil slaves' to take knives and coarse silk or cotton to mend it from outside. The 'devil slaves' are expert swimmers, and do not close their eyes under water.

"The masters of the ship know geography. At night they steer by the stars and in the day-time by the sun. When the sky is overcast they look at the compass or use a line a hundred feet long with a hook to take up mud from the sea bottom, by its smell they

¹ 甲令海船大者 For Chia-Ling Hirth and Rockhill suggest Kling, principal foreign traders at this time in Java, Sumatra, and possibly China. See *Ibid.* In mediaeval Chinese works the name for Kling is usually Ho-ling (訶陵).

know their whereabouts. In mid-ocean it never rains; whenever it rains, they are near the land."

Somewhat more than half a century later, Chou Ch'ü-fei gives us a more picturesque description of the ship and the life on board ¹:

"The ships which sail in the South Seas are like big houses. Their sails are like clouds hanging down from the sky ², their rudders are scores of feet long. A single ship carries several hundred men. It has stored on board provisions for one year. They feed pigs and ferment liquors. They put aside all thoughts of life and death, for once they enter the dark blue distant sea, it is no more a human world ³. Each day they give themselves up to meat and wine, and become hosts and guests by turn, thus to forget their peril."

The use of the mariner's compass, since the first quarter of the twelfth century and probably earlier, is an important improvement in the science of navigation. Hence, the captains were no longer so dependant on sun and stars for steering their ships and thus many calamities could be avoided in bad weather.

The status of foreigners in China remained practically what it had been in the previous (T'ang) period. Writing in the beginning of the twelfth century, Chu Yü says of the foreign quarter in Canton ⁴:

"In the foreign quarter in Kwangchow all the people from abroad live together. A foreign headman is appointed over them to take charge of all public matters of the quarter and in particular to persuade the foreign traders to send in tribute to the Court; this (tribute-presenting) is to be done through the foreign officials. The officials kerchiefs, gowns, shoes and tablets are like those of the Chinese. When a foreigner commits an offence anywhere, he is sent to Kwangchow, and if the charge is proved, he is sent to the foreign quarter to be disposed of. There he is fastened to a wooden ladder and is whipped with a rattan from head to heels. Three blows of the ratten are reckoned equal to one of the heavy bamboo. As foreigners do not wear drawers and like to squat on the ground, beating on the buttocks proves very painful, whereas they do not

¹ Ling Wai Tai Ta, Ch. 6, p. 4a.

² 帆若垂天之雲.

³ 置死生於度外徑入阻碧非復人世.

⁴ P'ing Chou K'ê T'an, Ch. 2, p. 3a-b.

fear beating on the back. Offences entailing banishment or severer punishment are to be carried out by the magistrate of Kwang-chow."

A.D. 1280 TO 1367.

The extermination of the royal house of Sung and the complete conquest of China by the Mongols in A.D. 1279 did not bring about any important change either in the commercial relations between China and the countries overseas or in the trade organization and taxation methods in the Chinese ports.

After south China was brought under the rule of the Emperor Kubilai (1260—1294) of the Yüan dynasty, the import duty on goods of 'coarse' quality¹ was fixed at one-fifteenth of its kind, that of 'fine' quality² at one-tenth. At first customs duties on Chinese commodities taken by foreign traders from one port to another were on a par with those on imported foreign merchandise, but in or about 1277 they were accorded a preferential tariff³. Besides import duty, a sales tax of one-thirtieth on goods of 'coarse' quality, and one-twenty-fifth on goods of 'fine' quality was imposed in Ch'üanchow and Fuchow after 1292, and in all the other ports after 1293. In 1314 import duties on coarse goods were raised to two-fifteenths, while those on fine goods to two-tenths⁴.

Bureaus of Trading Junks were established at Ch'üanchow which was the foremost centre of trade (Polo's Zayton)⁵, and at Shanghai, Kan-fu⁶ (near Hangchow, the Ganfu of Polo), Wênchow⁷, Hangchow, Ch'ing-yüan⁸ (the present Ningpo) and Canton. For the sake of efficiency, in 1285 the Bureau in Ch'üanchow was com-

¹ 麤色.

² 細色.

³ Yüan Shih, ch. 94 p. 106. Probably the duty levied on foreign goods was twice as much as that on Chinese goods, for Chinese commodities were under the so-called 'single-levying' (單抽), while foreign commodities were under the 'double-levying' (雙抽) regulation.

⁴ Ibid. p. 11a.

⁵ Ibn Baṭūṭa says (see Voyages d'Ibn Baṭoutah, texte arabe accompagné d'une traduction par Defrémery et Sanguinetti, Tome 4, p. 269): "The port of Zeitun is one of the largest of the world, I am mistaken, it is the largest of all the ports. I have seen there about one hundred junks of great size; as to the small ones, they were innumerable."

⁶ 澈浦.

⁷ 温州.

⁸ 慶元.

bined with the Salt Transportation Bureau¹ and formed one new one² with the functions of both. In 1293 the Bureau of Wênchow was absorbed into that of Ch'ing-yüan, in which those of Kan-fu and Shanghai were also merged in 1298³. Thus of the seven Bureaus, four only were left after that year.

In 1284 Supervisory Bureaus of Transportation were established in Hangchow and Ch'üanchow, and some attempts were made by the state to get the lion's share of the profits of the trade. The government built boats and men were chosen, provided with capital and sent abroad to trade in all kinds of goods. Seven-tenths of the profits thus secured were to go to the government and the remaining three-tenths to the traders. At the same time, "people who possessed power and influence", who thus could carry on private enterprise if they chose to do so, were forbidden to use their own wealth for trading abroad. Transgressing this law, the culprit was to be punished and half of his property was to be confiscated. Foreigners who carried on their trade by making use of the government boats were to be taxed according to law⁴. But these efforts on the part of the government did not succeed very well, although with the hope of improving the efficiency of the Bureau at Ch'üanchow, the government several times reorganised it and repeatedly re-enacted the prohibition law mentioned above⁵.

On account of the trade in precious stones, aromatics etc., the drain of gold and silver continued to be an embarrassing problem in the Yüan time. In 1283, the Superintendent of the Bureau at Ch'üanchow called the attention of the Court to this fact, accordingly measures were adopted to restrict the use of gold and silver for purchasing such luxurious commodities. Ten years later this restriction was extended to copper and iron, all of which were not to be

¹ 鹽運司. ² The Tu-chuan-yün-ssü (都轉運司).

³ Yüan Shih, Ch. 94, p. 106.

⁴ Ibid. Regarding the ships' charge for freight we learn from Marco Polo that in Ch'üanchow "the ships take 30 per cent. for light goods, 44 per cent. for pepper, and 40 per cent. for aloeswood, sandal-wood, and other bulky goods. Thus, between the dues and the freight, traders have to give half of what they carry. Yet, on the remaining half, they make such great profits, that they look forward to returning with more merchandise. It is therefore easy to believe that the Great Kaan draws an immense revenue from this city." See *The Travels of Marco Polo* p. 264 (trans. from the text of L. F. Benedetto, the Broadway Travellers edit. 1931).

⁵ Yüan Shih, Ch. 94, p. 116.

shipped abroad privately¹. To do so was made a criminal offence; the culpable trader, the captain and some other higher officers of the ship were to have 107 blows with the heavy bamboo each, while the ship and the cargoes were to be confiscated².

The drain on the revenues of the State was also quite considerable on account of the extraordinarily great number of the so-called tribute-bearers who came to the Court. Farther than ever before in the Chinese history, the Emperor Kubilai pushed his claim to suzerainty over all other countries. China having become unified under his rule, he sent officers to the various lands beyond the sea, summoning their kings to come, or at least to send envoys to his Court, thus to show their allegiance. Should such an order not be obeyed, compulsory measures might follow. Although this led to direct clashes with Japan and Java, who refused to submit, most countries readily acceded to the demands of Kubilai, and envoys with tributes were sent to the Imperial Court. As such embassies were probably more numerous than they had ever been before, they drew heavily on the resources of the state treasury. For the envoys were graciously received and assisted according to their wants and the imperial gifts were usually worth several times the value of the tributes. Fortunately, after the death of this ambitious sovereign in 1294, the number of envoys arriving in China greatly decreased under the reigns of his less able successors. Important commercial relations between China and the over-sea countries, however, continued.

As rare gifts from foreign subjects would also very much please the Imperial Court, many traders, hoping to get free entry into the Chinese ports and to be amply rewarded for their loyalty, gave themselves out as bearers of rare tributes. They were so numerous that not only were government resources seriously drained but also various State services, especially the courier service over the post-roads, were badly affected, for the bearers of such tributes were to enjoy free transportation and other conveniences at government expense. In 1308, the ministers of the Grand Council³ stated:

„Within the last half year, over 1200 messengers have travelled over the Kiangsu. Chêkiang and Hangchow post-roads. There was

¹ Ibid. p. 11a.

² Yüan Shih, Ch. 104, p. 2a.

³ 中書省.

a man of the name of Sang-wu-pao-ho-ting who with some others brought as tribute lions, leopards, and hawks. To provide for the men and the animals during twenty-seven days had required more than 1300 catties of meat."

Upon the request of these ministers, the court required that henceforth traders bearing offerings had to stand the costs of transportation themselves¹. Moreover, laws were elsewhere enacted to the effect that cargoes should be carefully examined at the ports to see that no goods were secretly imported under cover of tributes; attempts to smuggle commodities in this way was made punishable by confiscation, and the culprit was to receive one hundred and seven blows with the heavy bamboo².

Of the foreign settlements, which were, as a matter of fact, chiefly Mohammedan, the two largest ones were at Ch'üanchow and Canton. We are told by Ibn Batuta who visited China in the second quarter of the 14th century, that in Canton the Mohammedan town had its mosque, hermitage and market; it also had its own judge and sheikh³. In Ch'üanchow they also occupied a separate quarter organized like that at Canton but probably more thickly inhabited⁴. Thus the status of foreigners residing in China during the Yüan period remained what it had been. They continued to enjoy some sort of self-government as they had done before.

1368 TO 1513.

The political change which led to the foundation of the new dynasty Ming in 1368 did not seriously interrupt China's maritime trade. Soon after T'ai-tsu, first emperor of Ming, acceded to the throne, two Bureaus of Trading Junks were instituted, one at T'ai-ts'ang⁵ and the other at Hwang-tu⁶, both in the present Kiangsu Province. Evidently the Emperor desired to concentrate all overseas trade in these two ports in Central China. This soon proved impractical in the gigantic Empire. In 1370 they were abolished and three older ports officially re-opened: Ningpo, Ch'üanchow and

¹ Yüan Shih, Ch. 23 pp. 1b-2a. In the previous year there was already a similar memorial to the throne, vide Yüan Shih, Ch. 22, p. 14a.

² Yüan Shih, Ch. 104, p. 2b.

³ Voyages d'Ibn Batoutah, Tome 4, p. 273.

⁴ Ibid. pp. 269-270.

⁵ 太倉.

⁶ 黃渡.

Canton; Ningpo was to trade with Japan, Ch'üanchow with the Liukiu Islands and Canton with all other countries whose ships had to come from the south. In the beginning of the 15th century two other Bureaus were instituted, one in Tongking, the other in Yünnan Province, which the river junks from Farther India frequented¹.

The Bureaus were modelled after their predecessors. Each Bureau was headed by an Inspector who was assisted by two assistant-Inspectors. Under them there was a Head Constable². In or soon after 1403, by order of the Imperial Court some eunuchs were entrusted with the control of the Bureaus. Like their predecessors the Bureaus still had the following functions at the beginning of the period under survey: to ascertain the genuineness of the credentials to the throne and other identification papers of the foreign envoys, to prevent Chinese from private intercourse with foreigners, to levy taxes on imported merchandise, to provide for fair trade, to watch over people's coming to and departing from the ports, and to look after the lodging and boarding of foreign envoys. In a word they were to manage all matters relating to over-seas trade and to foreigners' visits to the Court³. But, as we shall soon see, the Bureaus were to lose their control over maritime trade after the 15th century.

An important development in the management of maritime trade took place in the course of the fifteenth century. Here we see for the first time the transformation of the Bureaus of Trading Junks into tribute-transmitting organs and the transference of their tax-levying function to the provincial authorities. That is to say the collection of customs duty on imported goods was no longer the concern of the state, but became that of the provinces in which the ports were located.

This development began with the reign of the able and vain-glorious emperor Ch'êng-tsu (1403—1424). He would not allow his officials to attach too much importance to the taxing of imported goods. On one occasion, disapproving of a request to tax some ship-

¹ Ming Shih, Ch. 75, p. 8*b*, and Ch. 81, p. 9*b*. In the first reference, the name used for Ningpo is Mingchow which is its old name. On account of the fact that Ming was the name of the Dynasty, it was later called Ningpo. See Ningpo Fu Chih, Ch. 2, p. 8*b* and Ming Shih, Ch. 44, p. 11*b*.

² 吏目.

³ Ming Shih, Ch. 75, p. 8*b*.

loads of pepper brought for sale to the Chinese markets by a group of foreigners visiting the Court, the Emperor said "... these foreigners have come from afar through admiration of our enlightenment. Now if we took away some part of their gain, how much could we get? And we should have badly impaired our honour thereby!"¹ Here we find an official explanation of his policy by Ch'êng-tsu himself. But did he say all that was really at the bottom of his policy? Being an able statesman-emperor, did he not have an eye to encouraging foreign trade the importance of which to China was only too evident? It must be admitted, however, that his attitude toward the foreigners was paternal. It was the duty of the rulers and subjects of other countries to do him homage, but it was his pleasure to be just and liberal to them. He went to considerable expense to encourage them to bring tribute. In order to impress them and to coerce them into doing so by force if need be, a fleet of 62 huge ships with 27,800 men was put under the command of the famous eunuch Chêng Ho, who proceeded toward the Malay Archipelago and the Indian Ocean for the first time in 1405. In his seven missions to that part of the world, the tactful and vigorous eunuch succeeded in inspiring, more than ever before, both respect and awe in the hearts of the natives of the countries he visited. As a result of this, there was a continuous influx of envoys, and probably pseudo-envoys too, and other tribute-bearers into China. It was natural that the Bureaus of Trading Junks were heavily burdened with matters relating to transmitting the tributes and to entertaining the missions².

As the central government showed no interest in levying on imports, and the imperial decrees became totally silent on the matter from the reign of Ch'êng-tsu on, the Bureaus which, as we have seen, were kept quite occupied elsewhere, lost in the course of time their control over maritime affairs, the superintendence of which had been for centuries past their chief *raison d'être*. But the provincial authorities who derived a large part of their revenue from customs duty on imported commodities could not let the matter pass. They took it into their own hands, and began to levy taxes

¹ Ming Shih, Ch. 81, p. 9b.

² The Bureaus had to manage huge post-houses in which foreigners were taken care of. Vide *Ibid.* and Ku T'ing-lin, (顧亭林), T'ien-hsia Chün Kuo Li-ping Shu (天下郡國利病書), Ch. 120, p. 3b.

on cargoes. At first this was probably considered as an expediency to relieve the overburdened Bureaus of part of their work. But as the practice became regular, it was quite natural that after the lapse of decades the collection of customs duty became definitely the concern of the provincial authorities.

It was in vain that the Bureaus of Trading Junks tried to recover their control over sea-commerce at the beginning of the 16th century. In 1509, a eunuch, Pi Chên¹ by name, was appointed to succeed Hsiung Hsüan² as head of the Bureaus. Pi Chên claimed that, according to former rules the Bureaus of Trading Junks had the exclusive management of the sea-going ships, but that nowadays the Governors-general, the Heads of the Provincial Civil Service, the Provincial Judges, and the Directors of Military Affairs took the matter in hand. He requested the central government to restore to the Bureaus their former power. The Board of Rites replied that the duty of the Bureaus was to attend to matters relating to tributes; and that, as the imperial mandates and orders had not mentioned either the merchants from abroad or the foreign ships visiting our harbours, it is in accordance with our usage that the Bureaus should not interfere with them³. After this, we are not aware of any further attempts of the Bureaus to recover their lost power.

For collecting customs duty, the provincial authorities did not try to set up any special organs. They simply made use of the local magistrates under them. When ships reached the Chinese docks, some such magistrates were sent on board to investigate them and then to assess the amount of duty they had to pay⁴.

¹ 畢真. ² 熊宣.

³ Ming Shih, Ch. 81 p. 9b-10a; Hsü Wen-hsien T'ung-k'ao (續文獻通考), Ch. 26, p. 31b. Hsiung Hsüan, Pi Chên's predecessor, also made a similar petition which probably cost him his office.

⁴ Ku T'ing-lin, T'ien-hsia Chün Kuo Li-ping Shu, Ch. 120 p. 5a. The text does not seem to be correctly printed. The phrase 夷之市舶內臣船 makes no sense in the context. I believe that 內臣 "Eunuch" is a wrong insertion. The text should read 夷之市舶船 which means "trading junks of the foreigners".

CHAPTER II

THE EARLY SINO-PORTUGUESE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.

CHINA AND THE FALL OF MALACCA.

When Vasco da Gama and his men reached India in 1498, the Chinese junks had already ceased to ply in the Indian Ocean. But the military prowess displayed by the men of Chêng Ho in the first half of the 15th century and the visits of the Chinese merchant ships had not yet been obliterated from the memory of the natives of the Indian coasts. The strange appearance of these first visitors from the Iberian Peninsular must have reminded the inhabitants of Calicut of what their fathers had told them about another strange people. For they told the Portuguese that some eighty years ago there also arrived in their city some white people who wore their hair long and had no beards except "around the mouth", and that they landed, wearing cuirass, helmet, and vizor, and carrying a certain weapon attached to a spear; their vessels were armed with arbalest; once every two years they returned with twenty or twenty-five vessels; their vessels had four masts. But what people they were, and whence they had come, the Calicutters were no longer able to say. It was quite natural that the Portuguese did not suspect that these were the Chinese, for they had never met them yet. They thought that possibly some Germans or Russians had come to that part of the world before they themselves did ¹.

In their arduous "discovery" of Asia, the Portuguese were interested in the Chinese from the outset. Before Diego Lopes de Sequeira sailed from Lisbon to "discover" the region west of the island of St. Laurence as far as Malacca, he had with him a set of instructions from the King Dom Manoel, dated February 13th, 1508. One of its items was the following ²:

¹ A Journal of the First Voyage of Vasco da Gama, p. 131.

² Alguns Documentos do Archivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, (1892, Lisbon) pp. 194—195; The same text is also to be found in *Maritimos e Coloniaes*, ser. 3 (1843), p. 490.

"You shall inquire about the Chijns, whence they come, and from how far, when they come to Malacca or to the places where they trade, and the merchandise they bring, how many of their ships come each year, and the form and size of their ships, whether they return in the same year they come, whether they have factors or houses in Malacca or in any other country, whether they are rich merchants, whether they are weak or warlike, whether they have weapons or artillery, what clothes they wear, whether they are big in body, and all other information about them, whether they are Christians or heathens, whether their country is big, whether they have more than one king among them, and whether there live among them Moors or any other people who do not live in conformity with their law or beliefs, and, if they are not Christians, in what they believe or what they worship, and what customs they observe, toward what place their country extends and upon whom they border."

Upon his arrival at Malacca on September 11th, 1509, Diego Lopes found three or four Chinese junks lying in the port. But due to the hostility of the Malays, he was unable to approach them or to make inquiries about them. In 1510, he was obliged to return to Portugal without getting all the information his lord had wanted about the Chinese.

On the first of July 1511, the fleet of the Great Affonso de Albuquerque anchored off Malacca. The Portuguese found five Chinese junks there. Opportunity offered this time for the Portuguese to win their friendship. For the king of Malacca who was then at war with the king of Daru, had detained, for some days past, these junks together with the captains and the crews with the purpose of using them against his enemy. The captains, thoroughly indignant at the robbery and tyranny of the king of Malacca, took the first chance to escape with their men and came with them to Affonso de Albuquerque to offer to help the Portuguese in the impending assault on Malacca. This the shrewd Portuguese commander declined, cleverly giving as grounds that the Chinese would henceforth be deep in the black books of the king of Malacca on account of their taking part in the Portuguese enterprise, and that should the Portuguese attack fail, they would be ill-treated by him. He would be glad, however, to use the barques for disembarking his men on land. It is said that the Chinese merchants, far from being displeased, were moved by the thoughtfulness of the Portuguese Commander. Later, they gladly rendered the Portuguese the

service of conveying Albuquerque's envoys to and from Siam. And when they returned to China, they carried home a very favourable report of the character and the prowess of the Lusitanians¹.

The king of Malacca, Sultan Mahamet², having withdrawn to the kingdom of Pahang, seeing that there was no chance for him to recover his lost territory without aid from others, decided to appeal to his suzerain for it. He dispatched to the Chinese Court an embassy headed by none other than his own uncle, Nacem Mudaliar. It embarked at the river of Muar³. When it reached Canton, the provincial authorities of that port despatched a message to Peking to inform the Court. After having received its reply permitting the embassy to proceed to Peking, Nacem Mudaliar and his suits lost no time in setting out upon the journey. On his arrival in Peking he was very well received. After some days had elapsed the Emperor received him in person. With many tears he set forth the events that had taken place in Malacca and begged the Emperor to assist, with men and a fleet, his lord, the king, in his present trouble. His Majesty was unwilling to give his word that he would help the King. He was luke-warm toward his cause. He and his ministers had their hands full, for they were undertaking a huge expedition to expel the Mongol raiders from Chinese soil. Moreover, he must have been aware of the complaints which the Chinese merchants made of the tyranny the king of Malacca had practised upon them when they were in his territory. Very likely he had also received news of the courteous treatment of his subjects by the Portuguese. The Emperor dismissed the ambassador and told him to wait for a reply. During his stay in Peking, his wife died. Then he was very much disappointed by the reply of the Court made through some officials. The

¹ Commentaries of Afonso Dalboquerque, Vol. 3, pp. 98, 113—114, 152 ff. When Barros says (Decada 3, Liv. 2, Cap. 6, p. 174) that from Malacca Affonso de Albuquerque "sent his messengers" to China among other countries, he must have meant these merchants, for we are not aware that Albuquerque sent any other messengers to China.

In a letter dated November 30th, 1513, to be found in the *Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque*, Tome 1, p. 138, Albuquerque tells the king that "the Chins are servants of Your Highness and our friends".

² Commentaries, Vol. 3, p. 81. The king's name appeared in the Ming Shih (Ch. 325, p. 4b) as Su-tuan-ma-mo (蘇端媽末).

³ The river in Malacca, on which the city of Pahang (or "Pão" in old Portuguese manuscripts and documents) is built.

unhappy ambassador set out again on his home journey. But he died, probably of grief, before he left Chinese territory. He was buried in China¹.

THE FIRST TWO VISITS OF THE PORTUGUESE TO CHINA
1514, 1515—1516.

In 1514, the situation became quieter in Malacca. The new governor of Malacca, Jorge de Albuquerque, could now give some attention to the "discovery of China". It was he who dispatched a pioneer expedition to Canton in 1514². We have hardly any details regarding this first visit of the Portuguese to China. Barros is the only Portuguese historian who incidentally mentions it³. He tells us that a Portuguese of the name Jorge Alvares came to the island Tunmên⁴ a year before Rafael Perestrello⁵, that is to say in 1514. He established there a memorial monument of stone⁶, with the arms of his kingdom. It was intended, of course, to commemorate his "discovery" of China. A son of his had died, and he buried him in Tunmên. It was at the foot of the same monument that he himself was buried seven years later when he died of an illness on another visit to China. The earliest mention of this visit was by the Italian

¹ Commentaries, Vol. 3 pp. 131—134. I have made use of the embellished Portuguese narration of the failure of Nacem Mudaliar only with reserve. In Ming Shih, Ch. 325 p. 4b we also find a brief statement of the conquest of Malacca by the Fo-lang-chi (佛郎機) (i. e. Feringis or Franks, a name by which the Portuguese were called in South Asia and in the Far East for many years), the flight of its king, and the arrival in China of his embassy asking for succour.

² G. C. M. Birdwood in his Report on the Old Records in the Indian Office, p. 168, says that China was visited in 1508—9, "the date of the first discovery of that country, from the sea, by the Europeans". Birdwood does not mention his authority. This date, without doubt, is wrong.

³ Decada 3, Liv. 6, Cap. 2, p. 20. ⁴ 屯門. ⁵ See *infra* pp. 38—39.

⁶ "Padrão" in Portuguese. It is an upright post or pillar on which the discoverers engraved an inscription to commemorate their discovery of the new land. In Chên Wên-fu, Wang Kung I-ai-tz'ü Chi (陳文輔, 汪公遺愛祠記), or Memorial Inscription for the I-ai Shrine of Mr. Wang Hung, quoted in Tung-wan Hsien-chih (東莞縣志), Ch. 31, pp. 10b—11a, it is also casually stated that "after the reign period of Chêng-té (正德 1506—1521) had commenced", the Fo-lang-chi (Portuguese) erected a "stone monument" in Tunmên. But no definite year is given.

Andrea Corsali, who, in his letter to Duke Giuliano de Medici, dated the 6th of January, 1515, says¹:

"The merchants of the land of China also make voyages to Malacca across the Great Gulf to get cargoes of spices, and bring from their own country musk, rhubarb, pearls, tin, porcelain, and silk and wrought stuffs of all kinds, such as damasks, satins, and brocades of extraordinary richness. For they are people of great skill, and on a par with ourselves (*di nostra qualità*) but of uglier aspect, with little bits of eyes. They dress very much after our fashion, and wear shoes and stockings (*?scarpe e calciamenti*) like ourselves. I believe them to be pagans, though many allege that they hold our faith or some part of it. During this last year some of our Portuguese made a voyage to China. They were not permitted to land; for they say 'tis against their custom to let foreigners enter their dwellings. But they sold their goods at a great gain, and they say there is as great profit in taking spices to China as in taking them to Portugal; for 'tis a cold country and they make great use of them. It will be five hundred leagues from Malacca to China, sailing north."

This pioneer voyage is also mentioned by another of the Italians then in the Portuguese service, Giovanni da Empoli² who wrote from Cochin on November 15th, 1515³:

"From Malacca have come ships and junks They have also discovered China, where men of ours have been who are staying here: which is the greatest wealth that there can be in the world. The confines reach to high Tartary, and are called Balascia⁴. They are all white people like ourselves; they dress like Germans with all their fashions of garments, such as fur-lined caps and jerkins. There are inclosed lands like ours and houses of stones like ours; they have great order and law, and are very friendly toward us. The country abounds with all fine white silk, and it costs thirty cruzados the *cantaro*; damasks of sixteen good pieces, at five hundred reals the piece; satins, brocades, musk at half a ducat the ounce, and less. Many pearls of all sorts in great abundance; and

¹ Ramusio, 1 ff. 180, 181. I use Yule's translation as given in *Cathay and the Way Thither*, Hakluyt Soc., 2nd ed., Vol. 1, p. 180.

² Regarding him, see *Archivo Storico Italiano*, App. 3, pp. 9-91.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 85-87. I use D. Ferguson's translation in *The Indian Antiquary*, Vol. 30 (1901), pp. 423-424.

⁴ Badakshan?

many caps, so that from there to here there is made on them a profit of thirty to one. There come from there amazing things; and to tell the truth, I relate to you nothing of what there is there. The ships bring spices from there ¹; so that every year there come from Zamatra some sixty thousand *cantara* of pepper; and from Coccin ² and the land of Mallibari fifteen to twenty thousand *cantara* of pepper alone; it is worth fifteen or even twenty ducats the *cantaro*. In like manner, ginger, mace, nutmeg, incense, aloes, velvet, our gold thread, coral, woolen clothes, robes. There come from there *somedrom* ³, cloths like ours, much white alum and good vermilions: many horses and large carts are in their country. Everything is sold by weight, both merchandise and provisions, and live and dead animals; all by weight. They have many grains: the great things are so many that come from there, that they are amazing; so that if I do not die, I hope before I leave here to take a leap thither to see the Grand Khan, who is the king, who is called the king of Cathay; for by land one makes a journey of three months on horse back, all along a river, as is the Rhine, crowded here and there with populous towns and cities, at the end of which one arrives at Zeiton ⁴ which is the said king's who resides there ⁵.

"This year there will go ambassadors to the king with presents ⁶ of value, and I hope to send thither a quantity of pepper and other things; and the result of all you shall know."

The writer of this letter had recently arrived in India in the fleet of the new Viceroy, Lopo Soares de Albergaria, which sailed from Lisbon on April 7th, 1515 ⁷. In spite of some inaccuracies in it, it remains a specimen of the enthusiasm inspired by the first visit. The report of the wealth of China and the prospect of a lucrative trade with her served as stimuli to the adventurous Portuguese. Besides this, the letters tell us what were the chief imports and exports of China at that time.

Soon after this first visit, another man of Italian extraction in

¹ "to there"?

² Cochin.

³ Ferguson cannot explain this word which is probably a copyist's error.

⁴ Ch'üanchow, see *supra* p. 12.

⁵ This is of course incorrect. The Chinese Court was at Peking.

⁶ The original has "prefetti" which Ferguson thinks to be a copyist's blunder for "presenti".

⁷ *Decada 3, Liv. 1, Cap. 1, pp. 3, 5.*

the Portuguese service, Rafael Perestrello¹, made a successful voyage to China. His brother, Bertolameu had been appointed factor of Malacca by Affonso de Albuquerque. Rafael accompanied him with orders to go to China. However, it was only after his brother's death in 1515 that he was able to undertake the trip². He did it in the junk of a native merchant of Malacca, Pulate by name, and took with him a number of Portuguese. No details have been preserved to us regarding this visit. His retarded return gave rise to apprehensions for his safety. But in August or September, 1516, he returned to Malacca safe and sound, after having made a profit of twenty to one. He also brought the good news "that the Chinese desired peace and friendship with the Portuguese, and that they were a very good people."³

FERNÃO PERES AND THE PORTUGUESE EMBASSY.

The party which sailed from Lisbon on April 7th, 1515 under the leadership of the new Governor to India, Lopo Soares de Albergaria, included Simão d'Alcaçova, son of Pero d'Alcaçova, in a privateer for China of which Fernão Peres d'Andrade was to go as Captain-major on the China voyage, and with him Jorge Mascarenhas, son of João Gonçalves Montans, and Giovanni da Empoli, a merchant. To them Lopo Soares was to give ships in India so that Fernão Peres could make "this discovery of China."⁴

Soon after their arrival in India, Fernão Peres d'Andrade and his companions were sent away to undertake their voyage to china⁵. They left Cochin in April 1516⁶. First of all Fernão Peres went with his squadron to Pasai⁷ in order to take some loads of pepper and other merchandise. There he was well received by the king. He joined again Giovanni da Empoli⁸ who had come ahead of him and

¹ Regarding the Perestrello family, see Amat di S. Filippo's *Biografia dei Viaggiatori Italiani*, p. 36 and H. Vignaud, *Etudes Critiques sur la Vie de Colomb*, p. 453. Rafael and Bertolameu Perestrello were relatives of Columbus by marriage.

² Barros (*Decada 3, Liv. 2 Cap. 6 p. 178*) says that he was sent by Jorge de Albuquerque, Captain of Malacca.

³ Lopez de Castanheda, *Historia*, Liv. 4, Cap. 4, p. 6. Cf. also Correa, *Lendas da India*, Vol. 2, p. 174, there we find a somewhat different wording: "the country [China] has much peace, and the Chinese are a very good people".

⁴ Barros, *Decada 3, Liv. 1, Cap. 1, pp. 3-5.*

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 13.

⁶ A. Galvano, *Discoveries of the World*, p. 129.

⁷ A cidade Pacem or Pacê. It is in Sumatra.

⁸ The Portuguese form of this name is Joannes Impole.

had already loaded his ship with pepper. Unfortunately, before they set sail, this ship caught fire. Fernão Peres thus lost not only his best and greatest ship but also the greater part of his cargo. As he could not remain there to wait for another ship from Malacca, because the monsoon season of the year would be over by that time, his new plan was to return to Malacca first with the commodities he still had; there he would take more goods and then go to Bengal, the discovery of which had also been entrusted to him by the king Dom Manoel. Having made up his mind, he sent Joãn Coelho ahead to Bengal in a ship of a certain Moor.

After entering into an agreement with the king of Pasai for the establishment of a Portuguese factory at that port for the purpose of loading pepper for China, he sailed for Malacca, arriving there probably in July 1516. The Captain there, Jorge de Brito, however, strongly objected to his new project and, in the name of the Portuguese King, wished him to go to China first, even it were only to learn the fate of Rafael Perestrello and his companions whom he feared had been detained in China.

Fernão Peres was at last prevailed upon to set sail for China on the 12th of August 1516 in the ship *Santa Barbara*, although the season was long past. He was accompanied by Manoel Falção and Antonio Lobo Falção in two other ships and Duarte Coelho in a junk. The wind was so feeble that it was the middle of September before they saw the coast of Cochinchina. There they encountered a storm, and the squadron had to seek safety on the coast of Champa. From there Duarte Coelho, by permission of Fernão Peres, proceeded in his junk up the Menam river, and passed the winter in Siam, while the rest of the company decided to return to Malacca, evidently to await there the next monsoon season. They took another route back. After touching at Pulo Condore for some fresh water, they sailed along the coast of the Malay Peninsula and reached Patani. There Fernão Peres made agreements with the authorities of that port as well as with those of other countries in the neighbouring coastal regions for trade facilities.

On reaching Malacca, they found to their satisfaction that Rafael Perestrello had already returned there from his China trip after having made an enviable profit. His success inspired them with courage. They were now determined to undertake first of all the voyage to China. They went to Pasai in December, 1516, to take in a cargo of pepper. As they stayed there until May 1517, one of the

company, Simão d'Alcaçova had time to go to India and to come back with another cargo of goods. Leaving Pasai for China, Fernão Peres and his men again visited Malacca. There they found the situation had become lamentable. The Captain Jorge de Brito had died, and a struggle was going on between Nuno Vaz Pereira, brother-in-law of the deceased, and Antonio Pacheca, an admiral, over the succession issue. After trying in vain to conciliate the two parties, Fernão Peres, for fear of again missing the monsoon, decided to depart with his squadron. This he did on June 17th, 1517¹ with eight sails. These were the *Esphera*, a ship of eight hundred tons commanded by Fernão Peres himself, the *Santa Cruz*, by Simão d'Alcaçova, the *Santo Andre*, by Pero Soares, and the *Santiago*, by Jorge Mascarenhas; a junk belonging to a native merchant in Malacca of the name of Curiaraja, in command of Jorge Botelho; two other junks belonging to the merchant Pulate mentioned above, in command of Manoel d'Araujo and Antonio Lobo Fação; and another vessel commanded by Martim Guedes². All of these vessels were well armed and carried Chinese pilots³.

Before the Portuguese squadron reached Tunmên at the mouth of the Pearl River, they met a Chinese fleet which was there for the protection of the merchant ships and of the coast from the attacks of the pirates. Evidently wishing to know whether the oncoming ships were not those of the pirates, they fired several shots which the Portuguese did not return. They hoisted their flags, and made "all other signs of peace", but at the same time held themselves "pre-

¹ A. Galvano, *op. cit.* p. 129 says July.

² Barros mentions Martim Guedes in the list of captains (*Decada 3, Liv. 2, Cap. 6* p. 185), and describes the fleet as consisting of eight sails. A. Galvano, *op. cit.* p. 129, says too that there were "eight sailes, fower Portugals, and the others Malayans". Castanheda (*Historia, Liv. 4, Cap. 27, p. 55*) and Correa (*Lendas 2, p. 524*) say that there were only seven.

³ The above account of the activity of Fernão Peres as well as the following details of his visit to Canton are taken, if not otherwise indicated, from the valuable documentary Portuguese works of Castanheda (*Historia, Liv. 4, Caps. 27—31, 40—41*), Correa (*Lendas da Índia, Tom. 2, pp. 523—530*), and Barros (*Decada 3, Liv. 2, Caps. 6—8*). As historian Correa is not so reliable as Castanheda and Barros. About the career of Correa and his work, see *Encyclopaedie-artikelen v. Dr. G. P. Rouffaer in Bijdr. tot de Taal- Landen Volkenk. v. Nederl.-Ind. Dl. 86* (1930). About Barros and Castanheda and their works, see *Encyclopaedie v. Nederl.-Indië. 2^{de} druk* (1917), *Dl. 1* pp. 173—174, 442—443.

pared for fight" if need were. On the 15th of August, 1517¹, they arrived safely at Tunmên which the Portuguese often called *the Island of Trade*². There Fernão Peres met Duarte Coelho who had arrived a month earlier after having encountered some thirty-five pirate vessels and narrowly escaping seizure by them.

Fernão Peres sent a message to the commander of the patrolling Chinese fleet, informing him of his coming with an embassy from King D. Manoel of Portugal or rather of the Fo-lang-chi (Feringis)³, to "the King of China". The commander bade him welcome, but asked him to apply to the Pei-wo⁴, a commander of coast guards at Nan-t'ou. This Fernão Peres did. The Pei-wo replied that he himself had no authority to give any one permission to go to Canton, but he would report to the authorities of that city and would communicate the reply to the Portuguese commander when he received it. After several days had passed without a reply, Fernão Peres became impatient. He took some of his ships out of the port of Tunmên to the mouth of the river, and was ready to sail up it

¹ Ku T'ing-lin (T'ien-hsia Chün-kuo etc. Ch. 119, p. 13b) says that the Portuguese fleet came to Canton in 1517, this agrees with the Portuguese sources. Ming Shih (Ch. 325 p. 8) gives as the year of its arrival 1518 which must be an error.

² A Ilha da Veniaga (or Beniaga). Malay *bârniyaga*, (to) trade, traffic, from Skr. *vanijaka*, merchant, *vâniya*, traffic (see The Indian Antiquary, vol. 30, p. 425). The word *veniaga* has found its way into the Portuguese vocabulary to mean "merchandise", while its verbal form, *venigar*, means "to sell", "to traffic".

³ Cf. supra p. 35.

⁴ His full Chinese title is Pei-wo Tu-chih-hui (備倭都指揮), a military commander whose chief function was to guard the coast against the pillage of the Japanese pirates. There were Pei-wo in other coastal provinces too. The Pei-wo at Nan-t'ou (南頭) was empowered to examine all ships that came to visit Canton; cf. Ku T'ing-lin, T'ien-hsia Chün-kuo etc., Ch. 120, p. 4b. Pei-wo is pronounced *pi-wo* in the coastal district of Hsiang-shan (香山), and from *pi-wo* we have the form *Pio* in Portuguese documents and manuscripts. Donald Ferguson makes rather good use of some Portuguese material for his article Letters from Portuguese Captives in Canton in Indian Antiquary 30 (1901). But the fact that he has no knowledge of Chinese language and literature makes an important part of his laborious notes quite useless and even misleading. In the present case, for example, he mixes Nan-t'ou (Nantó in Portuguese documents) with Lantau, and thinks that Pio is from the Chinese word 'ping', soldier, which he found in a Chin.-Eng. dictionary!

with some Chinese pilots whom he had taken with him from Malacca. This was probably only a gesture to let the Chinese know of his impatience. But unfortunately a storm broke out, and the ships were saved from wreck only by sacrificing some of their masts. As the Chinese on shore were unwilling to assist the Portuguese to repair their ships, a shift had to be made by a transference of masts from one vessel to another. When the repairs were completed, Simão d'Alcaçova was left in charge of a part of the squadron at Tunmên, Fernão Peres himself went to Nant'ou with the ships of Martim Guedes and Jorge Mascarenhas, and accompanied by some boats of other ships, all well armed. Having arrived there, Giovanni da Empoli accompanied by trumpeters and a body guard was sent to see the Pei-wo. The Portuguese threatened to go to Canton and get the permission themselves. The Pei-wo requested them to wait for another day or so. To this they consented. As still no reply had arrived, the Pei-wo no longer opposed their going to Canton. He gave them pilots, and the Portuguese fleet went up the river.

The city was reached after three days, and the fleet cast anchor before the Huai-yüan post station¹. It was already near the end of September, 1517. By order of Fernão Peres, the ships fired a salute with their cannon², and flags were displayed from the masts. Soon word came from the Pu-chêng-shih³ or Provincial Treasurer, Wu T'ing-chü⁴, that he was astonished at the improper conduct of the Portuguese who not only came without consent of the autho-

¹ 懷遠驛 See Mayers' article in the Notes and Queries on China and Japan, Vol. 2 (1868), p. 129. There a Chinese work on the art of war published in the Ming dynasty is quoted. The Chinese work in its turn quotes the words of Ku Ying-hsiang, Superintendent of the Bureau of Trading Junks at the time of the arrival of the Portuguese fleet under the command of Fernão Peres. Mayers does not give the title of the Chinese work quoted which is probably the Wu-pei Chih, (武備志) dated 1621, by Mao Yüan-yi (茅元儀). Unfortunately it is not available to me.

² Cf. also Ming Shih, Ch. 325, p. 8b.

³ 布政使 Pu-chêng-shih was at first a civil governor of a province, but later new positions were created above him in a province so that his functions became essentially those of a treasurer.

⁴ Ku, T'ien-hsia Chün-kuo etc., Ch. 119 p. 13b. Wu T'ing-chü (吳廷舉) was at the same time the Associate Judge of the Province (按察副使).

rities concerned, but had committed a breach against the custom of the land by firing off their cannon. As an explanation of his coming without permission, Fernão Peres gave an account of what had passed between him and the Pei-wo; as regards the firing, he said he had made a mistake through ignorance, for he had intended only respect. He added that he had with him an envoy and a present to the "King of China". Fernão Peres's statement seemed to have satisfied the Pu-chêng-shih who said that he would be glad to send word of the visit of the Portuguese to Canton to the Viceroy, Ch'ên Hsi-hsien, who then resided in Wu-chou in the present province of Kwang-si. Having heard of this, the Viceroy decided to come to Canton himself with some other high officials¹. Pending their arrival, Fernão Peres gave strict orders that none of his men was to go ashore, and that their business transactions were to be restricted to the boats on the river. After the lapse of some days, the dignitaries arrived in Canton. By order of the Viceroy the Portuguese were instructed in the proper ceremonies at the Mosque². A day was then appointed for an interview. On that day Giovanni da Empoli, accompanied by a suite and preceded by trumpeters, was sent to the high mandarins with much pomp³. He explained to them the object of the Portuguese mission. The result of this interview was gratifying. Although it was found that the Collection of Ordinances of the Ming dynasty⁴ made no mention of any previous visits of the 'Feringis' to China, the Chinese promised to prepare a full report of the matter and send it to the Emperor. Moreover, while waiting for a reply from the Court, the Portuguese were permitted to reside on shore. Accordingly the ambassador, Thomé Pires⁵, an apothecary who had been elevated to that dignity by

¹ Notes and Queries, Loc. cit.

² The Kuang-hsiao ssü. Ibid. This recalls the fact that previously foreign traders had been largely Mohammedans.

³ "No qual dia Fernão Peres mandou o Feitor da Armada Joannes Impole bem acompanhado de gente vestida de festa, e com trombetas diante, por ir com mais pompa..." (Decada 3, Liv. 2, Cap. 8 p. 214).

⁴ The Ta Ming Hui Tien (大明會典).

⁵ The name of Thomé Pires appears in Ming Shih Ch. 325 p. 8b and in Ch'u Yü Chou Tzū Lu (殊域周咨錄), preface date 1574, by Yen Ts'ung (嚴從), Ch. 9 p. 8b as Chia-pi-tan-mo (加必丹末) which is from the Portuguese title 'Capitão moor' (i.e. Captain-major) of Fernão Peres. The Portuguese captive, Christovão Vieyra, gives us an interesting

Lopo Soares ¹, Governor of India, was sent on land with a retinue of six or seven persons and a great display of pomp. They were lodged in the same house where the Superintendent of the Bureau of Trading Junks, Ku Ying-hsiang, lived ², and the presents for the Emperor were kept there also, under lock and key. Fernão Peres was also invited by the Chinese authorities to come on shore, but he declined the invitation on the ground that he was responsible to the King of Portugal for the safety of the ships. He asked, however, the favour of a house near the shore where he might offer for sale or exchange some of the commodities he had brought with him. He was granted his request. Thereupon, he sent the Factor, his clerk and several other persons on shore to carry on the trade ³. Taking advantage of this privilege, Fernão Peres sent other men on shore to make their way secretly into various sections of the city and to report what they saw. Barros tells us how one of them, a certain Antonio Fernandes, taking advantage one night of a festival of lanterns ⁴, climbed up the city wall, ran round on the top of it and counted ninety towers which were for the purpose of defence. There is no doubt that Fernão Peres obtained much information about Canton in this way ⁵.

Fernão Peres could not stay in Canton as long as he wished to. He was informed by Simão d'Alcaçova of an attack made by some pirate junks on the remainder of the Portuguese fleet at Tunmên, but fortunately the Portuguese had been on guard, so they success-

explanation of this misunderstanding as follows: — "When Fernão Peres arrived in China, he said that there had come 'embaixador capitão moor' [an ambassador and a captain-major, i.e. Thomé Pires and Fernão Peres]. They [the Chinese] thought all that was one name, and put down 'embaixador capitão moor'... they supposed that it was his [Thomé Pires] name". Vieyra's letter, f. 112, Portuguese text reproduced in *The Indian Antiquary*, Vol. 30.

¹ The King left the choice of an ambassador to him.

² Notes and Queries, loc. cit.

³ It seems to be strange that the Portuguese sources which give us much detailed information about this expedition to China, do not say whether their cargo had been inspected by Chinese officers, and whether they had paid any customs dues or had been exempted from them.

⁴ "festa solemne de grandes illuminarias". Barros describes the celebration of it to be like that of the "vespera de S. João Baptista" by the Portuguese (*Decada* 3, Liv. 2, Cap. 7, p. 202). The Chinese Lantern Festival falls on the 15th day of the first moon.

⁵ Cf. also Galvano, *Discoveries of the World*, p. 130.

fully repulsed the pirates. Moreover, an outbreak of fever and dysentery among his men which lasted throughout October, had already claimed the lives of nine of them including the Factor Giovanni da Empoli. He therefore decided to depart. Leaving behind Thomé Pires and his companions, Fernão Peres returned with his fleet to Tunmên where he continued bartering. As the Portuguese had to repair their ships, the Chinese furnished them with all they needed for that purpose.

Fernão Peres now saw a chance to learn more about the inhabitants of the Liukiu Islands of whom the Portuguese had already had some "great news"¹, because some junks from these islands had come to Tunmên. With the permission of the authorities of Canton², he sent the Captain Jorge Mascarenhas via Ch'üanchow, to visit these Islands. When Jorge Mascarenhas arrived in Ch'üanchow, it was already too late in the season to proceed to the Liukiu Islands. He therefore sojourned in Ch'üanchow and opened trade with the Chinese there. He found that one could make just as much profit in Ch'üanchow as in Canton. Jorge Mascarenhas is the first Portuguese to visit the port of Ch'üanchow.

At the same time, Duarte Coelho was dispatched to Malacca to bring to his countrymen the news of the good reception the Portuguese had met with in China. He arrived there in March. The news he brought very much encouraged his fellow countrymen. They sent

¹ "Grão noticia". Decada 3, Liv. 2, Cap. 8, p. 220. In the Commentaries of Afonso Dalboquerque, vol. 3, pp. 88—89, we find the following statement about the trade of these islanders in Malacca: "... the general opinion of all is that their land is an island, and they navigate from it to Malacca, whence come every year two or three ships. The merchandizes which they bring are silk, silk-stuffs, brocades, porcelain, a great quantity of corn, copper, rock alum, and frusseria (i.e. gold or silver dust in its native state, as obtained from washings at the river mouth, or in mines); and they bring a great deal of gold in little cakes; stamped with the seal of their king. It could not be ascertained whether these little cakes were the money of that land, or whether they impressed them with that mark to show that it was a thing which had passed through the port whence they brought it,.... This gold comes from an island which is close to theirs: it is called Perioso, and in it there is much gold".

² "licença dos Governadores de Cantam". Decada 3, Liv. 2, Cap. 8 p. 220. Such a "permission" was not necessary, but the Portuguese asked for it probably not only as a gesture of deference to the Chinese but also because they hoped to be better received in Ch'üanchow and in the Liukiu Islands which were nominally a vassal state of China.

another junk to China almost immediately. It was under the command of Jorge Alvares and loaded with both commodities and provisions. It also conveyed to Fernão Peres the sad news of a war with the Raja of Bintang who had been trying to recover his lost territory, and of the seriousness of the situation. Upon receiving this news, Fernão Peres sent at once a message by land to recall Jorge Mascarenhas who was still in Ch'üanchow. As soon as the latter arrived, the Portuguese commander took leave of the Chinese authorities in Canton; from them he learned that a reply from the Court had arrived permitting the Portuguese embassy to go to Peking¹.

Fernão Peres did a very tactful thing before he left China. He made proclamations in all the places he had visited "that if there were anybody who had suffered injury or that had anything owing to him from a Portuguese, let him come to him. [Fernão Peres] to obtain all satisfaction."² This move gave the Chinese a very good impression of the Portuguese.

At the end of September, 1518, the fleet of Fernão Peres d'Andrade was again under sail for Malacca. Unluckily it met with a storm, and one of his ships, the Santo Andre, was lost in the Gulf of Cochinchina although the captain and the crew were saved. When the fleet came near Singapore, Diego Pacheco was already there with a squadron to meet him. For fear of a possible attack on the fleet by the naval forces of the King of Bintang, the Portuguese government at Malacca had taken this precaution. Fernão Peres thus arrived safely at Malacca "rich and greatly honoured"³.

¹ I wonder whether this is not a misunderstanding. For it is neither confirmed by the Chinese sources nor by any subsequent event that the Portuguese embassy had received such a reply.

² *Decada* 3, Liv. 2, cap. 8 p. 223.

³ *Ibid.* G. Correa says that (*Lendas da India*, Tomo 2 p. 539) Fernão Peres arrived in Cochin in February, 1518. This is not possible in view of the fact that Fernão Peres was then still in China. He must have arrived in Malacca in or about November of 1518.

CHAPTER III.

THE EXPULSION OF FOREIGNERS FROM CHINA AND THE PROHIBITION OF FOREIGN TRADE.

THE VISIT OF SIMÃO D'ANDRADE TO CHINA.

There was already a very good prospect of establishing more permanent Sino-Portuguese commercial relations on an amicable basis when Fernão Peres left Canton. But all his good work was to be destroyed by a man of the name Simão d'Andrade who happened to be his own brother, but whose arrogance and rudeness curiously contrasted with the flexibility and tact of Fernão Peres.

Although Antonio Correa had received an order to go to Malacca and China, he was later instructed by the new Governor, Diego Lopes de Sequeira, to go to the former place only when Simão d'Andrade showed a paper which contained a royal grant permitting him to go to China. Simão was therefore appointed to the command of the fleet to China.

In April 1519¹, Simão d'Andrade left Cochín for Malacca whence his fleet sailed for China with three more junks. Their captains were Jorge Botelho, Alvaro Fuzeiro and Francisco Rodriguez. The fleet arrived at Tunmên in August.

Simão d'Andrade, very fond of pomp and impetuous by nature, soon committed a series of outrages which completely destroyed the amicable relations between the Portuguese and the Chinese established by his brother, and even turned the Chinese into deadly enemies. He ordered a fort of stone and wood to be built² and

¹ Barros says (Decada 3, Liv. 6 cap. 1 p. 2) "April, 1518, at the time of Lopo Soares". This is apparently an error, for Simão went to China after his brother's return thence.

² Cf. also Ming Shih, Ch. 325, p. 8*b*. Here it is stated that the Feringis "took forcibly or bought decent people to build houses and the fort for them, for the purpose of remaining there long". And Ku, T'ien-hsia Chün-kuo etc. Ch. 119 p. 13*b*.

ordnance to be mouted¹ under the pretext that the pirates were many and that the Chinese fleet did not give adequate protection to the sea-farers. This was of course considered by the Chinese as seizing unlawfully a piece of their land. To aggravate the situation he ordered gallows to be erected on an adjacent islet, and condemned a sailor to be hanged there. The execution was carried out with much pomp and with all the habitual Portuguese formalities. This was regarded as an infringement of the law and custom of China which reserved the right of pronouncing the death sentence of a foreigner to the Chinese authorities². Besides these, when the ships from Siam, Camboja, Patani and other places came, as they did always at this time of the year with the monsoon, Simão d'Andrade would not allow them to land their freight before the Portuguese sold their goods. They were said to have even robbed passengers and ships of other nationalities³. What was most outrageous was that they kidnapped and bought a large number of children, many of whom had been stolen from respectable families⁴. They were probably taken away to become slaves⁵.

THE FAILURE OF THE MISSION OF THOMÉ PIRES.

The behavior of Simão Peres d'Andrade and his men could but make the Portuguese much abhorred by the Chinese. Meanwhile the Portuguese mission under Thomé Pires was to go to Peking. The

¹ Cf. also Yen Ts'ung; Ch'u Yü Chou Tzŭ Lu, Ch. 9 p. 8b.

² Vide *Supra* pp. 24-25. ³ Ming Shih, *Ibid.* Cf. Decada 3, Liv. 6, p. 14.

⁴ Ming Shih, *Ibid.* and Decada 3, Liv. 6, Cap. 2 p. 17.

Barros says the Portuguese "bought" the children, while the Chinese historians say they "seized" them. Barros's text, when rendered into English, reads: "...there had been missing in Canton many young persons, children of respected people, whom Simão d'Andrade and the men of his fleet bought, ...".

⁵ It is said in Ming Shih (*Ibid.*) that the Portuguese went "so far as to seize the children for food" (至掠小兒爲食). The Yüeh Shan Ts'ung T'an (月山叢談), written at about the time of the Portuguese visits or soon after them, gives a vivid description of how children were bought at 100 cash each, and how they were roasted. A quotation from Yueh Shan Ts'ung T'an is to be found in Ku, T'ien-hsia Ch'ün-kuo etc. Ch. 119 p. 14a. A description similar to that of Yüeh Shan Ts'ung T'an is found in Ch'u Yü Chou Tzŭ Lu by Yen Ts'ung. Ch. 9 p. 8b. Although Yen does not mention his source here, it must be pointed out that Yüeh Shan Ts'ung T'an was one of the works he consulted. e.g. see Ch. 9

permission to go to the Court was given to the Portuguese only after the Emperor had communicated thrice on the matter with the mandarins in Canton. Such permission would not have been given, had not the Chinese authorities, having received bribes¹, hidden from the Court the scandalous deeds of the now unpopular Portuguese. Thomé Pires and his suite left Canton on the 23rd of January 1520 in great pomp. They proceeded up the river in three galleys decorated with Portuguese flags and silk awnings. When the party reached the foot of the mountain range north of Kwangtung, they left their boats and went through the Mei-ling pass² in litters, on horse back or afoot. From there they proceeded northward and reached Nanking where the Emperor was sojourning in May, 1520. But Thomé Pires and his company were to go to Peking where the Emperor would expect him. Accordingly the party proceeded northward³.

Things did not go smoothly with the Portuguese in Peking. When the sealed letter from Dom Manoel was opened, its language was found to differ entirely from that of the letters written by the

p. 9*b* of Ch'u Yü Chou Tzŭ Lu. Barros also says that the mandarins accused the Portuguese of having eaten these children roasted ("e que os comiamos assados"); Decada 3, Liv. 6, Cap. 2 p. 14. The Portuguese captive in Canton, Christovão Vieyra, who was once of the suite of Thomé Pires, says in his letter (f. 105 v.) that the mandarins of Canton wrote to the Imperial Court, accusing the Portuguese of having, among other crimes, stolen "dogs" and of having eaten them roasted ("e que furtauão cães e que os comião asados"). This statement must have been due to some misunderstanding or to some copyist's error in the manuscript. There is no reason to believe that the mandarins made such an accusation in their memorial to the throne.

¹ Vide Ming Shih, *Ibid.* 賞緣鎮守中貴許入京.

² "Malenxam" in Portuguese documents. From Mei-ling Thomé Pires wrote to Simão d'Andrade, telling him of his safe arrival, and saying that the city of Canton was but a "small thing" ("pequena cousa") in comparison with those he had seen in his journey. See Decada 3, Liv. 6, Cap. 1, p. 4.

³ We are unable to tell definitely when the embassy reached Peking. Ming Shih only mentions its arrival (Ch. 16, p. 5*b*). In his letter (f. 104) Christovão Vieyra says: — "on the 2nd of August they wrote to Canton about what had occurred with the King [of China] till that time". He does not say from where they wrote, but it is quite possible that it was from Peking.

interpreters¹ under the instructions of Fernão Peres d'Andrade. When asked to explain the difference, the interpreters said that they had prepared the letters for the Portuguese in conformity with the custom of China and without any knowledge of the language in the sealed letter of the Portuguese King to the Emperor, and that the Portuguese had erred through ignorance of Chinese custom. They also pleaded in behalf of the foreigners on the ground that such ignorance was but natural in a people from a distant country².

Although the Portuguese were temporarily deprived of the privilege of going to the palace³, there was no reason why it should not be given back to them after the Court, through further inquiry, was convinced of the honesty of their intentions. But unfortunately charges were soon brought against them by highly placed mandarins of both the central and the local governments. The main ones are the following: That the Portuguese came to Canton without permission; that they refused to pay the customs dues on their merchandise, insulted and mishandled the officials who were sent to their boats to collect duties; that they forcibly prevented foreign traders of other nationalities from doing their business, invaded their ships, maltreated them and extorted money from them; that they were constructing fortresses on Chinese soil and storing up arms; that they fired off cannon in front of the city of Canton and in other places where it was forbidden by law to do so; that they came to spy in the land; and that they took possession of Malacca by force. To all these charges the Emperor replied coolly, "these people do not know our customs; gradually they will learn them"⁴.

¹ One of the interpreters must be Huo-chê Ya-san (火者亞三), a Chinese, who was said to have been in the Portuguese service and was at this time in the Ssü-yi-kuan (四夷館) in Peking where foreign envoys were entertained. Huo-chê Ya-san was evidently with the Portuguese embassy. He was said to be a very clever man and both the Emperor and the powerful minister Chiang Pin (江彬) were very fond of him. He became therefore very haughty and gave himself out as Portuguese envoy from Malacca. At audience with the Emperor he wished to have the first place among the foreigners (朝見欲位諸夷上). Later when imperial orders were given to expell the Portuguese from China, Ya-san was also executed as the "chief criminal" (首惡) among them. See Ch'u Yü Chou Tzū Lu, Ch. 9 p. 86 and Ming Shih Ch. 325 p. 8.

² Vieyra ff. 104v-105. See *Infra* pp. 64-65.

³ Vieyra, *Ibid.*

⁴ Vieyra ff. 105-106.

But the opinion of two high officials of the Court carried great weight. One was that of Ch'iu Tao-lung¹, who held the post of Censor². Ch'iu remonstrated with his prince as follows:

"Malacca was a country which had been given the right of self-government, yet the Feringis dared to absorb its territory, and, moreover, to lure us with hope of gain by requesting us to confer upon them the right to rule it and to bring us tribute. We must never grant them this request. We must not receive their ambassador, and must let them know plainly whether they are obedient or recalcitrant in our eyes. We must order them to restore the (occupied) territory to Malacca; only after this is done shall we consent to their bringing tribute. Should they remain obstinately fixed in their delusion, we must issue manifestos to all foreign peoples to make known their crimes, and punitive expeditions must be sent against them."

Another Censor, Ho Ao³ by name said:

"The Feringis are most cruel and crafty. Their arms are superior to those of other foreigners. Some years ago they came suddenly to the city of Canton, and the noise of their cannon shook the earth⁴. Those who remained at the post-station⁵ disobeyed the law and had intercourse with others. Those who came to the Capital were proud and struggled [among themselves?] to become head⁶. Now if we allow them to come and go and to carry on their trade, it will inevitably lead to fighting and blood shed, and the misfortune of our South may be boundless. In the time of our ancestors, foreigners came to bring tribute only at fixed periods, and the law provided for precautionary measures, therefore the foreigners who could come were not many. But some time ago the Provincial Treasurer, Wu T'ing-chü, saying that he needed spice to be sent to the Court, took some of their goods no matter when they came. It was due to what he did that foreigner ships have never ceased visiting our shores and that barbarians have lived scattered in our departmental cities. Prohibition and precaution having been neglected, the Feringis became more and more familiar with our

¹ 邱道隆. ² Yü Shih 御史. ³ 何鰲.

⁴ This evidently refers to the cannon shots fired as a salute by the fleet of Fernão Peres.

⁵ This includes all the post-houses in Canton where foreigners were lodged.

⁶ 入都者桀鰲爭長. A rivalry between Thomé Pires and Huo-ché Ya-san?

fairways. And thus availing themselves of the situation the Feringis came into our port. I pray that all the foreign junks in our bay and the foreigners who secretly live (in our territory) be driven away, that private intercourse be prohibited and that our strategical defence be close, so that that part of our country will have peace."

As the censor Ch'iu had been a magistrate in the district of Shun-tê¹ in the province of Canton, and Censor Ho was a native of that district, they were familiar with the situation. Their remonstrances were given much consideration and mainly adopted later².

Meanwhile Tuan³ Mohammed, Ambassador of the Raja of Bintang, son of the fugitive King of Malacca, had arrived in Peking to lay before the Emperor the wrongs they had suffered at the hands of the Portuguese whom he characterized as robbers and spies⁴. He brought with him a letter the contents of which were, according to Cristovão Vieyra, as follows⁵:

"The Franges robbers audaciously came to Malacca with many men, took the land and destroyed it, killed many people, plundered them, took others prisoner. The people that remain are under the jurisdiction of the Franges. For this reason, the king of Malacca had a sad heart oppressed with great fear. He took the seal of the King of China and fled to Bentão⁶ where he now is. My brothers and relatives fled to other countries. The ambassador of the King of Portugal who is now in the land of China is a sham. He does not come in earnest, but to deceive the country of China. In order that the King of China may show grace to the King of Malacca whose heart is oppressed, he sends a present, and begs for succour and men so that his land may be restored to him."⁷

This letter was submitted to the Li-pu⁸ or Board of Rites to which all foreign envoys had to apply after their arrival in the capital.

Meanwhile the cold which the Emperor contracted in the pre-

¹ 順德. ² For all this see Ming Shih, Ch. 325 p. 8b.

³ A Malay word meaning "mister" or "master".

⁴ Vieyra, ff. 109v-110. Decada 3, Liv. 6, Cap. 1 p. 6.

⁵ Vieyra, *Ibid.* The name of the Ambassador is Tũão Mafame which evidently is only another transcription of Tuan Mohammed.

⁶ i.e. Bintang.

⁷ The punctuation is my own. I have omitted several 'ands' of the original text to make the English rendering smoother.

⁸ 禮部.

vious year after he had fallen into the water of a lake, developed into something more serious. At the beginning of 1521 while engaged in the worship of heaven, he had a violent fit of blood-spitting. Three months later, the 20th of April, he died.

It is true that soon after the death of the Emperor, the Embassy was ordered to return to Canton with its presents, but there is no reason to suppose that it would have been able to remain much longer in the capital had he not died. Before his death formidable charges against the Portuguese had already been piled up, and the high officials of the Court were in favour of taking strong action against them. Although, on one occasion at least, the Emperor wished to be more lenient with the Portuguese, he had shown no intention of acting otherwise than according to what his ministers thought to be in the best interest of his subjects.

Orders were also issued to the high officials in Canton to hold members of the Portuguese Embassy in custody, to discontinue foreign trade, and to liberate the Portuguese only after the Portuguese authorities in Malacca and in India had promised to restore the former place to its legitimate king¹.

The Portuguese Embassy left Peking on the 22nd of May, and reached Canton on the 22nd of September, 1521².

THE CLASHES IN CANTON AND THE EXPULSION OF THE PORTUGUESE.

In April or May, 1521, there arrived in the port of Tunmên a fleet of Portuguese ships laden with pepper, sandal wood and other merchandise³. This fleet which had come from Malacca consisted of a ship from Portugal, owned by a state officer of the name of Nuno Manuel and with Diogo Calvo as captain, the junk of Jorge Alvares, and several other ships which had arrived too late in Malacca to join Simão d'Andrade on the previous trip. The Portuguese began their business transactions both at Tunmên and in Canton. In spite of the antipathy of the inhabitants aroused by the criminal conduct of Simão, these traders do not seem to have met with any inconvenience in carrying on their business. The Chinese authorities in

¹ Decada 3, Liv. 6, Cap. 1 pp. 12—13; Vieyra, f. 110. ² Vieyra, f. 104.

³ For the visit of this fleet see Decada 3, Liv. 6, Cap. 2 p. 18; a briefer and more vague account may also be found in Correa, Liv. 2 p. 678 and Castanheda, Liv. 5, Cap. 80 pp. 292—293.

Canton also left them unembarrassed pending a decision from the Court.

But soon the news of the death of the Emperor Wu-tsung (1506—1521) reached Canton together with an order to discontinue foreign trade and a demand that foreigners leave Chinese territory under pain of death¹. The Portuguese refused to obey the order on the ground that they had not yet sold all their goods. But the mandarins were now determined not to tolerate any more flouting of their order. They arrested Vasco Calvo, brother of Diogo Calvo and several other Portuguese who continued in the city of Canton. At about the same time some Portuguese ships which had just come from Patani and Siam were also captured, one after another, by the Chinese although not without fighting. It seems that all of the great number² of men on board these ships were either killed or taken prisoner. Sixty of the male captives were later released besides some fifty women and children. Among the victims were Bertholameu Soares, Lopo de Goës and the Father Mergulhão who died fighting³. In the meantime the Chinese fitted out a fleet of armed junks which almost blockaded the ship of Diogo Calvo and seven or eight other Portuguese junks which were still in the port of Tunmên⁴.

On the 27th of June, 1521, another Portuguese captain, of the name of Duarte Coelho, arrived off Tunmên in a well armed junk accompanied by another junk belonging to some inhabitants of Malacca. Having learned of the hostility between the Portuguese and the Chinese, Duarte Coelho might have escaped immediately leaving his countrymen to their fate, had it not been for love for his friend Jorge Alvares who was then very ill and who died eleven days after Coelho's arrival. Wang Hung, the Hai-tao⁵ or Commander of the fleet at Canton, was much irritated to learn that the

¹ Cf. *Supra* p. 52. We know already that it was on account of the conduct of the Portuguese that the Court decided to discontinue trade, and not due to the death of the "King of China" as Barros gives us to understand.

² Vieyra says (f. 108) that the number amounted to two thousand. Of course not all of them were Portuguese.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Decada* 3, Liv. 6, Cap. 2 p. 20.

⁵ 海道汪鋐 Yüeh Shan Ts'ung T'an quoted in Ku, T'ien-hsia Chün-kuo etc. Ch. 119 p. 14a. The full title of Hai-tao is Hai-tao Fu Shih (海道副使). It appears in Portuguese manuscripts and documents in various forms: Haytao, Itáo, oytáo, aytão etc.

enemy had been reinforced. He decided to attack them. Realising the great danger in which they were when fifty Chinese military junks formed a semi-circle around them, Duarte Coelho made a peace proposal. But his proposal was rejected by the Chinese who probably suspected it to be a ruse. Then the Chinese began the attack. Thanks to their superior artillery, the Portuguese were able to hold their enemy at bay. After this failure, Wang Hung thought it wiser to lay siege to the Portuguese¹.

Almost forty days of warfare had passed when a ship in command of Ambrosio do Rego and likewise a junk were able to avoid seizure by the investing fleet, the commander of which was occupied elsewhere;² and to join the other Portuguese ships in the port of Tunmên.

Due to increasing casualties the Portuguese were steadily decreasing. Now there were no more than eight Portuguese in any of their vessels, the rest being slaves. After consulting one another, Duarte Coelho, Diogo Calvo and Ambrosio do Rego resolved to abandon some of the junks, to divide the crew among three major ships and to attempt an escape. On the 7th of September, 1521, under cover of darkness, the three ships set sail. But the Chinese were vigilant this time. They caught sight of the Portuguese ships and attacked them at daybreak. The engagement is said to have been so fierce that it had "a resemblance to a hell amidst fire and smoke". The Portuguese would probably have had to succumb but for the outbreak of a thunderstorm which wrought havoc among the Chinese junks and enabled the Portuguese to outdistance their enemy. They arrived safely in Malacca toward the end of October³.

It was rather ironic that soon after such a bitter clash the embassy of Thomé Pires was to come to Canton. It arrived there exactly a fortnight after the narrow escape of the Portuguese ships from Tunmên. The mandarins were far from being in good humour to receive the Ambassador and his companions. Furthermore there was an order from the Court to take them into custody until the Portuguese authorities gave assurance that Malacca would be restored to its ousted ruler. Therefore no sooner did the Portuguese

¹ Ku, *Ibid.*; Ch'ên Wên-fu, Wang Kung I-ai-tzŭ Chi quoted in Tung-wan Hsien-chih, Ch. 31 p. 12a-b; Decada 3, Liv. 6, Cap. 2 pp. 20-22; Ch'u Yü Chou Tzŭ Lu, Ch. 9 p. 9a.

² Barros said that he was in a bay three leagues from Tunmên, burying the bodies of his men who were killed in the fighting. Decada, *Ibid.* p. 22.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 20-23; Castanheda, Liv. 5, Cap. 81 pp. 291-293.

arrive in Canton than they were brought before the Provincial Treasurer who gave orders to detain them in custody¹.

After that, Tuan Healie², Ambassador of the exiled King of Malacca, was summoned to the presence of the authorities of Canton to state his case. Then a council was held by these high officials to deliberate on the measures to be taken to inform the Portuguese in Malacca of the wish of the Emperor. When Thomé Pires, summoned together with his suite before the council, was requested to write to the Portuguese leaders about it, he refused to do so on the ground that "neither had he come for that purpose nor was it proper for him to talk about it."³ Unable to persuade him the Chinese decided to treat the Portuguese more harshly. On August 14th, 1522, the Provincial Treasurer and the An-ch'a-shih⁴ or Provincial Judge allowed heavy irons to be put on the hands of the Ambassador, and on both the hands and the feet of his companions; and their belongings were confiscated⁵. These irons were struck off again only through the intervention of the Hsün-yüeh⁶ who called the attention of the mandarins of Canton to the fact that the Portuguese were on an embassy⁷.

The harsh treatment of the Portuguese was partly due, perhaps⁸, to another major Sino-Portuguese clash which took place at about this time. News of what had happened in China had probably not yet reached India, when in April 1522, another Portuguese fleet left Cochin for Canton. It consisted of four ships commanded by the Captain-major Martim Affonso de Mello Coutinho, his two brothers Vasco Fernandes Coutinho and Diogo de Mello, and Pedro Homen. Martim Affonso had been charged by the Portuguese King 'Dom Manoel'⁹ to conclude a "treaty of peace" or rather a treaty of

¹ Vieyra, f. 106.

² Tuan Ali?

³ Vieyra, loc. cit.

⁴ The Portuguese transcription "Anchuçi" is evidently an error for "Anchaçi", cf. Vieyra, f. 110.

⁵ Vieyra, f. 106v.

⁶ 巡閱, sometime called Hsün-yüeh-tu-shih (巡閱度使). The correct Portuguese transcriptions are Cenhi or Cenhituçi, from the Cantonese pronunciation Ch'un-yüt and Ch'un-yüt-to-si. All the other Portuguese forms ceuhi, cehi, cuhy, cuhi, euchi, cheuhi, cuchi are doubtless corruptions for which the copyists who had no idea of Chinese names were responsible.

⁷ Vieyra, ff. 106-107, 109v-110v.

⁸ We are not quite sure whether this clash had already taken place before August 14th. The Portuguese fleet, as we shall see, left Malacca on July 10th.

⁹ Martim Affonso and his companions left Lisbon on the 5th of April 1521 in the same fleet which took the new Governor, D. Duarte de Menezes, to India. Dom Manoel died on December 13th of the same year.

friendship with the Emperor of China, and to try to obtain permission to erect a fortress at Tunmên where he was to stay with his subordinates. Upon arriving at Malacca, he learned of the unfortunate change in the Sino-Portuguese relations. He determined, however, to continue his trip, but wanted Duarte Coelho and Ambrosio do Rego, both of whom narrowly escaped with their lives from the Tunmên blockade in the previous year, to go with him. It was only after being persuaded by Martim Affonso himself and by Jorge de Albuquerque, Captain of Malacca, that Duarte Coelho and Ambrosio do Rego reluctantly consented to join the fleet. So the four ships laden with pepper and other merchandise and now joined by two junks¹ left Malacca with three hundred men on board on the 10th of July, 1522.

Before they entered the port of Tunmên, they were seen by a patrolling fleet which fired off cannon at them. Knowing that further hostilities would make reestablishment of trade relations with China more difficult, Martim Affonso urged his men to refrain from any aggressive acts. But it was not easy for him to restrain them in view of the hostile actions on the part of the Chinese, and accordingly some bloodshed ensued². With the exception of Duarte Coelho the Portuguese succeeded in making their way to Tunmên. It is not clear whether Duarte Coelho was unable to enter the port or unwilling to do so³. At any rate his junk lagged, and when it came near Tunmên the others had already entered the port. For fear of

¹ Barros says (*Decada 3, Liv. 8, Cap. 5 p. 283*) that there were two junks. Correa and Castanheda, however, only mention one: that of Duarte Coelho. According to what we can make out from the subsequent events, it seems clear that there were two junks, but one of them, i. e., that of Duarte Coelho, did not enter Tunmên, and evidently did not take part in the ensuing battle with the Chinese. That is why Ming Shih (Ch. 325 p. 9) which gives a graphic description of this battle says that the Portuguese had five vessels.

² Correa, *Tom. 2, p. 718*; Castanheda, *Liv. 6, Cap. 13 pp. 30-31*; Vieyra f. 121. Correa adds (p. 719) that after the Portuguese arrived in Tunmên, Martim Affonso threatened to hang Duarte Coelho in the yard of his own ship because he used artillery against the Chinese and caused some death and damage. This statement is in contradiction to that of Barros who says (*Decada 3, Liv. 8, Cap. 5 p. 283*) that Duarte Coelho did not enter the port. Castanheda says (*loc. cit.*) that it was Ambrosio do Rego who headed a group that used their artillery.

³ Cf. Barros, *Dec. 3, Liv. 8, Cap. 5, p. 283* and Castanheda, *Historia, Liv. 6, Cap. 14 p. 31*.

encountering a Chinese fleet, it remained in the offing at a safe distance.

Martim Affonso sent word from Tunmên to the Chinese authorities in Canton that he came to bring necessities to the ambassador and his suite ¹, and that he desired trade with China. Although the overtures of the Portuguese were tempting to many officials in Canton ² who equally desired trade with foreigners — for it used to be an important source of the revenue of that province, — yet there was great fear of inviting a repetition of the previous troubles. So the Portuguese proposals were rejected ³.

Soon after that a fierce battle was fought between the Chinese and the Portuguese fleet. It is now difficult to ascertain how the engagement started, for the Portuguese and the Chinese versions differ widely, and each side blames the other. According to the former, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Judge who were deady opposed to a resumption of foreign trade, tried to block any possibility of it by bribing the Pei-wo of Nan-t'ou and the commanders of the fleet so that they were willing to attempt the capture of the enemy ships. Therefore when the Portuguese essayed to leave Tunmên by breaking through the investing fleet, they were attacked and the fighting began ⁴. All this is of course quite possible. The

¹ Ming Shih, Ch. 325 p. 9a. When Fernão Peres was in China, he insisted that the embassy should live at its own cost. This the Chinese politely declined on the ground that it was in conformity with their custom that they should provide for foreign embassies (Decada 3, Liv. 2, Cap. 8 pp. 217—218). Martim Affonso tactfully chose this as the pretext for his coming to China.

Vieyra, f. 134, a part of the text reads thus: — “trazia embaix or e vinha po que aqui estaua —”, when rendered into English it reads thus: — “he (Martim Affonso) brought an ambassador and came for the one that was here (in Canton)...”. There must be an error in this text, or a misunderstanding on the part of the chronicler for it is confirmed nowhere that Martim Affonso brought an ambassador with him.

² Ming Shih, Ch. 325 p. 9a; Vieyra, f. 121.

³ Vieyra says (*loc. cit.*) that it was due to the determined attitude of the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Judge that the overtures of Martim Affonso were rejected, and that orders were given to attack the Portuguese. This statement, even if it does contain some truth, is inaccurate. As there was an Imperial command to discontinue foreign trade, the Chinese authorities in Canton simply could not accept the Portuguese proposals (*cf.* Ming Shih, *loc. cit.*).

⁴ Vieyra, *loc. cit.*; Decada 3, Liv. 8, Cap. 5, pp. 285—286; Castanheda, Liv. 6, Cap. 14 p. 33; Correa, Tom. 2 pp. 719—720.

Ming Shih asserts, however, that the Portuguese should be held responsible for the outbreak of hostilities, for — evidently as a retaliation for the Chinese refusal to resume trade relations with them, and for their imprisonment of the Ambassador and his suite — they raided Hsi-ts'ao-wan¹ of the district of Hsin-hui². It was only after having parried this raid, that the Pei-wo³, K'o Jung⁴, and the Pai-hu⁵ or the Chief Officer of a hundred, Wang Ying-ên⁶, following up their success, persuaded the enemy to Shao-chow⁷ where fierce fighting took place. In the engagement the losses on both sides were heavy. The Chinese succeeded in capturing two ships of the enemy and forty-two persons. Some of the prisoners probably died of wounds, but those who still lived were executed on the 23rd of September, 1523, after the Court had confirmed the death sentence pronounced by the high mandarins of Canton⁸. Among the prisoners was the brave Captain Pedro Homen whom the Chinese took for the Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese fleet⁹, probably because of his prominence in the battle. Among the Chinese who were killed

¹ 西草灣.

² 新會 Ming Shih, Ch. 325 p. 9a. The Chang Chih (張志), quoted in Tung-wan Hsien-chih, Ch. 31 p. 12b, says that the Portuguese intended to try to capture Nan-t'ou. This is probably true, for Vieyra (f. 121v) also says that Martim Affonso de Mello brought three hundred men only, and that if he had a greater force of two or three hundred more men, Nan-t'ou might be captured.

³ The Pei-wo is sometimes called a Chih-hui (指揮), both have been derived from the full title Pei-wo Tu-chih-hui; cf. supra p. 41.

⁴ 柯榮. ⁵ 百戶. ⁶ 王應恩. ⁷ 稍州. ⁸ Vieyra, f. 109.

⁹ Ming Shih, *Ibid.* The name of Pedro Homen or Pedr'Omen appears in the Chinese text as 別都盧 Pieh-tou-lu (pit-tou-lou in Cantonese). The Portuguese sources quoted above depict how Pedro Homen distinguished himself in the fighting and how he attempted unsuccessfully to save the life of another Captain, Diogo de Mello, whose ship was destroyed by a Chinese cannon (cf. also Wang Kung I-ai-tz'ü Chi quoted in Tung-wan Hsien-chih, Ch. 31 p. 12b).

Ming Shih (*Ibid.*) mentions another Portuguese of the name of Su-shih-li (疎世利 pron. So-sei-li in Cantonese), important subordinate of Pedro Homen, who was also captured alive. I have not been able to identify this name with that of any person in the Portuguese sources. I think, however, it must be Syseiro, the name of the ship commanded by Pedro Homen (the ship is mentioned in Correa, Lendas, Tom. 2 p. 674). It is quite possible that the Chinese historians have confused the name of a ship with that of a man.

was the Pai-hu. The Portuguese cannons and other fire-arms captured in the battle were named Feringis, and sent to the Court as trophies. Several years later imitations were made and used for defence purposes¹.

After their escape and when night fell, Martim Affonso summoned his Captains and insisted that they should take vengeance on the Chinese who had inflicted such a heavy loss on the Portuguese. The Captains, however, thought it unwise to do so. Affonso yielded at last to their prudent counsel, but required them to sign a paper exonerating him from the blame. So the three vessels, remainder of the Portuguese fleet, sailed southward, and reached Malacca in the middle of October, 1522². Wang Hung, the Hai-tao or Commander of the Chinese fleet owed his promotion to this victory³. The Portuguese were thus expelled and the Sino-Portuguese commercial relations were severed for several years to come.

The situation in Malacca remained unchanged. The high mandarins in Canton must have been aware that the Portuguese would never quit the occupied territory unless they were forced to do so, and that China was then neither in a position nor anxious to use force in a distant country like Malacca. They insisted, however, that the Portuguese should be notified of the wish of the Emperor. With the help of some Portuguese captives, three letters were prepared: one for the King, another for the Governor of India, and a third one for the Captain of Malacca. When they were handed to the Provincial Judge on the first of October, 1522, for dispatch, he had some difficulty in finding a bearer. The Malay Ambassador was asked to take them to Malacca, but he was unwilling, saying that the Portuguese would not spare his life if he did. At last, at his suggestion, a small junk was dispatched to ascertain whether the exiled ruler of Malacca was still living and his whereabouts. It left Canton on the 31st of May, 1523, and went to Patani whence it brought back an urgent appeal for help from the exiled King. The Portuguese forces under Dom Sancho Henriques were attacking

¹ Ming Shih, *Ibid.* and Ch'u Yü Chou Tzū Lu, Ch. 9 p. 9b. In this last reference we are further informed that Wang Hung succeeded in enlisting in his service two Chinese, Yang San (楊三) and Tai Ming (戴明), who had been with the Portuguese for many years and knew how to cast cannon and make gunpowder, and that Wang owed much of his victory to the cannon made by them.

² Castanheda, *Liv.* 6, Cap. 15 p. 34.

³ Tung-wan Hsien-chih, *loc. cit.*; Yüeh Shan Ts'ung T'an quoted in Ku T'ien-hsia Chun-kuo etc., Ch. 119 p. 14a.

Bintang and also appeared in Patani¹. The Chinese authorities now urged Tuan Mohammed and Cojação,² the Malayan Ambassadors, to go back to Bintang, taking with them the letters which could be given to the Portuguese there. They threatened to stop supplying the Ambassadors with provisions should they refuse to do so. The Malays were thus compelled to leave Canton in 1524. Their fate remains a mystery. It was rumoured that, fearing lest they fall prey to the Portuguese, they made for Borneo, but unhappily their ship wrecked in a storm and they were captured by their enemy³. In the same year the Portuguese Ambassador, Thomé Pires, died of sickness in prison⁴.

After the complete severance of Sino-Portuguese trade relations, each side apprehended an attack from the other. On the 1st of January, 1524, Jorge de Albuquerque wrote to the King of Portugal that an avenging Chinese fleet might come to attack Malacca, and that if the Chinese came they would do great harm unless the Captain-major of Malacca should arrive in time⁵.

The Chinese on the other hand, fearing that the Portuguese might return, fitted out a fleet of one hundred junks in 1523. Half of the naval force lay in front of Nan-t'ou, and the other half at sea among the islands. But soon a calamity befell the fleet. A hurricane broke out at the end of August. It lasted a day and a night and wrecked all the bigger junks at sea. Only those before Nan-t'ou succeeded in taking refuge in a near-by port. In 1524 the Chinese equipped another fleet, but the Portuguese did not return. As time went on these precautionary measures were gradually slackened, and the war junks decreased in number. Some of them were destroyed while others were captured by the pirates. After 1528 no more fleets were prepared⁶.

The 'Feringis' and other foreigners had not come back, and the then biggest port of China, Canton, seemed now to be safe from any further danger of an attack from abroad. But as the fear subsided by degrees, the need of foreign trade was more and more felt.

¹ Vieyra, ff. 110v--111; cf. also a letter dated January 1st, 1524, from the Portuguese Captain in Malacca, Jorge de Albuquerque to the King of Portugal. An extract from the text of the said letter is to be found in the *Indian Antiquary* 30, p. 433.

² Vieyra, *Ibid.* I can not identify this name.

³ f. 111.

⁴ f. 112.

⁵ See a passage from his letter in *The Ind. Antiq.*, 30, p. 433.

⁶ Vieyra, f. 118v.

CHINA'S EXPORTS AND IMPORTS DURING THE EIGHT YEARS OF SINO-PORTUGUESE TRADE.

The visits of Portuguese adventurers and traders to China brought this country and Portugal into direct contact with each other. For the first time in history Chinese merchandise could and did find its way to Portugal without passing through the hands of the merchants of a third nation. But the volume of this trade was small. Of the goods which the Portuguese imported into China, only a few articles were from Portugal, e.g. woolen cloth and gold thread¹. Although no records of any kind are available, we may safely say that only a moderate percentage of the merchandise which the Portuguese exported from China was sent for consumption in their homeland, because they could profitably dispose of it in the Indian markets. No doubt trade between China and Portugal would have increased in volume, if commercial relations between the two countries had continued. But what seems certain is that even in that case it would have taken a good number of years for such trade to have become important. The chief reason is that the Portuguese could already make good profit by just carrying on business between China and South Asia. A product of South Asia could be sold in China at a price several times greater than the amount needed to buy it in a native market and vice versa. A South-Asiatic product which was then greatly in demand in China was pepper. A quintal of pepper was worth only four ducats in Malacca, but was sold at fifteen ducats in China². The Italian Andrea Corsali was probably right in reporting in 1515 that there was "as great profit in taking spices to China as in taking them to Portugal"³.

The kinds of articles exported from and imported into China remained in the main what they had been. From China the foreigners obtained copper, saltpetre, lead, alum, tow, cables, all kinds of iron work, pitch, silk and silk stuffs like damasks of all colours, many kinds of satin and brocade, porcelaine rhubarb, musk, silver, gold, seed pearls, gilded articles such as rich chests and trays of gilt wood, salt dishes, painted fans and other delicate hand-work.

Into China they imported pepper from Sumatra, Malabar, Pasai, Pedir and Patani, drugs of Cambay, opium, wormwood, Levant gall

¹ See a letter of Giovanni da Empoli in *The Ind. Antiq.* vol. 30 p. 423.

² Duarte Barbosa, *East Africa and Malabar*, p. 207.

³ Ramusio, l ff. 180, 181. I use the translation by Yule in *Cathay and the Way Thither*, Hakluyt Soc., 2nd ed. vol. 1, p. 180.

nuts, saffron, coral wrought and unwrought, stuffs from Cambay, Palecate and Bengal, vermilion, quicksilver, scarlet cloth, black wood, putchuck¹, frankincense, ivory, woollen cloth and gold thread².

It is a pity that there are no government statistics or other records indicating the amount of China's foreign trade during that period. We must be satisfied with a statement of Viceroy Lin Fu³ according to whom the revenue which the Cantonese Government was able to appropriate from customs duty in Canton amounted to several tens of thousands of taels per month⁴. This statement at least shows the importance of the trade, although it does not permit us to estimate the volume of it in figures.

THE CAUSES OF SINO-PORTUGUESE CLASHES.

The Portuguese were the first Europeans who succeeded in doubling the South African cape and reached South Asia and the Far East by a sea-route to seek a lucrative trade. When some of them came before Canton, they found that it was open to foreign merchants. They sold, or rather, due to the lack of a numismatic system for such trade, bartered with very profitable results, what they had brought from South Asia. But soon friction arose between them and the Chinese, which led to armed clashes and to their expulsion from Chinese territory. Seeking to avert any further disaster of the kind, China closed the port of Canton to all sea-trade, after which, for a number of years, the Portuguese had to give up their hope of a lucrative trade with China.

Did China not need such a trade? Was it superfluous to her? Far from this. The Chinese in the province of Canton at least, urgently needed it. As we shall see in the next chapter how the suspension of sea-trade led to serious financial difficulties with the provincial

¹ 木香.

² On both exports and imports, cf. D. Barbosa, *East Africa and Malabar* pp. 191, 206—207; Vasco Calvo's letter, f. 133—133v; Diogo Calvo's letter (published in the *Ind. Antiq.* vol. 30 p. 435); *Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque*, Tom. 1 p. 75; Ku, T'ien-hsia Chün-kuo etc., Ch. 120 p. 3b; letter of Giovanni da Empoli (*Ind. Antiq.* vol. 30 p. 423).

³ 林富.

⁴ See *infra* p. 74. This amount may not be the sum total of the revenue from customs duty, for the provincial government could only appropriate what was left to her by the central government.

government which derived a considerable part of its revenue from duties on imported goods. Furthermore, a considerable section of the Cantonese population eked out their livelihood by this trade. They ordered goods from interior China, sold them to the foreigners, at the same time bought imported commodities and distributed them in the interior provinces as they are doing at the present day. Once such trade was paralysed, they were deprived of a means of livelihood and became dangerous to peace and order. To the Chinese therefore, or at least to the Cantonese, the suspension of foreign trade was far from being desirable.

If both the Portuguese and the Chinese desired trade, what then were the causes of its suspension? One of them must be the misunderstandings which naturally arose from the widely different customs of the two peoples. As we remember, when the Portuguese fleet under Fernão Peres was about to cast anchor off a quay of the port of Canton, it fired a salute with cannon and displayed flags from the masts. It had never before occurred to the Chinese that in some part of the earth a demonstration of war implements could be also an expression of respect or courteous recognition. To them it had always been a gesture of defiance. To make the matter worse, it happened that the place where the Portuguese used their cannon was the section of the port where the use of arms was most strictly forbidden. The sudden roar of cannon caused therefore consternation among the population. Another misunderstanding arose from the contents of the letters to the Emperor. The sealed one which came directly from the Portuguese King Dom Manoel of course addressed the Emperor as his equal. The other was prepared in China by interpreters under the instruction of Fernão Peres who, eager to see that the Portuguese embassy meet with a warm reception by the Chinese Court, naturally desired that it be written in conformity with Chinese custom which demanded submission on the part of the foreigners. It was this difference in language which aroused the suspicion of the Chinese Court¹. We are not informed as to who

¹ The statement of Christovão Vieyra about the case is as follows: Em a çidade de Pinquim foy dentro nas casas do Rey aberta a carta del Rey nosso Sñor e foy nella achado ao Reues do que os lingoas escreuerão pareceo lhe a todos que enganosa^{te} emtramos na terra da China pera lhe ver a terra que era caso de engano a deferença das cartas foy escrita a carta ao Rey....

forão os lingoas pergūtados porq̄ fizerão carta falsa e não conforme a del Rey Nosso Sr diserão que as fizerão ao custume da China que a

had explained to the Court the letter of the Portuguese King. But in all probability the said interpreters had to do it. If this was the case, we are somewhat surprised at the unexpected honesty of these men who, knowing the Chinese custom, could have interpreted the language in the letter in a way more acceptable to the Chinese.

Misunderstandings of this kind, disagreeable as they were, could be removed with adequate explanations. By far the most important cause of the clashes was the flat refusal by some Portuguese to comply with the law of the land, and they behaved in such a way that they were not unjustifiably characterized as "robbers". As we have seen, they refused to pay customs duty, maltreated the Chinese officials who went on board their ships to collect such duty, would not allow the merchants from other countries to sell their goods before they sold their own, kidnapped children, etc. A Portuguese captain, Diogo Calvo, who was expected from China in 1521, wrote briefly several years later regarding the conduct of his fellow countrymen in China as follows: "They were not willing to obey the orders of the King of China, and wished to wage war in China, and to kill and plunder the country where much evil was done."¹

Perhaps no statement made on the cause of the Sino-Portuguese clashes is clearer than that contained in a manuscript report in which is embodied a succinct historical relation of the principal European embassies to China, now preserved among the Wellesley papers in the M.S. department of the British Museum, although we must admit that there is some inaccuracy in the details given in the report. It gives first an account of the good relations between the Chinese and the Portuguese at the outset, and then, explaining how these relations which could otherwise have become more amicable and permanent were shattered, it states:

"This commander [Simão Peres] treated the Chinese in the same manner as the Portuguese had for some time treated all the people of Asia. He built a fort, without permission, on the island of Taman²

carta del Rey nosso Sr vinha çerrada e asellada que se não podia leer nem abrir que auia de ser dada a el Rey em sua mão que eramos de longe terra e que não sabiamos o costume da China que era grande que que ao diante o saberiamos que elles não tinham culpa pois que fizeram a carta ao costume.... Vide ff 104v—105.

¹ The text is published in the *Indian Antiquary* 30, p. 435. The original is preserved in the Torre do Tombo in Lisbon (*Corpo Chronologico*, part one, maço 35, doc. 78).

² i. e. Tunmên.

from whence he took opportunities of pillaging and extorting money from all the ships bound from or to the ports of China. He carried off young girls from the coast, he seized upon the Chinese, and made slaves of them; he gave himself up to the most licentious acts of piracy, and the most shameful dissoluteness. The sailors and soldiers under his command followed his example."¹

Of course we must remember that the moral standard of the time regarding trade and particularly international trade was quite different from that which we have nowadays. With closer commercial contacts among the nations, the moral standard for such contacts has developed to a higher plane. But just because of this, we are apt to forget that our ancestors had an entirely different criterion for what is right and wrong, and that it changed from time to time. Many things which we now regard as immoral and even outrageous, were considered a matter of course. For instance, the confiscation of the cargo and the enslaving of the crew of a foreign ship which had been compelled to take shelter in a port other than its destination, or had been driven into it by a storm, were common practices vaguely justified on the ground that heaven had wished it to be a gift to the natives or a punishment to the unfortunate victims. Therefore it would be unfair for us to judge the behavior of the Portuguese according to our moral standard.

But merely taking into consideration the moral criterion of their time, we still have much difficulty in understanding the Portuguese attitude and conduct. They regarded trade and piracy as almost identical: a conception which was certainly not shared by most of the Asiatic and European peoples. A perusal of the valuable source book, *A Description of the Coasts of East Africa and Malabar*, translated from a Portuguese MS. copy of c. 1514², we find that the piracies of his countrymen are told by Duarte Barbosa without any reticence, apparently without consciousness of their criminality, for no attempt is made to justify them, and the pretext that such and such an independent state or city refused to submit itself on being summoned to do so by the Portuguese, seems to have been thought all sufficient for laying waste and destroying it. What actually accounts for this matter-of-course attitude of the Portu-

¹ Add. MS. 13,875, fol. 24, "Report of Embassies to China, presented to the British Museum by the Representatives of the Marquess Wellesley".

² London, Hakluyt Society, 1866.

guese? The answer must be largely sought in the Portuguese conception of their relationships to the countries they visited. The Portuguese believed they had come to Asia to "discover"¹, and the countries in south Asia and the Far East were but their "descobrimientos"², a word that fills many of the orders and instructions of the Portuguese king, and many of the correspondences and other writings of these days. As the early Portuguese authorities, merchants and sailors looked upon the countries they had visited as the fruits of their discovery, it is but logical that they considered it their right to enjoy such fruits in whatever way they desired. This is an important cause of the unscrupulousness of the Portuguese in their dealings with the peoples of Asia.

The "Christian" attitude of the Portuguese must have been another cause. Considering themselves the vassals of God they justified themselves in whatever they did to the "heathens" of Asia. It is indeed an irony that this consciousness of being Christians led them to the breaking of not a few of the ten commandments³.

The Portuguese occupation of Malacca by force also contributed toward increasing the Chinese ill-feeling. Although China had no direct control over Malacca, it was nominally one of her vassal states. To deprive its king of his possessions without the consent of his suzerain was deemed improper by the Chinese. That is why the Chinese Court insisted that the Portuguese restored Malacca to its former ruler. It was of course futile to try to persuade the Portuguese to give up Malacca, then a commercial center in South Asia. Thus there existed a cause of friction. It, however, might not have led to serious conflicts, had the Portuguese not aroused the antagonism of the Chinese by their atrocious deeds in Canton. The exactions of the king of Malacca, and his despotism toward foreigners, had made him disliked by the Chinese Court, and hated by the Chinese merchants who had been there⁴. This well explains the fact that the Chinese Court was rather indifferent to the cause of the king of Malacca when his first envoy came to Peking to beg succour. The Chinese might have connived at the

¹ Descobrir.

² The things discovered.

³ I do not want to dwell on this point which has already been very ably discussed by J. Murdoch and I. Yamagata in their *History of Japan*. P. 48 et sq.

⁴ This can be seen from the fact that the Chinese merchants who visited Malacca offered assistance to the Portuguese who came before the port to attack it. Cf. *Supra* p. 33.

Portuguese conquest of Malacca, if the Portuguese had not turned out to be more odious to them than the deposed king.

The Portuguese came to South Asia and the Far East for trade. It was evident to them that, without first taking possession of the strategical commercial centers, they could not safeguard the security of such trade in a part of the world so remote from their homeland. Therefore conquest must go hand in hand with trade. Thanks to their superior armament and better generalship, they were able, in spite of their inferior number, to capture Goa and Malacca, the two largest South-Asiatic marts. Soon they came before Canton, the largest seaport in China. Encouraged as they were by their previous successes, their ambition to secure a permanent footing in China where much profitable trade could be carried on, was only thinly veiled. As we have seen, Fernão Peres, during his short stay in Canton, secretly sent out men to reconnoitre the city. Repeatedly the Portuguese asked permission to erect a fortress on Chinese soil. Their arbitrariness and haughtiness also betrayed their ambition. It was only after the defeat of the fleet under Martim Affonso de Mello Coutinho off the Cantonese coast in 1522 that the Portuguese gave up their hope of conquest in China. It is interesting to notice the fact that, many years after this defeat, Vieyra and Vasco, Portuguese prisoners in Canton, still pathetically described in their letters the ease with which Canton could be conquered, in order to persuade their discouraged countrymen to return there.

The Portuguese appeared in South-Asiatic waters at a very propitious time. The heyday of the Ming House had passed, nay, with weak rulers on the throne, the Empire had been on the decline for several decades, and was rapidly decaying. Her military prowess and domination in South Asia had faded away. Had the Portuguese come eighty or ninety years earlier, they would have found the situation quite different: a formidable fleet under the able eunuch general, Chêng Ho¹, was then patrolling the South-Asiatic waters, and had inspired both awe and respect in the minds of the natives. Any contemplation of conquest by the Portuguese would inevitably have led them to a struggle with the Chinese who, very likely, would have made the Portuguese enterprise in South Asia impossible for a number of years.

¹ 鄭和.

CHAPTER IV.

TRADE OR NO TRADE.

TRADE UNDER COVER.

The thirty years following the expulsion of the Portuguese and other foreigners from Canton form a very abnormal period in the commercial history of China. We find, on the one hand, an enormous amount of illegal commercial activity under the thinly veiled patronage of the Chinese gentry, and on the other, an unprecedentedly hard struggle between those who favoured the continuation of foreign trade and those who advocated a closed-door policy.

Although the foreigners could no longer come to Canton after 1522, the Cantonese traders could still, as long as they dared, go to Patani, Malacca, Siam and a few other ports in the South Seas. The Portuguese could thus continue to obtain Chinese merchandise, and for exchange they brought from other parts of India goods which the Chinese wanted. For many years trade was carried on in this way. But this was naturally far from being satisfactory to the Portuguese, because they could not make as much profit out of the transactions as they had been able to do in Canton.

There was another and more important way of trading with China. Besides Canton China had three other sea-ports, these were Changchow¹, Ch'üanchow and Ningpo. The last two had been important entrepôts of China for centuries. Ningpo had been the principal port for trade with Japan until the middle of the 16th century when pirates became rampant, while Ch'üanchow had been a renowned international mart for centuries². Now the foreigners, disappointed in Canton, turned to Ch'üanchow and Changchow in the province of Fukien for trade, and later carried it as far as Ningpo in the province of Chêkiang and Nanking. As

¹ 漳州.

² See *supra* pp. 12, 25 and Ming Shih Ch. 75 p. 8*b* and Ch. 81 p. 9*b*.

the trade was illegal, much of the business was transacted on the islands off the coast¹. The gentry² not only encouraged the smugglers but often pulled strings, while the magistrates connived at what was going on³.

The smuggling revealed the necessity of foreign trade as well as the inefficiency and the impotence of the mandarin state. An enormous number of the inhabitants of the coast depended upon foreign commerce to eke out their existence. To them a discontinuation of such commerce meant privation or even starvation. Therefore many of them chose to transgress the prohibition law rather than die of hunger⁴. But they would not have become so dangerous, had they not been encouraged and backed up by the Chinese gentry. This gentry constituted a bourgeoisie in the coastal towns. Their wealth gave them considerable power and influence. Many of them had become wealthy through foreign trade, and were therefore very hostile to the prohibition law. In the face of this situation, the imperial government with its inherited impotence was bound to fail. The higher mandarins, fearing lest they should antagonize the powerful gentry, were reluctant to enforce the law more than was necessary to satisfy the ill-informed Court. The meagrely paid mandarins⁵ of the lower ranks were even less eager to offend the gentry. They knew very well too that they had much to lose by attempting to baffle them and had much to gain in the form of gifts and bribes by closing their eyes to the smuggling.

The Portuguese did not fall behind others in the smuggling. Most of them went to Ch'üanchow and Changchow⁶. Others went to

¹ Ku, T'ien-hsia Chün-kuo etc., Ch. 120 p. 4a. Cf. also Castanheda, Liv. 8, Cap. 66 p. 164; Correa Tom. 3 p. 487; Decada 1, Liv. 9, Cap. 1 pp. 288 et sq.

² 勢豪 or 勢家. For 勢豪 see Yen Ts'ung, Ch'u Yü Chou Tzū Lu, Ch. 8, p. 11a.

³ Ming Shih Ch. 205 p. 1a-b.

⁴ Cf. a memorial to the throne from the Supervising Censor, Fu Yüan-ch'ü (給事中傅元初) to be found in the Ch'ung-tsuan Fu-chien T'ung-chih (重纂福建通志) Ch. 87 p. 14a-15a.

⁵ For the emolument of the mandarins of all ranks, see Ming Shih Ch. 82 p. 6 et sq.

⁶ Both of them seem to have been indifferently called Chincheo by the Portuguese.

Ningpo, or as a Portuguese historian tells us¹, were "induced" to go there by Chinese merchants. But well aware of their unpopularity in China², they did not give themselves out as Portuguese or rather as Feringis, they disguised themselves as Siamese or Malay traders, and sailed with these people on board their ships³. It is thus interesting to note that these merchants whom the Portuguese, eager to monopolise South-Asiatic trade, had tried to discourage in their commercial pursuit, became, for some years at least, their benefactors.

The offences of the Portuguese were neither forgotten nor forgiven too soon by the Chinese. In 1530 when Canton was reopened for trade — we shall deal with this elsewhere — the Portuguese were singled out for exclusion from the port. Undaunted they began to send their own ships to China and continued to carry on trade under cover. In 1535 they even sent a junk from Patani to China to find out whether the Chinese authorities were now willing to permit them to come to China for trade⁴. But they had still to wait. As late as 1542, according to Couto⁵, the great Portuguese historian, the imperial edict "That the men with beards and large eyes should no more be permitted in his realm", written in large letters of gold, and posted up on the gates of the city of Canton, was still in full force. In the same year, a junk belonging to three Portuguese partners, Antonio da Mota, Francisco Zeimoto and Antonio Peixoto, — loaded with hides and other commodities, passed the port of Canton without being able to enter. It went to Ch'üanchow where they transacted their business at sea with the connivance of the mandarins⁶.

It is worthy of note that the prohibition law was more vigorously enforced in the province of Canton than in those of Fukien and Chêkiang. The result was more smuggling than otherwise there

¹ Fr. Gaspar da Cruz, *Tractado da China*, Cap. 23, or in *Purchas, Pilgrimes*, vol. 11 pp. 542-543.

² Fr. Gaspar da Cruz says (*Tractado*, Cap. 23, cf. also *Purchas, Pilgrimes*, vol. 11 p. 541) that the Chinese would not allow the Portuguese in the country, and through hatred and abhorrence, called them "fâcui". Fâcui or 番鬼 fan-kuei means "foreign devils".

³ Ku, *T'ien-hsia Chün-kuo* etc. Ch. 119, p. 14a.

⁴ Castanheda, *Liv. 8*, Cap. 89 p. 214.

⁵ *Decada 5*, *Liv. 8*, Cap. 12 pp. 262-263. About Couto's career and his work, see *Encyclopaedie-artikelen v. Dr. G. P. Rouffaer in Bijd. tot de Taal-land- en Volkenk. v. Nederl.-Ind. Dl. 86* (1930), pp. 196-201. ⁶ *Decada*, *Ibid.*

would have been in the provinces last mentioned. Changchow of the province of Fukien in particular was the favourite resort of the smugglers¹. This lack of cooperation on the part of the authorities of Fukien gave rise to loud complaints in Canton².

Smuggling continued almost unchecked in Fukien and Chêkiang until the year 1547, when the government of these two provinces under Viceroy Chu Huan³ started an energetic campaign against it.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE REOPENING OF THE PORT OF CANTON.

For several years following the closing of the port of Canton, the economic situation in that province went from bad to worse. The impoverished population found life hard. It was not long before robbers and freebooters became rampant. Passengers were molested, villages on the coast were pillaged, and even armed junks of the Chinese fleet were captured or destroyed. The provincial government was helpless and had at last recourse to a time-honoured method: instead of meting out to the pirates the punishment they deserved, it tried to pacify them by giving them arable land on the coast. After that the pirates were even entrusted, with the task of maintaining order at sea⁴.

Meanwhile the provincial treasury was facing a more and more serious financial problem. As the customs dues which had been one of the most important items of the revenue of the province ceased to be forthcoming, the government of Canton suffered from a deficit. The administrative machine was partially paralysed, while the civil servants and the military officers were discontented on account of arrears in salary⁵. Moreover, the costly military operations against the rebels in Kwang-si province were crippled, because Canton failed to give the steady support which was expected of her⁶.

From all quarters there was such a clamour for the reopening of the port that the Governor and the Provincial Treasurer petitioned

¹ Ku, T'ien-hsia Chün-kuo etc., Ch. 120 p. 4a-b; also Yen, Ch'u Yü Chou Tzŭ Lu, Ch. 9 p. 10a-b.

² Ibid. ³ See *infra* p. 81 et sq. ⁴ Vieyra, f. 118r-v.

⁵ Before the port of Canton was closed, they used to have their pay in the form of imported merchandise which the government had received as customs duty from the traders. Cf. Ku, T'ien-hsia Chün-kuo etc. Ch. 120, p. 5a. ⁶ Ibid. p. 4a-b.

the throne to revoke the previous edict that foreign trade should be discontinued¹. Their petition was not granted on account of the strong opposition of the Supervising Censor, Wang Hsi-wên². Like many other high officials of the Court, Wang was doctrinarian. He ignored the realities of the local situation. He contended that to restore foreign commerce would merely be to invite a repetition of the trouble previous to 1522. Envoys from the vassal states, however, according to Wang, might be permitted to come to bring tribute provided they could prove that they had done so before. But even in this case, they should be restricted to one ship at a time with no more than a hundred persons on board; the merchandise which they might bring with the tributes would be exempted from customs dues but should be sold to the provincial government only; and the foreigners should not have any private intercourse with the people³.

This view of the Court failed, as was expected, to satisfy the government at Canton which more and more realized the urgency of the situation and the necessity of resuming foreign trade. In 1530, Viceroy Lin Fu⁴, who was at the same time President of the Censorate⁵, petitioned again. He pointed out that the closing of the port of Canton to foreigners not only was in itself undesirable as it had impoverished the province, but was inconsistent with the established principles and practice of the past, and that it was absurd to ban a profitable trade solely because of the misconduct of the subjects of one nation who could be debarred. He saw four chief advantages in lifting the ban: first, the imperial household would have for its own consumption a sufficient amount of foreign products⁶, for

¹ Yin Kuang-jên (印光任) and Chang Ju-lin (張汝霖), Ao-mên Chi-lüeh (澳門記畧), Ch. 2 p. 21b. We are unable to say with certainty in which year petition was presented. It was in any case before 1530.

² 給事中王希文.

³ The text of Wang's memorial can be found in the Ao-mên Chi-lüeh, Ch. 2 pp. 21a-22a.

⁴ 林富 A native of P'u-t'ien (莆田) district of Fukien province. His biography can be found in the Ch'ung-tsun Fu-chien T'ung-chih, Ch. 119 pp. 43a-46a and in Kwangtung T'ung-chih (廣東通志) Ch. 242 pp. 20a-21a. ⁵ 都御史.

⁶ e.g. spice. The demand of the Court for spices must have been quite considerable, for the ground which Wu T'ing-chü gave for his permitting foreign ships to come to Canton at any time they chose was that "he needed spices to be sent to the Court". Vide Supra p. 51.

the foreigners must pay, besides their tribute-goods, customs dues in kind; secondly, the expenses of the military operations in the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwang-si¹, which took place annually and had drained the provincial treasury of Canton, could be met with a portion of the revenue from customs dues; thirdly, with an additional income of several tens of thousands of taels per month which the provincial government of Canton used to enjoy from the customs, Canton could easily sustain the costs of her own administration as well as that of Kwang-si which was dependent upon her²; and finally, the now impoverished population would again be better off. Against the assertion that there would be grave dangers in resuming foreign trade, he argued that, with the exception of the Feringis, the foreigners had been peace loving and compliant as historical records could show. While urging the reopening of the port of Canton, he also mentioned the importance in that event, of guarding the Cantonese coast with increased vigilance. Besides, he proposed that the Feringis should in no case be permitted to return with other foreigners³.

Not his argument alone but his influence and prestige as well made him victorious in the fight. The opposition, strong as it was, had to give in. His petition was granted, and the door of Canton was thrown open again to foreign trade.

Although officially debarred from visiting Canton the Portuguese did not fail to derive some profit from the trade there. But they had to do so in a roundabout way. They had to remain in the offing or on some islands off the coast. From there they made use of traders of other nationalities as their agents to carry on trade in Canton. In this way they even managed to keep in touch with the Portuguese captives in Canton who were still hoping for the deliverance which never came. In his letter written in October, 1536, from

¹ (Kwangtung) and Kwang-si formed the administrative area Liang-yüeh (兩粵) under the same Viceroy but they remained two distinct provinces, each of them having its own administrative staff.

² Kwang-si was a poorer province.

³ The text of Viceroy Lin's petition is to be found in Yen Ts'ung, Ch'u Yü Chou Tzŭ Lu, Ch. 9 pp. 10a-11a and Ku, T'ien-hsia Chün-kuo etc. Ch. 120 p. 4. Ming Shih makes a mistake (see Ch. 325 p. 9a) in saying that the Viceroy requested the Central Government to permit the Portuguese to return. The Fu-chien T'ung-chih (loc. cit.), following the Ming Shih, makes the same mistake.

Canton, the prisoner, Vasco Calvo, refers¹ to a letter he had received from the person he was addressing who was evidently off the island Hainan². The mandarins were naturally not unaware of some activities of the Portuguese whose timidity curiously contrasting with their recklessness in former times must have amused them. But so long as they did not come near the port, their business transactions were connived at.

The Portuguese, however, were not satisfied to remain indefinitely in the offing, for they lost a considerable portion of their profits to the agents they employed. Even if there were Chinese merchants who were willing to come on board the Portuguese ships to deal with them directly, they did so only with the expectation of a much more advantageous purchase than that which they could make from the other foreigners in the port. Moreover, it was very risky for the Portuguese to remain at sea, not so much because of the pirates who were not eager to attack with their small junks these huge, well-armed, ocean-going ships³, as because of the storms. It is thus quite natural that they hoped very much that they would soon be permitted to go ashore. As the mandarins winked at what they were doing, their boldness increased. They drew nearer and nearer the shore each year, until at last, probably through bribery, they landed. This must have taken place in the course of the fifth decade of the sixteenth century. The law which forbade the Portuguese to return to Canton was thus virtually nullified although it was not officially repealed until some years later.

THE INCREDIBILITY OF PINTO'S STORY OF THE MASSACRE OF PORTUGUESE AT NINGPO IN 1542.

We have said elsewhere that after their expulsion from Canton some of the Portuguese went to the vicinity of Ningpo as smugglers. Emboldened by success, they began to winter at some islands adjacent to Ningpo and extended their commercial activities as far as Nanking. The Chinese and the Portuguese began to quarrel, which led to robbery and murder on both sides. The situation at last became so serious that it came to the notice of the higher man-

¹ f. 124.

² f. 128.

³ Cf. Lan Ting-yüan (藍鼎元), *Lun Nan-yang Shih-i Shu* (論南洋事宜書), a text of which is in Ch'ung Tsuan Fu-chien T'ung-chih, Ch. 87 pp. 18a-20a.

darins and even of the Emperor. The latter gave order that a fleet should be prepared in the province of Fukien to clear the coast of Portuguese smugglers as well as of the undesirable Chinese. This fleet, being unable to make Ningpo on account of foul wind, proceeded to Ch'üanchow and began to apply itself diligently to the task of ridding that section of the coast of "robbers"¹. All this took place in the last years of the fifth decade of the 15th century. Although we shall be able to give, in due course², an account of some of the activities of the fleet, we are left in the dark about the fate of the smugglers near Ningpo. Did they leave the islands before the Chinese fleet could arrive to eject them?

While the reliable Chinese and Portuguese sources furnish us with but very scanty information about the Portuguese and other aliens in, or more probably near, Ningpo, Fernão Mendez Pinto, a Portuguese writer and adventurer, gives us however, in his *Peregrinação*³, a vivid description of a prosperous Portuguese settlement in Ningpo and then a sensational account of its tragic disappearance in 1542. As the narrative of Pinto was inserted as a statement of historical facts by Faria y Sousa in his *Asia Portuguesa*⁴, and has been presented by many modern writers as authentic⁵, it seems to me necessary to give it here and then to discuss its credibility. It is as follows:

The port of Liampo (i.e. Ningpo)⁶ consisted of two islands⁷

¹ Fr. Gaspar da Cruz, *Tractado da China*, Cap. 23 et sq., or *Purchas, Pilgrimes*, Vol. 11 p. 542 et sq. ² Vide infra p. 82.

³ Caps. 66, 221. This book was published in 1614, more than fifty years after its alleged author's return from the East, and about thirty years after his death. It is quite doubtful, if the whole book was written by Fernão Mendez Pinto. Did the Jesuits not have a hand in it for the purpose of glorifying Xavier as R. S. Whiteway believes? ⁴ Tom. 2, part. 1, Cap. 8 pp. 88-89.

⁵ Int. Al. the Viscount de Santarem's *Memoria sobre o Estabelecimento de Macau*, p. 14; A. Ljungstedt, *An Historical Sketch of the Portuguese Settlement in China*, pp. 2-9; Danvers, *Portuguese in India*, Vol. I pp. 457, 486; Denny, *Treaty Ports of China and Japan*, p. 329; Wells Williams, *Middle Kingdom*, Vol. II, p. 428; R. K. Douglas, *China*, p. 48; C. A. Montalto de Jesus, *Historic Macao*, p. 13-14 (I have been informed that a second edition of Montalto's work has appeared, but regret that I have inquired for it without success. I am ready to apologize if he has revised his work in this regard); A. F. de Loureiro, *O Porto de Macau*, pp. 24-25; etc.

⁶ *Decada 1 Liv. 9, Cap. 1 p. 288.*

⁷ Pinto must have heard of Shuang-hsü (雙嶼) or "the Twin Islands" near Ningpo. Foreigners used to come to these islands for trade with the Chinese. See Ming Shih, Ch. 205 p. 1a.

facing each other and about two leagues from each other. By 1540 or 1541 the Portuguese had already built more than 1000 houses there. Some of them cost more than three or four thousand ducats. It was a colony of about three thousand men of whom 1200 were Portuguese while the rest were Christians of various nationalities. The traffic of the Portuguese was over three million cruzados. The greater part of this trade was done in ingots of silver from Japan with which the Portuguese in Liampo had already had important commercial relations for the previous two years.

The colony had its own government which consisted of an auditor, several judges, some "vreadores" ¹, a superintendent of the deceased and orphans, some commissaries of police, a clerk of the town hall, a number of ward-inspectors, lessees and all other kinds of offices which there could be in a republic. There were four notaries whose duty was to draft deeds, contracts etc., besides six others of the registry; each of these positions was worth three thousand ducats, but there were other positions which were worth much more. There were two hospitals and a House of Grace in which more than 30,000 ducats were distributed each year. The rent of the town-hall alone amounted to 6000 ducats a year. It was therefore often said that this colony was the richest and the best peopled of all the Portuguese colonies in the East. As to extent it had no equal in the whole of Asia. Therefore when the clerks or secretaries wrote a document, they usually put down these words "this very noble and always loyal town of Liampo for our Lord the King".

This prosperous colony was doomed to destruction chiefly on account of the misconduct of one man. Lançarote Pereyra, a native of Põte de Lima, was an honourable man of a good family. It was said that he had lent several thousand ducats to some untrustworthy Chinese who broke their word and never paid anything back. They disappeared, and Lançarote Pereyra had not had any news of them since. In order to make good his loss, he gathered fifteen or twenty of the most wicked Portuguese desperadoes, and under cover of night they fell upon a village which was situated two leagues from Liampo. They plundered ten or a dozen houses of farmers, took possession of their wives and children, and unjustifiably killed thirteen persons. The violence aroused great fear amongst the

¹ This word must be a slip of the pen for "vereadores" which means "aldermen".

population in the surrounding country. All the inhabitants went to complain to a highly placed mandarin. The mandarin reported the affair to the Viceroy, and requested him on behalf of the people to take strong measures against the Portuguese whose heinous conduct elsewhere had already aroused much ill-feeling. Without any delay, the Viceroy gave order to a Haitao, who had under his command a fleet of three hundred junks and eighty row-boats whose combined crews were 60,000 strong, to hold himself ready for action. After seventeen days the preparations were completed, and the fleet pounced upon the doomed Portuguese colony. The destruction was so horrible that it was beyond his power to depict it, according to the narrator, Mendez Pinto himself. Although the punishment lasted less than five hours, there was left in Liampo nothing to which one could give a name. These cruel enemies demolished and burnt everything they could find and put to death 12,000¹, christians among whom there were 800 Portuguese who were burnt alive in thirty-five ships and forty-two junks. In this total ruin the property destroyed was estimated at two and a half million gold cruzados: half of this amount was in ingots, pepper, sandal wood, (oil of) cloves, mace and walnuts, while the other half was in other kinds of merchandise. All this took place in 1542².

Before we can set any historical value on this narrative of Mendez Pinto, we must consider the nature of his work as a whole. After a perusal of his work of 226 chapters, any intelligent reader can tell that it is but a long tale of adventures. Having been in Asia for a number of years he took for his subject the adventures of the Portuguese in Asia because they appealed most to the imagination of his fellow countrymen at home. Primarily interested in telling fascinating stories, he did not concern himself about what actually took place. Much of what he says is in flat contradiction to well-established facts³ while much more of it can not be checked. Many of the queer names of persons and places which can not be identified probably existed only in the mind of the author. It is thus evident that we can not confidently draw our material from such a source.

Furthermore, we have not found in any Chinese records or annals,

¹ 1,200 ?.

² This whole narrative is in *Peregrinação* (Porto, 1931 ed.), Cap. 221 pp. 122—124.

³ Cf. *The Ind. Antiq.*, 30 pp. 439—441.

or in any serious Portuguese sources a single statement of or even an allusion to the existence of any important colony of foreigners in or about 1542 in Ningpo, and still less a general slaughter of them. It is quite unbelievable that the Chinese historians or annalists could have failed to record a carnage of such magnitude that 12,000 souls perished and an enormous quantity of wealth was destroyed.

Although we can not accept the story of Pinto as authentic, we think it highly probable that the activities of the Portuguese in the neighbourhood of Ningpo and the known fact that quarrels arose between them and the Chinese were the basis of his narrative. The story-tellers often begin with where the history ends. And here is the danger for the students of history. The fact that we are entirely left in the dark about the fate of the Portuguese near Ningpo¹ makes the tale of Pinto the more attractive as it fills a gap. Pinto's sensational account of the career of a Portuguese freebooter of the name Antonio de Faria² is also no more than an interesting fiction,

¹ See supra p. 76.

² To satisfy the possible curiosity of my reader, I sum up this story of Pinto as follows: Antonio de Faria who was probably a relative of Pedro de Faria, Governor of Malacca, was sent by him in 1540 to Patani to ratify a treaty of friendship between the Portuguese and the Raja. He took with him a large consignment of private merchandise. Since he could not sell it in Patani with as much profit as he had hoped to make, he sent Pinto with it to Ligor, a little state further north on the eastern shores of the Malay Peninsula. Here Pinto, while lying outside the bar, was set upon by native pirates. He was robbed of his ship and cargo, and only saved himself by swimming ashore with such of his European companions as had survived the fight. He then made his way to Patani and reported what had befallen him to Antonia de Faria, adding the information, which avowedly rested upon the merest guesswork, that the pirate who had used him so evilly was one moor of the name Coja Acem. Upon hearing this, Antonio de Faria decided to put to sea in search of this marauder.

Accordingly, on the ninth of May, 1540, Antonio de Faria sailed with his men from Patani and steered toward the Kingdom of Champa, hoping by means of some good booty to furnish himself with such things as he wanted. After roving in many regions, most of the names of which can not be identified, this adventurer crossed over to Hainan, the big island facing Kwangtung, stayed there for some time and then returned to the mainland. Later he spent some months cruising about the coasts of Indo-China with the intention of wintering in Siam, but unfortunately he met with utter shipwreck somewhere to the south of Quangiparu (? !). The spot where de Faria and his followers were cast ashore was barren and uninhabited, and for some days the survivors of the wreck — fifty souls, of whom twenty-three were Portuguese, out of a company some five hundred and

despite its having been much used by scholars for their own works. Most of the names of places in his story defy identification. We may, however, regard de Faria as a representative type of some Portuguese adventurers who vagabondized in Asiatic waters.

In spite of what has been said above about Pinto, we should have gone too far by saying that the whole of *Peregrinação* is a pure fiction. As we shall see, in his story about the demolition, by the Chinese, of a Portuguese colony in Ch'üanchow, some historical truth could be found. The learned world would be grateful if some competent scholars would undertake to ascertain how much truth there is in this long tale of adventures.

thirty strong — wandered about in a condition of great distress. A Chinese vessel, however, soon put in there to water. While her crew were ashore, de Faria succeeded in surprising her, and sailed away in triumph, leaving the dispossessed owners marooned upon an inhospitable coast.

They next captured some unfortunate fisher-folk on a little island called Quintoo(?) to serve as pilots. After touching at several islands and ports, and committing various acts of piracy, they made their way to Ch'üanchow. Thereafter de Faria fell in with the pirate of whom he had so long been in search. He defeated and killed him, and took a rich spoil. Then he went to a place called Nanday(?) in the beginning of 1542. Having plundered and burnt the town, he sailed to Pulo Hindor(?). After another engagement with another powerful group of pirates he went to Ningpo where a very splendid reception was accorded him by his enthusiastic countrymen. The sea-rover was conducted in state to the church where public thanks were offered to the Almighty for the victorious crusade against the infidels.

De Faria set out about the middle of May with two galiots in which were 146 men, of whom fifty-two were Portuguese. After a tedious voyage of two months and a half, he reached Nanking. From Nanking he proceeded to an island called Calemply(?) where were the ancient monuments of the Kings of China; and in these monuments there was considerable treasure which he desired to take. Calemply was soon afterwards reached. In the evening after his arrival de Faria landed with sixty men and began to rob the tombs of bars of silver, notwithstanding the remonstrance of an old man he met there. Having ascertained the contents of the several chapels, de Faria returned to his ships, intending to go again the next day and plunder them all. Before the morrow, however, an alarm had been given from the island. Knowing that relief was immediately expected to protect the treasures, de Faria at once set sail. But unhappily he encountered, on the 5th of August, a violent storm, in which his vessel foundered and went down with all hands. The other vessel was also lost, but fourteen of the crew managed to save themselves. (See Fernão Mendez Pinto, *Peregrinação*, Caps. 38-80).

THE FAILURE OF VICEROY CHU HUAN AND THE TRIUMPH
OF THE PROTAGONISTS OF FOREIGN TRADE.

We were informed at the beginning of this chapter that the Portuguese, after being expelled from Canton in 1522, sought new markets on the eastern coast of China and in particular the ports Ch'üanchow and Changchow in the province of Fukien. It is quite natural that, being themselves smugglers, they soon fraternized with their Chinese counterparts who, as we know already, were encouraged and backed up by the gentry in their illegal pursuits. They were also on friendly terms with the gangs of vagabonds and outlaws of the coast¹ whose piratical acts were not regarded as frightful crimes by the Portuguese themselves. It is thus quite conceivable that in case of necessity or of danger all of them would band together, and create an even greater problem for the government.

A new regime set in, in 1547 when Chu Huan² was appointed Viceroy of the two coastal provinces, Fukien and Chêkiang. Being a conscientious and straightforward man, he could not suffer the smugglers and their powerful allies behind the scene to flout so flagrantly the law of the state. Moreover the smugglers were to him but robber-bands whose activities portended disasters for the country. He was determined at all costs to curb the gentry, to stop illicit trade and to clear the coastal waters of "robbers". The time seemed to be propitious for the new Viceroy to act, because the quarrel between the Portuguese and the Chinese near Ningpo, the killing and the increased disorder had called the attention of the Central Government to the seriousness of the situation and the Court had even given orders to the provincial authorities to prepare a fleet to clear the Chinese coast of smugglers and undesirable Chinese³.

The first step that Chu took was to proclaim a law by which the Chinese were henceforth strictly forbidden to have any intercourse with foreigners⁴. This action of the Viceroy was to vindicate the validity of the standing order of the Court interdicting foreign trade as well as to warn those who were engaged in smuggling.

He soon turned into bitter and uncompromising enemies the gentry who had been receiving the lion's share of the profits from smuggling and who would naturally do their utmost to

¹ Ming Shih Ch. 205 p. 1a and Ch. 325 p. 9b.

² 朱統. His biography is in Ming Shih Ch. 205 pp. 1a-2a.

³ See supra pp. 75-76.

⁴ Ming Shih Ch. 325 p. 9b.

undermine the influence of the Viceroy and his supporters and even to plot for their overthrow. Fully aware of this, of course, Chu was unflinching in his decision to do what he considered to be for the best interest of the nation.

In 1548 the Portuguese smugglers in the neighbourhood of Ch'üan-chow and Changchow were blockaded. Becoming desperate they organised themselves and attacked Yüeh-chiang¹ and Wu-hsü² of the prefecture of Changchow, but were forced to retreat by the Hai-tao K'o Ch'iao³. If at last the smugglers were able to dispatch their business, it was only through making gifts to the officers of the Chinese fleet who, learning that the Portuguese intended to depart, sent a secret message by night, offering, in consideration of a present, to send them some goods⁴.

In the following year, the fleet watched the coast and all forts and entrances to the mainland with increased vigilance. If the fleet was unable to stop completely the intercourse between the Chinese and the Portuguese who hid themselves on the multitudinous isles off the coast, it succeeded at least in preventing the Portuguese from obtaining any important quantity of merchandise and victuals, and thus put them in sore straits. As a retaliation the hard pressed Portuguese, assisted by their Chinese allies, raided the district of Chao-an⁵ in the province of Fukien, but they were totally routed at Tsou-ma-ch'i⁶ and ninety-six of their number including many Chinese were taken prisoner. Seeing that nothing more could be done, they decided to quit their China trade. They stored up their unsold goods in two junks belonging to some expatriated Chinese and left thirty of their fellow countrymen to guard them and to barter the goods whenever a more favourable occasion should arise. Then they departed for Malacca and India. The Captain of the Chinese fleet, having learned of the rich cargoes from some merchants on shore, swooped down upon the two junks, and partly by stratagen, partly by force, succeeded in capturing them after having killed several of the Portuguese company and wounded others.

In punishing the criminals the stern Viceroy showed no leniency. A great number were cruelly and probably indiscriminately executed, and their property was confiscated; possibly the lion's share went into the pockets of some greedy mandarins. As the Portuguese were

¹ 月港.² 浯嶼.³ 柯喬.⁴ Purchas, Pilgrimes, vol. 11 p. 548.⁵ 詔安.⁶ 走馬溪.

said to have not only robbed and pillaged, but arrogated to themselves some titles¹, four of them were dressed up, cooped in cages and ironically labeled "the Kings of Malacca", and were sent about through several towns till they came to where the Hai-tao was.

Meanwhile the gentry's fear of the Viceroy increased. And they were highly incensed when the intrepid Viceroy in one of his memorials to the throne frankly admitted that: "It is easy to exterminate robbers from foreign lands, but it is difficult to get rid of those from our own country; it is comparatively easier to extirpate the robbers of our coast, but it is indeed difficult to eliminate those who belong to the 'robe-and-cap class'² of our own country."³ Naturally the gentry regarded these words as an open accusation of their crime as well as a deliberate insult.

Although vindicating his policy in his provinces, Viceroy Chu was rapidly losing the favour and the confidence of the Court as the gentry were gaining the ear of the high officials. The Board of Civil Service⁴ acting on the request of two censors, memorialized the throne to curb the power of the Viceroy. Against this move Chu bitterly protested, denouncing it as a device of his enemy to jeopardize his good work.

It was difficult for him to maintain his position against a prejudiced Court, the more so because his rashness made some of his actions not quite defensible. When his own report of the execution, by his order, of the ninety-six men captured at Tsou-ma-ch'i, accompanied by a plaint which further wounded the gentry, came to the Court, the Censor, Ch'ên Chiu-tê⁵, impeached him for having acted on his own authority in executing men without duly ascertaining the gravity of their offence. Thereupon the Emperor dispatched a high official of the Court, the Supervising Censor Tu Ju-chên⁶, attended by some other important officials to investigate the affair. As a result of this inquisition, many of the charges against the Portuguese were declared to be without basis. Most of them were subsequently released from captivity. Viceroy Chu and many of his subordinates were pronounced guilty of unjustifiably executing "merchants" and of concealing the truth from the Court.

¹ Ming Shih Ch. 325 p. 9b. Later the special Imperial Commissioner for the investigation declared these charges unfounded.

² 衣冠之盜.

³ Ming Shih, Ch. 205 p. 1b.

⁴ 吏部.

⁵ 陳九德.

⁶ 給事中杜汝禎.

After the findings of the investigators had been presented to the throne, an imperial decree meted out punishment to the offenders according to the gravity of their cases. The Viceroy, however, had already committed suicide by taking poison¹, in order to avoid more ignominious punishment. The Hai-tao, K'o Chiao, and the Commander of the army of the province, Lu T'ang² were both put to death. Many officials of Fukien and Chêkiang were banished and many others were discharged from public service.

The Portuguese were provided with necessaries and conveyed to Hangchow³. They were later dispersed by twos or threes through various parts of the country in order to prevent them from forming anew dangerous groups. When their countrymen were permitted once more to come to trade in Canton⁴, some of these Portuguese, with the assistance of the Chinese, went there to join them⁵.

With the downfall of Viceroy Chu Huan and his supporters, the protagonists of commercial intercourse with foreigners triumphed. Some opposition continued to exist, but it was never strong enough to change the Government's trade policy until the overthrow of the Ming dynasty in 1644. What we shall see hereafter is the miraculous rise of a hitherto obscure village, Macao, on the coast of the province of Canton, to the position of the most important entrepôt of the Far East. Upon Macao China's foreign trade concentrated at the expense of other ports. And with the rise of Macao China's commercial relations with other nations entered upon a new phase.

We may dismiss with a few words the historically unverified yet often retold⁶ story of Fernão Mendez Pinto about the demolition

¹ Here I follow Ming Shih (Ch. 205 p. 2a). According to Fr. Gaspar da Cruz, the Viceroy, fearing lest he should be decapitated, "hung himself, saying that seeing the Heaven had made him whole, that no man should take away his head". See Purchas, *Pilgrimes*, vol. 11 p. 555.

² 都司盧鏜.

³ "Cãsi" in Portuguese. Cf. Yule, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, vol. 2 pp. 152-153.

⁴ See Chap. 5 of this book.

⁵ This section on Viceroy Chu Huan's failure is synthesis of the account given by Friar Gaspar da Cruz (cf. *Purchas, Pilgrimes*, vol. 11 pp. 542-556) and that in Ming Shih (Ch. 205 pp. 1a 2a and Ch. 325 p. 9b).

⁶ e. g. F. C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, vol. 1 pp. 486-487. A. Ljungstedt, *An Historical Sketch*, p. 5; C. A. Montalto de Jesus, *Historic Macao*, p. 14 (Cf. *supra* p. 76); A. F. de Loureiro, *O Porto de Macau*, p. 25.

of a prosperous Portuguese quarter in Ch'üanchow. The cause of the tragedy, is said to be this: the greedy and unprincipled Aires Botelho de Sousa, Superintendent of the Defunct¹, seized as part of the estate of a dead Armenian some merchandise which belonged to two Chinese traders. On its not being turned over to them, they appealed to a mandarin for redress. In order to do justice to them and to many others who had formerly complained against the Portuguese, the mandarin interdicted intercourse with these foreigners, cutting short their supply of provisions. Driven by hunger, they scoured the country-side in search of food. Soon there ensued such disorders that all the country-side rose furiously against them. Sixteen days later the Portuguese were set upon by a Chinese army which, operating in concert with a number of junks, razed the town to the ground and massacred the inhabitants. Of five hundred Portuguese only thirty escaped. This took place in 1549².

It is interesting to note something true in this story of Pinto. If we strip it of embellishments and exaggeration, its kernel is more or less this: some Portuguese actually settled down in Ch'üanchow or rather Chincheo (a name by which the Portuguese evidently meant to include both the prefectures of Ch'üanchow and Changchow), they were greedy and unprincipled, on account of this the mandarins prohibited the Chinese from having any intercourse with them, they became hungry and resorted to violence, but they were severely chastised in 1549. As all these statements agree with the facts we have established, it is not improbable that he had acquainted himself with the mishaps which had befallen his countrymen in the province of Fukien.

Pinto, whose *Peregrinação* has victimized many a careless writer of history, has been denounced by Congreve as a "liar of the first magnitude"³. He is probably not so much a liar as a big-story teller.

¹ 'provedor dos defunto' (sic!)

² *Peregrinação*, Cap. 221.

³ *Love for Love*, Act. 2, sc. 1.

CHAPTER V.

THE RISE OF MACAO.

MACAO AND LANG-PAI-KAO.

The rise of Macao is a wonder in the modern commercial history of Eastern Asia. Within the span of a few decades, this obscure fishing village, situated at the head of the Hsiang-shan promontory and the southern extremity of the estuary of the Pearl River, rose to a position which overshadowed even the port of Canton.

Curiously enough, the name Macao, so widely known in the non-Chinese-speaking world, is not a proper Chinese name for that port. A traveller is sometimes told by its inhabitants that it is but the name of a famous rock called Ma-chiao¹ or Ma-kao in Cantonese. Formerly this rock stood some distance from the peninsula, but recently some new land has been reclaimed from the sea in that part of the bay, and as a result, the rock has been annexed to the mainland and buried under ground. It was either due to misunderstanding or for the sake of convenience that the small peninsula was called after the rock. It is more generally believed, however, that Macao is but an abbreviation of A-ma-ao², or A-ma-ngao (with *ng* strongly nasalized) in Cantonese, i.e., the Bay of A-ma, a navigators' goddess³ to whom there was a temple at Macao. As A-ma-ngao was a familiar name used by Cantonese sailors to designate the port and as *a* is merely a prefix that may be omitted, it is more than probable that the Portuguese learned it from them.

The commonest Chinese name for Macao is Ao-mên⁴, i.e., the Portal of the Bay. There are two explanations as to the origin of this name. One is that there rise above the water level south of the

¹ 馬交石 meaning "Rock of mating-horse", apparently from its shape.

² 阿媽澳.

³ Often called Ma-chu-p'o (媽祖婆).

⁴ 澳門.

bay four mountains forming a portal in the shape of a cross. The other explanation is that the two mountains Nan-t'ai and Pei-t'ai¹ at Macao face each other as if they were doors of the bay². The most correct name for Macao is, however, Hao-ching-ao³ or the Bay of Hao-ching.

Although the rise of Macao did not attract attention until after 1557, the use of that port for commercial purposes dates more than two decades back. As early as the period Chêng-tê, 1506—1521, Cantonese authorities invited foreign traders to resort to a coastal place, called Tien-po⁴ for business transactions. It is southwest of the city of Canton and about 180 miles overland from it. In 1535, that is to say soon after foreign trade was resumed, the authorities, at the request of the Pei-wo, Huang Ch'ing⁵, moved the custom house to Macao, where at the outset, the government collected customs dues to the amount of 20,000 taels per annum.

This effort of the Cantonese government to look for a new place for the purpose of foreign trade is very noteworthy. It indicates an increased cautiousness on the part of the Chinese with regard to foreigners. They now saw the advisability of keeping foreign traders at a safe distance instead of allowing them to come to the port of Canton, which besides being very populous, was at the heart of a large province; any serious disturbance breaking out there would directly affect many people, and have repercussions in a large area of South China.

At that time a big island called Lang-pai-kao⁶, about 30 miles to the west of Macao and forming the southern section of the river delta, was playing a significant part in the foreign commerce of Canton⁷). Because of its geographical position it became a natural rendezvous for smugglers. It is said⁸ that in 1542, the Portuguese smugglers "occupied" this island. These were probably some of the

¹ 南臺 and 北臺.

² For all this see Ao-mên Chi-lüeh, Ch. 2, p. 1a.

³ 濠鏡澳. ⁴ 電白.

⁵ 黃慶. It is said that Huang received a bribe for making this request. Ming Shih, Ch. 325, p. 96.

⁶ 浪白灣. For a detailed description of the location of this place, see Ao-mên Chi-lüeh, Ch. 2, pp. 9b—10b and cf. map. 1.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ J. R. Morrison, Chinese Commercial Guide, p. 66.

first landings of the Portuguese on Cantonese soil after they had been prohibited from coming there. Such landings were of course illegal, and were effected only with the connivance of the mandarins. It is further stated¹ that in 1554 trade was concentrated on this island, and that in 1560, 500 or 600 Portuguese dwelt there. If this is true, Macao must have been abandoned in 1554 in favour of Lang-pai-kao, with the reasons therefore not given. In due course, we shall try to see how this might have happened.

In spite of its commercial importance at that time, the name Lang-pai-kao has fallen into oblivion in the last two centuries. A mysterious name of a place, Lampacao, found in some old Portuguese writings, has been a subject of much discussion among scholars, some of whom even questioned its existence². Even now, Lampacao is still considered "a mystery of the Far East"³. We have not the least doubt that Lang-pai-kao, or Long-pa-kao after Cantonese pronunciation, is the Portuguese Lampacao.

CONTENTIONS REGARDING THE ORIGIN OF THE PORTUGUESE SETTLEMENT AT MACAO.

The Sino-Portuguese trade was officially resumed in 1554. In that year Leonel de Souza, a native of Algarve, together with the Captain-major of Chaul made an agreement with China. According to the terms of this agreement the Portuguese were to be allowed to trade in Chinese ports on condition that they paid the customs dues⁴. The fact that the payment of customs dues was specifically stipulated was evidently due to the traditional unwillingness of the

¹ Ibid.

² E. g., *Indian Antiquary*, vol. 30 p. 441.

³ We see no reason for accepting the opinion of H. B. Morse and T. J. Eldridge (*The Journ. of the N. China Branch of the Roy. Asiatic Soc.*, vol. 52, 1921, pp. 137—138) that Lampacao, of which Morse changes c into ç, is probably "Lampienchau on the western shore of Bias Bay".

In his *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 1910, Morse identifies (p. 42) Lampacao with Lang-peh-kau. I am unable to say which place he means. If he already meant Lang-pai-kao, it is difficult to understand why he changed his mind ten year later. Moreover *pai* is never pronounced *peh* in mandarin, and I am not aware of its being pronounced *peh* in Cantonese.

⁴ Gaspar da Cruz, *Tractado da China*, cap. 23; also Purchas, *Pilgrimes*, 11, p. 541. This is the only statement about the treaty of which I am aware. But the on the whole reliable nature of the narratives of da Cruz and the subsequent events lead me to believe in the high probability of such an agreement.

Portuguese to pay such dues. This agreement opens a new period in the Sino-Portuguese commercial relations.

If Macao was really abandoned in 1554, it emerged again into the view of historians in 1557. Since that year it steadily and rapidly grew as a foreign trade center, or to be more exact, as a Sino-Portuguese trade center.

In 1557, there was already at Macao a small Portuguese colony together with some traders of other countries. How did these Portuguese come to settle there? Since the 18th century when question of the right of sovereignty over Macao came to the foreground, there has been much controversy regarding the origin of this Portuguese settlement. In defence of their rights at Macao, the Portuguese claimed that they had conquered that place at the point of the sword. In a memorandum of about 1784, Martinho de Mello e Castro, the Portuguese Minister for the Colonies, says ¹:

"The China Sea was infested by pirates and insurgents who wrought havoc with the trade and shipping, when, after due preparation, the Portuguese assailed the marauders and soon cleared the sea of the scourge, much to the relief and joy of the Chinese. The Portuguese then bore down upon Hsiang-shan, where large tracts were held by a powerful chieftain ². After staunch resistance, he was vanquished, and the island taken, by vassals of the crown of Portugal; whence it results that the sovereignty in question is founded on the right of conquest, acquired by the arms of Portugal, and at the cost of Portuguese blood. The island occupied, and Macao being best adapted for trading purposes, the city was built on that peninsula. This the Chinese could certainly not have permitted unless they fully recognised the Portuguese rights over that territory. Nor would the Portuguese have incurred the heavy outlay they did in building the city, had they not been quite sure of their right to do so independently of the laws and government of China.

¹ Apontamento e Noticias enviadas pela Secretaria do Estado de Ultramar para a Instrucção que se deve formar em Goa ao Bispo de Peking sobre os negocios relativos ao dominio de Macao addressed to Bernardo Aleixo de Lemos Faria, appointed in 1784 Governor and Captain-general of Macao. See Montalto de Jesus, *Historic Macao*; cf. also A. Ljungstedt, *Historical Sketch*.

² Ljungstedt comments on this: "The grievances that provoked the war are not mentioned, nor is it known when the hostilities began, how long they continued, nor even the particulars of its termination".

It is traditionally recorded, however, that for a better safeguard, the founders of Macao insisted upon their possession being confirmed by the Chinese emperor, who in return for the deliverance of his subjects from piratical depredation and atrocities, not only acquiesced in the request, but accorded the Portuguese many privileges and immunities"¹.

This assertive version of the Portuguese Minister, interesting as it is, is anachronistic. It shows a complete failure on his part or an unwillingness to recognize the attitude and demeanour of his countrymen at the time of their settling down at Macao. His account gives us a picture of the Europeans of a later period and not at all of the Portuguese, who returned to Kwangtung thirty years after their expulsion. Returning to that province, the Portuguese entirely abandoned any recourse to forceful methods. They substituted for them a demeanour of humility and compliance which the following pages will show. In other words, they had adopted a different policy in China, a policy of bribery and conciliation if not of obsequiousness. It is erroneous to imagine that these "vassals of the crown of Portugal" whose offences had hardly yet been forgiven and who were jubilant at a new prospect of trade in Canton, turned out to be more violent than ever; and that hardly were they allowed to come near the Chinese shore again than they began to unsheath their swords and make an ostentatious display of their spirit of conquest on Chinese territory. Granted that the vanquished were but pirates, it would have been extraordinary had the Chinese authorities not intervened especially as such arrogant conquerors, whose past records were far from being commendable, might some day become a greater menace to the security, peace and order of China than the ousted pirates.

It requires further investigation yet to know whether the Portuguese actually built a city on the peninsula. Even if they did, it does not necessarily imply that the Chinese "fully recognised the Portuguese rights over that territory", especially if this had meant sovereignty rights. No matter how modern jurists viewed the question, the Chinese conception was entirely different. They never conceived that they gave up their territorial rights when, on some justifiable grounds or other, they permitted foreigners to build up

¹ The official document is not available to me. I have used, therefore, the wording of Montalto.

defence works in their territory. Moreover, they always understood that it was their unquestioned right to demolish such works whenever they saw fit. This they actually did to the Portuguese fortifications at Macao on several occasions.

The fact that the Portuguese paid a ground rent of 500 taels¹ besides anchorage dues also indicates that they recognized Chinese territorial rights at Macao. This sum was later augmented by several additional charges. It was paid at the beginning of a year by the Procurator of the Senate, to the magistrate of the district of Hsiangshan upon the latter's presenting a discharge signed by the Imperial Treasurer at Canton².

Taking all these facts into consideration we cannot accept the statement of Martinho de Mello, which is, moreover, not supported by any historical documents of the period under observation.

The Chinese version is diametrically opposed to the Portuguese claim. Chang and Yin in their *Ao-mên Chi-lüeh* or *The Topography and History of Ao-mên*, make the following remarks about the origin of the Portuguese settlement there³:

"In the 32nd year of Chia-ching⁴ (1553), there arrived at Hao-ching some foreign vessels whose captains alleged that they had met with a storm and that the articles which they had brought as tribute had been wetted by sea-water. They desired permission to dry them on the shore of Hao-ching. Wang Po⁵, the Hai-tao, gave them the permission. Mat sheds only were raised then. But merchants, allured by the hope of gain, came imperceptibly, and constructed houses of bricks, wood and stones. Thereupon the Feringis, mixed with other foreigners, obtained admittance into Hao-ching... Thus foreigners began to settle at Macao in the time of Wang Po."

The *Ao-mên Chi-lüeh* was compiled in the years 1743—1751⁶, but based on much earlier sources. In the passage cited above it tries to show that the settlement originated through a favour granted to foreigners in 1553 when the agreement permitting Portuguese to trade again in China was not yet concluded. This simple version is, nevertheless, far too simple and unconvincing to us. The Portuguese

¹ *Ao-mên Chi-lüeh*, Ch. 2, p. 49a.

² Ljungstedt, *Historical Sketch*, p. 76. It is said that before 1572 or 1573, the ground-rent was usually remitted to the Hai-tao. See Montalto, *Historie Macao*, pp. 33—34.

³ Vol. 2, p. 22b.

⁴ 嘉靖.

⁵ 汪柏.

⁶ Cf. the authors' preface.

would not have thought of building permanent residences at Macao if they had felt that their stay there was entirely dependent on the whim of a few mandarins. The influx of Portuguese into Macao and the rapid rise of the port show that the new inhabitants had a sense of security based upon something more than a mere favour.

A third version is that of the Jesuit missionary, Alvarez Semedo, in his *Relatione della Grande Monarchia della Cina*, published in Rome, 1643. Being a man of an inquisitive mind, Semedo, during his twenty-two years residence in China, gathered much valuable and, on the whole, very accurate information about China. His work is, in our opinion, the first good work on China by a European since the time of Marco Polo. His statement about the origin of the Portuguese settlement at Macao if it was not a result of his own research, doubtless represents the prevailing belief of the Portuguese then residing in Macao. Translated into English, it reads as follows¹:

"Fifty-four miles thence (Shang-ch'uan²), more within the Kingdom, there is another island called Gau Xan³, and by the Portuguese, Macao; it is small, and so full of rocks, that it is very easy to defend it, and very convenient for the rendezvous of robbers, as indeed it was at that time, when many of them having assembled there, they harrassed all the islands thereabouts. The Chinese discussed how to remove this evil. It was either because they lacked the courage or that they chose to have it done with less danger to themselves and at the expense of others, that, knowing the valour of the Portuguese, they committed the enterprise to them, with the promise that if they could drive out the robbers, this island should be granted to them for a dwelling".

"The Portuguese accepted the condition with much pleasure and joy: and though they were but few and much inferior in number to the robbers, being nevertheless more skilful in the art of war, they put themselves in order, and attacked them in such a way that without losing one man on their own side, but with great slaughter of the enemy, they soon became masters of the field as well as the

¹ pp. 211—212.

² 上川 commonly known in English as St. John's island from its Portuguese form São João, which is in turn from the Cantonese name of that island.

³ 澳山?

island. They started immediately building, every one taking that place and ground which seemed good to him".

The same version is also given in *Asia Portuguesa* ¹. It is rather certain that its author Manuel de Faria, a contemporary of Semedo ², had either come in touch with Semedo or had made use of his manuscripts ³.

Semedo's account of the origin of the settlement at Macao is, in our opinion, most convincing: the Portuguese were given the right to live at Macao in recognition of their service. The so far unexplained removal of the custom house from Macao to Lang-pai-kao in 1554 was very likely due to the increasing embarrassment by and threats of pirates. But after Macao was abandoned, it must have been occupied by pirates who used it as a base for their forays until they were destroyed. The failure of the Chinese historians or chroniclers to mention this feat of the Portuguese is quite natural. At that time the South-China Sea was so infested by pirates that the fighting between them and the government troops was but commonplace. That is why so few records regarding any single clash have been preserved while much has been written about the deplorable condition. It is true that the dislodging of the pirates from Macao had more lasting significance than probably any other government victories, but its importance was not recognized until a number of years later when the valorous deed of the Portuguese was already forgotten by the Chinese.

It must also be added that in granting the Portuguese the right to live at Macao, the Chinese did not alienate their sovereignty right which none but the Emperor himself could do. It is questionable whether the Emperor was even aware of what was taking place at Macao. Throughout the Ming dynasty neither did the Chinese government ever suspect that she had not the right to intervene in the affairs of Macao whenever she saw the necessity, nor did the Portuguese there ever question the legal side of their dependence.

¹ Tom. 3, Part. 3, cap. 20.

² According to *Retrato de Manuel de Faria e Sousa*, a work by D. Francisco Moreno Porcel, Manuel de Faria was born on March 18, 1590 and died on June 3, 1649.

³ The close connection between the two can be seen from the Spanish work *El Imperio de la China*, which has been commonly considered by scholars as a translation of Semedo's work by Manuel de Faria. Moreno Porcel, in his *Retrato*, etc., thinks, however, that it is a genuine work of Manuel de Faria himself, made up of information of Semedo.

A NEW CENTER OF SINO-PORTUGUESE TRADE.

Convenient for business purposes, enjoying a salubrious climate, possessing picturesque scenery and now inhabited by an enterprising race, Macao was destined to rise rapidly to the position of a new center of Sino-Portuguese trade.

Besides these factors there was one which, probably most important in the rise of Macao, has nevertheless escaped the observation of scholars. That is the Chinese law which forbade Chinese subjects to go abroad under pain of death. A Chinese could sail along the coast of China and carry on trade in home waters provided he was furnished with an official licence carefully identifying him ¹.

As this prohibition law prevented the Chinese from competing with the Portuguese, the latter obtained a very favourable opportunity to "monopolize" the China trade in Kwangtung. The merchants of other nationalities were, of course, not forbidden to come to China, but less well armed, and not having the backing of their governments at home, they had to drop their competition with the Portuguese. These hardy Lusitanians soon had almost exclusive use of the sea-routes connecting India, the Malay Archipelago, China and Japan with Macao as the center through which all goods to and from China and Japan had to pass.

Probably nothing could have been a more serious blow to China's foreign and home trade than the repeated adoption of this prohibition measure by the government in order to repress piracy. Whenever this law was enforced, China's foreign trade fell into the hands of foreigners while her home trade was also hampered through the oppressive execution of the law by the coastal officers and mandarins of the port. Moreover, this measure, designed to prevent inhabitants of the coast from becoming or joining pirates, never proved to be very effective. As it has been shown, people of evil intent could easily escape to the sea from most places on the long and almost unguarded coast. The peaceful traders were the real victims of this law.

It must be noted, however, that the above mentioned law, was not enforced in the Province of Fukien, where the Chinese merchants

¹ Purchas, *Pilgrimes*, vol. 11 pp. 541—542. As the Ming Law Code is not available to me just now, I am unable to verify this information which I believe is true.

carried on a very brisk trade with Manila, Patani and many other places and to a less extent with Japan¹. This trade was so important that in the reign of Wan-li (1573—1619) an official market was opened at Yüeh-kang² in the Prefecture of Changchow. The taxes collected at this market amounted to more than 20,000 taels per annum which were appropriated for the army of the province. This market was closed toward the end of the same reign³ when the pirates became rampant and the Dutch traders came to knock at the door of Fukien. Foreign trade, however, went on uninterruptedly.

The fact that the Fukienese could go abroad in spite of the prohibition law was the result of their victorious struggle against Viceroy Chu Huan. None of Chu's successors cared to obstruct the powerful bourgeoisie. This freedom of trade abroad revived the prosperity of the coastal towns of Fukien. Besides this it had very important consequences in the colonial history of China. These men of Fukien were not only good traders but good colonists. When the pressure of population was more and more felt in the coastal regions of that province in the latter part of the Ming dynasty, many of them chose to settle down in foreign lands. This exodus gained momentum toward the end of the Ming dynasty when disorder was increasing as the Manchus pressed southward⁴. Thus a large scale Fukienese colonization of the Philippine Islands, Java, Sumatra and other regions which we now call the Dutch Indies, and the Strait Settlements began in that period. The story would have been quite a different one if the Chinese of Fukien also had been subjected to the same prohibition law as their fellow countrymen elsewhere.

Although the rapid rise of Macao was to a great extent the result of both the Chinese decision to remove the foreign trade center from Canton and the interdiction of Chinese subjects from going abroad, it was nevertheless very perplexing to the Chinese authorities. On the one hand they saw their aim attained: they could now reap the benefits of foreign trade without either permitting foreigners to visit Canton or Chinese to leave their country. Here, right at the doorway of Canton, was a settlement of foreigners who eagerly took what China could offer to other countries, and brought

¹ Cf. also A. Semedo, *Relatione della Grande Monarchia della Cina*, p. 15.

² 月港. ³ Fu-kien T'ung-chih (福建通志) Ch. 87, p. 14a-b.

⁴ The Mings made their last stand in Fukien and many Ming supporters also fled to the South Seas.

to her what she needed from abroad at such terms as were satisfactory to her. On the other hand, however, the Chinese watched the mushroom growth of the Portuguese colony within the borders of their own territory with a certain amount of apprehension¹. In view of their past experience with the Portuguese they feared lest these foreigners might some day on slight provocation revolt or create serious disorders. This perplexity accounted for their irregular treatment of the Portuguese. At times the foreigners were treated with singular generosity and showered with rare favours, while at other times, they were suspected, closely watched and subjected to grotesque restrictions.

Following the traditional policy of permitting foreigners living as a group in China to govern themselves according to their own laws and customs if these were not incompatible with the peace and order of China, the Cantonese authorities, although at first not explicitly so, allowed the Portuguese to have a government of their own. Under the influence of some prominent members of the young colony, a rudimentary government was formed in 1560 which consisted of a Captain (*Capitão da Terra*), a Chief-judge (*Ouidor*), whose power was that of a justice of the peace, and a Bishop. A few enlisted men under the direction of this governing party helped to maintain order and peace. The Commodore (*Capitão Mór da Viagem do Japão*) of the royal fleet which periodically called at Macao on his way to and from Japan was also given a share in the government. During his visits, he took precedence over all others in directing the affairs of the government.

This governing group gradually crystallized into a more definite form of government based on election². The right to vote was conferred upon every free subject of the crown of Portugal born at Macao and possessing the qualification prescribed by law. Free men from other parts of the Portuguese dominions, unless disqualified by law, had also the right to vote, provided they married and settled at Macao. The result of the election had to be confirmed by the Governor-General of Portuguese India. Besides the chief officers already mentioned there were several other important officers who held

¹ This anxiety was repeatedly expressed by scholars of that time. Among others, see the memorial of P'ang Shang-p'êng (龐尙鵬) in *Ao-mén Chi-lüeh*, Ch. 2, pp. 23a-24a.

² Concerning the method of election, cf. *Ljungstedt*, pp. 45-46.

somewhat inferior positions. These were two Judges (Juizes), three Aldermen (Vereadores), a Procurator (Procurador) and a Treasurer. These officials, with the exception of the treasurer, formed a Senate. The aldermen had charge of the various municipal concerns. The judges executed the commands of the Senate provided these were in accordance with the established rules and laws; they also decided upon certain civil and criminal cases, but appeals could be made from their decision to the Chief Justice of Macao, or to the Supreme Tribunal (Relação) at Goa, which consisted of six Ministers, including the Chancellor and was presided over by the Governor-General. The decisions of the Supreme Tribunal were conclusive in most cases. The Procurator was to inspect the public buildings and recommend what repairs should be made; he too had to execute the orders of the Senate. Moreover, he was the man through whom the Portuguese community was in direct touch with the magistrates of the district of Hsiang-shan in which Macao was found. The treasurer's duty was to collect the revenue of the colony. He was not one of the Senators although twice each year he took a seat in the Senate to present to it his accounts. It should be remembered that the Portuguese colony at Macao consisted primarily of traders, whose influence on the municipal government was paramount. The fact that the majority of the important positions were held by the leading merchants¹ indicates the control they had over the government.

It took but a few years for the Portuguese to have a colony of considerable size at Macao. In 1563, they already numbered nine hundred, exclusive of children. This rapid increase must be partly due to the fact that the Portuguese settlers at Lang-pai-kaio left their old residences to join their countrymen at Macao. They were, however, still outnumbered by other foreigners, namely several thousands of Malaccans, Indians, and Africans. Some of them were traders, but many of them were servants and slaves. Very few Chinese, if any, inhabited Macao.

The relationship between China and the young foreign colony was for a number of years uncertain, because the Government at Peking steadily refused to have any official relationship with the Portuguese. As late as 1565, a Portuguese mission bearing tribute was

¹ *Ibid.*; *Historic Macao*, p. 31.

refused by order of the Court.¹ When the rapid growth of the colony caused some uneasiness in Chinese official circles, it was thought desirable to take some precautionary measures. In 1574², the Chinese constructed a barrier-wall with a gate at Lian-hua-ching³, i.e., the isthmus connecting Macao with the mainland. A squad of soldiers under an officer was stationed there to debar foreigners from the mainland except those who had official Chinese passes.

The purpose of this barrier was to control the provisioning of the colony as well as to mark a delimitation of the frontier. The gate, called *Porta do Cerco* by the Portuguese, was opened periodically to let provisions be taken into Macao where they were disposed of at a fair held within an enclosure. After this the gate was closed and sealed with six strips of stamped paper. Upon the gate was a Chinese inscription: "Dread our greatness, and respect our virtue"⁴. The fair was held every five days and later fortnightly. With the control of provisioning the Chinese succeeded in keeping the Portuguese within bounds. When they were recalcitrant, often a mere threat to stop their supply was sufficient to bring them to their knees.

For the first 25 years after 1557 the higher mandarins of Canton paid but scanty attention to the Portuguese settlement at Macao. The only Chinese officials at Macao were the customs officials. The magistrates of the district of Hsiang-shan interfered with the internal affairs of Macao only when it was absolutely necessary. Indeed the early Portuguese settlers could have boasted, as is stated in the Ministerial memorandum mentioned above, of "being governed by the laws and jurisdiction of Portugal, without the least dependence on, and subordination to, or interference of, either the Ministers or Mandarins of China"⁵. But an ever increasing population and the misdemeanours of some individuals soon called the attention of the high mandarins to the situation at Macao and an inquiry was deemed necessary.

As the local Portuguese government at Macao had not been legally recognized by the Cantonese government, the new Viceroy

¹ Ming Shih, Ch. 325, p. 9.

² Ao-mên Chi-lüeh, Ch. 2, p. 23a.

³ 蓮花莖 lit. the Stem of a Lotus Flower.

⁴ 畏威懷德. ⁵ Historical Sketch, p. 78.

of the provinces of Canton and Kwang-si summoned in 1582 the Captain, the Chief-Judge and the Bishop to appear before him and to explain their right to govern the colony. Being afraid of what might happen to them, they were unwilling to answer the summon. It was, however, in the interest of their infant colony that someone should confer with the Viceroy¹. At last, Matthias Penella, the Judge, an aged and experienced man who had been on very good terms with the mandarins, and Miguel Ruggiero², an Italian Jesuit, probably accompanied by a colleague, were deputed by the community to proceed to Chao-ch'ing-fu, where the Viceroy was at that time.

Having arrived there the delegates were brought before the tribunal of the Viceroy. They were said to have been upbraided for their unauthorized use of laws other than those of China in governing Macao. The Viceroy even threatened to deprive them of the privilege of trading in China and to expel them from Macao. It is said that in twenty-four hours the tone of the Viceroy mellowed, perhaps not so much due to the clever arguments of the Portuguese as to the magnificent presents which had been heaped on him and on those who had influence with him. The gifts consisted of velvets, mirrors, silk camlets, crystals and some other European manufactured goods to the value of four thousand cruzados. The envoys were then treated with civility and absolved with these gracious words: "the foreigners subject to the laws of the Empire, may continue to inhabit Macao"³. This dramatic scene, disgraceful as it was to the Chinese Mandarinate gave the Portuguese colony at Macao a legal status, and well established the relationship of Macao and China as of a vassal town to its sovereign state.

THE HEYDAY OF COMMERCIAL MACAO.

The period between 1582 and a decade after the tragic destruction of the Armada in 1588 may be considered as the heyday of Macao in view of its undisturbed and increasing commercial prosperity.

These prosperous years had hardly begun when the young colony

¹ Montalto describes the situation somewhat differently (*Historic Macao*, p. 35): "The functionaries in question indignantly refused to comply with such a bare-faced imposition. Yet, it was evident that, for the safety of the colony, someone should accomodate matters at Shao-king-foo, then the viceregal seat".

² Michel Roger in French.

³ *Historical Sketch*, p. 79.

was overwhelmed by anxiety and fear consequent on the death of Dom Sebastião at the disastrous battle of Alcacer Kibir and the assumption of the Portuguese crown by Philip II of Spain in 1580. The sad tidings were conveyed to Macao in 1582 by the Jesuit Alonso Sanchez, despatched as emissary by Don Gonzalo Ronquillo, Spanish Governor of Manila. Taking care to give the colony as little shock as possible, Alonso Sanchez used much circumspection and tact in unfolding the disaster under the clever guise of the union of the crowns of Portugal and Spain. First he secured the concurrence of the official class and the religious leaders, then he eloquently tried to persuade the other influential colonists to accept the new situation. At last the colony reluctantly swore allegiance to the Spanish King, while Portuguese flags were allowed to flutter at Macao.

The first move of the panic-stricken Portuguese inhabitants at Macao was to place the colony beyond the reach of Spanish Governors. For if the Portuguese at Macao were to be reduced to the status of ordinary Spanish subjects and if the Port of Macao then would be open to Spaniards as might be expected, the Portuguese "monopoly" of the China trade would immediately come to an end and their loss would be beyond repair. The efforts of the Portuguese had now to be toward making the Portuguese community at Macao actually independent of the Castilian sovereign although nominally acknowledging him as their king. In 1583, the Portuguese assembled to deliberate upon the form of government best adapted to the altered circumstances. The assembly presided over by the Bishop Belchior Carneiro, most prominent leader in the new move, decided in favour of a senatorial administration based on the municipal franchises. This decision was justified on the ground that in the days of old such franchise had been conferred by royal bounty on several cities of Portugal. With the sanction of Dom Francisco Mascarenhas, Viceroy of India, the Senate of Macao was established. In 1586, Dom Duarte de Menezes, Viceroy of India, bestowed on Macao the Senate's charter and conferred on it the rank and prerogatives of Cochin in India. The settlement, now possessing the legal status of a Portuguese city, was henceforth called *Cidado do Nome de Deos do Porto de Macao na China*.

We shall not enter into the particulars of this new form of government at Macao as they can be found in any of the more detailed

histories of Macao. Our main interest is to point out the commercial motive behind this political move, which has been ascribed by the Portuguese themselves to an unswerving patriotism toward their hapless fatherland.

It had often been the practice of the Chinese government to confer upon one or more of the chiefs of a foreign settlement in China Chinese titles to show that they handled public affairs in the capacity of Chinese officials. It was in 1584 that the Emperor of China conferred upon the Procurator of Macao a mandariate of the second grade. In official correspondence with the Chinese, the Procurator is styled "I-mu"¹ or "the Superintendent of the Foreigners". The Portuguese Chief Judge (Ouvidor) was also given authority for some restricted jurisdiction over the Chinese at Macao. But in important cases the right to pass sentence on Chinese culprits was reserved to the Prefect of Hsiang-shan. This arrangement evidently did not work satisfactorily as it was not always easy to determine upon the gravity of a case. It must have been on account of this difficulty that in 1587, the Chief Judge was deprived of this power.

Judging from the justifiable fear of Spanish intervention, we can be sure that this investiture by the Chinese Emperor was not only acquiesced in but was welcomed by the Portuguese at Macao. The colony was now more shielded behind Chinese protection than ever before: a protection against foreign aggressions, which the colony continued to enjoy for many years to come.

With all these political safe-guards Macao now enjoyed some sort of independence from Spain. The Castilian King on the other hand, fearing interference with the internal affairs of Macao might lead to defiance or even open revolt, acquiesced in its nominal allegiance. However, despite its semi-independence Macao was to share the fate of the Spanish Empire.

There was at Macao a Chinese custom house which collected import and export duty and anchorage dues. On the arrival in port of a vessel, the customs officials were informed by the Procurator who transmitted to them a manifest of the cargo. On a fixed day the chief customs official or his representative, accompanied by the Procurator and the captain of the ship went on board to measure it. The amount of the anchorage dues depended upon the size of the ship. In case of a Portuguese man-of-war no measurement dues

¹ 夷目.

were collected. After the measurement the cargo was appraised and the duties paid. The commodities could then be sent abroad or to Canton for distribution. The customs official would be informed again of the ship's departure. The customs revenues were remitted to the provincial treasury at Canton.

Before 1578 Chinese merchants, although forbidden to go abroad, bore the duty of imports as well as exports. The Portuguese were therefore regarded merely as their foreign trade agents who distributed for them Chinese commodities abroad and brought back to them foreign goods. In that year, however, the Macao Portuguese began to go to Canton to buy Chinese goods themselves. The fact that the Portuguese could do this must be owing to the 'favour' being granted by local mandarins and not to an explicit permission from the provincial authorities who at that time still took very little, if any, notice of the Portuguese.

The favour was well returned by the Portuguese. The merchants, who were probably deputed from the Senate to manage their mercantile concerns in the city, had to wait on the mandarin to whom these concerns were entrusted with a present of 4,000 taels; nearly double that sum was proffered him when the ships were loaded and dispatched¹.

As the Portuguese now traded on their own account they were asked to pay export duty at Canton from the year 1579². The custom house at Macao was henceforth to collect only import duty and anchorage dues. Although a new custom-house was instituted in Canton later for the purpose of collecting export duty, it is very likely that in 1579 and even several years after, no custom-house with its regular staff was there. The local magistrates were asked to act, *ex officio*, as customs officials.

A fair lasting two, three, and sometimes four months was held at Canton at first once, and from 1580 twice a year. From January, the foreign merchants of Macao began their purchases for Manila, India and Europe and from June for Japan, so as to be in time for sending the goods during the south-west and north-east monsoons respectively.

The Portuguese were vested with privileges and immunities which no other foreign traders enjoyed. A Portuguese vessel, of 200 tons for instance, on being measured for the first time, paid 1,800 taels

¹ *Historische Beschrijving der Reizen*, Deel 8, p. 177.

² *Hist. Sketch*, p. 81 quoting an old manuscript.

as tonnage dues; and on every subsequent visit, only one third of that amount. A ship of the same tonnage flying any other foreign flag had to pay 5,400 taels, on the first as well as on subsequent visits. On all merchandise bought by the Portuguese at Canton were levied duties two-thirds less than what others had to pay. In case of the shipwreck of a Portuguese vessel, the crew, if saved by the Chinese, was conveyed to Macao at imperial cost. Other foreigners, on the other hand, had to compensate liberally for the trouble and expense incurred on their account ¹.

The Portuguese at Macao, as we have said, were carriers of trade between China and foreign countries. The principal places with which the Portuguese carried on trade were Japan, Manila, Siam, Malacca, Goa and Europe.

The time was most propitious for the Portuguese to promote their commercial interests in Japan. On account of Japanese piracy along the China coast the important Sino-Japanese trade had been vigorously suppressed by the Chinese government since the middle of the 16th century. The once profitable trade had been thus reduced to secret trading which supplied the Japanese with but a small quantity of Chinese commodities far insufficient to meet their demand. The Portuguese now stepped in to be a new commercial link between China and Japan. Moreover, the generous way in which foreign traders were received in Japan at that time gave the Portuguese the amplest opportunity for business expansion.

According to E. Kaempfer, who visited Japan in the years 1690—1692 and whose work, *The History of Japan*, preserves for us much valuable information about the early Europeans in that country, foreigners could, in the 16th century, visit the Empire in whatever manner they pleased, and put into whatever harbours they wished. The Portuguese, therefore, not only went wherever they liked in the Empire "but were very much caress'd by the Princes of the Island Kiusju, and invited to settle upon their territories" ². This is quite understandable for, as Ljungstedt remarks ³, the petty sovereigns and the local authorities reaped considerable advantage from liberal presents, and the merchants great profit from the trade. These princes became, as a matter of fact, rivals in soliciting the

¹ Montinho de Mello e Castro, Memorandum, para, 41—44. (Cf. the summary in *Historic Macao*, p. 53).

² E. Kaempfer, *The History of Japan*, Vol. 1, p. 311.

³ *Historical Sketch*, p. 118.

Portuguese to put into their harbours. Under such favourable circumstances, the Portuguese disposed of their commodities freely all over the Empire at a high price.

According to Kaempfer, the profit on the goods imported to Japan, was at least a hundred per cent. "The Japanese, curious as they are, strove who should first get these foreign rarities into his possession, and being unacquainted with their intrinsic value, they willingly paid whatever price was exacted"¹. The profit from the exported goods was also large. From 1569 on Nagasaki became the biggest center of Portuguese and Japanese trade.

Owing to its relative abundance in Japan, gold was estimated as bearing less proportionate value to silver in that country than elsewhere. It was used in exchange for European and Indian curiosities, works of art, firearms, drugs, aromatics, wine, cotton and woolen goods; raw silk and other products from China, and other things. As a result, the exportation of this precious metal from Japan to Macao was considerable. As the Portuguese enjoyed full liberty to export as well as to import it was said that in the halcyon days of Portuguese commerce with Japan the annual exportation of gold was upward of 300 tons².

This figure given by Kaempfer represents so enormous a sum, especially for that time, that it seems to be incredible. Was he not misled by some exaggerated reports? Valentijn estimates this business transactions at 60 to 70 tons of gold³ which agrees fairly well with the statement of Montanus⁴. Considering the general commercial conditions in Japan and Macao, Valentijn's estimate seems to be much more reasonable.

Dictated by self-interest some Portuguese merchants married daughters of the richest Japanese in the principal ports⁵. In this way they must have adopted many of the native customs and habits. Blood and social ties were thus formed which greatly strengthened their position in Japan.

The trade between Canton and Manila, a Spanish possession, was also in the hands of the Portuguese, because the Spaniards were excluded from it. By the Eight Articles of Peace between Spain and Portugal and the Portuguese acceptance of the overlordship of

¹ Kaempfer Ibid. ² Ibid. ³ Beschrijving van Japan, p. 24.

⁴ Gezantschappen aan de Keizeren van Japan, p. 201.

⁵ Kaempfer, Ibid., p. 313.

Philip I in 1583, the Portuguese were granted the right of exclusive trade with India and all other parts of the incorporated Portuguese dominions, and that of free intercourse with Spain, Peru and Manila¹. This stipulation could be applied to Macao, which was considered by both the Spaniards and the Portuguese as the latter's dominion. The Portuguese at Macao did not, however, monopolize the trade with Manila. For the Fukienese were also carrying on a thriving trade with that Spanish port.

In 1590 there occurred an accident between the Portuguese and the Spaniards. Acting on the instructions of the Spanish king Gomez Perez de las Marinas, Governor and Captain-General of the Philippine Islands, sent a ship to the port of Macao with royal money to purchase ammunition for the fortress and fortification of Manila and the Philippine Islands, and also with money from some inhabitants of Manila to purchase goods. In order to show Spanish friendship to the Portuguese at Macao, he also promised the Captain in command at Macao favours and assistance in all his needs. The Portuguese, however, fearing lest their profitable trade would be at stake, if the Spaniards were permitted to come, were not in the least moved by their promise of friendship and assistance. Upon its arrival at Macao the Portuguese seized both the ship and the money². An investigation of this serious incident was instituted, but was soon allowed to drop and the Portuguese claim was vindicated. The reason is apparent. The King, in his instructions of 1582, although maintaining that "all become one and the same people, and you and the Portuguese are all my vassals", did not fail to express his wish "that, for the better support of my service, there be agreement and amicable relations among all . . . I command you that on all occasions, whether together or separated from one another, you maintain friendly relations and one mind among yourselves, . . . being careful to help, support, and defend one another alike in all needs and with great harmony and friendship . . ." ³.

Eager not to alienate the loyalty of the Portuguese at Macao and

¹ Historical Sketch, p. 121.

² See the report of the investigation made by Melchor de Bacca to the Governor of the Philippine Islands in 1591, published in Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, Vol. 8, pp. 177—178.

³ The text of these instructions is to be found in Blair and Robertson, *Vol. 8*, pp. 190—192.

hoping to avoid future conflicts, the King, in a decree of 1594, prohibited any direct trade of the Philippine Islands and Mexico with China in view of its being prejudicial to the Portuguese interests. The King even showed his displeasure at what the Spaniards had done. The Portuguese Viceroy of India was instructed in 1595 to debar, by all possible means, the Spaniards from the trade which, the King declared, was reserved to his Portuguese vassals at Macao¹.

It is interesting to see what was the Chinese attitude in this regard. According to the Spaniards, the Chinese "greatly desired" trade with them. In the official Spanish documents on the investigation of the case of 1590 just mentioned, one of the witnesses testified to the following effect: He spoke with the Chief-captain of Macao and a mandarin, this latter said: "Let the Spaniards come here and trade; for the inhabitants of your country do not come to trade with the Chinese, as the Portuguese do." The witness answered: "We are hindered by the Portuguese, who do not wish us to come." Thereupon the mandarin became much vexed, and said to the Portuguese Captain: "How is this, does not the land which you hold belong to the King of China? The Portuguese have nothing to do in the matter." And then turning to the witness, he added: "Look you, Castilian, from now on come here and carry on your trade, and have nothing to do with the Portuguese; for we will give you all you need, as well as a passport". The witness then suggested that it would be better to assign the Spaniards a small piece of land near Canton upon which they could settle. The mandarin promised to see to it that the Spaniards had a settlement there in good time, if the witness could come with him. As this witness had no order to that effect, and was busy with his own affairs, he did not go to Canton, and so the matter was dropped².

This document is significant in that it tries to show that the Chinese authorities did not desire a Portuguese monopoly of the trade between Canton and Manila, and that they encouraged the Spaniards to come.

It must be pointed out, however, that although the Portuguese monopoly of the trade between Canton and other countries was not

¹ Archivo Portuguez Oriental, Fasciculo 3, no. 162, item 26.

² Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, pp. 183—184. A report of Captain Juan de Argumedo.

a deliberate commercial policy of China, yet China was willing to allow it to take its natural course and even favoured it because it worked well. This attitude of the Chinese can be readily seen from the most favourable customs rates which were accorded the Portuguese, and the exemption of Portuguese warships from measurement and tonnage dues which those of other nations had to pay¹. This Chinese attitude could be easily explained. Monopoly was indeed not desirable, for it gave the Portuguese much control over the prices of the goods brought to China, but it had at least an important advantage, i.e., it saved the Chinese ports from dangerous strifes which would necessarily accompany competition among these unscrupulous and unrestrained traders from Europe.

It is possible that a certain mandarin, out of selfish motives, might have invited the Spaniards to China. But it is unbelievable that the Chinese authorities desired to encourage competition.

The relations between the Portuguese and Siam had been cordial from the beginning. Some years after Malacca was firmly in the grip of the Portuguese, the government of Malacca made proposals for establishing a factory in Siam; to this the King of Siam assented. The director and his staff behaved so much to the satisfaction of the Siamese Court, that they became the most favoured foreigners.

The trade between China and Siam was largely if not exclusively in their hands. The Siamese merchants, trading with Chinese as individuals, offered but very feeble competition to the well organised government factories of the Portuguese. Here, more than anywhere else, they knew how to strengthen their tie of friendship with the native population. It was due to their influence, that for some time the Siamese were unwilling to allow the Dutch to settle among them.

The prosperity of Malacca steadily revived after 1542 when Alfonso de Souza, Governor-General of Portuguese India, checked the growing tyranny and the covetousness of the Portuguese officers there by prescribing strict regulations to be observed in levying the King's duties on imports and exports. It became again a center where all the countries of the Far East, India and Persia exchanged the products from their native lands. Much of China's merchandise from Macao also changed hands at Malacca, where merchants of other nations bought them from the Portuguese.

Goa was the capital of Portuguese India and was moreover on

¹ Historic Macao, p. 53.

the highway to Europe. It was therefore natural that its relations with Macao were very close both commercially and politically.

The trade with Europe was a monopoly of the crown. A royal fleet of galleons and carracks largely laden with glass-ware, crystal, woolens, scarlet cloth, Portuguese wines and clocks of English and Flemish manufacture sailed from Lisbon annually. These were bartered at the ports of call for other products. Leaving Goa, the fleet made Cochin for precious stones and spices; thence to Malacca for more spices and sandalwood from Sunda. The fleet thus came before Macao loaded with both European and Oriental products. These were bartered at Macao for silk which, together with the remnant of the cargo was disposed of in Japanese markets for bullion. After a stay of several months at Macao, the fleet brought home gold, silver, pearls, silk, musk, ivory and wood carvings, porcelain, lacquered ware, etc. It can be easily understood that the profits must be immense when such goods were disposed of at Lisbon, then the greatest distributing center of oriental goods in Europe. As the oriental trade was reserved to the crown, it was one of the greatest royal favours when a vassal was granted a licence to load a galleon or two to join the royal fleet.

The kinds of merchandise exported from and imported into China remained, for the most part, what they had been. European goods, e.g., clocks, woolen stuffs, etc. were novelties in Chinese markets. No statistics are available to us regarding the volume of exports and imports. A small and imperfect hint regarding exports from China is a brief statement in *Asia Portugueza*, according to which the annual exports of wrought silk from China amounted to 5,300 boxes, each box containing one hundred rolls of velvet or damask, and one hundred and fifty of a lighter texture. Martin Martini in his *Atlas Sinensis* mentions only 1,300 boxes, besides 2,200 or 2,500 sticks of gold, each weighing ten taels, 800 pounds of musk; and also seed pearls, precious stones, China-ware, sugar, and a variety of other things¹.

An important innovation in the commerce of China is that after 1582, silver became a medium in commercial dealings between China and the Portuguese. Bartering was discontinued and henceforth duties were also paid in taels. Until very recent times, taels continued to be the exchange medium in China's foreign trade.

¹ See *Historical Sketch*, p. 82.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ARRIVAL OF OTHER EUROPEANS IN THE FAR EAST AND THE POSITION OF THE PORTUGUESE.

THE SPANIARDS.

The rapid rise of Macao was followed by a rapid decline. One of its causes was the covetousness and pride of the Portuguese which alienated them from the Spaniards at a time when close cooperation between the two peoples in defending their possessions against their common foes was imperative. From the beginning the Portuguese were unwilling to give up even a bit of their privileges in the matter of trade monopoly at Macao. The quarrel between the Portuguese of Macao and the Spaniards of the Philippine Islands over the China trade became more bitter than ever on the eve of Dutch and British aggression. In 1598, a Spanish envoy, Don Juan de Çamudio, was dispatched from Manila to China to negotiate with the Viceroy of Canton for direct trade with his province. Çamudio was accorded a warm reception at Canton. The Chinese, growing more disgusted with the Portuguese, were now willing to establish commercial relations with the Spaniards. The Portuguese, deeply resenting what the Spaniards were doing, represented to the Chinese authorities that they were pirates and evil-doers. The Viceroy and his subordinates, knowing the motive of the Portuguese, at first listened to them indifferently, and later even ordered them to keep silent. The Castilians were assigned a place on the coast, which they called Pinal¹, twelve leagues from the city of Canton. The Spaniards began trading. The Portuguese, seeing their interests jeopardized, unsuccessfully attempted one night to set fire to the ship of the envoy. The Spanish ship returned to Manila in 1599 with

¹ I have not succeeded in satisfactorily identifying this place. It can hardly be Ping-nan (平嵐) in the Hsiang-shan district. A. Ljungstedt suggests Pinghae (Historical Sketch, p. 22) which is phonetically unacceptable.

a cargo from China and with written permission to come back in the future.

In the mean time, a Spanish expedition, making from Manila for Cambodia, was driven toward Canton by a storm and shipwrecked near its coast. The survivors, a hundred and twenty Spaniards, managed to save a few things of the greatest value, their arms and a part of their artillery. Coming near Macao, the Commander, Don Luys Dasmariñas, despatched two soldiers to that port and two other persons to Canton asking for assistance. The two sent to Macao were imprisoned by Don Pablo de Portugal, the Captain-major who, with threats, ordered Dasmariñas and his company to leave immediately. At the same time two Portuguese delegates were sent to Canton to make in vain representations to the Chinese authorities that the Spaniards were pirates. The mandarins permitted the Spaniards to go to Pinal. There they bought a new ship, waiting to proceed to Cambodia as soon as more ships and provisions which they had asked the Governor to send them should have come from Manila. As the answer from Manila was overdue, Dasmariñas attempted to sail for Manila with his ship; but the weather was not good and his ship too crowded; so he passed the time near Pinal. The Portuguese again sent him messages, threatening to seize him and his men and send them to India for punishment unless they departed immediately. Dasmariñas gave reasons for his temporary sojourn, and complained of their sufferings under the hands of the Portuguese vassals of the same king and begged for the release of the two soldiers and intimated that he would defend himself if attacked. Dissatisfied with this reply the Portuguese Captain-major decided to resort to force; but his fleet of lateen-rigged boats and other craft was beaten off with great loss. The Portuguese then retired to Macao, while the Spaniards put into the port of Pinal. Later a ship came from Manila and the Spaniards were brought back in 1599 after having made some purchase at Canton¹.

THE DUTCH CHALLENGE.

Another chief cause of the rapid decline of Macao is one over which the Portuguese themselves had no control. With the rise of Protestantism, England no longer assented to the papal bulls which apportioned almost the whole world to Portugal and Spain. The

¹ For all this see Morga, *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*, pp. 80—91.

friction between England and the two Iberian nations now under one king, increased until the tragic year 1588 when the Armada was smashed by the English. This marks the beginning of the rapid decline of the Spanish-Portuguese colonial power. The highways of commerce were now exposed to rampant privateering which is not very different from piracy, while the Portuguese and Spanish colonies were open to attacks without being able to obtain much protection from their mother countries. At the Azores, Burrough's fleet overpowered in 1593 the *Madre de Deos*, a very rich prize. The carrack, of 1600 tons, was exhibited at Dartmouth as the largest ship yet seen in England.

As early as 1596, an English expedition, consisting of three ships, was prepared for a trip to China, for which purpose Queen Elizabeth granted letters of recommendation to the Emperor in favour of Richard Allen and Thomas Bromfield, merchants of London. These vessels, under the command of Captain Benjamin Wood, sailed from England for China, but were never heard of again¹. As there is no record of tribute having been presented by the English at the end of the 16th century or at the beginning of the 17th, they must have been wrecked in the outward journey.

As a punishment for the revolt which overthrew the Spanish dominion in the Netherlands, Philip II placed an embargo on the trade of the Dutch in Portugal whence they had drawn their supply of oriental commodities. This led the Dutch to project a direct trade with Eastern Asia. For a number of years from 1594 they endeavoured to find a new route to China and Japan by way of the Arctic Ocean² in order to avoid being waylaid by their hereditary enemy. Having failed, they turned to the old route, particulars about which they had already had through their countrymen, Houtman, Linschoten and Pomp³.

¹ Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, vol. 2, p. 109.

² J. K. J. Jonge, *De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië* dl. 1, pp. 14-31; *Begin ende Voortgangh van de Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, dl. 1, Stuk 1.

³ Dirck Gerritsz Pomp, native of Enkhuizen, is the first Dutchman who visited China. We are unable to determine the exact date of his first visit which, in any case, took place between 1568 and 1583. Starting from Goa he made his second voyage to China from 1584 to 1588. Vide J. W. Yzerman, *Dirck Gerritsz Pomp alias Dirck Gerritsz China. de Eerste Nederlander, die China en Japan Bezocht (1544-1604)*, 's-Gravenhage, 1915. The verbal information about the East which he gave to Lucas Jansz. Waghenauer has been preserved in *Tresoor der Zeevaart*, publ. 1592, Leiden.

The appearance of van Neck's fleet in Asiatic waters heralded a period of bitter Dutch-Portuguese rivalry. After attacking in vain the Portuguese stronghold at Tidore¹, a part of the fleet appeared before Macao at the end of September 1601. The inhabitants of Macao gathered together on one of the hills. Two emissaries sent on shore to gather more information about that colony did not return. A party sent to sound the harbour, after a valiant fight, fell prisoners to five Portuguese junks. Of the twenty captives 17 were put to death in cold blood, and three among whom was Martinus Apius, were sent to Malacca. Apius later returned to his fatherland to tell the tale².

But soon the Portuguese of Macao were to pay dearly for these outrages. Highly incensed, Admiral Jacob van Heemskerck went in 1602 with his men to lie in wait in the Straits of Malacca for Portuguese vessels which had been loaded at Macao. The first carrack escaped the waylayers. Another one, called Catharina, with a rich cargo of valuable objects of art, lacquered wares, silk and porcelain, etc., was caught sight of in the beginning of 1603, and after a stubborn resistance fell prey to the Dutch. The spoil was taken to Amsterdam, where it threw the population into commotion. The proceeds of the sale was almost 3,400,000 guilders (about 5,700,000 Chinese dollars at the present exchange-rate). From this unfortunate carrack originated the current Dutch word "kraakporselein" or carack-China³. This success was a great encouragement and an additional incentive to the Dutch. Now it had become clearer to them than ever before what they could get in China or from the Portuguese

With the Portuguese at Macao, one disaster was quickly followed

¹ Fruin, *Verspreide Geschriften*, deel 3, p. 419.

² Statement of M. Apius is in de *Bijdragen van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht*, deel 6, p. 228. A narrative of this trip is preserved in the diary of Roelof Roelofs, the "vermaender" or visitor of the sick persons on board the ship Amsterdam. See *Begin ende Voortgangh*, dl. 1, 7^{de} stuk. See also de Jonge, *De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië*, dl. 2, p. 239 et sq.; Tiele, *De Europeërs in den Maleischen Archipel*, 6^{de} gedeelte (*Bijdragen v. h. Koninklijk Instituut voor de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde v. Nederlandsch-Indië*); cf. also Ming Shih, Ch. 325, p. 10b, some inaccuracies in the Chinese statement are pointed out by W. P. Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, p. 10.

³ For a detailed account of van Heemskerck's adventure, see R. Fruin, *Verspreide Geschriften*, dl. 3, pp. 378—398.

by another. At the end of July 1603, two Dutch vessels of the fleet of Wijbrand van Waerwijck came before Macao. There they found a huge carrack bound for Japan. The ship was immediately attacked and fell an easy prey to the enemy as the crew fled ashore without even attempting to defend it. The cargo was taken over to the Dutch ships and fire set to the carrack. After this, the Dutch retreated and returned to Holland. The spoil was very valuable. The raw silk alone amounted to 2800 bales at 500 guilders per bale. They were worth 1,400,000 guilders¹ or more than 2,000,000 Chinese dollars.

In the next year (1604), Admiral van Waerwijck decided to go to China himself. He left Patani at the end of June and came near the Cantonese coast in the middle of July. He intended to sail for Macao, but the Chinese pilots, unfamiliar with the waterways, were unable to find a route through the islands. At the end of the month a north-eastern storm broke out, which forced them to stand out to sea, and carried them so far out of their course that they abandoned their plan of going to Macao and went to the Pescadores instead². There van Waerwijck³ began negotiations for trade with the Chinese officials of Fukien province. These negotiations ended in failure which has been ascribed, not without reason, to Portuguese influence. Van Waerwijck left the Pescadores on the 15th of December⁴.

THE INCREASING CHINESE SUSPICION.

The unfortunate relations between the Portuguese and the Chinese were also weakening the position of the former in China. Here again they had to pay dearly for their covetousness and their natural pride, swollen by their commercial success. Ignoring the remonstrances of the mandarins against smugglers, they rambled on

¹ P. A. Tiele, *De Europeërs in den Maleischen Archipel*, 6de gedeelte, 6de Hoofdstuk (Bijdragen v. h. Koninklijk Inst. voor de Taal- etc. 1882, 6de dl.); also R. Fruin, *Verspreide Geschriften*, dl. 3, p. 398.

² 澎湖 or P'êng-hu.

³ 麻章郎 in Ming Shih, read Ma Ui-long or Moa Ui-long in Amoy, evidently from Wae(rwijck) Wij(b)rand.

⁴ A detailed account from Dutch sources of the arrival of van Waerwijck in the Far East and of his negotiations with the Chinese is in W. P. Groeneveldt's *De Nederlanders in China*, pp. 11—19. A Chinese account of his visit to China is in Ming Shih, Ch. 325, pp. 10—11.

the coast, avoiding both measurement of their ships and duties on imports and exports. Were any of them apprehended, they cried out against the provincial government, denouncing, by sophistical evasions, its right to punish interlopers¹. Such was the relationship between the Portuguese and the Chinese that the success of the former was looked upon by the latter not with admiration but with increasing uneasiness, or at its best, with indifference. In a letter to the Viceroy at Goa, dated 1596, the Senate, although complaining of the attitude of the Chinese, honestly admitted that "it was owing more to the Portuguese themselves than to the Chinese"².

The arbitrariness of the Portuguese in executing their Dutch captives must have increased the Chinese grudge and distrust. To make the matter worse the Portuguese, anticipating more Dutch attacks in the future, fortified, with all rapidity and without Chinese consent, the steep cliffs near the sea. This unauthorised preparation for defence and the building of a high walled church on Ilha Verde³ near Macao further aroused the suspicion of the Chinese. All this gave rise to a rumour that the Portuguese had aggressive designs upon China, and that Father Cataneo, a Jesuit missionary, was to be made emperor. This led to a serious riot at Macao in the course of which a Portuguese church which had been suspected of being a fortress was pillaged and set fire to. As a retaliation, the Portuguese incited their negro slaves to sack the Chinese government buildings at Macao. It was only after an agreement was reached between the authorities of the district of Hsiang-shan and the Portuguese magistrates that order was restored.

This is, however, only a lull. Soon a Chinese published a pamphlet asserting that a formidable Portuguese fleet would soon make its appearance. The Chinese at Macao, seized with panic, hurriedly packed up their property, fled with their families and took refuge at Canton. The arrival of these fugitives at Canton aroused a general alarm in the city. The war junks were held ready, the militia called out, the guard strengthened and a watch kept day and night on the ramparts; a great number of houses between the city walls and

¹ Historical Sketch, p. 83.

² Ibid.

³ 青州 or Green Island. The district magistrate of Hsiang-shan, Chang Ta-yu (張大猷) petitioned the Viceroy to have the high walls of the church demolished. But he was not granted his request (see Ming Shih, Ch. 325, p. 9b).

the river were demolished so that the city could be better defended. It is said that the Emperor was also informed of the danger that menaced the city.

In the meanwhile the Portuguese of Macao were placed in a very distressing situation. As their traffic with the Chinese came to a standstill, they were threatened with death by famine, for Macao itself was a barren place, and its inhabitants depended upon Hsiang-shan and Canton for food supply. The Portuguese therefore sent an embassy to represent to the Viceroy that the report of a Portuguese attack on China had absolutely no foundation. Thereupon some kind of intercourse was resumed, and a few Chinese were permitted to go to Macao to examine the state of affairs on the spot.

No sooner had the panic been allayed than the Hai-tao became the target of public resentment and wrath on account of his pulling down people's houses on mere pretexts. The Hai-tao, fearing the consequences of what he had done, attempted to exculpate himself by unfairly accusing a young Chinese convert of being a secret agent of the Portuguese to spy out the country and to foment insurrection and caused him to be mangled and condemned to death. Fortunately, Macao itself escaped a disaster through the prudence of the Commander of the provincial army who sent one of his lieutenants to the colony to investigate it and found that all the rumours of imminent Portuguese attacks on Canton were baseless. All the warlike preparations were laid aside, and normal intercourse between Canton and Macao was restored¹.

The excitement had subsided but there remained some objection to the Portuguese living so near to the heart of the province of Kwangtung. In 1607, a *littérateur* of the name of Lu T'ing-lung² petitioned the court to remove the foreigners to Lang-pai³ and to put Macao again under the direct administration of the Chinese. His proposal was rejected by the Court⁴.

The relations between the Chinese and the Portuguese were far from being satisfactory and smooth, but China was steadily reluctant to establish commercial relations with the Dutch. The Dutch fleet

¹ For all this see E. R. Huc, *Christianity in China*, etc., Vol. 2, pp. 178—185. I can not verify Huc's statements with a Chinese source.

² 盧廷龍.

³ see Lang-pai-kaō.

⁴ Ming Shih, Ch. 325, p. 96.

under Cornelis Matelief visited China in 1607. In spite of the civility and patience of the Dutch Admiral all negotiations to open trade with China were in vain. Six Portuguese vessels at last bore down and chased him away from Lantau¹.

The reason for the unwillingness of the Chinese is apparent. They were aware of the advantage which could be derived from the competition between the Dutch and the Portuguese; it was nevertheless evident to them that there would be danger of serious quarrels and hostility between the two peoples in the territory of China. Furthermore, the behaviour of the Dutch in South-Asia could inspire but little confidence in the mind of the Chinese, while the Portuguese were doing their best to paint as dark a picture as possible of them. Here is a specimen of the early Chinese impression of this admirably enterprising and courageous race which at that time probably had not yet realized that it was embarking upon building up a colossal colonial empire in South-Asia:

"The people which we call Red-hair or Red barbarians are the Dutchmen. They are also called Po-ssü-hu². They live in the extreme west of the Ocean extending from Formosa. Their country is but a dependency of the Spaniards and Portuguese³.

They are covetous and cunning and have good knowledge of valuable commodities and are clever in seeking profits. They spare

¹ For details of Matelief's visit, see W. P. Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, pp. 23-42.

² 波斯胡 Prof. J. J. L. Duyvendak tentatively suggests that Po-ssü-hu may have been derived from Paizas (Bai)xos, Portuguese name for the Netherlands.

³ Hsi-yang (西洋) in the Chinese text. Hsi-yang or more commonly Ta-hsi-yang Kuo (大西國) is an old name for Portugal and evidently for the united kingdom of Spain and Portugal too. Cf. Hai-kuo T'u Chih (海國圖志, Ch. 38 p. 1a et sq.). For the origin of this appellation for the Portuguese, see *Razão do Titulo in Ta-ssi-yang-kuo*, serie 1, Vol. 1 by J. F. Marques Pereira; also *Ao-mên Chi-lüeh*, Ch. 2, p. 26a.

The Chinese apparently got the information of Holland's being a dependency of the united kingdom of Spain and Portugal from the Portuguese who said the same thing to the Japanese. In the *History of Japan* Kaempfer says (Vol. 1, p. 317): "The Portuguese made use of all the cunning malicious inventions to blacken the Dutch, calling them Rebels to the Spaniards, their former Sovereigns, Pirates and the like; in a word, describing them as the very worst and most unjust people in the world".

not even their lives in looking for gain and go to the most distant regions to trade... Moreover, they are very ingenious people; the sails of their boats are like spider's webs so that they can be turned in all directions for wind, and go any where they want. If one meets them in the high seas, one is often robbed by them... Wherever they go, they covet the rare commodities, and contrive by all means to take possession of the land."¹

THE JAPANESE AVERSION AND DISTRUST.

Next to China the principal country with which the Portuguese traded was Japan. The prosperity of Macao was in a great measure owing to the export of bullion from that country. Unfortunately in the closing years of the 16th century, the Portuguese in Japan were already losing the friendship of the natives and their prestige was on the wane. We admit that the internal political upheaval much affected their position but the Portuguese were themselves mainly to blame for their misfortune. In giving the cause of their unpopularity in Japan, Kaempfer justly remarks: "pride amongst the great ones, and covetousness in people of less note, contributed very much to render the whole nation odious."² The increasing wealth and the unexpected success in the propagation of their religion puffed up the laity as well as the clergy. The heads of the clergy thought it beneath their dignity to go afoot any longer, but "must be carried about in stately chairs, mimicking the pomp of the Pope and his Cardinals at Rome." Even the native converts were astonished, as Kaempfer points out further, and grew impatient when they saw that their spiritual fathers had an eye to their money and lands and that the merchants from this Christian nation disposed of their goods in a most usurious manner. Showing how the pride of the Portuguese caused their fall in 1597, he gives the following anecdote:

It happened one day that a Portuguese bishop met upon the road one of the councillors of state on his way to Court. The haughty prelate would not order his chair to stop, that he might pay his

¹ T'ai-wan Fu-chih (臺灣府志), Ch. 19, pp. 41b-42a. This book was compiled for the first time in the eighteenth century but the greater part of it is based on earlier sources.

² The History of Japan, p. 314.

respects to this important man. He was unwilling to show even ordinary civility, and contemptuously bade his man carry him by. The councillor, exasperated at so signal an affront thenceforward bore a mortal hatred toward the Portuguese. Later he made his complaints to the Shogun¹ and depicted the insolence, pride and vanity of the Portuguese in such a way as to make the Shogun very indignant. The next year, i.e., 1597, the persecution began anew.

The Portuguese were already in a very precarious position when another incident made their situation even more untenable. In 1608, a ship belonging to the Daimio of Arima was wintering at Macao when, in a riot, more than twenty of the crew perished. The Commandant at Macao, André Pessoa, proceeded to Japan the following year to explain matters as requested. He arrived at Nagasaki with a goodly number of priests and shipments worth a million gold. It is said² that the explanations given by Pessoa at first satisfied the Japanese but that it was at the instigation of the Dutch, who had just obtained a footing in Japan, that an order was later given the Daimio of Arima to capture Pessoa. Beset by a vastly superior armed force, that handful of Portuguese bravely defended their carrack and the Japanese were repelled with great loss. Unfortunately a grenade set a sail ablaze. The flames spread which aided the Japanese to board the carrack. The Portuguese Captain rushed to the magazine and blew up the doomed carrack with the people on board. The Japanese indeed gained nothing in this conflict but the aspect of Portuguese trade in Japan was darker than ever. The Dutch, availing themselves of the opportunity, gained steadily more influence with the Japanese.

A NEW POLICY OF THE CHINESE.

In April 9, 1609, a twelve year truce brought about a temporary cessation of hostility between Spain and the Netherlands, although outside Europe this treaty did not become effective until one year later. The Spaniards had come to realize the tremendous difficulty in preventing the Dutchmen from having a share in the oriental trade and they gave in at least for the time being. It was now agreed that the Dutch should carry on no business in the ports and places

¹ It must be the Shogun and not the "Emperor" as Kaempfer says here. The Shogun is a Japanese hereditary commander-in-chief and virtual ruler for some centuries until the office was abolished in 1868.

² Montalto Historic Macao, p. 56.

possessed by either the Spaniards or the Portuguese outside Europe but they could trade with "all other" rulers and peoples.

The truce gave the Portuguese at Macao as well as elsewhere an excellent opportunity to strengthen the fortifications of their possessions and to effect closer cooperation among themselves as well as with the Spaniards in the event of revived hostility with the Dutch. Unfortunately nothing important toward closer cooperation was achieved, while their secret fortifying of a piece of Chinese territory only increased the mistrust of the Chinese.

The suspicion of the Chinese was such that in 1612 the local official declared that a Portuguese man-of-war was henceforth required to pay measurement if armed "en guerre et marchandise". In this category fell the galleons¹ which the Chinese contended to be more merchantmen than warships². This immediately gave rise to disputes which could but embitter the feeling of both sides. The Commodore rejected the new regulation, declaring that, if necessary, he would resist by force of arms. But the officials again wielded their powerful weapon, i.e. cutting off the supply of provisions to the colony. Under these distressing circumstances the Senate, in conformity with the advice of the Council, consented to comply with the wish of the Chinese authorities. The commanders, however, turned a deaf ear to all appeals, declarations and solicitations. The people, driven to despair, at last seized the commanders of the galleons and forced them to pay their customs dues³. The sum paid was 4870 taels⁴.

After this incident, the Chinese decided to have more control over the Portuguese. Because of their piratical acts, the Japanese had been forbidden Chinese soil. Despite this law the Portuguese secretly harboured a goodly number of them at Macao. This fact was revealed to the Chinese. In 1614 Viceroy Chang Ming-kang⁵ sternly ordered the Portuguese to expel the Japanese from Macao⁶. The Portuguese obeyed, through fear of punishment. According to Danvers⁷ besides

¹ A. Ljungstedt, *Historical Sketch*, p. 89.

² *Mémoire sur la Souveraineté Territoriale du Portugal à Macao*, p. 28.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29 where a passage of a letter on this incident from the Senate to the viceroy of India is translated into French. The "Mémoire sur la Souveraineté" itself is a book full of errors.

⁴ A. Ljungstedt, *Historical Sketch*, p. 89.

⁵ 張鳴岡. ⁶ Ming Shih, Ch. 325, p. 10a.

⁷ F. C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, Vol. 2, p. 213.

the expulsion of the Japanese there were other orders to Macao to the following effect: not to purchase Chinese subjects, for when bought they were shorn of their hair and dressed like the Portuguese¹; not to erect any new houses without permission; to forbid the landing of unmarried merchants, who must remain on board their ships; these orders must be obeyed or the Portuguese would be expelled from Macao. In reply, the people of Macao declared that they would obey them.

After this, Viceroy Chang presented to the throne a memorial which stated tersely the principles which were to be adopted henceforth by the Chinese government in dealing with the Macao Portuguese. The contents of the memorial according to Ming Shih are as follows²:

"The foreigners at Macao are just like an ulcer on the back of a person while the Japanese there are just like the wings of a Portuguese tiger. The fact that we have been able to expel the Japanese in such a short space of time without the need of using even an arrow is due to both the prestige and the virtue of Your Holy Majesty. Now the Japanese have been expelled but the Portuguese are still there. Some people think that they should be destroyed while others are of the opinion that the Portuguese should be moved to Lang-pai³ or should be permitted to trade with us only aboard their ships which should remain in the open sea."

"In my opinion we should not resort to the force of arms without duly weighing the consequences. As Macao is within the boundary of our land and forms a part of the district of Hsiang-shan, our military forces can watch over the foreigners by just guarding the surrounding sea. Moreover, they are completely dependent upon us for their food supply; we shall know how to put them at death's door as soon as they cherish any disloyal designs. Now if we moved them to an open sea, by what means could we punish both the Chinese and foreign evil-doers, and how could we keep them in submission and defend ourselves against them?"

"It appears to me the best thing to do is to put the foreigners definitely under restrictions, while neither wicked Chinese nor Japanese are admitted at Macao. There should be no provocation from

¹ To dress oneself in foreign attire was considered a sign of disloyalty to the Chinese Emperor.

² Ming Shih, Ch. 325, p. 10a.

³ See Lang-pai-kao.

our side, yet at the same time we should not neglect the precautionary measures. So we shall live in peace with the foreigners."

Viceroy Chang's policy was endorsed by the Court. Additional military steps were taken as precautions against any eventuality¹. The Hai-tao Yü An-hsing² even worked out a detailed system to detect "wicked persons" in the colony³. Later a law consisting of five items was formulated by Hai-tao Yü and after its sanction by the Emperor was engraved on a stone tablet and affixed at the entrance of the Senate-house. Besides interdicting the admission of Japanese, the purchase of Chinese subjects and the building of new houses without permission, as already mentioned, it ordained that all ships should enter the harbour of Macao for measurement and payment of dues: attempts to evade this by going to other ports would be severely punished⁴; that smugglers were to be severely punished besides losing the goods and ships captured⁵.

But how long and to what extent was this law respected? The corruption of mandarindom at the end of a decaying dynasty is shocking. To the ill-paid mandarins of the lower rank, this law provided an additional opportunity for obtaining beautiful gifts from the foreigners. In consideration of a gift, they scrupled not to violate both the spirit and the letter of the additional clause which permitted the "rebuilding" of old houses⁶; for supposed foundations of former houses were unearthed and the Chinese artisans were given licenses to undertake the "rebuilding". As a result the Portuguese built not only new houses, but fortresses.

Anticipating renewed Dutch attacks after the truce, the King of Spain gave instructions in 1615 for fortifying Macao and directed the Captain to keep his plans secret. In case of inquiry, he was to

¹ Ibid.

² 俞安性.

³ Ao-mên Chi-lüeh, Ch. 2, p. 25a.

⁴ According to I. de Andrade, *Cartas Escriptas da India e da China*, p. 124, the third article of the law reads thus:

"É prohibida a entrada de navio algum no porto de Macáo, sem preceder medição, a fim de pagar o imposto, que a lei exige."

When translated into English:

"No ship is permitted to enter the port of Macao without being first measured for the payment of duty imposed by law". I am afraid the Chinese text has not been correctly read here.

⁵ The complete text of this law is to be found in Ao-mên Chi-lüeh, Ch. 2, p. 25a-b.

⁶ Ibid.

point out to the mandarin that it was for their own good too to protect the place against the attacks of "pirates".

In carrying out their plan they did not seem to have been much bothered by the Chinese until 1621. By that year, the uneasiness of the Chinese had increased to such a degree that it was considered necessary to give the Portuguese a warning. The authorities sent a Judge, of the name Fêng Ts'ung-lung¹ to the Green Island to raze the fortifications there. The Portuguese are said to have made no resistance². At the same time Chinese military and naval forces around Macao were strengthened and vigilant measures were taken³. Nothing happened however; the Portuguese had learned to remain calm and passive at what the Chinese were doing.

In spite of their difficulties with the Chinese, their precarious position and declining trade in Japan and finally the menace and privateering of the Dutch, the Portuguese at Macao continued to be prosperous. In an account⁴ given of the place about 1621, Macao is said to have about 1,000 Portuguese inhabitants, all of whom were rich, and amongst the best families in India. Since their dowry was munificent, many eminent men resorted thither for wives. Although no detailed records are given to show the volume of the trade in its entirety, its importance can be seen from the fact that the duties paid by ships trading thence to Japan alone still amounted to 300,000 crowns (evidently per annum) which sum was raised by a ten per cent duty. The annual expenses for the maintenance of the fortifications and garrison were set down at 40,000 ducats; the voyages to Japan with embassies and presents for the Emperor and his officials, at 25,000; the house "La Miseracordia" spent 8,000 or 9,000 in works of charity; in addition to these outlays the city could still afford to maintain two hospitals, three parish churches, and five monasteries and repeatedly sent alms to the necessitous Catholics in China, Japan, Siam, Tonking and other places.

The covetousness and the pride of the Portuguese as well as the often unjust suspicion of the Chinese had kept the two peoples whose commercial interests were closely allied from being more friendly. Now the Manchu menace in North China furnished a good

¹ 監司馮從龍.

² Ming Shih, Ch. 325, p. 10.

³ Ao-mên Chi-lüeh, Ch. 2, pp. 25-26.

⁴ F. C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, vol. 2, p. 214.

opportunity for them to renew their friendship. It was obviously prompted by a desire to win Chinese amity that in 1621 the Portuguese offered to assist the Chinese with men from Macao in their war against the Manchus. Gonsalvo Texera, a Jesuit, was sent to the Court of Peking with an embassy and a present from Macao to make the offer which was gracefully accepted. The Canton mandarins were ordered to give as much facility as they could to the soldiers from Macao and to treat them with liberality. Accordingly, the Portuguese fitted out a company of 200 soldiers. Many of them were Portuguese either born in Portugal or at Macao. The majority, however, were Chinese trained by the Portuguese. Magnificently remunerated and provided with all conveniences, they set out. In all the places they passed through, they were very well received and fêted by the nobles and the magistrates and were objects of much curiosity on the part of the populace. They proceeded from Canton through Kiang-si until they reached the capital of the latter province, Nan-cha'ng-fu¹, where they received news that they were no longer needed.

The unexpected recall of this small army was due to the opposition of the merchants of Canton. These merchants were by way of being "middlemen" between the Portuguese and the business men in the interior of China. They bought imported goods at Canton distributing them in other parts of China, gathered native products in those places and sold them to the Portuguese, who exported them. It is no wonder that they were opposed to anything which might give the Portuguese a chance to have direct contact with the inhabitants of interior China. Moreover, there was a fear that as an acknowledgment of their service, the Portuguese might be given the privilege of trading in other parts of China. Well aware of all such possibilities, the Cantonese merchants opposed from the outset the sending of the Portuguese contingent to the North. At first they approached the provincial authorities. Upon being told that a large expense having been incurred in fitting it out the army must be dispatched to the front, the merchants offered to reimburse the Imperial Treasury. Having failed to prevent the Macao force from leaving Canton, they now got in touch with some high officials of the Court. Money makes the mare go! This is particularly true of the shameless Court officials of a deteriorating Empire. The scanda-

¹ 南昌府.

lous report was circulated that the very mandarins who once had urged the Emperor to accept the proffer of assistance from the Portuguese now presented another memorial in which they deemed the Macao contingent no longer needed! This irritated the Emperor who, nevertheless, gave orders that the Portuguese return to Macao¹.

UNSUCCESSFUL DUTCH ATTEMPTS TO TAKE MACAO AND TO MONOPOLIZE THE FOREIGN TRADE OF CHINA.

Meanwhile the Dutch observed the terms of the twelve years' truce and refrained from descending upon Macao. They continued, however, to covet Chinese commodities. Their first design was to have such commodities delivered to them by the Chinese themselves who then lived in great numbers as traders in many places in the South Seas. The Dutch easily got in touch with them in Bantam, Grisse, Patani and the Moluccus². But the trade carried on in this way proved unsatisfactory. In certain passages from some Dutch correspondence of that time published by W. P. Groeneveldt, we find loud complaint about the poor quality of Chinese commodities acquired in this way³.

Dissatisfied with their share in the trade with China, the Dutch were spurred on to formulate an ambitious plan: that of monopolizing the trade with China at the cost of the Portuguese. As a first step toward the realization of this plan Macao should be conquered. Once this key position was captured not only would China's foreign trade fall into the hands of the Dutch, but also all trade between Malacca, Japan, and Manila would be at their mercy, for the Dutch need simply watch the routes between these places during the monsoon months of the year. Moreover, the political consequences of the possession of Macao would be great, for if the Portuguese lost their trade with China, it would be impossible for them, or to a certain extent, for the Spaniards, to hold their own in Eastern and Southern Asia.

¹ A. Semedo, *Relatione della Grande Monarchia della Cina*. 1^a parte, cap. 21. I can not verify these statements of Semedo with Chinese sources.

² W. P. Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, pp. 49—53.

³ *Ibid.*

The truce having lapsed, the Dutch could now put their plan into execution. On the 29th of May 1622, a squadron of four vessels, two English and two Dutch, all belonging to the fleet of defence¹ appeared before Macao. They fired into the town, probably attempting to take the place by surprise. The next morning they left for the Island of Viados with intent to intercept Portuguese vessels then expected from India. Knowing this, the Portuguese sent off seven well-armed craft to convoy these and other vessels to Macao. The Dutch and English were, nevertheless, not completely baffled. They succeeded in plundering two Chinese junks with rich cargoes and some Portuguese frigates and then made for Japan to divide their spoils there².

Meanwhile a powerful Dutch fleet dispatched from Batavia by the Governor-General Coen was on the way for the capture of Macao. The fleet reached the roadstead of that port on the 22nd of June 1622, in all sixteen or seventeen sail carrying about 1300 men under the Commander Cornelis Reijersen³. The major attack took place on June 24. The Dutch landed 600 armed men⁴. We do not want to dwell on the details of this important engagement about which the report of Reijersen⁵ and a manuscript document in the Senate's archives at Macao⁶ agree in essentials, although not in

¹ The „vloot van defensie”, consisting of 5 English ships under Adams, and 5 Dutch ones under Willem Jansen. Adams was the chief commander with an admiral's title. See W. P. Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, p. 85, n. 1.

² *Ibid.* Without indicating the sources, F. C. Danvers (*The Portuguese in India*, vol. 2, p. 214) says that, when the four vessels appeared before Macao on the 29th of May, the English vessels “hailed the Dutchmen as they passed, but receiving no reply, doubted at first whether they were friends or enemies, and they then stood away for Japan”. A strange incident of misunderstanding indeed! If this is true, the vessels must have joined company again soon, for some days later the main Dutch fleet met them near Macao sailing for Japan. (See Groeneveldt, *loc. cit.*)

³ Other variations of this name are Reijersz, Reijerszoon, Reijerse, Reijerssen and even Reijerts. In some Portuguese sources e.g., *Asia Portugueza*, we wrongly find Regeres.

⁴ 800 men according to a manuscript document referred to below.

⁵ W. P. Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, pp. 87—89.

⁶ This manuscript is not available to me, but the Portuguese text is reproduced in Ta-ssi-yang-kuo, *Archivos e Annaes do Extremo-Oriente Portuguez*, serie 1, Vol. 1, pp. 162—163. It is an official statement made soon after the battle. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

detail. Suffice it to say that the Portuguese were beaten at the outset, but at last the Dutch were forced to retreat and re-embark with heavy losses ¹.

The failure of the Dutch attack left the Portuguese unquestioned masters of Macao. From that time on the Dutch made no further attempt to capture it. This repulsion of the Dutch should be regarded as the highest point of the military success of Macao and the last and most brilliant feat of the Portuguese in defending their position in the Far East. It did not, however, prevent the big colonial empire of the Portuguese from crumbling before the persistent and relentless assaults of their more powerful enemies, because, as we have seen, the causes of her weakness lie much deeper than that which a single military victory could remedy.

After being repulsed at Macao, the Dutch fleet made for the P'êng-hu islands ² or Pescadores (Portuguese word meaning "fishermen"). These are a group of twenty-one islands lying between Formosa and the coast of Fukien. Except for a few fishing villages, the islands were uninhabited and dependent largely on the mainland for food supply. In spite of these disadvantages, the islands were geographically so well situated that besides Macao no other place was more suitable for the Dutch in carrying out their commercial plans in China. Facing the P'êng-hu islands were Amoy, Ch'üanchow, whose importance in China's foreign trade was next only to that of Canton. Somewhat to the North was the port of Fuchow.

Unlike T'ai-wan or Formosa, the P'êng-hu islands were already under the jurisdiction of the Chinese. Taking no notice of this fact, the Dutch set about building a fort just at the south point of entrance of the Malung harbour ³, interestingly called by the Chinese Fêng-kuei-tzū-wei ⁴ or Handle of the Bellows. Many Chinese fishermen were kidnapped to do the work. When they wanted to negotiate for trade the Chinese authorities insisted on their moving to non-Chinese territory, preferably Formosa, before there could be any talk of trade. At the same time Chinese subjects were forbidden to

¹ Cf. also the works: Alvaro Semedo, *Relatione della Grande Monarchia della Cina*, parte 2, Cap. 1, and Manuel de Faria y Sousa, *Asia Portuguesa*, Tom. 3, Part 3, Cap. 20. I have not found any Chinese record on this fighting.

² 澎湖 It often appears in Dutch texts as Pehoe.

³ See *China Sea Directory*, 3rd ed. vol. 3, p. 210.

⁴ 風櫃仔尾. See also Ming Shih, Ch. 325, p. 11.

have any intercourse with them. The Dutch refused to comply. After much fruitless negotiation, they decided that they could more easily attain their object by resorting to violence. Armed vessels were then sent out to intercept Chinese vessels trading with Manila and other places. On the 17th of October, 1622, a fleet of ships with 422 men under the command of van Nieuweroode was sent to the Chinese coast with the order "to do as much damage as possible to the Chinese"¹ in accordance with the instructions of J. P. Coen², Dutch Governor-General at Batavia. The situation was fairly described by Captain F. Brinkley as follows³:

"There was no quarrel between China and Holland. The two countries were complete strangers to each other. Thus their acquaintance opened first with an armed essay on the part of the Dutch to drive the Portuguese from a place in China which the latter had leased to them, and secondly with the forceful seizure of another place in China's territory, though no state of war existed nor even any cause of quarrel. In short, the Dutch introduced themselves to the Chinese in the guise of international freebooters. Under such circumstances Chinese, Spaniards, and Portuguese alike were interested in preventing trade between the new-comers and the Middle Kingdom. Then as now, shrewd, brave, tenacious of purpose, not to be deterred by any obstacle or disheartened by any failure, the Dutch adopted the expedient of making themselves so hurtful as enemies that their friendship should become obviously desirable."

The Chinese soon came to realize that only the use of force could curb the Dutch and make them evacuate the Pescadores⁴. For this purpose an army was raised and provided with war junks. It attacked the Dutch at P'êng-hu, took one place after another until the Dutch force under Martinus Sonck was compelled to leave its last stronghold in August 1625 and make for Formosa, where they established themselves for 38 years.

The Dutch had thus yielded to the Chinese on all points, as W.P. Groeneveldt remarks⁵ and the sacrifices they had endured for

¹ W. P. Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, p. 119.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 318-319.

³ *China*, vol. 10, pp. 180-181.

⁴ See the memorial to the Emperor by the new Viceroy of Fukien, Ming Shih, Ch. 325, p. 11.

⁵ *De Nederlanders in China*, p. 291.

more than two years had been useless. Some of them now saw the necessity of reconsidering their policy. Reflecting on their failure in the past the Commander Sonck wrote after he was compelled to leave the Pescadores¹:

"The former methods employed on the Chinese coast made all China so very bitter against us, that we were known as murderers, intruders and pirates . . . The methods used against the Chinese have been indeed hard and cruel and, in my opinion, they have been such that through them the trade could never have been obtained."

¹ Ibid.

CHAPTER VII.

MACAO IN DAYS OF TRIBULATION AND THE DECLINE AND STAGNATION OF SINO-PORTUGUESE TRADE.

MISGOVERNMENT AND INTERNAL DISCORD.

In the last twenty years (1625—1644) of the Ming Dynasty we find Macao falling into a state of increasing distress. During this short period it was to suffer from misgovernment, to lose important commercial privileges in China, and then its trade with Japan, and to make most vital concessions to England; finally, the fall of Malacca into the hands of the Dutch and the severance of commercial relations with Manila sealed the fate of Macao. It then ceased to be the important commercial center through which Chinese commodities were distributed abroad and foreign goods were imported.

The first sign of the decay of the prosperous Portuguese colony at Macao became apparent when it began to be misgoverned. Up to 1625 the government of Macao was under the supervision but not the actual control of the Commodore of the royal fleet who, in his voyages to and from Japan, called at Macao. In this way the virtually autonomous Macao was only technically subordinated to the colonial government at Goa. This arrangement seems to have worked very satisfactorily, because the heads of the municipal government, though nominally responsible to Goa and through it to the Spanish Crown, were, in reality, accountable to the Portuguese inhabitants of Macao. This being the case they could regard their position as safe only when they had conducted the administration to the satisfaction of that colony.

In or about 1625 the colonial government at Goa, doubtless prompted by the desire to have greater control over Macao, decided to appoint a more permanent resident-head to that port. In 1626, Francisco Mascaranhas was appointed Governor of Macao¹. Being a man fond of power he wanted to have the government in his own

¹ J. I. Andrade, *Memoria dos Feitos Macaenses*, etc., p. 18.

hands. He soon fell out with the Senate which, up to that time, was the real governing body of Macao. After much quarrelling with the Governor the Senate was practically dissolved and never recovered its power even under his successors. Independent of the will of the Portuguese inhabitants at Macao for his tenure of office, he was unscrupulous, oppressive, or in the words of Andrade, he was "a great assassin, a great robber, and a cruel ravisher of the wives and daughters of the citizens"¹. Such was the hatred and despair of the inhabitants, that he was at last slain by a mob.

Mascaranhas was killed but good government never returned to Macao. His successors did not prove to be able and efficient administrators either. Meanwhile, the government was suffering from the steady decrease of its income. This was of course largely due to commercial conditions, but it was also because of the untrustworthiness of the Portuguese officials who collected taxes and customs for that port. This is the way the customs dues for Macao were collected: the moment a ship belonging to Macao made her appearance in the roads, the Procurator, who acted also as treasurer, went on board, where he left some guards. They were supposed to draw up a list, declaring the quantity, quality and weight of the goods and the names of the persons to whom they belonged. This being done, the merchandise was sent by the guards to the warehouses of its respective owners while that part of it which was assessed for payment of the duty was sent to the stores of the Procurator or Treasurer. These guards are said² to be unfit, disloyal, and fraudulent. Instead of making first a list of the contents of the chests and boxes on deck, they suffered the cargo to be unloaded or to disappear during the night. "Mean, miserable dependents", as Ljungstedt describes them, "they often went on shore, leaving the owners to act as they pleased; the cargo was sent home and no duty paid." The Procurator himself was no better than these guards. He "received the duties with weights, five per cent better than those he sold by. Permitted to clear his godowns by public sales, at which none of the Senators were to be present, he improved his situation with so few scruples of conscience that he paid off all his debts, and remained a rich man."³

¹ Ibid.

² Roman Catholic Church at Macao and the Domestic and Foreign Relations of Macao, p. 39.

³ Ibid., pp. 39-40.

Such maladministration coupled with a decreasing volume of trade soon brought the municipal government of Macao to a state of bankruptcy which made her unable to provide the colony with adequate defence. On the 10th of June, 1627, four Dutch ships appeared before Macao with a view to capturing the vessels then about to leave the port. For want of money and vessels the government was powerless to resist the enemy, whereupon five wealthy citizens fitted out five galliots and put them under the command of Thomas Vieira, acting Captain-general. On the 18th of August the Dutch flagship was attacked, boarded, and burnt, the Commander and twenty-seven of the crew were slain and thirty taken prisoners. Its guns, ammunition, treasury and provisions all fell into the hands of the assailants. After the loss of this ship the other three vessels withdrew ¹.

THE LOSS OF COMMERCIAL PRIVILEGES AT CANTON.

Smuggling was the cause of continuous wrangling and brawling between the Portuguese and the Chinese. The patience of the Chinese authorities was at last exhausted. In 1631, the port of Canton was closed against Portuguese ships. This was a serious blow to the Portuguese, for they were again made dependent on the merchants of Canton for their supply of Chinese commodities.

Under the new circumstances the Portuguese merchants formed an association with Chinese traders who were to furnish them the exports and to receive the imports at Macao. Unfortunately this scheme did not work smoothly. The partners soon fell out. The Chinese became hostile to their Portuguese co-partners. Notwithstanding the discord the association lasted several years, because the cooperation of Chinese merchants was indispensable. In 1637, a deputation of six gentlemen commissioned to negotiate with the Chinese authorities for permission to return to the port of Canton for trade failed to accomplish their purpose. It is said that the authorities had even sent a memorial to the Emperor complaining of the haughtiness of the Portuguese and proposing to curb them. It reads thus:

"Macao was formerly an insignificant place, it is now a kingdom; it has many forts, and a great and insolent population. It would be proper to ask, how much rice and liquors, which the Portuguese

¹ A manuscript reproduced in Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, vol. 2, p. 227; the *Boletim do Governo de Macau* of 28 June 1862 (cf. Montalto, *Historic Macao*, p. 77).

may want, and let them have the supply: it would be proper to debar them from the commerce at Canton"¹.

RELENTLESS DUTCH AND ENGLISH AGGRESSION.

Inasmuch as the weak Spanish-Portuguese colonial empire could not resist the English and Dutch privateering and the rapid extension of Dutch influence and power in East Asia, Macao was doomed. The Portuguese shipping already had been so ruined by privateering, that there was want of vessels in Goa for the service of the State. As their trade came to a standstill, Count de Linhares, Viceroy at Goa, saw the necessity for making some concessions to one of their two powerful enemies, namely, the English. In 1635, he effected a truce whereby the East India Company secured for the English the privilege of trading at Portuguese factories in India. In the same year the Viceroy chartered an English ship of the East India Company for a voyage to China. That vessel was the "London", and the special object of the voyage was to fetch to Goa 4,000 quintals of copper and some 100 pieces of iron artillery. The "London" first went to Goa to take on a cargo. Well aware of the greater security it would enjoy, the people of Goa eagerly provided freight. Some of them sold even their wives' jewels for that purpose. Such was the enthusiasm that the Viceroy observed in a letter to the King on the subject, that this kind of commerce had so nearly disappeared that the people appreciated the opportunity to renew it "as if it were a general pardon"².

Two Portuguese factors were put on board the "London" with instructions to prevent the English from going ashore at the ports they visited. After arriving at Macao the English sought to get in touch with the mandarins. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Portuguese factors, they did some trading on their own account and even sought permission to put up two huts for this purpose. They also desired permission to return to China the following year, and as an inducement for complying with this request they promised to supply the Chinese with drugs at fifty per cent, less than what the Portuguese charged. Taking all the consequences into consideration, Pero da Silva, who succeeded Count de Linhares as Viceroy, declared

¹ Historical Sketch, p. 83. I have not met with the Chinese text of this memorial.

² F. C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, vol. 2, p. 248.

that nothing worse could have been done to the interests of Portuguese trade than by sending the English to Macao¹.

De Linhares might have made a mistake, but his mistake did not make the already hopeless situation much worse for the Portuguese. The trade of the Portuguese had been almost entirely taken from them by their rivals; the government treasuries were empty; the resources of the state were drained by the Jesuits and other religious bodies; their army was undermanned and demoralized; their officials corrupt and there was no prospect of getting material assistance from home. It was this helplessness of the Portuguese that forced de Linhares to adopt the tactics of trying to conciliate one of their two invulnerable foes. In one respect at least, his peaceful policy proved most helpful: it left the Portuguese possessions in India in a state of general peace at the conclusion of his term of government. Unfortunately this was but the calm that preceded the storm which, a few short years afterwards, swept from the Portuguese almost all their most valued possessions in the East.

Conscious of their own youthful power and aware of the helplessness of the Portuguese the English were less concerned about an Anglo-Portuguese friendship. Although well received by the Portuguese at Goa Captain John Weddel of Courten's Association² offered at Kanara to purchase pepper at a higher price than the Portuguese were in the habit of paying. He also sent an ambassador to Venkatappa Naik, a chieftain of Bednur and ruler of Honavar, with offers to purchase pepper, after which the Portuguese noticed a coolness on the part of Venkatappa Naik toward them, which they attributed to the intrigues of the English³.

In a letter to the King of Portugal on the subject, dated 5th October, 1637, the Viceroy remarked that the bad behaviour shown by the English in return for the friendship of the Portuguese was increasing, and expressed the opinion that the English were not a people with whom the Portuguese could have any commercial transactions but it would hardly be to their own interests to terminate the armistice⁴.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 248—249.

² Courten's Association of the Assada (Madagascar) Merchants was established 1635, and united with the London East India Company in 1650 (*Ibid.* 241 n.).

³ *Ibid.*, 241.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 241—242.

Orders were given to all the Portuguese factories to decline trading with the English, but at the same time to manage this in such a manner as to avoid any rupture with them; to give them help in every possible way in case of shipwreck or distress but permitting neither trade nor any lengthy stay of theirs at the factories. Besides, on no account were any Portuguese vessels to be sold to the English¹.

The English were now attempting to open direct trade with the Chinese. Weddel's fleet of four ships proceeded to Macao, in 1637, with a quantity of artillery, ammunition, and stores from Goa for the Portuguese at Macao. Although Weddel was well aware that for the English there was no prospect of doing business at Macao, he was "resolved to employ bribes, cunning, and every means to attain his object." He and his men were described as adventurers, without any respect for law and religion². He had with him a letter from King Charles I to the Governor of Macao, Domingos da Camara Noronha. On Weddel's arrival, the Governor sent to inquire about his business in visiting Macao and advised him to leave. The English were not allowed to land nor any Chinese to approach the fleet except those sent with provisions. As the Chinese communicated with the ships in spite of the efforts of the Portuguese, Captain Weddel was warned to beware of their treachery. With two Chinese pilots, the English went sounding all round the islands at the mouth of the Canton river. A small *patacho* even got close to Canton and spent a month examining the coast. Then the English fleet sailed for Canton but was stopped by a Chinese fleet. At the instance of the mandarins it returned to Macao hoping to trade there. But disappointed by the Portuguese, Weddel again proceeded to Canton with his whole fleet. The ships moored close to a dismantled fort and the supercargoes began negotiations with the mandarins for trade. On the fourth day, the fort, having been secretly mounted with guns at night, fired upon an English barge. This incident was not unnaturally ascribed to Portuguese intrigue and bribes. An engagement followed, the fort was bombarded and destroyed. A message was sent to the mandarins, protesting against the breach of faith and soliciting permission to trade. The supercargoes were then conveyed to Canton by a petty mandarin for the purpose of tendering their petition. It is said that they were well

¹ Ibid.

² A. Ljungstedt, Historical Sketch, p. 84.

received and that they returned with an alleged "patent for free trade and liberty to fortify on any place outside the mouth of the river"¹. The English began loading sugar and ginger on payment of ten thousand reals as duties while a pinnace was in search of an island on which to settle. Soon, however, affairs again took an ill turn, again attributed to Portuguese actions. One of the supercargoes was seized and detained on board a junk by order of the Hai-tao while the others were imprisoned and starved in Canton. At the same time fire-vessels were sent down against the English ships. In retaliation Weddel destroyed some Chinese armed junks, pillaged and burned right and left the undefended towns and villages.

About this time Weddel received a protest from Macao against his visit to that place without any orders from the King of Spain or from the Portuguese Viceroy; and much surprise was expressed at his having forced his way to Canton, in consequence of which it was feared the Chinese would retaliate upon the Portuguese. Weddel treated the protest with scorn. In a reply dated "From our vessels in the port of Canton", he expressed surprise at the protest, and declared that despite it they intended to continue their trade "with blood and sweat" in a land which belongs to the "King of China" and concluded that "No time to write more as engaged on more important business"². The fleet then took up a position to intercept Portuguese vessels due at Macao. Helpless as the Portuguese were, they knew it would be wise to conciliate him. They then proposed to Weddel that if he would station his fleet to leeward, his men would be allowed on shore at Macao. The proposal was accepted. Weddel was provided with a house and entertained at a banquet. The Senate also obtained the release of the supercargoes from Canton after having paid a ransom of eighty thousand taels evidently as a penalty for the violence of the English. At first Weddel and his advisers were asked to promise in their king's name never to send any more ships to China³. But after some deliberation the mandarins and the Portuguese came to the conclusion that it might be desirable to allow the English a limited trade at Macao provided their ships carried Portuguese artillery from Macao for the defence of Goa against the Dutch⁴. Thus for the first time

¹ C. A. Montalto, *Historic Macao*, p. 97.

² F. C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, vol. 2, p. 261.

³ C. A. Montalto de Jesus, *Historic Macao*, p. 98.

⁴ F. C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, vol. 2, p. 260.

the Portuguese at Macao made a formal concession to another nation for sharing the profits of China's foreign trade¹.

THE LOSS OF TRADE WITH JAPAN.

The embargo on Portuguese shipping in Japan on account of the plunder of a Japanese junk in the roads of Siam by the Spaniards was lifted in 1631², but Portuguese trade in that country never recovered from this blow. It continued to show a downward trend. In 1636, it reached its lowest point, the export of that year only amounting to 2,350,000 Japanese taels³. The steadily weakened position of the Portuguese was due to their increased unpopularity with the Japanese and to the mistrust with which the Shogun viewed the growing power of Christianity under the auspices of the Portuguese. The Dutch, who were there, knew how to take advantage of the situation to strengthen their own position and to undermine the remnant of the Portuguese interests. In 1636 the hour at last struck for them to deal the Portuguese a deathblow.

In that year the Japanese authorities were alarmed by the discovery of a treacherous letter addressed to the King of Spain said to be written by Moro, a Japanese Christian, who was chief of the Portuguese in Japan. It disclosed a plot of the Japanese converts to subvert the Empire in concert with the Portuguese, stated the need of ships and soldiers already promised them by the King, and named several Japanese princes involved in the conspiracy and finally it invoked the Pope's blessing on the undertaking.

The origin of this letter seems to be most questionable. The Dutch alleged that on board a homeward bound Portuguese ship, captured near the Cape of Good Hope, they found this letter. But the Dutch traders were then engaged in a relentless struggle with the Portuguese for commercial supremacy in South and East Asia. The hatred between them and the Portuguese was inveterate. Each side used all possible means to undermine the other's position. It is indeed difficult to believe that, hard-pressed by the Dutch and the English and helpless as they were, the Portuguese could still make fantastic

¹ For a detailed account of Weddel's visit to Canton, see H. B. Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China*, pp. 14-30.

² A. Ljungstedt, *Roman Catholic Church at Macao*, p. 44.

³ E. Kaempfer, *The History of Japan*, p. 314. For the value of a Japanese tael, cf. G. F. Meylan, *Geschichte des Handels der Europäer in Japan*, p. 4.

plans for overthrowing the Japanese Empire. It is equally unbelievable that the Spanish King, unable to give any significant naval or military protection to his vast colonial empire in the Orient crumbling before the assaults of formidable foes, promised to give such aid in an impossible undertaking.

The letter was handed over by the Dutch to the Prince of Firando, an influential man and their friend. It was immediately transmitted by him to the Governor of Nagasaki, supreme director and judge in foreign affairs. Captain Moro firmly denied that he had anything to do with the letter. But the excitement of the Japanese was great and the Portuguese were very unpopular. Under such circumstances it was impossible to expect the Japanese authorities to give Moro a fair trial. He was sentenced to be burnt alive at the stake, on the ground that the hand and seal were his ¹.

Moro's plot was said to have been afterwards confirmed by another letter of his to the Macao government on the same subject; it was presumed to have been intercepted and brought to Japan by a Japanese ship ².

These letters sealed the doom of the Portuguese in Japan. In the year 1637, an Imperial decree interdicted all intercourse between Japanese and foreigners ³. Japanese natives and their vessels were, under penalty of death and confiscation, forbidden to go abroad; all Japanese, who returned from abroad, should be put to death; bountiful rewards were promised to those who detected any priests and converts; the Portuguese, with their families and nurses, were to be banished to Macao; whoever returned or even brought a letter from abroad was to be put to death with his family; whoever interceded for them should also die; no nobleman, nor any soldier, was to purchase anything from a foreigner ⁴.

In this year, the silver and gold exported by the Portuguese still amounted to 3,142,365 Japanese taels ⁵.

For two years more, a few directors of the Portuguese trade remained in the prisonlike island of Desima and continued their trade which sharply dropped to the value of 1,259,023 taels in 1638; but the Shogun ⁶ was quite resolved to get rid of them. At the same

¹ E. Kaempfer, p. 318.

² *Ibid.*

³ From the subsequent events we know that the Dutch were excepted.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 318-319.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

⁶ See *supra* p. 118 n. 1.

time he was assured by the Dutch East India Company that it would guarantee that the country should be supplied with such commodities as had been formerly imported by the Portuguese. The importation of Spanish and Portuguese goods was, however, interdicted with the exception of Spanish wines, which were used at the Japanese court. Thus were dashed the hopes of the Portuguese, who were totally expelled from Japan before the end of 1639¹.

However, refusing to give up hope of reviving their trade with Japan, the Senate of Macao sent, in 1640, four leading citizens on a conciliatory mission to Japan. Off Nagasaki, the ship was embargoed, and even a sum of four hundred thousand taels due to native merchants was rejected. The embassy boldly landed, though only to be imprisoned. Soon an Imperial reply was received to the effect that the Portuguese violated the interdict and should be punished with death. The Ambassadors protested, pointing out that the Japanese violated the law of nations in failing to respect their persons and lives². But alas, the protest was of no avail. The Ambassadors were beheaded together with all their large retinue, excepting twelve of the crew who were spared to convey to Macao the sad tidings of the embassy's fate. The so-called law of nations was at that time the law of the European nations; it was not well recognized in the Orient, where the execution of the ambassadors of a nation which had been regarded as an enemy was not unusual until recent times. In reply to the protest of the unhappy Portuguese delegates, a haughty threat was sent from the Shogun to Macao to the effect that "should the King of Portugal himself, nay the very God of the Christians, presume to enter his dominions, he would serve them in the very same manner"³.

FALL OF MALACCA AND THE SEVERANCE OF COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH MANILA.

With the loss of Japanese trade, the main source of Macao's prosperity was gone. Its remaining mainstays were Malacca and Manila. The trade with these two places was, however, also bound to be lost to Macao before the end of the Ming Dynasty.

Since 1633, the Portuguese had suffered greatly at Malacca,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

² Montalto, *Historic Macao*, p. 88.

³ E. Kaempfer, *The History of Japan*, p. 320.

owing to the persistent obstruction of the Dutch to their intercourse with other places. The tightness of the blockade of the Dutch, who were assisted by some Chinese vessels, increased year by year, Owing to such a close investment of the port, vessels could get out or go in only with great difficulty, consequently its trade was completely paralysed. Although well knowing the commercial and strategic importance of Malacca, the Portuguese Indian government was not at all in a position to give any relief to it.

Due to the scarcity of food in Malacca, the suffering of the inhabitants greatly increased. The Dutch Governor-General at Batavia was at that time the well-known Antonio van Dieman, who, informed of the distressing condition at Malacca, judged that the hour had arrived for his men to strike. An expedition consisting of 1,400 or 1,500 men under the command of Adriaan Antonissoon reached the port in June, 1640 where they were joined by a force of about the same size sent by their ally, the King of Johore. Malacca was closely blockaded. The Portuguese garrison was then attacked on land. It was only after a fierce struggle and determined resistance on the part of the Portuguese that the town and the forts were surrendered to the Dutch in January of the following year.

With the fall of Malacca, the key position to East Asia was now in the hands of the Dutch. The lonely Portuguese colony at Macao had been rendered more helpless than ever before. Her only remaining lifeline now was the trade with Manila. This trade had also suffered much from Dutch privateering and Chinese competition, but it remained important. Unfortunately the Portuguese were soon to lose that too. Strangely enough the loss of this valuable trade was not due to any Dutch or English intervention, but to the sentimental folly of the Portuguese themselves, which provoked the Spaniards, their only possible ally, who severed their commercial relations with Macao.

In December, 1640, open rebellion broke out in Portugal against the Spaniards, whose yoke was soon shaken off. Tidings of the change in the administration in the Portuguese Kingdom were speedily communicated to her several colonies and dependencies, in all of which Dom João IV was proclaimed King amidst general rejoicings.

Don Sebastian Corcuera, the Governor of Manila, attempted to win over the allegiance of Macao to the King of Spain. For this purpose, the Governor dispatched Don Juan Claudio as an envoy

to Macao. Dom Sebastião Lobo da Silveira, the Captain-general of Macao, and some of the gentry favoured the Spanish overture. We can but admire the far-sightedness of these gentlemen who well realized the critical situation of Macao, the impossibility of obtaining any protection or assistance from the new King of Portugal, the desirability of retaining the amity of the Spaniards and the importance of the trade with Manila. But the degenerate and mobbish Portuguese population of Macao refused to listen to any wise and cool counsels. The causes of the decay and collapse of the vast Spanish-Portuguese colonial empire lay much deeper than they could see or understand. Deeply aggrieved they laid all blame on the Spanish King, and believed that he was exclusively responsible for their ruin and distress. Guided by the illusion that an independent Portuguese government would usher in happier days, and urged by some blind patriotic sentiment, they cried down indignantly all prudent advice. In the midst of a tumult, the Spanish envoy had to place himself under the protection of the Captain-general. He and his retinue were then thrown in prison and were not released until orders came from Goa. Every Spaniard was bundled out of the colony. Dom Sebastião Lobo da Silveira, regarded as a traitor, was assailed one night, and stabbed to death under a staircase, where he was found concealed. A military officer, the *sargento mór* was also hunted down and murdered though hiding himself between the altar and a priest celebrating night mass at the church of the Dominicans. Allegiance to the new Portuguese monarch Dom João IV was sworn, and on the 20th of June, 1642, two persons were sent as envoys to greet the King with assurances of Macao's loyalty, and with a beautiful gift.

Oh grão fidelidade portugueza

De vassallos que a tanto se obrigava!¹

Then came the punishment. In retaliation for the Portuguese insults and maltreatment of their envoy and fellow countrymen, the Spaniards of Manila severed all commercial relations with Macao, thus cutting off the last life-line of the colony.

Such were the vicissitudes of the first European settlement on Chinese territory. In less than a century it reached the apogee of

¹ Camões.

enviable prosperity, lived through many troubled days and then was plunged into misery and grief. In the closing years of the Ming Dynasty, the Sino-Portuguese trade dropped almost to naught, Macao was impoverished and its inhabitants were rebellious.

Thus faded away the glory of Macao, and ever since Sino-Portuguese trade has ceased to be of much importance in the commercial history of China.

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STELLINGEN.

WIDENING

STELLINGEN.

1. Confucianism is, in not a few respects, anti-nationalistic.
2. For expressing modern thought the *pai-hua* (spoken style) is better suited than the *wên-li* (classical style).
3. The Chinese family P'u (葡) is of Arabian origin. *P'u* is from *abu*.
4. A decentralised form of government is more desirable than a centralised one in building up a new China.
5. The "looking backward" attitude of the Chinese has not been so harmful to the progress of China as is often thought.
6. The eclipse of the moon was never considered an ill-omen before the third century A.D.
7. The Shan-hai-ching (山海經) should be considered a serious geographical work of ancient China in spite of the mythological tales in it.
8. The present communistic movement in China is bound to fail.
9. Hsi-wang-mu (西王母) is the name of a tribe.
10. The Chinese characters could be advantageously replaced by a phonetic system.

